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The objective of this dissertation is to document how white property owners in 
Cobb County, Georgia achieved political, economic, and social influence over local and 
state affairs by the mid-twentieth century through processes of racial privileging and 
policy-making.  Prior to World War Two, the county’s white property owners were 
historically divided into two competing political factions of equal demographic size with 
one faction residing in rural unincorporated parts of the county, and the other in urban 
centers. For much of their history, these two factions waged political battles against one 
another over the distribution of real and personal property taxes. In 1937, the two factions 
joined forces to push for a statewide homestead exemption to lower property taxes 
collected at the state and county level.  The sudden loss of revenue financially devastated 
local governments across the state.  In Cobb, city and county politicians and civic leaders 
began to search for new ways of raising revenue, including home-building campaigns, 
expansion of municipal utilities, and the courtship of federal investment.  Through a 
combination of local planning and federal intervention, Cobb County’s quest to raise 




homeowners and ultimately influenced how white property owners saw themselves and 
the world around them through the policy-making process.   
   The primary vehicle for this study will be tax policy, a largely understudied yet 
critical component of the built environment.  The trajectory of the white property owner 
in Cobb County is complicated, as it ties the effects of local, state, and federal policy-
making to sets of identity politics influenced by white supremacy and formed over the 
course of several decades.  It is a study long overdue for investigation as it lays the 
groundwork for understanding how property and financial self-interest would inform the 
political and social positions of white homeowners in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  Within this convergence of racial and economic issues, one question is 
paramount: How did the interconnected political and social formations of white 
supremacy and property ownership change over time within the context of state and local 
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 By any conceivable metric 1951 had been a very good year for Cobb County:  
local banks were flush with deposits, business was booming, and new single family 
homes were being built at an unprecedented rate.  So many new families were moving 
into the county, in fact, that the local Marietta Daily Journal began publishing a section 
titled “Meet the Newcomers” that introduced readers to recent arrivals from states such as 
California, New York, and Michigan. 
1
 Cobb owed its prosperity in the 1950s to the 
California-based Lockheed Corporation, which had reopened Aircraft Assembly Plant #6 
through an agreement with the United States Department of Defense to refurbish and 
eventually build airplanes for use in the Korean Conflict.  The “bomber plant,” as it was 
known to locals, dated to 1943 when it was operated by Bell Aircraft, and was seen as the 
culmination of intense efforts on the part of local boosters to secure a defense industry for 
the county and its largest city, Marietta. 
2
  In the two years the plant produced bombers 
before the end of World War Two, the population of Marietta had doubled in size, and 
the federal government had invested millions of dollars into local housing programs, 
infrastructure improvements, and on the plant itself. 
3
  The reopening of the plant by 
Lockheed continued Marietta’s and Cobb County’s meteoric development, as farmland 
was converted into subdivisions, earthen roadways were paved to four lane highways,  
                                                 
1
 “Meet the Newcomers” was a daily feature of Marietta’s local newspaper between 1951 and 1952.  A 
typical entry was that announcing the arrival of the Moores family from Encino, California. The family 
resided in house on North Hillcrest Drive in Marietta and the father was employed as a tool manager for 
Lockheed.  Marietta Daily Journal, 4 October 1951.  
 
2
 A brief account of the arrival of Lockheed and the origins of the plant found in Thomas A. Scott, Cobb 
County, Georgia and the Origins of the Suburban South: A Twentieth Century History (Marietta: Cobb 
County Landmarks and Historical Society, 2003), 179-216. 
  
3
 The transformative effects of federal intervention on Marietta and Cobb recounted in L. M. Blair, 
“Memories of Marietta,” Interview by Florence F. Corley and Anne Blair Buchanan, 1962, Transcript, p. 8. 





and shopping centers replaced the older commercial districts as the centers of business 
and economy.       
Between 1930 and 1950, Cobb’s total population had grown seventy-five percent.  
More significantly, however, was the rise in the number of white residents.  In 1930, 
whites in Cobb County held an eighty-one percent majority.  By 1950, the total 
population of whites in Cobb had risen to ninety percent.  By the mid 1960s, Cobb’s 
African American population – despite a respectable upward trend since the 1930s – 
would come to constitute a mere five percent of the county’s total residents, being 
overwhelmed by a two hundred and thirty percent increase in white residents over the 
same thirty-five year span. 
4
      
The raw demographics of race and wealth often portray an incomplete picture of 
urban and suburban development.  In Cobb County of the early 1950s it was good to be 
white.  The production lines and managerial positions of Lockheed were almost 
exclusively reserved for white employees. 
5
 The subdivisions that seemed to spring up on 
a near weekly basis were similarly “protected and restricted.” 
6
  Cobb, in this sense, was 
not merely developing as a county with high concentrations of affluent white 
homeowners; it was being made into a location of racial privilege.    
                                                 
4
 Historical Census Browser. Retrieved 15 January 2012, from the University of Virginia, Geospatial and 
Statistical Data Center: http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/collections. 
 
5
 Several oral history interviews with African American employees of Lockheed during the 1950s that 
discuss the segregation of the workforce are found in Thomas A Scott, Cobb County, Georgia and the 
Origins of the Suburban South: A Twentieth Century History, 341-348. 
 
6
 An advertisement for Pioneer Woods in Cobb County was typical for promising “protected and restricted” 
access. Marietta Daily Journal, 6 April 1958. In Cobb during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the use of 
“restricted” applied directly to race – some housing advertisements even signaled out Anglo-Saxon or 
Caucasian in the text. By the 1960s, the use of “restricted” became more coded and tied to “zoning.” In this 





At mid-century, white residents of Cobb County and Marietta were significant 
beneficiaries of federal intervention.  This fact, however, was rarely acknowledged by the 
local population.  One of the lasting legacies of federal interventionist policy-making, 
from the New Deal of the 1930s and through the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, is 
how white populations, privileged through federal investment, became divorced from 
their historical past.  The wealth accumulated in Cobb County by the 1950s was accepted 
as a natural phenomenon of good planning at the local level. The county’s super-majority 
white population was, for its residents, merely an extension of the homeowner’s right to 
live where they wanted.  The effect of federal intervention, of how it acts in concert with 
local policy-making to create environments of racial segregation and economic 
inequality, is a process of obfuscation.  Cobb’s white property owners at mid-century, 
unable or unwilling to recognize the significance of federal investment to the 
development of the county, created a local ideology rooted in low taxes and fiscal 
conservatism to explain their newfound wealth and prosperity.            
For scholars of metropolitan development in the post-World War Two era this is a 
familiar story. From Phoenix, Arizona to Orange County, California, to Charlotte, North 
Carolina, and onto Atlanta, Georgia, scholars have seized upon the fertile interconnected 
fields of economic inequality, racial privilege, and federal intervention to examine issues 
of grassroots political organization, conservative ideology, and housing discrimination – 
among others. 
7
  This dissertation, however, seeks to better understand the foundations of 
                                                 
7
 See Matthew D Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton 
University Press, 2006), David MP Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in 
Suburban America (University of Chicago Press, 2007); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of 
the New American Right (Princeton University Press, 2001), Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the 
Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso Books, 1990 ; reprint 2006); Michelle M Nickerson, Mothers of 
Conservatism: Women in the Postwar Right (Princeton University Press, 2012), Kevin M Kruse, White 




such issues by excavating into the history and formation of white property owners, and to 
explore the ways in which their desire for lower taxes affected the economic and political 
transformation of Cobb County, Georgia.  
The objective of this dissertation, therefore, is to chart the rise of Cobb County’s 
white property owners and document how they came to wield immense political, 
economic, and social influence over local and state affairs by mid-century.  Prior to 
World War Two, the county’s white property owners were far from being the formidable 
political bloc they would later become.  Throughout much of the early twentieth century, 
their demands for increased services and lower taxes went unheeded.  In the late1930s, 
white property owners organized to push for a statewide homestead exemption to lower 
real property taxes.  Faced with declining tax receipts, local officials scrambled to find 
new ways of raising revenue, including home-building campaigns, expansion of 
municipal utilities, and the courtship of federal investment.  Programs and policy-making 
decisions at the federal level were instrumental to Cobb’s transformation, as government 
money allowed local officials the ability to provide for infrastructure, education, housing, 
and employment – all for the benefit of the county’s white population.  The confluence 
between tax policy and federal intervention in the making of a politically active group of 
white property owners is significant to understanding the history and trajectory of 
metropolitan development in the twentieth century.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (University of 





   The primary vehicle for this study will be tax policy, a largely understudied but 
critical component of the built environment. 
8
  The rise of the white property owner in 
Cobb County is a complex one, as it ties the effects of local, state, and federal policy-
making to sets of identity politics influenced by white supremacy and formed over the 
course of several decades. 
9
  It is a study long overdue for investigation, as it lays the 
groundwork for understanding how property and economic self-interest would inform the 
political and social positions of white southerners in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  Within this convergence of racial and economic issues, one question is 
paramount:  How did the interconnected political and social formations of white 
supremacy and property ownership change over time within the context of state and local 
tax policy debates?         
Putting Tax Policy into Focus 
 
In his opening to a mostly glowing review of a book detailing the significance of 
tax policy in affecting Georgia’s nineteenth-century political and social landscape, Mark 
                                                 
8
 Within many studies of the formation and operation of whiteness in the American South, there is an over-
emphasis on racial backlash and political social conservatism, while economic interests are 
underrepresented.  Interestingly, studies on the formation of whiteness that focus on geographic regions 
other than the American South much more often incorporate economic concerns into their work. For 
examples of works on whiteness within a southern context see Michelle Brattain, The Politics of Whiteness: 
Race, Workers, and Culture in the Modern South (University of Georgia Press, 2001); Grace Elizabeth 
Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890-1940 (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1998); Angie Maxwell, Indicted South: Public Criticism, Southern Inferiority, and the Politics of Whiteness 
(University of North Carolina Press, 2104); Lewis M. Killian, White Southerners (University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1985).  
 
9
 Richard Saull’s work on the connections between uneven economic development (locally, nationally, and 
globally) and neoliberalism has greatly influenced this dissertation. As Saull accounts for the rise of 
neoliberalism as constitutive of a historical bloc. “[The historical bloc]…refers to the constellation of 
social, economic, political connections – organized nationally and internationally – between the 
administrative and coercive machinery of the state and social groupings but do so by incorporating them 
into the structures of state governance as subaltern partners. Thus, the historical bloc is more than just a 
political alliance, but rather the integration of a variety of class interests which are propagated throughout 
society in a way that promotes not just harmony of political and economic aims, but also a wider cultural 
and moral unity.” Richard Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the 





Summers noted that “Nothing is certain but death and taxes, and historians dread books 
on the second almost as much as the arrival of the first.” 
10
  While recognizably a tongue-
in-cheek comment, Summers’s statement hits at an all too common preconception: that a 
formal study of taxation is an exercise in tedium and banality.  After all, a perusal of the 
introductions and acknowledgments sections of the few monographic studies that focus 
on the historical dimensions of tax policy at either the local, state, or federal level locates 
a recurrent theme:  an account of the various hurdles the authors faced in researching and 
producing their works.  Mark H. Leff, for example, in his book detailing federal tax and 
fiscal policy during the New Deal, cautioned readers and future scholars that “Anyone 
venturing into terrain as forbidding as the tax system should have a good excuse.” 
11
  
David T. Beito, who examines taxpayer antipathy in Chicago during the Great 
Depression, notes that when he began his study in the 1980s, little secondary source 
material on the fractious relations between local and state tax policies and regional 
populations existed beyond the events of the Whiskey Rebellion of the early 1790s. 
12
  
David F. Prindle faced similar problems in locating sources while conducting research at 
the University of Texas at Austin for a book examining the intersections of American 
capitalism with political, economic, and legal theory.  To find titles on “political thought” 
Prindle had to go to the “northwest side” of the “fifth floor” within the main library, 
while he found books on economic subjects on the “southeast side” of the “fourth floor.”  
                                                 
10
 Mark W. Summers, Review of From Slave South to New South: Public Policy in Nineteenth-Century 
Georgia by Peter Wallenstein, Journal of Southern History, Vol. 54, No 3 (August 1988), 506.  
 
11
 Mark H. Leff, The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933-1939 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 1.   
 
12
 David T. Beito, Taxpayers in Rebellion: Tax Resistance during the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: 





To cross reference the citations found in books focused on political and economic topics 
against books dealing with “legal thought,” Prindle wrote, “you have to travel to a 
different library, a third of a mile to the northeast on the edge of campus.” 
13
      
It is small wonder that the history of taxation, whether at the local, state, or 
federal level has failed to capture the geography of university library shelves in a manner 
commensurate to works centered on the organization of political parties, the history of 
federal housing policy, or the social formation of race in American society.  This lack 
nonetheless is a strange omission, for politics, race, and the built environment are as 
intricately linked to public policy as they are to one another.  As one historian has aptly 
noted, studies of tax policy could easily be “characterized as an x-ray” in that they 
[reveal] the anatomy of political and social power.” 
14
  Another scholar writing on the 
significance of public policy has likened the “tax system” to a geological investigation, 
stating that it “has a stratified quality, each layer of tax institutions, almost like a layer of 
the earth’s crust represents the legacy of an earlier epoch or fiscal regime.” 
15
  Taxation, 
from its design to implementation to the feelings of resentment or appeasement it can 
engender in those who pay (or in some cases, do not pay) its levy is deeply embedded 
into everyday life. 
16
  As such, it is also important to rescue studies of tax policy from a 
                                                 
13
 David F. Prindle, The Paradox of Democratic Capitalism: Politics and Economics in American Thought 
(The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), ix.  
 
14
 Quoted in Mark H. Leff, The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933-1939 
(Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2.  The analogy of the x-ray is attributed to William A. Williams, The 
Great Evasion (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 159.  
    
15
 W. Eliot Brownlee, ed. “Introduction,” Funding the Modern American State: The Rise and Fall of the 
Era of Easy Finance (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.  
 
16
 As Jason Read has noted, “[C]apitalist production has taken on a dimension that could be described as 
‘micro-political,’ inserting itself into the texture of day to day social existence, and ultimately subjectivity 





position as something that happens solely at a national level.  While the works of Leff, 
Prindle, and also Romain Huret offer excellent insight into the origins of macro-policy, it 
is far past time to explore how taxation affects the function of government at all its levels. 
17
  
A study that centers itself on taxation and policy-making disputes lends itself to 
critical interventions in a number of different settings.  Due to its “stratified quality,” the 
implementation of tax policy has broad significance, affecting not just the economic lives 
of a given population, but the very social structure of society.  As such, a focus on 
taxation can help illuminate a number of different issues, well beyond the limits of urban 
and metropolitan development.  From student achievement gaps due to education funding 
to income inequality and generational poverty, the power of tax policy has a long reach.  
The cross-applicability of a tax-focused study is a rich field of exploration – being both 
theoretically complex and methodologically diverse.  Lifting the study of taxation from 
being what some may see as an exercise in banality to a critical study of how inhabitants 
of a landscape see themselves and the world around them through the policy-making 
process is a worthwhile endeavor.     
Entering an Ongoing Conversation  
The decidedly integrative nature of taxation into political, economic, and social 
realms may be what is propelling current scholars of the built environment to be willing 
to engage the historical ramifications of tax policies.  As an area of study that relies upon 
interdisciplinarity to examine the direct, indirect, and more often cumulative effects of 
planning policy, politics, property rights, racial formation, and class conflict among a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17




host of issues, many of which are illustrated at a scale that incorporates local, regional 
and national perspectives, the topic of taxation is more apt to find itself in a position of 
discussion.  In his book A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim 
Crow South Florida, for example, historian Nathan D.B. Connolly explores the 
intersection of political power and real estate development in making a Black built 
environment in Greater Miami, Florida.  In a startling revisionism of the motivations 
behind its local Civil Rights movement, Connolly demonstrates that African American 
elites in South Florida – as rentiers and landowners – pushed for policies amenable to 
their own economic interests.  In this, issues of property rights and low taxes came to be 
intertwined with broader concepts of citizenship and race.  Connolly’s study is decidedly 
complex.  On one hand, local Black elites underrepresented the interests of lower income 
African Americans (many of whom were their tenants) in order to place themselves in a 
more privileged position in the capitalism of postwar real estate development.  Yet, the 
actions of South Florida’s Civil Rights leaders also allowed for unprecedented access into 
housing markets and commercial development, “[granting] colored people the 
opportunity to pay property taxes and thus to make claims on the state for better access to 
public amenities and services.” 
18
        
Race and class are therefore crucial to understanding the impact of tax policy. 
Richard Harris provides a study of how Toronto’s blue-collar workforce fashioned its 
own suburban ideal though the construction of ramshackle houses on the peripheries of 
the city center.  In the transformation of the idiosyncratic neighborhoods into a 
metropolitan sphere, property taxes would come to play an important part in the social 
                                                 
18
 Nathan D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South 





conflict between working class self-identity and a prescriptive municipal vision based on 
land use and regulation. 
19
  A similar theme relating to class identity and taxes, yet this 
time with strong associations to racial segregation, is found in Becky M. Nicolaides’s My 
Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965. 
20
 An intense monograph focused on the plight of working class white residents of South 
Gate, Nicolaides’s study examines the travails in which the suburban homeowners tried 
to keep their neighborhoods both blue collar and racially homogenous.  During the Great 
Depression, with local tax bills mounting, the area began to change as more tenants began 
settling into dispossessed housing units.  In an effort to beat back the changes financial 
problems wrought, South Gate’s white residents became tax reduction activists, while 
championing a racially idealized conception of homeowner rights.  For whites in South 
Gate, economic security was intractably tied to racial identity, political autonomy, and 
property rights.                    
The significance of tax policy also informs David MP Freund’s work on policy-
making and its implications in affecting racial politics in American suburbs. 
21
  By 
examining how property was appraised and the reactions it elicited from white 
homeowners intent on staying in their homes and in racially-exclusive neighborhoods, 
                                                 
19
 Richard Harris, Unplanned Suburbs: Toronto’s American Tragedy, 1900-1950 (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996).  See also Mary Corbin Sies, review of Chevy Chase: A Home Suburb for the 
Nation’s Capital, by Elizabeth Jo Lampl and Kimberly Pronthro Williams & Unplanned Suburbs: 
Toronto’s American Tragedy, 1900-1950, by Richard Harris, Journal of the Society of Architectural 
Historians, Vol. 59, No. 4 (December 2000), 549-552.   
 
20
 Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 
1920-1965 (University of Chicago Press, 2002).   
 
21
 David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America 
(University of Chicago Press, 2007).  A complimentary study that also emphasizes the significance 
homeowners placed on tax appraisals, property values, and racial homogenization is Kevin M. Kruse, 





Freund demonstrates that tax policy is an important structural component in the 
relationship between taxpayer and local government.  As Freund interrogates the role 
federal housing policy played in fostering increased racial segregation in Michigan cities, 
he also ultimately underscores the interconnectedness of national, state, and local 
economic policy.  Freund’s white suburban Dearborn homeowners, after decades of 
being privileged by the architects of policy making, did not see themselves as biased in 
their politics or in their defense of racial exclusivity.  Instead, they viewed their 
judgments and actions as a seemingly natural extension of what was actually a socially 
and politically constructed logic concerning property values, tax policy, and even 
citizenship.   
Historian Matthew D. Lassiter, in his work detailing the formation of white 
suburban political consciousness in Charlotte and Atlanta in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, also discusses the mediating role tax policy played when it came to 
political and racial self-identification and sense of place.  In his examination of 
Charlotte’s anti-busing movement, for example, suburban whites organized to stop a 
“two-way” busing plan that would send both white and African American students to 
schools outside of their own immediate neighborhoods. 
22
  In formulating their 
opposition, white suburban residents placed their concerns in terms of protecting property 
rights, while presenting themselves as aggrieved taxpayers whose freedom of choice was 
being limited by an overreaching government intrusion.  Like Freund, Lassiter’s agents of 
study relied upon a logic of colorblindness that allowed their own white privilege to be 
                                                 
22
 Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton University 





covered in economic self-preservation rather than in a declared opposition to racial 
integration.   
In Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New Right, Lisa McGirr provides an 
account of just how far white suburbanites were willing to extend their beliefs in property 
rights, individualism, and governmental decentralization into a broader movement of 
modern American conservatism. 
23
  Focused on Orange County, California, McGirr notes 
how the white affluent suburbs rebelled against what they saw as an intrusive federal 
government intent on legislating every aspect of their lives, from their religious choices 
to whom they chose to (or chose not to) call a neighbor or classmate.  A common tactic 
used to channel white resentment into grassroots action was to organize an anti-tax group.  
Similar to how Lassiter’s white Charlotteans and Freund’s Michiganders were quick to 
mobilize community-based responses to perceived outside agitation in the name of 
economic self-preservation, Orange County’s decades-long tax rebellion culminates in 
California’s passage of Proposition 13, a ballot amendment that tied annual increases of 
assessed properties to inflation or a flat two percent instead of an assessor-derived value.  
For the conservative forces in McGirr’s book, Proposition 13 was a profound victory and 
seemed to legitimate the anti-tax rhetoric that was so central to the idea of white taxpayer 
victimization.  The fact that urban and minority majority school districts bore the brunt of 
the Proposition 13 initiative’s revenue slashing implementation was certainly not lost on 
Orange County’s white suburbanites who saw the ability to maintain their own schools as 
                                                 
23





a product of personal responsibility, individual choice, and ultimately the supremacy of 
conservative values. 
24
   
Though California’s tax revolt of the 1970s is just a part of McGirr’s overall take 
on the rise of the political right, it looms much larger in Robert O. Self’s examination of 
Oakland after World War Two.  Charting the plight of African Americans in Oakland’s 
urban core to retain political power in local affairs and influence at a state level, Self 
demonstrates just how important tax policy is in its potential to manipulate and 
undermine the political process. 
25
  In a detailed contextual account of the roots of 
California’s Proposition 13, Self illustrates how California’s most powerful corporations 
and industries had successfully manipulated the state’s tax code that by the mid 1970s, 
real property taxes and income taxes constituted the bulk of revenue.  White residents in 
Alameda County even began complaining that due to excessive taxes, the opportunity for 
the working class to achieve homeownership was quickly dissipating.  Tax relief as 
promised through Proposition 13, therefore, seemed to salve the economic concerns of 
working white families, who were nonetheless already disproportionately privileged 
when it came to employment and housing opportunity.  According to Self’s research, 
some of Proposition 13’s biggest supporters were industries and corporations, who stood 
to see their tax liabilities reduced even more if the initiative passed, because as written, it 
would apply tax limits to both residential and commercial real estate.  When Proposition 
13 became law, the business community saw dramatic drops in its total share of 
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California’s tax obligation.  With a loss in revenue from residential and commercial 
taxes, social services went unmet, schools struggled for funding, and infrastructure 
improvements declined.  All the while, sales taxes and other use-based fees increased, as 
more and more of the state’s tax burden was passed onto the state’s individuals and 
families.  As Self highlights through the latter stages of his book, these events would 
have devastating effects on urban minority areas such as Oakland.  In urban centers, 
already ignored by federal intervention for nearly a decade, the search for revenue 
became paramount to keeping schools and hospitals operating for the public.  In the 
suburbs, white dominated enclaves enveloped Oakland with politically-active voters 
intent on keeping hold of their own self interests, using tax reduction as a rallying cry.                                                       
This dissertation seeks to build upon the framework of study established by these 
scholars and to expand upon their historical scope.  Though recent works in studies of the 
built environment have tied the significance of taxes to issues of planning, race, political 
conservatism, and social activism, tax policy, itself, has remained secondary if not 
tertiary to the overall narrative.  In an effort to move a study of tax policy and its 
implications on local communities to the forefront of discussion, two books, which 
notably do that, provide a very shortlist of mandatory reading. 
26
  The first is historian 
Peter Wallenstein’s 1987 book From Slave South to New South: Public Policy in 
Nineteenth Century Georgia, which follows tax conflict in the state from the colonial 
period through the antebellum era and on to the beginnings of the New South.  The 
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economic and political tensions between white property owners in rural sections of the 
state and those in the cities play important roles in understanding future fights over 
Georgia’s fiscal policy.  Though Wallenstein is less concerned with the formation of a 
built environment, he nonetheless provides an excellent starting point for launching an 
investigation into place, people, and fiscal policy.  As he notes in the introduction, “most 
studies of public policy focus on either social or economic affairs, in most cases for only 
a few decades.”  Wallenstein, for his part, wanted to produce a study that examined the 
“connections” of multiple issues over a long period of time, and one that combined 
“federal, state, and local developments in one analysis.” 
27
  The unifier to his study was 
tax policy and from it, he examined property rights, slavery, and political and economic 
conflict between rural and urban populations.  A major point of his study, and one that 
heavily influenced the production of this dissertation, is how the dynamic qualities of 
taxation continued to resonate among taxpaying voters from one generation to another.  
The ideologies shaped in response to tax policy, and in reaction to changing social 
relations, evolve across time, exposing themselves as stratigraphical evidence of 
economic conflict.        
The second book is David T. Beito’s Taxpayers in Revolt: Tax Resistance during 
the Great Depression. 
28
  With Chicago as a case study, Beito delves into the grassroots 
formation of tax resistance in the early years of the Great Depression, noting that between 
1931 and 1932, the majority of the city’s property tax bills went unpaid.  What Beito 
uncovered through an examination of various anti-tax organizations was the making of a 
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broad-based taxpayers’ strike against what was viewed as excessive government intrusion 
into their economic livelihoods.  By far the largest and most powerful of the anti-tax 
organizations to make Chicago and Illinois home was the Association of Real Estate 
Taxpayers (ARET) whose membership rolls ticked upwards of thirty thousand by the 
early 1930s.  The most interesting component to Beito’s research into the ARET is 
demonstrated in just who made up the group’s membership.  Though it was, as to be 
expected, home to many upper middle class families and businesses with interests in real 
estate, the majority of ARET was comprised of working class Chicagoans.  Though Beito 
does not reflect on racial politics or its social formation in the book – a glaring omission 
– it is inferred that ARET was a white phenomenon given the group’s strength in the 
city’s white and white ethnic neighborhoods.  Despite the book’s subtle politically 
conservative tone, and its overstated conclusion that Chicagoans’ (at least white ones’) 
participation in the tax strike was a rejection against governmental bureaucracy, even 
though Chicago’s working class would embrace the New Deal in the following years, 
Beito’s study does provide an excellent framework for analyzing the social history of tax 
policy debates. 
29
      
Another aspect in which this dissertation will expand upon preceding works has to 
do with time.  With the important exceptions of Wallenstein’s work on nineteenth-
century Georgia tax policy, Freund’s deconstruction of pre-war housing policies, and 
Connolly’s examination of South Florida, most studies that engage with tax policy, local 
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politics, and property ownership tend to share a common link: the majority of their action 
takes place mostly after World War Two.  On this, David M.P. Freund has correctly 
pointed out that the decades prior to the 1940s have “largely been ignored” with regards 
to their impact on housing policy, local politics, and especially, the racialization of 
America’s built environment.  Though many recent urban, suburban, and planning studies 
privilege the postwar years, the events of the 1910s and 1920s were integral as Freund 
has observed in “setting the stage for New Deal-era housing policy, the modern housing 
market, and the intellectual foundations that helped defend racially discriminatory 
practices after 1940 in both the public and private sectors.” 
30
  Connolly, too, argues for 
the significance of starting a historical investigation in an earlier era, noting: “Even 
today, land and its uses serve as expressions of acceptable governance.  And between the 
1890s and 1960s, people built a sturdy and supple infrastructure for white supremacy that 
remains very much in place.”
31
  A study that focuses on the beginnings of these issues, 
particularly when it comes to suburbanization and metropolitan growth, would be a 
welcome addition.  With taxation being this dissertation’s centerpiece, the long-term 
trajectories of local, state and federal policy-making, evolving political alignments, and 
social conflict can provide important background details on how post World War Two 
metropolitan regions in the Sunbelt South built upon the discriminatory patterns of its 
past to create a racially-exclusive future.   
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Likewise, a focus on the origins of suburban growth and metropolitan 
development allows for a deeper understanding of the mentalities of those involved in the 
process.  Ed Ayers and Peter Onuf, in their influential revisionist intervention into 
American geography, allude to this when they write of how generational inhabitants of a 
landscape come to “assume historical burdens.” 
32
  Tax policy, property rights in a fluid 
capitalist system, rising debt obligations, changing notions of citizenship, and social 
anxiety among others, have immense ramifications on the historical psyches of persons 
and families.  In places such as Cobb County, Georgia, the relationships between 
property and conceptualizations of class and race were being negotiated and renegotiated 
since the nineteenth century.  Even in spite of historical developments and transitions, 
these relationships continued to have resonance.  In many ways it is akin to Walter 
Benjamin’s theorization of the human “cellar,” wherein the “antiquities” of personal 
experience and family history reside just out of contact with the conscious mind.  For 
Benjamin, even though a body may project a bourgeois exterior, reflective of social and 
monetary accumulation over time, the contents and memories of the cellar can be brought 
out at any moment depending upon the situation. 
33
  This is no less true within the 
seeming resplendency of suburban Cobb County after World War Two, where memories 
and mentalities of its struggling farmers helped inform the present.  Though white Cobb 
Countians held high rates of home ownership by the mid twentieth century, and gave 
every appearance of living a metropolitan ideal with well-funded schools, good roads, 
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and high paying jobs, they were – and have always have been – a highly contentious and 
fractious lot.                 
The study of how institutional structures, historical mentalities, and social 
formations evolved with an economic focus is a tricky subject.  An important issue, 
therefore, when approaching the built environment from the perspective of tax policy, 
and perhaps one reason why so many scholars are hesitant to do so, is the potential trap of 
economic determinism, whereby complex factors of historical change become reducible 
to purely economic motivation.  This is a point not to be taken lightly.  Here, it is 
important to note that economic factors are intricately linked to the history of Georgia, 
from its expansion of slavery to the removal of Indigenous persons and on through 
federal Reconstruction and the New Deal. 
34
  In conducting literature reviews of political 
and economic concerns within Georgia, one notices that the issue of taxation is much 
more prevalent in studies from the 1940s and 1950s (even prior to Marxist analysis of the 
1960s and 1970s) than in more recent scholarship.  The reason is unclear, but perhaps it 
owes to the relatively short period of time that passed between what was historical event 
and what became historical study.  Indeed, a survey of the multitude of recent articles and 
books produced on Georgia topics during the pre-World War Two era will show little 
interrogative concern for the role tax policy had in local, state, and regional politics.  
Unwind a microfilm roll for a Georgia newspaper from the 1910s to 1930s, however, and 
the editorial pages will be dominated with pieces discussing nearly every tax levy 
imaginable: income, automobile tags, gasoline, gross receipts, liquor, and of course, ad 
valorem.  This dissertation’s focus on taxation and its social and political implications is 
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an endeavor to recover an overlooked, if not forgotten, aspect of everyday life in both 
Cobb County and Georgia.  By viewing tax policy outside of a strictly economic 
experience, and by placing it within broader regional and national contexts, the concern 
against economic determinism can be mitigated.    
Tax Rebels: An Origins Story of White Property Owners  
The root of any debate over local or state tax policy in Georgia begins in the 
geography of economic self-interest, particularly the contested ground of urban and rural 
white property owners.  In the history of American land use from the late nineteenth to 
early twentieth century, there is no shortage of inquiries into the political and economic 
conflicts between residents of the country’s urban and rural areas. 
35
  Generally, these 
studies revolve around geographical differences, economic tensions over resources or 
monetary valuation, and competing ideals between Jeffersonian agrarianism and 
entrepreneurship.  What is often missing from the rural / urban division is a critical 
intervention into how the binary itself was created, and by whom.  In the American 
South, for example, where antagonisms between the interests of small farmers were often 
at odds with financial concerns of city businesses and banks, the divide between rural and 
urban interests is often taken as natural, an immutable fact of southern life.  In truth, their 
differences, though recognizably rooted in economic and social concerns, were fluid and 
susceptible to manipulation.   
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FIGURE 1: COUNTY MAP OF GEORGIA AT MID TWENTIETH CENTURY.  COBB COUNTY 
IS FILLED IN WHITE AND LOCATED NORTHWEST OF ATLANTA IN FULTON COUNTY.     







In nineteenth and early twentieth-century Georgia, debates of tax policy would 
dominate the differences between agrarian and urbanized sections.  With elected 
politicians unwilling to implement a uniform system of taxation for real and personal 
property, ad valorem assessments varied dependent upon the county.  In real property 
assessments, tax valuations often failed to acknowledge the types of improvement made 
to land, or even the acreage of the lot.  In Georgia’s annual revenue reports up until the 
1950s, tax receipts from municipal and unincorporated property were listed in separate 
categories.  Prior to Georgia’s equalization law of the mid 1910s, state tax reports also 
reflected the disparity between assessment calculations made against urban or rural 
property to meet state tax obligations. 
36
 Without a metric to account for improvements 
and acreage, the rates at which properties were assessed for state levy could vary from 
year to year and from place to place.  Such was the fluctuation that it was not uncommon 
for city or rural taxpayers to proclaim themselves at various times to be among the most 
“over-taxed” class of Georgians. 
37
   
With both rural and urban sections of the state steadfast in their belief that the 
other was not carrying its fair load of the “tax burden,” Georgia’s political establishment 
embarked on a decades-long feud that pitted city and agrarian interests against one 
another.  From tax equalization, a law conceived by urban legislators and designed to 
make rural dominated counties increase their assessment revenue before being able to 
collect state funds to the county unit system, to a change to Georgia’s election procedure 
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engineered by rural counties that gave the most sparsely populated parts of the state 
increased voting power in state-wide elections, each session of Georgia’s General 
Assembly became a venue for lowering the tax obligations of one group at the expense of 
another.  By the 1920s, hostility between rural and urban parts of the state had grown so 
intense that the Atlanta Constitution implored state and local politicians to reform 
Georgia’s tax system, noting that it was accomplishing little more than “arraying class 
against class…city against country.” 
38
       
Conflict between rural and urban whites was also manipulated for political gain, 
and in terms of corruption and cronyism in the early twentieth century, Georgia’s state 
government had few rivals.  Heavily influenced by corporate and industrial interests and 
incessantly lobbied by manufacturing organizations and various business groups, 
Georgia’s General Assembly was a legislative body at odds with the mass of its 
constituents.  As white property owners in the state fought over how tax policy was 
enforced and over what should be funded by state revenue, powerful special interest 
groups successfully manipulated the political establishment for its own benefit.  With 
regards to tax obligations, for example, the influence corporations held with state 
government can be found in the annual reports of the state’s revenue office.  Within the 
reports, all forms of revenue were listed alongside the aggregate amount of what they 
supplied to the state, including “city property,” “wild lands,” and “value of dogs” among 
many others, along with the amount contributed by corporations operating in the state.  
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By 1921, however, although all the other forms of revenue were still listed, the amount of 
revenue generated from corporate taxes was no longer printed in the annual report. 
39
  
Not surprisingly, the reliance on real property to form the bulk of state revenue 
led to widespread evasion in addition to resentments among propertied classes of 
Georgians.  One of Georgia’s tax commissioners once referred to tax collection as being 
the “life blood of the state.” 
40
  Yet in most circumstances, despite the need for its 
revenue to keep the state running, the county agent charged with overseeing its collection 
was an appointee of the county-level tax and revenue commissioner. 
41
  Lowered 
assessments on property far too often translated directly into political power.  Though 
Georgia was a one-party state comprised of white Democrats, factional politics ran deep, 
and those that kept the majority of taxpayers content could control local government.  
With one hundred and sixty-one individual county assessors working to keep local 
property values as low as possible, the ability to fund the most basic of government 
services led to annual budget crises. 
42
  As historian Albert D. Kirwan has similarly noted 
in his studies of Mississippi politics, whenever the “state levy went up, property 
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For as much as state government teetered on financial solvency from year to year, 
local governments, too, were often caught in a vicious cycle of debt, never quite 
emerging from their financial troubles.  Beholden to bond markets for favorable rates, 
and with limited revenue to pay off existing debt obligations, municipalities across the 
state issued short term and long term bonds, passing debt from year to decade as interest 
continued to accrue.  Adding to the difficulty local governments faced in dealing with 
their financial problems was Georgia’s lack of a home rule doctrine. 
44
  Without 
municipal home rule, changes to local millage rates, bond issuances and their amounts, as 
well as what could appear on a city’s public ballot, all had to be approved by a committee 
of Georgia’s General Assembly and then put to an up or down vote before the entire 
legislature.  The state’s failure to adopt a home rule doctrine was not for lack of trying.  
Throughout the early twentieth century, Georgia’s largest cities such as Atlanta and 
Columbus, down to moderate-sized cities such as Marietta and Cartersville, argued that 
municipal home rule would lead to better efficiency in government and would give more 
control over their fiscal situations.  The state’s rural legislators, politically emboldened by 
implementation of a county unit system that granted more voting power to sparsely-
populated counties in state-wide elections, repeatedly blocked home rule from being 
considered.  Unwilling to cede power away from state government and onto local 
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municipalities, rural Georgia’s legislators ensured that they could retain a voice in urban 
politics and keep state tax levies in their favor.   
The lack of home rule also affected pro-growth and development policies.  Unlike 
the Michigan cities and suburbs chronicled by David M.P. Freund and the suburbs of 
Alameda County studied by Robert Self, where local zoning laws intersected with federal 
housing policies to promote racial separatism and an ideology of free market capitalism, 
Cobb County and its cities had neither the autonomy granted by municipal home rule 
doctrine nor much interaction with housing programs prior to the emergence of the 
Federal Housing Administration in the mid 1930s.  The New Deal, in this case, had a 
profound effect on local governments, allowing for the first time a chance to throw off 
the burden of state government by working directly with federal agencies and 
bureaucracies. 
45
  Due to the injection of federal money that required a minimal matching 
fund amount for proposed projects, cities and counties such as Marietta and Cobb were 
able to participate in infrastructure and housing improvements without the threat of being 
stalled by an ineffectual state government.  The move of local government from the 
sphere of the state to the federal government is a key component of the New Deal era’s 
impact on Georgia politics.             
Within this context of resentment politics and dysfunctional state government, the 
tax rebel emerged.  As poll taxes, white primaries, and various forms of intimidation 
reduced voter turnout, the white real property owner became the backbone of the 
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electorate.  Despite being aware that the tax system was being manipulated by corporate 
and industrial interests, white property owners routinely turned against one another to 
secure reductions to their own tax obligations.  Over time, the resentment forged between 
economic classes and geographic partisans converged into an ideology of anti-tax views 
and anti-government feelings.  The white property owning tax rebels chronicled in this 
dissertation are significant for the near totality of their resistance.  In the fight to protect 
their property from what they saw as excessive taxation, encroachment from non-white 
racial groups, and obtrusive regulation, the tax rebel not surprisingly lashed out against 
local and state governments.  In the 1930s, even though the federal government helped 
pacify the economic concerns of whites in the cities and the countryside through massive 
housing and infrastructure improvements, anti-government rhetoric flourished.  
From the nineteenth-century onward, the Cobb County tax rebel was quick to 
form coalitions and alliances with others to protect their own interests, but even quicker 
to destroy established partnerships if it meant securing the temporary protection of their 
own fiscal interests.  An example of this can be found in the Taxpayers’ League, an 
organization of realtors and rentiers that originally formed in the 1920s but that had three 
different incarnations by the end of the 1930s.  Determined to lower county assessments 
on real property and reign in what they felt was excessive spending by local 
governments, the league would have had a seemingly natural ally with rural farmers.  In 
the 1910s, following the state-wide implementation of tax equalization, whereby counties 
were expected to uniformly assess real properties for state collection, rural white farmers 
threw their political force behind trying to lower the entire assessment process – from 




an urban phenomenon, would not align itself with rural interests, believing the small 
farmer to be a tax dodger. 
46
  Even with the chance of producing political change to the 
tax code, the old urban / rural divide was difficult to overcome.           
 
FIGURE 2:  GEOGRAPHIC RELATIONSHIP OF COBB COUNTY TO SURROUNDING 
COUNTIES AT MID TWENTIETH CENTURY.  THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER SERVES AS 
THE BORDER BETWEEN COBB AND FULTON.  THE RED STAR INDICATES THE 
LOCATION OF THE STATE CAPITAL OF ATLANTA. 
Map download available from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/maps/georgia_map.html  
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A focus on white property owning tax rebels in Cobb County during the first half 
of the twentieth century also allows the opportunity to explore a political world before the 
liberal / conservative binary became entrenched in the identities of local populations.  For 
much of the early twentieth century, the primary factions within Georgia’s Democratic 
Party echoed the political debates from decades earlier.  In the state’s developed urban 
areas, for example, which were strongholds of the nineteenth century Whig Party, an 
underlying Whiggism continued to inform the politics and policies of elected officials 
and property owners. 
47
  Built upon the defunct party’s principals of promoting economic 
development and increasing land equity, urban politicians, especially in areas such as 
Marietta and nearby Atlanta, never shied away from recalling their Whiggish pasts.  Even 
into the late 1920s and early 1930s, local politicians and business leaders could be heard 
admonishing state government to return to the values of Crawford and Gilmer, two 
antebellum Whig governors.  In rural areas of Cobb County and throughout the farming 
areas of North Georgia, Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson were just as quick to be 
mentioned in political discourse during the first of the twentieth century as were Whigs in 
the cities.  As Georgia sat on the verge of modernity in the 1930s and 1940s, political 
thought continued to recall debates from the antebellum era.  Federal intervention, though 
it did not synthesize the political, economic, and social differences between rural and 
urban property owning whites, did create a system amenable to their interests and 
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concerns at the local level – low taxes, more schools, and good roads – all, of course, 
with unquestioned white supremacy. 
48
         
Over the course of the first half of the twentieth century, Georgia’s tax policy 
debates would become intertwined with property rights, citizenship, and white supremacy 
at the local level. 
49
  Evelyn Nakano Glenn, who has successfully critiqued the 
interrelations of citizenship with labor, has argued that scholars should see citizenship 
beyond its national and global definitions by examining how its meaning is constructed at 
the local level.  “Citizenship,” Glenn writes, “has been used to draw boundaries between 
those who are included as members of the community and entitled to respect, protection, 
and rights and those who are excluded and thus not entitled to recognition and rights.” 
50
  
Within Cobb County, citizenship was deeply tied to the political dictates of white 
supremacy, but also to the social realm of white privilege.  Within the legal framework of 
white supremacy, where one could physically reside in a city, at what water fountain one 
could drink, and in which seat one could sit on a public bus were codified into local 
ordinances and enforced under penal threat.  White privilege as the social manifestation 
of legally prescribed white supremacy might be seen as the extra-legal advantages of 
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living within a racist society.  Within the context of Cobb County in the first half of the 
twentieth century, white supremacy is about limiting rights and opportunities of African 
Americans while white privilege concerned the benefits of imposing racism, such as 
freedom of movement or the unquestioned right to hold personal and real property. As 
Nikhil Pal Singh has correctly surmised, whiteness is a “conscious 
assemblage…designed to extend, fortify, individualize, and equalize the government of 
private life in a world dominated by private property holders.” 
51
  A study of how white 
supremacy and white privilege changed over time and in response to events such as 
political capitalism or federal intervention policy will provide a better understanding of 
the rise of Cobb’s tax rebel and what it meant to localized conceptions of citizenship. 
52
  
It will also demonstrate that within the localized world of white privilege, real property 
owning whites attained even more specialized rights than did non-real property owning 
whites. 
53
          
With the appearance of more critical studies of the relationship between racial 
formation and the physical built environment since the 1990s, scholars from a variety of 
different fields turned their eye towards the question of how white supremacy and 
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privilege affected property rights in the United States. 
54
  Perhaps no more 
groundbreaking work exists on this subject than Cheryl Harris’s “Whiteness as Property,” 
which first appeared in a 1993 edition of the Harvard Law Review. 
55
  Arguing that 
whiteness serves as an intangible right in American society and is passed through familial 
lineage, Harris theorized that white privilege, in this respect, is best seen as a form of 
property.  Derrick Bell has made similar arguments, noting that “In the United States, 
where property is a measure of worth, many whites with relatively little or no property of 
a traditional kind – money, securities, land – cling to their whiteness as a kind of 
property.” 
56
  Whiteness as a form of property is at once mobile, valuable, and rarely 
loses its ability to translate into capital.  The lasting significance of Harris’s theorization 
of whiteness is that she articulates it as being equally immaterial in its ability to inform 
social processes and also material in its capacity to affect the physical environments of 
people inside and outside of the cloak whiteness offers. 
57
  Richard Delgado and Jean 
Stefancic, two leading voices in critical race theory, have built upon Harris’s theoretical 
foundation and asserted that  
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“[O]ver time, whiteness became a sort of asset, like a ranch or money in the bank.  
Whiteness and property have a common quality or premise, namely, the right to exclude.  
These features enabled white identity to become the basis of a system of privilege that 
allocates social benefits, one that in turn became legitimated in law as a kind of status 
property.”  
58
    
 
In the late 1990s, George Lipsitz continued to expand upon the literature of 
critical race theory in his book The Possessive Investment in Whiteness:  How White 
People Profit from Identity Politics.  By critiquing law, labor, and culture, Lipsitz 
demonstrates how whiteness maintains societal racism to serve its own interests 
throughout American history.  Writing on how whiteness secures its long-term 
accumulation of wealth, Lipsitz outlines how taxation plays a central role in defining who 
has mobility in the economic and political spheres of American life.  In an effort to 
satisfy the demands of white taxpayers who feel over-burdened by local, state, and 
federal taxes, Lipsitz notes that the modern tax system has become increasingly 
regressive, with a considerable amount of the real burden being passed onto low-income 
and minority groups who have historically been shut out of property ownership through 
“payroll taxes, sales taxes, and user fees.” 
59
  The lingering effects of inequality in tax 
policy and distribution in services can be even more readily seen in events surrounding 
New York City’s “stop and frisk” program which, in the name of crime reduction, 
advocates searching young minority men and women for illegal goods and paraphernalia.  
Yet despite its tough-on-crime claims, stop and frisk is, in reality, a cash-cow for city 
revenue, as those stopped are given summons and citations to be paid into city coffers.  
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Programs such as stop and frisk, in this respect, are examples of indirect taxes – placed 
on minorities so that whites and businesses need not have their tax liabilities raised. 
60
  
The securitization of wealth among whites that Lipsitz outlines and the regressive, 
indirect forms of revenue generation from stop and frisk were heavily influenced by the 
histories of white property owners in places like Cobb County.     
From a theoretical perspective, perhaps no better articulation of how political 
inequality, social privilege, and economic power manifest themselves into lived 
experience exists outside of the work sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.  In his much cited 1986 
article “The Forms of Capital,” Bourdieu sought to investigate how the French academic 
system aided in the construction of both class immobility and identity. 
61
 From his study, 
Bourdieu theorized that there existed three forms of cultural capital: embodied, objective, 
and institutionalized.  Capital is embodied by learning and is transferable from one 
generation to another; it is objectified in that it has a material basis, and institutionalized 
because those that hold cultural capital ensure that the state apparatus supports their 
interests.  Cobb County serves as a corollary.  Federal interventionism privileged white 
residents through job training and later defense employment.  These privileged whites, in 
turn, bought houses and material possessions.  In the political arena, Cobb’s white 
property owners pressured government for more schools and better infrastructure – all 
securing their hold over social and economic affairs.  How Cobb’s white property owners 
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accumulated capital over the span of several decades is a key component of this 
dissertation.              
 This dissertation’s focus on the white property owning tax rebel will expand upon 
the ideas expressed by critical race scholars and the groundwork of cultural capital and 
introduce a class and factional element to the formation of whiteness in Cobb County.  
The Cobb tax rebel through much of the first half of the twentieth century was both 
privileged through property ownership, access to voting rights, and of course, through 
being white in a highly racialized social and legal environment, but also aggrieved by 
political and economic systems that favored the interests of corporations, banks, 
industries, and the combined strength of lobby groups.  Likewise, in terms of economic 
privilege, white property owners in the first decades of the twentieth century constituted a 
minority of Cobb’s white population.  The effects of a multi-decade tax rebellion, 
however, changed the dynamic of class difference among Cobb’s white population.  
Spurred by federal interventionist policy, more and more whites through federally 
subsidized home loans and from employment in the defense industry rose to the ranks of 
property owners and voting citizens, the very basis of capital accumulation.   
 By the early 1950s, Cobb’s white property owner was bent on maintaining 
economic, social, and political power.  The more significant effect of federal intervention 
was that it salved conflict between rural and urban white taxpayers by introducing high 
paying jobs, subsidized infrastructure, and access to low interest mortgage loans. With 
increased federal investment, county and city governments in the metropolitan region 
were able to keep local millage rates at lower levels.  This mitigation is crucial to 




The effects of federal intervention in Cobb County helped to synthesize the once 
oppositional nature of white property owners into an ideology based on low taxes and 
pro-growth policy-making.  With rural and city interests no longer in direct conflict in 
places like Cobb County – and throughout many of the counties surrounding the city of 
Atlanta – the metropolitan political coalition became a potent political force.  The mid 
century metropolitan regime, to build upon the model provided by Clarence Stone, was, 
nonetheless, constantly being negotiated and maintained. 
62
  One part of the process was 
to push for a more regressive tax structure at the state level.  For example, metropolitan 
white property owners sought to transfer more of the tax burden onto the shoulders of 
lower income Georgians through sales taxes and user fees, while pushing for the abolition 
of state level property taxes.  For Cobb County, which received investment from the 
federal government and had an expanding local tax base of professional residents, the 
ability to support schools and infrastructure was not in question.  For counties outside of 
metropolitan Atlanta and without federal subsidy, the loss of a share of collected state 
revenue had dire consequences, as their schools struggled to pay teacher salaries and 
roads crumbled.  The second part was the formation of a new political ideology rooted in 
a language of low taxes, business development, housing subdivisions, and, of course, 
white supremacy.  In the early 1950s, Cobb was just breaking ground on a massive 
suburbanization that would make it one of the fastest growing counties in the United 
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States during the late twentieth century. 
63
  The metropolitan ideology it fostered would 
resonate across local, regional, and national levels.                      
Framework 
Because this dissertation will study a broad convergence of factors from public 
policy to the changing dynamics of white supremacy and racial privilege within the built 
environment, primary source documents must be placed within a scope of theoretical and 
methodological inquiry from a diverse array of academic fields from both the humanities 
and the social sciences. 
64
  Drawing upon primary source material that will include 
federal, state, and local records, manuscript collections, historical newspapers, oral 
history interviews, genealogical data, and insurance maps, this investigation aims to 
produce a methodologically rich contribution to the studies of public policy-making and 
racial privilege within the context of the American South. 
65
  These primary sources will 
be interpreted both originally – as a requirement of the dissertation process – and also in 
comparison to major recent works dealing with topics of the history of urban growth, the 
built environment, racial formation, and economic history.  As a monographic study, this 
dissertation will be both descriptive in its ability to demonstrate the inner workings of tax 
policy and policy-making at the local, state, and national level, and intensive in its focus 
on the environs within and surrounding Cobb County, Georgia.           
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This dissertation is presented in three parts.  The first will lay the foundation for 
understanding the context of white taxpayer antipathy (Chapters 1 and 2).  Significant 
themes within these expositional chapters include the racialization of property rights at 
the turn of the twentieth century, evolving political alignments at the local, state, and 
national level, ideological formations, and the corruptive influence of unbridled corporate 
and industrial interests on the daily lives of Cobb County’s white property owners.  How 
did state and local tax policy intersect with federal policy to affect racial and class 
formation in Cobb County during the first half of the twentieth century?  What role did 
Georgia’s emergent system of political capitalism play in creating an atmosphere of 
resentment between various groups of white property owners?   
The second part examines the rise of special interest groups and the roots of anti-
government sentiment (Chapters 3, 4, and 5).  The conclusion of the second part focuses 
the events surrounding the 1937 Homestead Exemption Act, which saw rural and urban 
property owners unite to support the lowering of all real property tax obligations for 
owner-occupied homes.  What were the immediate and long-term ramifications of anti-
government rhetoric that grew out of the discontent white property owners felt towards 
the policy-making process? And, how did white property owners finally achieve a 
consensus to push for a state constitutional amendment to allow for a homestead 
exemption?   
The last section will investigate the fallout of the tax rebellion, with particular 
attention being paid to how local governments mitigated the loss in revenue through 
participation in New Deal programs and through the successful courtship of a federal 




broaden its local tax base through expanding housing programs. The city’s effort to raise 
revenue through the addition of white property owners is discussed from the perspective 
of supply-side economic policy. When the city failed to add the number of housing units 
needed to keep pace with bond debt and local services, it partnered with the county to 
lure a massive federally subsidized bomber plant to the area. In what ways did white 
Cobb County’s support for property tax relief aid in further segregating the local 
environment? And, how did the opening of the defense plant substantially change the 
political and social influence of the white property owner in local and state affairs?   
This dissertation concludes (Chapter 8) with an examination of the years between 
the closing of the aircraft assembly plant in 1945 and its re-opening in 1951.  This period 
would prove significant for Cobb County because even though the bomber plant was 
shuttered, federal projects that were planned for during the war years continued to be 
implemented.  The most substantial of these projects included a massive hydroelectric 
dam that in addition to providing electricity, supplied a reservoir for pre-treated potable 
water and a recreational lake for Cobb County.  The continued federal investment in 
Cobb would provide the foundation for its phenomenal growth in the numbers of white 
homeowners beginning in the 1950s.  Also significant by 1951, following the re-opening 
of the bomber plant, was that white property owners, having successfully lowered real 
property tax liabilities, sought to engineer a more regressive tax system that relied on 
sales, gasoline, and other user-based taxes.  This turn towards regressive or backdoor 
taxes would hit cities and counties who were not receiving substantial federal support 
especially hard.  As Cobb County appeared to be an economic miracle by mid century, its 




construction.  At the confluence of low property taxes, federal intervention, and white 
supremacy, an asymmetrical topography of whiteness emerged – while all whites retained 
social, and sometimes political privilege, white property owners in places like Cobb 
County reaped unparalleled economic benefits. 
66
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THE POLITICS OF PLACE 
 
On a spring day in 1820, along the northern banks of Georgia’s Chattahoochee 
River, United States Army officer Andrew Jackson dismounted his horse to nail a federal 
proclamation onto a nearby tree.  The northern side of the river was federally recognized 
by treaty as the territory of the Cherokee Nation.  The land south of the river was under 
the authority of the state of Georgia.  The notice was brief and declarative:  “[W]hite men 
with their livestock found trespassing on the Indian land will be arrested… their crops, 
houses and fences destroyed.” 
1
    On orders from the United States government, Jackson 
had spent months travelling the interior of the Nation looking for evidence of illegally 
constructed white settlements, talking with local Cherokee leaders, and writing reports 
about the state of relations between Georgia and its Native Peoples.  Given the significant 
rise in Georgia’s white population during the early 1800s, and the near insatiable desire 
they had for land, there was no surprise in what Andrew Jackson discovered during his 
expedition: whites were felling trees for cabins and clearing brush for crops; small herds 
of livestock were grazing on the land; and makeshift ferries were carrying traffic back 
and forth across the river.  “On the excursion through the Cherokee Nation,” Jackson 
reported to his superiors, “I found a great many intruders and those on the north of the 
Chatahoochey [sic] not only numerous but insolent and threatening resistance.” 
2
  
The land upon which Jackson placed the warning would become, just twelve 
years later, Cobb County.  The declaration to force trespassers from the Cherokee Nation 
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had little to no effect against a seemingly endless tide of white settlers. Land-hungry and 
willing to take up arms against any government attempting to thwart what they conceived 
as their natural right to property, Georgia’s “insolent” whites were a driving factor 
leading to the eventual removal of the state’s Native peoples less than two decades later. 
3
  
Events beginning with Removal and leading through the remainder of the nineteenth 
century illuminate a number of significant topics that would resonate in Georgia’s history 
well into the twentieth century.  The opening for legal white settlement of what was 
referred to at the time as Georgia’s “frontier,” for instance, provides an entry-point into 
studying the integrated nature of social relations, political objectives, economic systems, 
and the effects of early federal intervention in counties such as Cobb carved from the 
former Indian Territories.  Central to these were the formation of distinctive groups of 
white settlers who had competing views on how Georgia’s government should be run and 
from whom it should be financed.  The unyielding desire many whites had for property 
ownership played a direct role in pushing treaty cessions and Removal, and it also gave 
rise – both in numbers and in political influence – to a white yeomanry comprised of 
subsistence-based farming families.  The creation of Cobb County through the dispersal 
of property to white Georgians also helped establish an entrepreneurial class in North 
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Georgia that included land speculators, mercantilists, and lawyers, as well as financial 
institutions and industries.  The social and economic conflicts that arose between these 
groups – one agricultural-based, the other more urban-centered and business-oriented – 
influenced both political party participation and fiscal policy at the state and local level 
for decades. 
4
   
This conflict also reflected and engaged regional and national trends, especially in 
economic matters.  Slavery, for instance, became an issue tied to market prices, credit 
lending, land valuation, and perhaps most importantly, tax revenue.  Industrialization, 
tariffs, state’s rights, and publicly-funded infrastructure projects would, likewise, 
highlight the growing sense of resentment each group of property owners held towards 
the other. 
5
  In the 1830s and 1840s, for instance, Cobb’s white property owners pushed 
for the construction of a state-funded railroad that would tie North Georgia to regional 
and national markets. The creation of the railroad was more than just about capitalist 
enterprise (both mercantile and agricultural), and was seen by Cobb and other counties 
adjacent to its route as a revenue-generating device.  By charging shipping rates to 
Georgia businesses and farmers for use of the rail line, the railroad would, in theory, 
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contribute funds to state government that would result in the reduction of real and 
personal property taxes. 
6
  In the years leading up to the Civil War, Cobb’s politicians 
even argued that its white population should be able to pay a lower shipping rate than 
residents in other counties due to Cobb having supplied land to the rail line. 
7
  In this, 
Cobb’s white property owners supported the intervention of state government into 
economic affairs so long as they were the primary beneficiaries and were not above 
alienating white property owners in other counties for the sake of their own financial 
interests.   
The relationships between a physical place and the people that inhabit its terrain 
are best studied through the lens of political geography. As a subfield of human 
geography with an intellectual history dating to the 1930s, political geography is a largely 
discursive exercise, interested in how a “body of knowledge…produces particular 
understandings about the world” through a study of “internal debates, the evolutionary 
adoption of new ideas, and dynamic boundaries.” 
8
  Unlike studies of formal politics that 
tend to give supremacy to national or international events and their effects on local 
populations, political geography chooses a more integrated approach to historical 
development, offering a study of how people interact with one another and shape their 
local environments while being readily aware of the political and economic world that 
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  Such a methodological approach is particularly suited for a study of 
the origins of Cobb County and its white property owners, and shows sharp concern for 
the logic of political motivation and organizational structure. 
10
  With a focus attuned to 
the locality of place (and how that place recognizes itself within regional or national 
settings), political geography is also decidedly materialist, showing interest in the 
interrelations between people and the environments they build. 
11
  As highlighted in the 
removal of Native Peoples from Georgia’s borders so that white settlers could lay claim 
to property, there is a deep connection between the construction of a built environment 
and conceptions of race. 
12
  By tying land ownership, tax policy, and capitalist 
productivity to whiteness, Cobb’s landscape became inherently racialized – a 
consequence that would have profound effects on the Cherokee, enslaved Africans, and 
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later Freedmen and Freedwomen. 
13
  With an understanding of the relations of property 
ownership, the racialization of the built environment, and the construction of two distinct 
white political identities, two fundamental questions are opened: How was Cobb’s white 
property owner historically constituted?  And, how was the racialization of property and 
tax policy in Cobb affected by a convergence of geographical, economic and political 
forces at the local, regional, and national level?   
A Hunger for Land 
The path to Native American Removal and the subsequent creation of Cobb 
County began several hundred miles to the southeast, along Georgia’s coastal and upper 
Savannah River region following the incorporation of large-scale human slavery into 
capitalist production.  With West African bodies impressed into bondage, rice, tobacco, 
and long staple cotton became the state’s primary exports by the late eighteenth century.  
Labor-intensive for the enslaved persons forced to work the fields and modestly, if at all, 
profitable for the planters, agricultural production required vast amounts of land and 
human resources. 
14
  The introduction of the hand-operated cotton gin in the mid 1790s, 
however, revolutionized the state’s agricultural prospects by dramatically curtailing the 
expenditure of labor needed to separate ball from seed.  The new technological 
innovation also allowed planters the ability to grow heartier varieties of short staple 
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cotton that prior to the gin’s creation had not been a cost effective alternative.  From 1791 
to 1801 the amount of cotton produced in Georgia exploded to rates of nearly 1900 
percent. 
15
  As plantations became more economically viable, credit and banking systems 
in Georgia and throughout the South became prolific as they sought to capitalize on an 
expanding and newly commoditized cotton market.  Georgia’s planters began expanding 
their land-holdings by borrowing against the collateral of their acreage, personal 
property, and future harvests, and became the first hardened proponents of Indian 
Removal from the state’s fertile inland areas, where short staple cotton could be grown in 
abundance and sold on an international cotton market. 
16
  To ensure that their expanding 
plantations would be properly cultivated, the planters, many of whom also held office in 
state government, likewise facilitated the expansion of an institutionalized slave labor 
system encompassing the importation and mass sale of African persons into forced 
bondage.  
17
  Between 1790 and 1808, the international slave trade brought approximately 
48,000 West Africans into Georgia.   Georgia’s slave trade auctioneers, a byproduct of a 
changing agricultural climate and economic system, relocated approximately 17,000 
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enslaved persons from the Mid-Atlantic to Georgia from 1790 to 1820. 
18
  By the end of 
the first quarter of the nineteenth century, roughly forty-four percent of the state’s total 
population was held in human bondage. 
19
     
As Georgia’s enslaved African population continued to grow from 1790 to 1820, 
its white population also grew substantially, rising from approximately 53,000 to 190,000 
during the first three full decades of American nationhood, an increase of over two 
hundred and fifty percent. 
20
  Georgia’s expanding white population during this period 
was overwhelmingly concentrated in those with English and Scots-Irish ancestry, but also 
showed small concentrations of other white ethnic groups.  
21
  Though many of these 
settlers arrived from passenger ships landing in New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, or 
the state’s primary port in Savannah, before heading to interior regions of Georgia, many 
others were second or third generation Americans from the northeast, Mid Atlantic, or the 
Upper South who sought a new life on what was thought of at the time, as America’s 
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  For those arriving in Georgia with money in hand, buying small 
parcels of land was a possibility and a small white farmer class was born.  A significant 
segment of the white immigrant population, however, without money or capital and 
having little potential to acquire land, earned for themselves the moniker of being “white 
trash” and of “inhabiting the lower classes.” 
23
           
The collision between Georgia’s growing white immigrant population and its 
established planters, who were intent on expanding personal land ownership, led to 
political problems that reverberated across the state for several decades.  While many 
landless white immigrants settled in Georgia’s urban cities such as Savannah or Augusta 
where they worked in trade or in emerging factory positions, others sought to partake in 
agricultural subsistence production, where they might join the ranks of the state’s land-
owning independent small farmers.  The limited options for newly minted poor whites, 
however, often meant staying in a labor position in the state’s urban areas, renting a small 
piece of land from a planter, or as it became increasingly popular, illegally crossing into 
the Indian Territories. 
24
  The growing discontent among the state’s burgeoning white 
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population was codified in a popular verse:  “All I ask in this creation / Is a pretty little 
wife and big plantation / Way up yonder in the Cherokee Nation.” 
25
 
The quest of poor whites to obtain legal land ownership was thwarted by the 
economic concerns of plantation owners and the corrupt state political establishment they 
oversaw. 
26
  The Yazoo land fraud case best epitomized this scenario, when, in 1795, the 
state passed a significant amount of its land holdings (the unsettled areas of what would 
become the states of Mississippi and Alabama) to a group of financial speculators who 
had bribed and intimidated state officials into selling them the land.  In one of Georgia’s 
first examples of broad coalition building since the end of the colonial era, small 
independent white farmers, landless poor whites, and many of the state’s early 
newspapers joined their voices in decrying the readily apparent graft of the sale. 
27
  The 
state’s political establishment, no doubt concerned about angry white crowds but 
probably even more fearful that it had been cheated in the selling price, soon balked at 
handing over the land.  After several court cases in which the speculators sued the state, 
the federal government stepped in and purchased the territory.  Under terms of transfer, 
Georgia received an annual payment from the United States for the sale, as well as a 
promise from the federal government to explore the termination of all Indigenous land 
claims within the state’s borders.   
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In response to the Yazoo debacle and to avoid future cases of widespread 
corruption, the state implemented a land system beginning in 1805 that allowed whites 
and military veterans to enter a lottery for the dispersal of future land obtained by 
cession. 
28
  Many of those in the upper echelons of the state’s powerful planter class 
resented the loss of such potentially valuable agricultural land to whites of varying 
economic means.  Planters, specifically, argued that the lottery system denied state 
government of revenue that could fund the state’s new land-grant college and various 
infrastructure improvements, and urged that the parcels be put up for auction.  Given the 
increasing tension between Indigenous Peoples and the state over cession-politics, 
however, the majority of white elites were in general agreement that the lottery would at 
least help in “establishing a barrier population against the aggressive Indians” by 
bolstering the ranks of the state’s militia. 
29
   
Yet even with additional land lotteries over the next two decades, the overall 
desire for land never subsided and the state’s poorest whites, unable to procure land 
through the market or by lottery, grew more disgruntled and continued crossing boundary 
markers into Native territories.  The writings of Colonel Hugh Montgomery, North 
Georgia’s Indian Agent in the 1820s, speak to the mindset of the state’s land-hungry 
white residents, when he noted that the “prevailing idea in Georgia (especially among the 
lower class) is that they are the rightful owners of the soil, and that the Indians are mere 
                                                 
28
 Prior to the implementation of the lottery, Georgia had operated under a headright system, that privileged 
existing property owners and their first born sons through a metric that awarded more opportunity based on 
the number of slaves and children one had.  George R. Lamplugh, Politics on the Periphery: Factions and 
Parties in Georgia, 1783-1806 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986) and James C Bonner, A 
History of Georgia Agriculture, 1732-1860 (University of Georgia Press, 1964).    
 
29
 Edward J. Harden, The Life of George M. Troup (Savannah: EJ Press, 1859), 191-192.  James C. Bonner, 





tenants at will; and indeed…there is only one point on which all parties both high and 
low in Georgia agree, and that is, that they all want the Indian lands.”  When the colonel 
rode through what would become Cobb County in 1826, just as Andrew Jackson had six 
years prior, he remarked that white settlers – though there illegally – had militarized 
themselves to action against any Cherokee that dared live too close to what they viewed 
as their own property.  
30
   
Adding fuel to an already volatile situation was a growing sense of victimization 
on behalf of Georgia’s whites, poor and wealthy alike.  As the only remaining member of 
the original thirteen colonies whose Native inhabitants had not been cleared from its 
borders, Georgia’s politicians began blaming the land crisis and ensuing instances of 
white violence on the United States government.  Often citing the promise to look into 
voiding all Native American land claims in the state, as had been stipulated in the post-
Yazoo land sale, the state’s political establishment sought to absolve itself from 
increasing acts of violence.  As one Georgia politician noted at the time, the United States 
government was either “unwilling or unable” to remove the state’s Native Peoples.  
Because of this, many white citizens surmised, Georgia had no choice but to take matters 
into her own hands and solve the crisis by whatever means it saw necessary, and that if 
violence did erupt, it was the federal government’s fault for being apathetic to the needs 
of white Georgians. 
31
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Concurrent to increases in anti-government rhetoric was an attempt to create a 
racial hierarchy based on white desire for open land. Georgia’s Governor George Troup, 
whose first cousin was a leader of the Lower Creeks wrote that “the utmost of rights and 
privileges which public opinion would concede to Indians would fix them in a middle 
station, between the Negro and the white man; and that as long as they survived this 
degradation without the possibility of attaining the elevation of the latter, they would 
gradually sink to the condition of the former.” 
32
  This sentiment was shared by another 
Georgia politician, George Gilmer, who often corresponded with a Cherokee leader, John 
Rogers.  In an 1831 letter, Gilmer urged Rogers to move his family west of the 
Mississippi River with other emigrating Cherokee, arguing that his “friend” should 
“accompany the Cherokee People in the move…You can be more useful and 
consequently happier with them than with us.” 
33
  Georgia’s new racial hierarchy, as 
proscribed by established white property owners, became clear by the second quarter of 
the nineteenth century, with whites holding a top position, Native Americans in a “middle 
station,” and Africans – whether free or enslaved – at the bottom.   
Just as concepts of race and class proved dynamic along the border between 
Georgia and its Native Peoples, so too, did the changing notions of what constituted 
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property rights.  As expressed in the United States Constitution, Indian lands under treaty 
were considered sovereign entities, alongside federal and state governments.  Beginning 
in 1823, the sovereign property rights of Native American Tribes began to be diminished 
with the Supreme Court ruling in Johnson v McIntosh.  In recognition of European 
property laws regarding “right of discovery,” the Court ruled that colonial laws in place 
at the time of “discovery” of the New World continued after the formation of the United 
States.  In short, the United States held title to all Native Lands, with Tribes merely 
holding legal possession in tenancy.  Tenancy, in this respect, meant that the land could 
not be transferred to a private person, but only to the federal government.  As Chief 
Justice Marshall concluded:  “Their [Indian Tribes] power to dispose of the soil at their 
own will, to whomever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, 
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.” 
34
  In Georgia, as in other states, 
state governments would recognize a prominent, wealthy Native American – who more 
often than not held European ancestry  and who happened to be open to land cession – as 
a “chief,” negotiate a land cession with that person, and send the treaty to the United 
States Congress for ratification. 
35
  Although the Cherokee Nation would eventually 
challenge their loss of land claim in a Supreme Court case, which saw the Court rule that 
Georgia had overstepped its Constitutional limits in negotiating treaties, the decision did 
nothing to halt what would become known as the Trail of Tears, the Removal of the 
state’s remaining Native Peoples.  Georgia’s state and local governments, along with land 
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hungry whites were in rare general agreement with one another when they embraced 
President Andrew Jackson’s assertion that the Cherokee were a “conquered and 
dependent people.”
 36
   
Though seemingly far removed from the politics of global capitalism, Georgia’s 
land hungry whites and established white property owners were well-integrated in an 
evolving universal concept of white political, social, and economic supremacy.  Legal 
scholar and critical theorist Peter Fitzgerald, in a study of the significance of the term 
“human rights” in post-Enlightenment global contexts, has demonstrated how “rights” 
were, and still are, constructed within a dynamic framework of economic exploitation.  
The formation and practice of “rights” such as with human or property is dependent upon 
a constant strategy of difference-making that serves to reinforce a concept of white 
supremacy as being the basis of legal thought.  In the contested lands of North Georgia, 
whites, whether as established property owners or as hopeful ones, embraced a concept of 
legal “rights” that tied race not just to land ownership but to the right to accumulate 
capital. 
37
  Such an increasingly racialized interpretation of property rights would 
continue throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century as many whites considered 
themselves – and not without legal precedent – to be the rightful heirs of all American 
soil, regardless of their economic or social class. 
38
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 Grace Kyungwon Hong has also noted the destructive qualities of universal markers such as human 
rights or property rights.  Hong argues that the formation of these markers in the era of American nation-




The effects of evolving conceptualizations of race, class, and property in the first 
half of the nineteenth century produced an economically and politically self-aware group 
of land holding whites. 
39
  Referred to by agrarian historians from the 1930s as “plain 
folk” and by later southern social historians as the “yeomanry,” this group of subsistence-
based farmers, empowered by their escalating numbers and their ability to vote as land-
holders, began fomenting their political and economic interests into pamphlets, 
newspapers, and other various tracts that focused their complaints on the influence 
planters held in state and local governments. 
40
  Chief among their arguments against the 
state’s elites was their rejection of large-scale slavery, which they viewed as an economic 
threat that drove prices down due to the planter’s ability to bring increases in supply to 
market upon the backs of African labor.  In northwest Georgia’s Carroll County, itself the 
creation of a Creek land cession, lottery settlers in a rebuke of the planter class and 
reflecting the ambivalent feelings they held towards large plantation slavery in general, 
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came to refer to their newly apportioned home county as the “free state of Carroll.” 
41
  
While it was not uncommon for the yeomanry to participate in small scale slavery – often 
excused as an economic necessity precipitated by the demands of settling new land – as a 
group with distinct political and economic concerns, they remained wary of the influence 
slavery-dependent planters had in state politics.  What was becoming apparent by the 
1820s was that the emergent white yeoman class was a political force that had no 
problem in exerting its new found strength.  Indeed, in the roughly twenty five years 
Georgia’s lottery system was active, nearly two thirds of the state was parceled to over 
100,000 white families. 
42
  By the beginning of the 1840s, Georgia’s white yeomen 
owned more land in total acreage than did the state’s planter class, the only southern state 
to have such an imbalance. 
43
   
While many scholars have rightfully addressed the “myth” surrounding agrarian 
values, democratic republicanism, and self-sufficiency, the significance of these traits 
seemed no less real to the small Georgia farmers who saw themselves as embodying the 
vision of Jefferson’s rural community-based America. 
44
 Even as early as 1860, writers 
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were referring to the “honest southern yeomen” as being “the industrious poor whites of 
the south.” 
45
  For many white yeomen, industriousness and self-sufficiency through land 
ownership were badges of honor that they came to believe separated themselves from the 
business-minded elites of Georgia’s cities and from the market-driven planters of the 
Black Belt.  The appeal of democratic republicanism as an identity marker proved to have 
a lasting effect on Georgia’s small farmers.  Even into the twentieth century, for example, 
the most popular newspaper among the state’s white farmers was titled The Jeffersonian, 
and politicians in counties with strong numbers of rural voters never hesitated to extol the 
virtues of Thomas Jefferson, or the legacies of Andrew Jackson. 
46
     
As the Cherokee embarked on the Trail of Tears in 1838 and 1839, the 
relationships between the yeomen who settled into North Georgia’s new counties such as 
Cobb and the old planter families in the Black Belt and Coastal Regions would become 
even more complicated, as state’s rights, tax policy, publicly-funded infrastructure plans, 
industrialization, and ultimately secession came to dominate political discourse.  Poor 
landless whites – those “inhabiting the lower classes” – continued to reside in Georgia’s 
older cities, as well as in the social and economic landscapes of the newly formed 
counties.  With their unlawful settlements uprooted by the legal awarding of land from 
the lotteries, poor, and once more landless whites in the former Indian Territories often 
gravitated to the nascent towns where they again labored in construction and milling, and  
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FIGURE 3: NATIVE AMERICAN LAND CESSIONS, 1733-1835 
The star indicates the location of Marietta in Cobb County, Georgia 






in later years, especially after the destruction of the southern economy by the Civil War, 
in northern-financed factories, becoming the backbone of North Georgia’s industrial  
workforce. 
47
 Following the upheaval of the Civil War, the ensuing economic depressions 
of the late nineteenth century, and a volatile cotton market in the early twentieth century, 
issues of ownership, property rights, political influence, and market capitalism would 
continue as the state’s white yeomanry struggled to keep hold of both their land and their 
social position.               
The Rural / Urban Divide  
The founding of Cobb County in 1832, the year of the next to last land lottery for 
Georgia, highlighted the rifts being felt across the state as white yeomen entered the 
upcountry seeking to preserve their new political clout as land owners.  With fertile 
bottomlands in the southern end of the county along the Chattahoochee River and red 
clay choked hills turning into mountains with streams speckled with gold flakes to the 
north, Cobb offered a diverse physical geography to arriving white settlers.  As 
proscribed by the state, the land was distributed in two separate lotteries, one for land, 
which awarded one hundred sixty acre parcels, and a gold lottery, which was granted in 
forty acre allotments.  In accordance with preceding lottery draws, entrants were required 
to be citizens of the United States (which precluded Native Americans and descendent 
Africans) and to be documented residents of Georgia for at least three years, which 
precluded most newly arriving immigrants who may not have documentation such as tax 
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payments or letters of tenancy.  Additionally, anyone previously cited for trespassing in 
the Indian Territories was denied the ability to draw.  The lottery system, in these 
respects, was designed to favor the state’s established whites – planters, yeoman, and 
their progeny.  Though “insolent” whites had been integral parts of Removal politics, 
once the state took title to Native lands, Georgia’s government and its legal system 
privileged white families who had stayed within the bounds of the law.  
48
   
By 1834 wagons were streaming into Cobb County, crossing legally-constructed 
ferries over the Chattahoochee River.  Within a year, a county seat of government was 
platted a few miles north of the river towards the geographic center of the county.  Given 
the name Marietta, a county courthouse was erected and a small business district created. 
49
  In the short time between the founding of Cobb County and the start of the Trail of 
Tears six years later, many Cherokee, in spite of being dispossessed of their lands, still 
had a physical presence in the area, trading goods and services with arriving lottery 
grantees and other settlers.  In this sense, early Cobb County was not the impenetrable 
barrier Georgia’s elites envisioned, but was instead a dynamic borderland between the 
older Black Belt plantations of the south and the remnants of the Cherokee Nation to the 
north. 
50
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With the exception of Marietta, Cobb’s other early cities of Acworth and 
Springville (Powder Springs) were less centers of commercial activity as they were place 
markers granted charter of incorporation by the state’s General Assembly. 
51
  Since 
Georgia only recognized two units of local government – city and county – a geographic 
place able to receive incorporation often reflected the influence of a well-connected 
businessman or industrialist who hoped to build a commercial center at some point in the 
future.  Throughout Georgia, it was not uncommon to find chartered cities with 
populations under a few hundred people, and sometimes even less. 
52
    
Politics in the county and in the nascent city of Marietta closely followed the 
divisions seen in older established parts of the state.  Throughout the early nineteenth 
century the two dominant political factions in Georgia involved the followers of former 
governors George Troup and John Clarke.  Class and geographical differences were 
integral to the state’s political organization, with Clarkites tending to be more rural with 
high concentrations of yeomen farmers in its ranks, while the Troupite faction consisted 
largely of wealthy planters, as well as those birthed by Georgia’s changing economic 
climate and geographic expansion, such as merchants, bankers and assorted urban 
entrepreneurs.  Not surprisingly, in new counties such as Cobb with a strong yeoman 
population due to the land lottery, Clarkites tended to be powerful in the countryside, 
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while Troupites were particularly influential in its newly incorporated cities, such as 
Marietta.  Both factions were ardent supporters of Indian Removal and embraced white 
supremacy as the basis of government.  Clarkites however, reflective of their yeoman 
base and republican values, remained wary of planters, large-scale slavery, as well as city 
development and business, while Troupites tended to embrace economic growth through 
public-funded projects and the private accumulation of capital. 
53
        
The politics of Removal and Georgia’s direct participation in Supreme Court 
rulings as in the Worcester decision had thrust the state and especially its newly formed 
counties into political disputes of regional and national character.  The federal tariff acts 
of 1828 and 1832, which were designed to protect northern industrial interests by 
enacting a tax on goods imported from other countries (mainly from Great Britain) 
incensed the urban Troup faction for two primary reasons.  First, was the belief that 
import tariffs unfairly affected the South due to its agricultural-based economic system.  
Because the region was an export-based economy that relied upon importation of finished 
goods, many politicians, planters, and merchants feared that higher import taxes would 
hinder economic development in the region.  Second, they felt that Great Britain, the 
South’s largest trading partner, might retaliate against higher tariffs by purchasing less 
cotton, an occurrence that would cripple southern ports such as in Savannah, implode the 
region’s highly leveraged banking institutions, and subsequently discourage large-scale 
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agricultural production in places like Cobb County. 
54
  Despite being geographically 
removed from the state’s shipping ports and lacking established financial institutions, 
Cobb County and Marietta were, nonetheless, within the orbit of state, regional, national, 
and even international economic systems.   Those who favored development and 
economic expansion, as the Troupites did, sought to protect their interests based on what 
they saw in the state’s future – a fully integrated economic system consisting of 
agriculture, mercantilists, banks, and industry, all predicated on the notion of low tariffs 
and the continued practice of human slavery.  The tariff dispute came to a head in 1832 
when South Carolina passed an ordinance arguing that the state could nullify any federal 
law it found as detrimental to the interests of its people.  Andrew Jackson, recently 
elected to the Presidency, began preparations for the use of force against the state until 
members of Congress successfully negotiated a new tariff compromise between northern 
industrialists and southern politicians. 
55
               
Georgia’s subsistence-based farming yeomanry was less affected by trans-
Atlantic trade than were the large planters of the Black Belt or the South’s urban 
mercantilists, but were certainly not without an opinion in the matter.  Many yeomen 
believed that the federal government should obtain the majority of its revenue from 
import taxes instead of domestic excises that might affect their day to day lives on a level 
that tariffs would not.  Though a higher tariff benefitted the interests of northern bankers 
and industrialists – the antithesis of the yeomanry’s Jeffersonian ideals – from the 
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perspective of state and local politics, the main foe of the small landed farmer was still 
the planter class and the broader Troup faction.  Thus, Clarkites and its yeomen 
constituents sided pro-federal tariff.  Georgia’s Troup faction, which by 1830 contained 
several competing elements, split on whether to oppose the tariff.  Planters, who were to 
be directly affected by the excise, largely stood against the tariff and embraced the 
concept of nullification.  Many emergent entrepreneurs, merchants, and bankers, 
especially in the new upcountry counties, however, voiced concern not so much over 
whether the tariff was harmful to their interests, but over the secessionist rhetoric of 
nullification.  
56
  Much more so than in the state’s Black Belt, the upcountry, birthed from 
federal intervention in Removal politics, was less willing to embrace secessionist 
thought.  The tariff issue also highlighted direct economic tensions between yeomen and 
large scale planters in both the Black Belt and the Upcountry.  Though the yeomanry 
prided itself for self sufficiency, they often lacked the ability to gin their own cotton and 
take their goods to market and were thus dependent upon planters, to remove seed from 
ball and to sell the farmer’s bales on the cotton market.  It is possible that Georgia’s white 
small farmers were willing to accept tariffs out of a sense of aggrievement over being 
unable to control the economics of their own properties.        
In the midst of the debate over the tariff, Georgia’s anti-nullification Jackson 
loyalists from the Clark faction folded into a newly created Union Party.  The troubled 
Troup faction likewise reorganized itself as the State’s Rights Party, following similar 
political organizations in Virginia and South Carolina.  As a broad-based coalition of 
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planters, merchants, and other wealthy elites, the Georgia party continued to be split on 
the nullification issue.   Within a few years of the nullification crisis being resolved, 
another point of contention within the new State’s Rights Party emerged, it too 
highlighting the rift between the planter and business wings. 
57
   At issue was the Bank of 
Georgia, a state-funded venture designed to underwrite or finance infrastructure 
improvements across the state that the General Assembly had narrowly passed with the 
backing of a Troupite-held governor’s office.  Popularly supported by the State’s Rights’ 
pro-business wing, and marginally accommodated by the party’s planters, the bank was 
never fully funded and became a source of antipathy for Georgia’s yeomanry, who saw 
the bank as a device that could take money from small farmers, while handing the 
financial benefits of the improvements over to businessmen and industrialists.  Just as the 
tariff and nullification issue split the Troupites years before, the state bank question 
sowed discord in the State’s Rights Party with convention meetings being unable to 
decide whether to support or weaken what their own party members had helped create.  
Not surprisingly, the Union Party capitalized on the split in the State’s Rights camp by 
decrying the continued existence of the state bank.  In Cobb, as in other counties of the 
former Cherokee Territories, the Union Party reigned supreme in the 1830s, often beating 
State’s Rights candidates for local and state election by two to one margins, closely 
indicative of population trends between county and city voters. 
58
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In an effort to legitimize their floundering party and reflective of the growing 
integration between local, state, regional, and national politics, Black Belt and upcountry 
members of Georgia’s State’s Rights Party aligned themselves with the Whigs, a 
business-friendly party that supported the national bank, tariffs, and publically-funded 
infrastructure improvements designed to further entrepreneurial and industrial growth.  
While seemingly odd given that many State’s Rights members had been ambivalent to 
the idea of either a national or state bank and that the former party could not even reach 
consensus over the question of nullification and the tariff, affiliation into an emergent two 
party national political system was unavoidable.  What the alignment demonstrated was 
the unity the State’s Rights Party and national Whigs shared in opposing Georgia’s Union 
Party and the national Democratic Party’s grasp on yeomen farmers and white urban 
laborers. 
59
     
With an increasing number of cities and business operations sprouting up in both 
the new counties and across the Black Belt, Georgia’s Whiggish State’s Rights Party 
began making considerable inroads in local and state elections in the mid to late 1830s.  
Not surprisingly, economic tensions between reenergized Whigs and state Democrats 
came to the fore, triggered, in large part, by the end of federal payments from the Yazoo 
land transfer.  The end of the payments coupled with the state legislature’s decision to 
dramatically cut tax rates led to Georgia reporting no revenue for three straight years 
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beginning in 1835. 
60
  Additionally, the state government found itself unable to issue 
bonds because the end of federal Yazoo payments meant that Georgia lacked a form of 
steady revenue to satisfy any potential bond purchasers.  By the end of the 1830s, the 
state government began taxing real and personal property which were dominated by 
farmland and slave-holdings as a way to generate revenue. The structure of this tax was 
based on an ad valorem system that placed a levy according to the value of real and 
personal property.  In an ad valorem system of taxation, property – such as with land – 
would be taxed a percentage of its assessed worth; the higher the value of the property, 
the higher the tax.     
Search for Revenue without Taxation 
Throughout the fiscal crisis and subsequent revenue reorganization plan, there 
was a strong unilateral public demand on the part of Georgia’s white property owners for 
government-funded services.  Georgia’s Union Party, for instance, championed hospitals, 
asylums, and additional welfare for the poor.  State’s Rights members favored 
transportation enhancements, such as with canals and wagon roads, as well as irrigation 
projects – reflective of their belief in using public money to spur economic growth 
beneficial to their interests.  Both parties favored additional spending on education.  
Finding the money to fund any project, however, proved to be problematic, as voters in 
both parties balked at seeing any possible increase in their own taxes.  From the 1830s 
and continuing throughout the remainder of the Antebellum Period, Georgia’s two 
dominant political parties waged an ongoing battle over what taxes should fund state 
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  Whiggish State’s Rights voters advocated that ad valorem real property 
taxes should pay the largest part of the financial burden, while Democratic supporting 
Union Party members argued that increased taxes on slaves and other forms of personal 
property should be the basis of government funding. 
62
        
As historian Peter Wallenstein has argued, what Georgia’s white property owners 
wanted, as did so many states in the years before the Civil War, were “tax-free sources of 
revenue.” 
63
  What emerged in the 1830s to be a possible realization of this desire was 
state-funded railroad construction.  Conceived as a publically-supported venture, 
proponents of the state railroad contended that Georgia could issue bonds for the 
construction costs based on future generated income to build a rail system that would tie 
the state’s agricultural regions and cities with markets in the Mid-west and possibly even 
up the east coast.  As planned, the proposed rail line would begin just south of the 
Chattahoochee River and continue through northwest Georgia to connect with existing 
lines in Chattanooga, Tennessee.  In a rare show of cooperation across party lines, the rail 
plan gained supporters among Union Party and State’s Rights members.  The Union 
Party’s Jacksonian Democrats in the state saw Georgia’s ownership of the railroad as 
essential because they believed it to be in the shared interests of white land owning 
farmers, who might be able to bypass having to deal with Black Belt influenced 
agricultural markets through direct rail access, while also seeing their tax liabilities 
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reduced due to increased revenue.  Georgia’s Whiggish State’s Rights members also saw 
the benefits of a state-owned rail line, but for different reasons.  Whigs, by and large, had 
no problem with state ownership of the rail system as they were champions of active 
government and viewed it as sound investment for promoting economic growth for Black 
Belt planters and business opportunities for bankers, merchants, and industrialists.  
Rome’s Georgia Courier, a Whig-leaning newspaper, editorialized in the early 1840s that 
in terms of promoting economic growth in the area “the distance to market” was “the 
great drawback upon our prosperity.” 
64
  As one early historian of American real estate 
noted “land speculation and railroad construction went hand in hand.” 
65
   
Another aspect of State’s Rights’ support for the railroad was that many pro-
railroad Whigs believed that once the line was opened, it would lead to the creation of 
new credit systems that would help finance future growth and development.  Since the 
failure of Georgia’s state bank, enterprising capitalists and pro-business politicians were 
left to either the volatility of private banks to finance construction projects or the slow 
process of waiting for state tax receipts to fund infrastructure improvements.  With a 
working railroad many state Whigs believed that a combination of revenue and capital 
would increase credit lending, which, in turn, would spur business entrepreneurship and 
industrial development.  By the 1840s, belief in the power of credit lending systems had 
become a near rallying cry for Whigs across the South.  In Maryland, for instance, a 
Whig legislator extolled that “credit is the poor man’s capital; and by it, in a moral point 
of view, the nation is benefited; for every individual is more anxious to preserve his 
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integrity and honesty, when he knows, that by doing so, it may advance his wealth and 
prosperity.” 
66
  Credit lending also took on a regional character with proponents claiming 
that it would free the South from northern influence over its economic affairs.  With a 
publically-funded transportation system, one historian has noted, Georgia’s Whigs saw an 
opening to encourage the state’s yeoman farmers to become “rational, market oriented, 
self-interested capitalist producers.” 
67
   
This Whig notion, however, was at odds with the aspirations the yeomanry held 
for the railroad line’s completion.  For white small farmers along the line’s route, direct 
rail access was seen as a way to reduce their reliance on third parties in the system of 
agricultural exchange by effectively cutting out the planter and his influence over markets 
from the equation.  Even with white property owners in agreement that the rail plan 
would provide tax free revenue, the discrepancies in what the railroad’s opening would 
mean at an economic level would have profound effects in years to come.      
   Work on cutting right-of-way and laying track for the newly christened Western 
and Atlantic Railroad began as early as the late 1830s only to be curtailed during a 
national economic depression that lasted nearly seven years.  In the early days of the rail 
line’s survey and construction, the state employed Cherokee laborers, but after the Trail 
of Tears and the onset of the depression and a shortage of state financing, slave labor 
filled the ranks of the railroad’s workforce. 
68
  As many historians have noted, the 
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prolonged construction phase of the rail line led to disputes over whether work should 
continue.  Primary among the arguments against continuing the line was the rising cost of 
the project and the always contentious question of tax policy and of who was and was not 
paying their fair share.  Small farmers across the state grumbled over tax assessments on 
their property, while noting that many of the largest planters near the proposed railroad 
were finding it more economically advantageous to lease slaves to the state for the 
construction than it was to plant cotton.  Among planters in areas removed from the 
construction resentment toward the railroad also began to fester.  Historian Steven Hahn, 
writing on the ill feelings brewing among the elites of the Black Belt toward the railroad, 
noted that many planters “had little desire to subsidize potential competitors” in the 
northwest parts of the state. 
69
  As progress on completing the railroad lagged, whether 
one supported or opposed continuing the endeavor often rested on where one resided.  In 
northwest Georgia, the line continued to garner wide support from yeomen and Whigs, 
alike.  New businesses in cities where the proposed railroad would have stops, such as in 
Marietta, flourished with activity, while area farmers looked forward to increased market 
potentials enabled by new transportation access (See Figure 3).  In portions of the state 
not directly impacted by the construction, even among state Democrats, who had 
originally conceived the plan, enthusiasm waned with representatives from south and 
eastern Georgia refusing to support a project from which their constituents “would derive 
scant benefit,” but from which they were expected to share in the cost burden through 
state ad valorem taxes to complete. 
70
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 The debate over real property taxes would heighten in the late 1840s, when a 
Whig dominated state legislature began to remake Georgia’s tax laws through sweeping 
changes to the ad valorem system.  Under an 1852 tax act, planters and urban landowners 
saw their share of taxable property decrease dramatically.  Prior to the new tax act, the 
majority of Georgia’s revenue came from slave-holdings and personal property, as well 
as from the poll tax.  In terms of real property, town lots prior to 1852 were taxed at 
higher rates than farms, leading a city resident to exclaim in the Whig-leaning Southern 
Recorder that Georgians residing in the cities “are more unequally taxed than any people 
in the civilized world.” 
71
  Following the passage of the 1852 act, slave-holdings and 
urban lots saw tax reductions, while rural farm land witnessed marked increases.    
 
TABLE 1:  Percentages of Georgia Property Taxes Paid in Three Selected Counties Before and After the 1852 Tax Act 72 
 
County Type of Property 1851 1852 Relative Change 
 
Baldwin Slaves 43.0% 43.6% +1% 
 Land 14.4 18.7 +30% 
 Town Lots 18.2 4.9 -73% 
 
Hancock Slaves 64.1% 53.2% -17% 
 Land 12.6 22.6 +79% 
 Town Lots 8.0 2.3 -72% 
 
Walton Slaves 55.2% 43.6% -21% 
 Land 19.1 26.2 +37% 
 Town Lots 6.3 1.4 -78% 
 
Lowered tax rates on town lots in incorporated areas and on the numbers of 
enslaved persons combined with the opening of the Western and Atlantic Railroad had an 
immense effect on state and local economies.  In counties where the rail line traversed the 
landscape, cotton production at least quadrupled during the 1850s.  Even counties 
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removed from direct access to the railroad, but that abutted counties that did, saw 
increases in cotton production double their 1840s levels. 
73
  The numbers of enslaved 
persons in counties along or near the rail line also grew in accordance with the rise in 
cotton production.                  
TABLE 2: Rise in Percentage of Enslaved Persons as Related to Total County Population in Selected Counties Carved from 
Cherokee Nation 74 
 

















9390 21% Cass 
(Bartow) 
13300 23% Cass 
(Bartow) 
15724 27% 
Cherokee 5895 8% Cherokee 12800 9% Cherokee 11291 11% 
Cobb 7539 12% Cobb 13853 16% Cobb 14242 27% 
Floyd 4441 29% Floyd 8205 37% Floyd 15195 39% 
Forsyth 5619 10% Forsyth 8850 12% Forsyth 7749 12% 
Gilmer 2536 4% Gilmer 8440 2% Gilmer 6724 3% 
Lumpkin 5671 9% Lumpkin 8955 11% Lumpkin 4626 9% 
Murray 4695 17% Murray † 14433 13% Murray 7083 20% 
Paulding 2556 18% Paulding 7039 21% Paulding 7038 8% 
Union 3152 3% Union 7234 4% Union 4413 3% 
 
†In 1850, Murray County included what would become Catoosa and Whitfield Counties, and contained parts of existing Cass and 
Chattooga Counties.   
 
As Table 2 illustrates, the counties carved out of former Native American lands, 
which had prided themselves on the values of self sufficiency and yeoman ideals, were 
becoming increasingly more integrated into the economics of agricultural slave labor 
production.  Such integration was especially noticeable in counties with physical access 
to the state constructed railroad.  Yet unlike the older established counties of the 
agriculturally-dominated Black Belt, North Georgia’s counties along the Western and 
Atlantic route also included growing urban centers that fostered industrial development, 
mercantile operations, banking institutions, and other venues of commerce.  Increased   
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FIGURE 5:  AN 1885 MAP ILLUSTRATING THE WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RAILROAD IN 
COBB COUNTY AND THE GEOGRAPHIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARIETTA AND 
ATLANTA.  THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE MAP WAS TO PROVIDE LOCATION SITES 
OF CIVIL WAR BATTLES.  





levels of production and business following the opening of the railroad line demonstrate 
that counties such as Cobb were undeniably involved in antebellum market capitalism.   
The population split between commercial and agricultural interests, however, was largely 
unique in Georgia, where counties were dominated politically by either its cities or by its 
rural concerns.   
Although urban / rural economic tensions as epitomized by the 1852 Tax Act had 
often run high throughout the period between settlement and the beginning of the Civil 
War, operation of the Western and Atlantic brought not only revenue but the opportunity 
for capital accumulation.  For a short period of time between the rail line’s opening and 
the onset of the Civil War, real and personal property taxes were actually reduced.   
According to Peter Wallenstein, “As nontax revenue took pressure off taxpayers, the two 
groups’ differences grew less pronounced.” 
75
  The two factions also managed to work 
together to lobby state government for a discounted freight cost relating to the movement 
of agricultural and commercial products emanating from locations adjacent to the 
government subsidized rail line, a plea that alienated other regions of the state and 
brought about a strong rebuke from railroad officials in Georgia’s government.  One 
leading official of the state railroad upon hearing of the lobbying effort scoffed at the 
idea:  “They insist that the Road [rail line] was constructed for the purpose of promoting 
the agricultural and industrial interests of one peculiarly favored section of the state, and 
protest against the efforts of its managers to make it a source of direct pecuniary profit; 
they are willing to tax the whole population of Georgia for its construction, but when the 
time comes to reimburse its owners for their outlay…they seek to…deprive the Road of 
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all profit from its way of business.” 
76
  Even though deep economic differences still 
existed between factions of white property owners – be they in the countryside or cities – 
the coalition instilled by the railroad led to a brief period of political cooperation at the 
local level.      
The realization of lowered property taxes with increased revenue, and the political 
cooperation it fostered would prove to be short lived.  In addition to the 1840s and 1850s 
ushering in an era of publically-funded infrastructure projects, it also witnessed a startling 
reversal of political organization at the state level.  Having embraced private-public 
improvements such as the Western and Atlantic Railroad, many members of the old 
State’s Rights Party, particularly those from North Georgia, reformed into the 
Constitutional Union Party, which continued to align nationally with Whigs and held 
strong pro-federal feelings in contrast to the nullification rhetoric that once came out of 
the State’s Rights camp.  Other former State’s Rights members, especially planters from 
the Black Belt, joined the Democratic Party, which over the course of the 1850s and in 
the context of the American South, were harboring increasingly anti-Union sentiments.  
Georgia governor Joseph E. Brown, a one-time ardent supporter of Jackson and vocal 
opponent of nullification had, over the course of a decade, come to embrace Calhounism.  
In a demonstration of his new state’s rights leanings, Governor Brown seized control of 
the Georgia Military Institute located in Marietta and significantly increased funding to 
the state militia system.  By the mid 1850s, as the national Whig Party began to collapse, 
so too did Georgia’s Constitutional Union Party.  As early as 1852, many Georgia Whigs 
were already backing away from national affiliation.  When the national party nominated 
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Winfield Scott for the presidency, a significant number of disaffected Georgia Whigs 
shunned the nominee and voted for Daniel Webster who had actually died before the 
election. 
77
 With some Constitutional Union members sitting out of local and state 
politics, many more entered into the Democratic fold, while others still followed the end 
of the national Whigs into splinter parties. 
78
  In Georgia’s seventh congressional district, 
which included Cobb County, a candidate aligned with the national xenophobic and anti-
Papist Know Nothing Party even managed to win election, despite a decided lack of 
immigrants or Catholics in North Georgia.  In this sense, party affiliation was secondary 
to protecting local interests, which continued to be Whiggish.  Although political 
realignments and reversals of ideological differences may appear “illogical” on the 
surface, they reflected the evolving attitudes commercial and agricultural interests held 
towards changing economic and social conditions. 
79
              
The Cost of Secession  
Examinations into North Georgia’s participation in secession have received ample 
attention over the past several decades.  One current of thought holds that the dissolution 
of the Constitutional Union Party removed a political ballast that countered states rights 
extremism.  Another line of reasoning contends that economic forces drove the secession 
crisis.  Still another argues that a confluence of southern nationalism, increased 
militarism, and the desire to protect not just white supremacy but the hegemony of white 
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landowning farmers and business persons led to secession. 
80
  In probability, there is truth 
in all lines of thought.  As pointed out, much of the region was increasingly integrated in 
the economics of slavery; was in a fractured state of political organization; and was 
mostly united to the protection of its commercial and agricultural interests.  Yet it should 
also be noted that while counties such as Cobb approved secession from the Union, many 
of its neighbors did not.  Indeed, when the armies of General Sherman began pushing 
Confederate forces south from Tennessee and into the mountains of northern Georgia, 
many southern soldiers were shocked to see towns and communities where the United 
States’ flag still flew above public buildings and private residences alike.  As the war 
inched closer to Cobb County, the Western and Atlantic Railroad was routinely targeted 
for destruction, and Union and Confederate forces stripped many homes and farms of 
their wares.  By the summer of 1864, Union forces controlled the major commercial 
centers of North Georgia.  Prior to beginning the march to Savannah, Sherman’s army set 
fire to parts of Marietta and Atlanta, including county courthouses, city buildings, cotton 
warehouses, and most structures related to the railroad. 
81
      
Unsurprisingly, the physical destruction unleashed upon North Georgia 
transformed the region’s political, social and economic structures, as agricultural and 
commercial systems were left in a state of chaos given the breakdown in infrastructure 
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and currency.  With dissolution of Confederate currency, creditors demanded payment in 
federal greenbacks, a high value note that most southerners could hardly obtain.  The 
collapse of the southern economy led to a massive turnover in property ownership, 
especially among the planter class who, unlike their yeoman counterparts, often held high 
quantities of debt due to their direct relationships with regional and national markets, as 
well as the credit systems they had advocated so vociferously.   
At the end of the Civil War, Georgia’s state government was still accountable for 
its pre-war debts and faced the fact of having to issue bonds to rebuild much of its 
infrastructure.  Local governments suffered similar problems.  As late as 1869, four years 
after the end of the Civil War, Cobb’s government held a grand total of sixteen cents in 
the county treasury. 
82
  On the social front, the end of the war greatly unsettled the racial 
and class formations constructed over the decades following Removal.  In Cobb County, 
twenty-seven percent of its total pre-war population were newly emancipated and by 
1868 granted federal citizenship.  The next ten years would see dramatic tensions arise 
between struggling propertied whites and Freedmen and Freedwomen over land 
ownership, labor contracts, and for men, the right to vote without duress. 
83
  Even as the 
years after the war witnessed the maturation of Lost Cause mythology, Georgia’s 
veterans and their widows, unlike those in the North, were unable to receive assistance or 
pensions from the federal government.  The need to provide for veterans and their 
families placed an extra annual fiscal burden onto state government.   
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TABLE 3:  Collected Percentages Contributed to State Property Tax 84  
 
 1860 1870 1888 
 
Rural Real Estate 24.1% 42.3% 31.0% 
Urban Real Estate 5.2% 21.2% 23.8% 
Slaves 45.0% --- --- 
Miscellaneous Personal 
Property 
6.7 % 14.4% 15.0% 
Merchandise 2.3% 5.7% 5.2% 
Capital 16.7% 16.4% 16.8% 
        
With much of the Western and Atlantic Railroad’s infrastructure waiting to be 
rebuilt, and with the loss in revenue it once generated for the state combined with the loss 
from levying slave holdings, Georgia once again turned to ad valorem taxation to pay for 
the majority of state expenditures.  As represented in Table 3, the 1870 data figures relate 
to the tax codes enacted by Georgia’s Reconstruction Republican government.  The sharp 
increases in rural and urban tax collection helped fuel white resentment towards what was 
seen as a government of carpetbaggers and former slaves.
 85
   As many historians have 
noted, however, Georgia’s Reconstruction government was far from economically 
radical. 
86
  Although there were marked rises in ad valorem taxes, they were needed to 
offset the loss of revenue from slave holdings and the destruction of the railroad.  Actual 
spending adjusted for the changes shows that the aggregate value generated from 
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property taxes fell precipitously from $672,000,000 in 1860 to $226,000,000 in 1870, 
only to rise modestly to $357,000,000 in 1888. 
87
  The decrease is illustrative of the 
lowered value of real and personal property in the state – as could be expected after the 
war and during the economic depression that followed – but the aggregate value taken 
into consideration with the percentages collected in ad valorem taxes demonstrates that 
Georgia’s Reconstruction government was far from a radical body intent on transforming 
the state’s economic system through massive tax and spend programs.  Another 
interesting component of the data is that taxes on merchandise, a commodity held by 
members of the state’s mercantilists and small business persons, also doubled after the 
Civil War.  Tax percentages on capital, which included industrial and manufacturing 
concerns, however, remained remarkably steady compared to other forms of property 
available to taxation.  Though capital was a large contributor to state revenue, the 
increased burden on small commercial, merchandise-based businesses would create 
friction between small businesses and industry and corporations, a division that seldom 
receives the investigation it deserves.             
Cobb’s White Property Owner in Reconstruction and the New South  
Resentments among white property owners following the increased tax rates 
placed upon the public by the state’s Reconstruction government played a significant part 
in rebuilding the Democratic Party and ushering in the era of Redemption, a white 
revanchist exercise to reclaim Georgia’s government from Republicans and their African 
American allies.  Shortly after the tax receipts of 1870, disgruntled white taxpayers 
fueled by economic anxiety and a belief in the cure-all fix of white supremacy, drove 
                                                 
87
 Aggregate value in this case refers to the total amount in dollars collected from property taxes.  




state Democrats back to power in the Georgia General Assembly.  Two years later, 
resurgent Democrats regained the governorship, ushering in a nearly one hundred and 
thirty consecutive year reign of Democratic governors. 
88
   
Although the 1870 reclamation of state government was supported by a broad 
coalition of white property owners, from both the cities and countryside, representing 
small farmers, planters, businessmen, and urban professionals, fissures in the new 
political alliance would emerge nearly instantaneous to the transfer of power from 
Republican to Democrat.  The impending breakdown was prophesized by Joseph E. 
Brown, the state’s Civil War era governor and one-time arch secessionist turned post-war 
Republican “scalawag” turned born-again Democrat who looked at the formation of 
Georgia’s new multi-factional Democratic Party and surmised it to be “a heterogeneous 
mass of as antagonistic elements as ever banded together in one common cause.” 
89
  
White supremacy may have brought the coalition together, but it would be tax policy that 
would break it apart.       
Among the chief complaints of disaffected white taxpayers was that the state’s 
Democratic hierarchy was awarding spoils of office to persons and industries it favored.  
Generally, these favorites were individuals or nascent corporations that could provide 
financial gain to those at the head of the party.  This was especially true when it came to 
railroad ownership.  Citing the need to generate revenue, Georgia’s Republican and later 
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Democratic Parties engaged in a wholesale dismantling of public ownership over the 
state’s rail lines.  Rail lines such as the Western and Atlantic were designed to generate 
revenue through leases, while reducing the tax obligations of property owners.  Many of 
the whites who rallied behind the Democratic banner in 1870 did so out of rising real and 
personal property taxes, and were largely surprised that what they perceived to be 
valuable public commodities were being sold to newly-organized corporate concerns.  
Small business owners and rural farmers no doubt expected the government they 
supported to be economical in expenditure and reach.  When state government began 
awarding contracts and issuing bonds for the rebuilding of infrastructure destroyed during 
the war, astute property owners growled at what they saw as continued graft and 
corruption.  Indeed, in an 1870 special investigation conducted by the national 
Democratic Party that was meant to uncover Republican graft in Georgia during 
Reconstruction, its investigators found a dismal assessment of both parties.  
90
 
One particular case that became a favorite topic of Democratic dissidents 
involved what was known as the “Brunswick and Albany railroad swindle.”  During the 
war years, Georgia Governor Joseph E Brown took control of the line claiming it 
necessary for the war effort.  At the conclusion of the war, the devastated railroad line 
was sold for fifteen hundred dollars to a private individual.  Within a few years, the 
Brunswick and Albany Railroad was incorporated by a group of investors and began 
pressing the governor’s office and the General Assembly for monetary help in rebuilding 
the line.  By 1869, the state had agreed to financially support the rail line’s reconstruction 
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with state-issued bonds.  When Democrats swung back into power of the state house they 
continued to increase Georgia’s financial obligations in rebuilding the line’s 
infrastructure.  By the early 1870s, the rail line had one hundred and seventy total miles 
of track that was inclusive of the sixty miles of track that had survived the war.  Though 
the railroad corporation only managed to complete approximately one hundred and ten 
miles of track, Georgia’s state government had issued bonds totaling $5,000,000 for its 
construction.  That the money was going to a privately-held corporation that had 
purchased the line for only fifteen hundred dollars incensed many of Georgia’s taxpayers.           
Such private-public partnerships, however, were not an outgrowth of the political 
turmoil of the post Civil War era.  Indeed, throughout the 1840s and 1850s, private 
investment groups routinely tried to gain state funding for projects they argued would be 
beneficial to the state, such as with the Western and Atlantic Railroad. 
91
  Generally, 
these projects promised to bring development and commerce to the regions in which they 
were planned.  State government, consumed with bringing in whites to settle Georgia 
through territorial expansion, often took such plans seriously as viable options to 
encourage commercial and agricultural development.  Georgia had, in fact, a strong 
history of state interventionist policy-making.  The difference between the antebellum 
and postbellum eras was both the number of private-public partnerships being approved 
and the lack of scrutiny into the merit of the projects.  Prior to the Civil War, Georgia’s 
competing political factions kept graft, at least to some degree, in check.  The brief 
coalition of whites that formed in opposition to new taxes and to instill white supremacy 
in state government actually undermined the ability to run economy in government. 
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FIGURE 6: WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RAILROAD IN COBB COUNTY, c. 1890.  
Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia, Cob-41. 
 
Emerging from the fissure in white unity was an independent movement headed 
by William Harrell Felton, a doctor, Methodist circuit minister, and planter from Bartow 
County, whose only political experience was serving one term in the state legislator in the 
early 1850s as a Whig. 
92
  Counting upon his deep ties in his home county of Bartow and 
also in Cobb, Felton came to be widely respected by farmers and small businessmen alike 
who gathered to hear his condemnations of Democratic corruption and fiscal 
irresponsibility. 
93
  As a preacher of political Independentism, which eschewed formal 
affiliation with either Republican or Democratic Parties in the 1870s and 1880s, Felton 
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tied questions of finance, accusations of corruption, and regionalism to his critiques of 
state government. 
94
 Above all, the Independent Movement was about having control 
over one’s economic situation without falling prey to what they saw as a rigged political 
and economic system, a popular concern among white property owners following the 
Civil War.  Yet unlike future political movements, particularly Populism and the 
Farmer’s Alliance, the Independent Movement in North Georgia never sought to 
repudiate capitalism or market economies.  Respective of both the Whig belief in 
entrepreneurship and profit accumulation, as well as the Jeffersonian ideals of self-
sufficiency and republicanism of the land owning farmer, Independentism spoke against 
mostly what it saw as a corrupted economic system. 
95
  Georgia’s old Whig members 
particularly bristled at the apparent graft of the state’s reconstituted Democratic Party.  
As one old Georgia Whig complained: “There is no principle involved in politics since 
the war…It is only a contest between the ins and outs for place and power for the 
privilege and opportunity to rob the United States Treasury.” 
96
  As such, the goal of 
Independents was not to radically alter capitalist exchange or accumulation, but to make 
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it more egalitarian, if not at least more beneficial to the needs and desires of those who 
carried the Independent banner to the polls.  In this objective, Felton found many allies 
among struggling white property owning and tenant-based farmers, small business 
owners who lacked political connections, urban property owners who decried rising tax 
rates, white laborers in the cities, and also Freedmen, who faced a resurgent Democratic 
Party intent on disenfranchisement.   This would mark the first coalition of African 
Americans and whites who, while unwavering in their belief in white supremacy, were 
willing to choose the primacy of economic security over their assumptions in racial 
hierarchies.              
With Independentism’s appeal largely limited to North Georgia, Felton’s 
followers urged him to run for the United Sates Congress.  Unlike his Democratic 
opponent, who had the backing of most of the Seventh District’s industries and 
newspapers, as well as the support of a powerful network of resurgent Democrats, Felton 
relied on grass roots organization to mount his campaign for the House seat. 
97
  In the 
final month leading up to the election, Felton traveled each day to a different location, 
giving impromptu speeches wherever he was welcomed.  Recognized by many, including 
his opponents, as a masterful orator and debater, Felton often encountered little to no face 
to face resistance in the places he visited. 
98
  In an effort to draw attention away from 
Felton’s barnstorming through the northern counties, local newspapers, which were 
largely in league with the state’s Democratic Party, began printing stories that supporters 
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of the Independents were planning to bring in “Negroes” from Alabama to vote for 
Felton.  The Atlanta Constitution, like many of the other pro-Redeemer Democrat papers 
in the state, claimed that a Democratic win was all but a certainty. 
99
  In the end, after 
three days of counting and recounting the ballots, Felton won the House seat by a mere 
total of eighty two votes.  Where Democrats won convincingly in counties such as Floyd, 
where iron industries and textile operations were especially strong, in places where the 
Western and Atlantic Railroad was key to the economic survival of mercantilists and 
farmers, Felton won in a landslide.  In Cobb, Felton recorded nearly twice the votes of 
the Democrat candidate.  In Bartow, Felton’s home county, the Independent won over 
five times as many votes as his competitor.  In Marietta, which had prided itself on its 
pro-business environment dating back to the 1840s, Felton won 863 votes to the 
Democratic Dabney’s 239 votes, with Felton proving especially strong with laborers, 
small business owners, and Freedmen. 
100
         
The intense conflict between the grassroots power of the Independents and the 
political influence of the state’s Democratic Party led observers to refer to the Seventh 
Congressional District as the “Bloody Seventh.”   While Democrats had largely 
reclaimed most of the state without any opposition, the counties carved from Cherokee 
lands and located along the Western and Atlantic Railroad continued to be hotbeds of 
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political discontent.  In Felton’s subsequent reelection campaigns in 1876 and 1878, the 
state’s Democratic Party and its allied industries, corporations, and newspapers waged a 
relentless attack on the Independent champion.  Prominent Democrats smeared Felton’s 
service during the war, proclaiming that his stint as a surgeon in Macon had allowed him 
to dodge the conflict.  A common attack upon Felton was the Independent Movement’s 
association with Freedmen voters.  With the Republican Party in disarray by the mid 
1870s, many of its stalwart white supporters and African American voters in North 
Georgia gravitated to the Independents.  This occurrence undoubtedly struck fear in 
Democrats who feared that such an alliance would spread to other parts of the state with 
strong populations of Freedmen and unhappy white Democrats. 
101
  When Felton shared a 
stage at a campaign rally in Adairsville with a group of Republicans, discontented 
Democrats, and an African American orator known as “Middlebrooks,” his opponents 
were quick in their attempts to undermine the formation of a possible alliance between 
disaffected whites and Freedmen.  The Daily Constitution, pointing to the number of 
African Americans Felton attracted to his campaign, decried that a vote for Felton would 
be a vote for “civil rights and social equality.” 
102
  Similar sentiments were found in the 
Marietta Journal, when it asked in an editorial how any proud white Georgian could still 
support Felton. 
103
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Despite being accused of racial radicalism, Felton’s tenure as a Congressman was 
markedly conservative, with the Independent advocating fiscal responsibility with 
moderate public investments in education and healthcare.  Drawing upon his experience 
as a doctor, Felton was instrumental in bringing quinine to the Deep South to help 
prevent malaria outbreaks and argued that agricultural technical schools would benefit 
residents in rural and urban communities. 
104
   As a member of the influential Ways and 
Means Committee, Felton also opposed tariff reform of steel firms that would reduce the 
steel tax from twenty eight dollars a ton to ten dollars a ton on materials shipped via 
railroads.  The lowered shipping taxes were universally favored by Georgia’s corporate 
and industrial concerns, who felt that the better prices would spur investment and 
development in the state.  Felton, however, argued that tax rates and shipping costs were 
issues that should be settled between the steel industries and the railroads, not the federal 




On race, Felton and the Independents were willing to court African American 
votes and to share public spaces, but did not attempt to overturn the basis of white 
supremacy in state or local government.  Emerging Jim Crow laws, for example, which 
limited social mobility and political access, were not challenged.  Instead, Independents 
preached an ideology based on fairness and egalitarian principles.  For Felton and his 
followers, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had granted “the [N]egro…all the 
rights guaranteed him,” while claiming the “race issue” to be “completely eliminated 
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from our politics.” 
106
 Unlike Democrats, who relied upon racist appeals to win white 
votes, Independents codified an early example of race-neutral language into political 
discourse.  Though their appeals for a color-blind approach to political change allowed 
Independents to be seen as racial moderates interested in broad coalition-building, they 
were unquestioned proponents of white supremacy.  Georgia’s legal and economic 
systems were built on racial exclusion, and Independents were not going to make any 
attempt to overturn them.  Felton’s political influence came in pointing out how he and 
others, as white property owners, were being affected by political corruption.  
Independents wanted a system based on racial privilege; they just wanted the privileges it 
promised.             
As a purely North Georgia phenomenon, the Independent Movement, as a viable 
alternative to the Democratic Party, lost its momentum in the 1882 election.  Felton, who 
had always performed well in counties such as Cobb, where business and agriculture 
shared power, eventually lost by a two to one margin to a corporate-backed Democratic 
candidate. 
107
  The decline of the Independent Movement can be attributed to three 
factors: 1) that the post-Redeemer anger felt by property owning whites ran its course as 
taxes stabilized by the 1880s; 2) that many of Felton’s grievances against the Democratic 
Party such as large-scale bond issuances had been curtailed; and 3) that Felton was seen 
as being of a different era, an anti-modern at odds with the forward vision of the 
emerging New South ethos.  During his last campaign for Congress, for example, local 
newspapers aligned with industry, such as the Marietta Journal and Daily Constitution, 
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routinely lambasted Felton as an enemy of a modern “New South.” 
108
  But it would be a 
mistake to assume that Independentism receded into the past.  Political and economic 
disaffection would continue to play significant roles in the daily lives of North Georgia 
and Cobb County residents.   
Although Independents had little interest in remaking the capitalist system, the 
later Populist movement of the turn of the twentieth century proved an intense challenge 
to Georgia’s Democratic Party and the corporate and industrial coalitions it had 
cultivated.  Led by Thomas Watson, who had witnessed his father lose his farm, the 
Populists organized at the grassroots to transform the economic structure of post-war 
Georgia, and gained strong traction among Cobb’s white farmers.  “Men in prosperity do 
not want reform,” Watson once wrote.  “Reforms commence from below…they begin 
with the ‘outs’ not with the ‘ins.’” 
109
  An overwhelmingly rural movement, yet one with 
small pockets of support from labor, Populism pulled together white farmers fearful of 
crushing debts and the possibility of losing their property, and courted, as had the 
Independents,  African Americans to support their cause.  Looking at the ability of 
Watson and his grassroots Populism to mobilize farmers across the state to local polling 
booths and to flood courthouse squares to speak out against existing economic policies, 
some historians have noted that Populists could be legitimately “labeled everything from 
proto-Fascists to proto-Marxists.” 
110
  While Populists were primarily interested in 
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reforming national currency rates and state ad valorem tax structures, along with 
promoting increased agricultural aid and services, they also continued the Independent 
movement’s call for ending political corruption.  “[W]ealth,” one Populist wrote in an 
essay from Watson’s Jeffersonian newspaper, “belongs to him who creates it, rather than 
those who by chicanery, legislation, and fortuitous circumstance, manage to get 
possession of it.”  The proper role of “government,” the writer concluded, is one that 
promoted “wealth, prosperity, and happiness” and offered “every man a fair chance.” 
111
  
Without a standing coalition between farmers and the entrepreneurial class that 
had existed with Independents, Populism largely failed to register in urban centers, 
making its political aspirations more difficult.  Likewise, Georgia Populism’s turn to 
militant white supremacy destroyed the tenuous partnership between white and African 
American farmers when, after losing a close election, Watson blamed the loss on what he 
saw as the disloyalty of the African American voters to the Populist cause.  Astonished 
that African Americans might vote for candidates whom they felt might better represent 
their own local interests and not just Watson’s party, Watson turned on his allies, arguing 
that Democrats would manipulate the Black vote if African Americans were enfranchised 
in large numbers. From there forward, Watson and his white populists began pushing for 
more stringent devices to discourage Black participation at the polls. 
112
   
Another factor contributing to the decline in power of Georgia’s Populist Party 
was the advent of progressive politics.  Reflective of national trends, Georgia’s political 
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establishment came to embrace Progressivism by the turn of the twentieth century.  A 
movement initially sparked by reformists, and quickly seized upon by elected officials 
looking to counter both the public impact of Populist-Democratic unity and the power of 
corporate and industrial concerns in government affairs, Progressivism promised 
increased social services to the state’s residents.  From its onset in Georgia, the 
movement showed divisions between rural and urban interests.  In rural areas, Georgia-
style progressivism tended to gravitate towards agricultural reforms and regulation of 
railroads to ensure fair price access of farmers to markets.  In urban areas, the state’s 
progressive causes more often than not emanated from the business and industrialist 
communities.  In cities, and in other areas with large-scale factories and mills, the 
proponents of Progressivism included civic leaders, elected officials, stock holders, and 
those in the higher echelons of an operation’s organization.  Touting the need for public 
investment in infrastructure improvements that would increase industrial productivity, 
and would in turn produce more jobs, Georgia’s urban Progressivism fit nicely within the 
framework established by the New South ethos.  Among the business community and for 
urban property owning professionals, Progressivism was tied to modernity through 
activities such as infrastructure projects and beautification efforts.  What both rural and 
urban Progressivism in Georgia offered was a top-down approach to social uplift.  
Changes in agricultural policies and rail rates promoted by rural Progressives were good 
for small land owning farmers, but the real benefits were returned to the large planters.  
With urban Progressivism, seemingly benevolent programs aimed at issues of child labor 
or anti-lynching were often rooted in how they could benefit business and industry.  As 




raised the minimum working age before hand to show themselves as protectors of 
innocent children.  Among many urban politicians and boosters, support for anti-lynching 
laws was done less out of respect for the law than for placating northern investors who 
expected to see a modern, less violent South.  J Morgan Kousser’s assertion that “If 
Progressivism had a general theme in the South, it was hardly ‘democracy’…but the 
stabilization of society, especially the economy, in the interests of the local established 
powers,” is true to point. 
113
   
By the early years of the twentieth century, Cobb’s white property owner 
inhabited a precarious place within the political climate of state government, being at 
once privileged by their legal status of property ownership, but also largely disaffected 
from the political process since the dissolution of the Independent and Populist 
Movements.  Through their demands for federal intervention to remove Native Peoples 
from Georgia’s borders and their subsequent involvement in political alignments and 
public policy-making, Cobb’s white property owners were instrumental in the creation of 
a white supremacist state government, but saw their economic interests devalued by the 
corrupting forces of political failure and corporate money. Rural white property owners, 
for example, witnessed its Populist leadership forsake its movement against credit 
systems and corporate control of state government for the disenfranchisement of African 
Americans.  Urban white land owners, likewise, saw the Independent Movement, which 
championed the small entrepreneur (also within a framework of white supremacy) lose to 
the overwhelming power of corporate and industrial interests.  The Progressive spirit that 
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promised to uplift Georgia’s property owner into a modern era failed to materialize, being 
sufficiently co-opted by the financial interests of banks, railroads, and various 
corporations. By the beginning of the twentieth century, white land owners also chafed 
under a state government that had reverted to its antebellum ad valorem tax scheme, 
which had property be the basis of revenue collection.  The changing economic and 
political tides witnessed from the 1870s to the turn of the twentieth century further 
entrenched Georgia’s white property owners into enclaves of rural and urban 
factionalism.  They had been principle actors in the development of a capitalist system 
that afforded them property rights and racial privilege, yet, as their mounting tax bills 
showed, had become unable to accumulate or preserve the wealth they desired.   
Since its beginnings in the 1830s, Cobb County and its white property owners 
were products of its location in time and place.  Carved from the remnants of the 
Cherokee Nation and built upon a plan to modernize Georgia through the construction of 
a revenue-generating railroad system, Cobb, like its neighbors, evolved with strong 
factions of both rural and urban interests.  Unlike the planter-dominated areas of South 
Georgia, which was historically based on large-scale agricultural production, Cobb 
developed in the mid nineteenth century as a place for entrepreneurial capitalists and 
small-scale farmers. Without the political clout of planters or corporations, Cobb’s rural 
and urban white property owners grew keenly aware of economic forces, such as with tax 
codes and lending practices.  For a brief decade prior to the American Civil War, Cobb’s 
white population was united in their support for the state-funded Western and Atlantic 
Railroad that reduced their local and state tax liabilities. The synthesis of political and 




policy would not reappear again until the 1930s and 1940s.  For Cobb’s white property 
owner, the first two decades of the twentieth century would be spent negotiating external 












































NEW WHIGS AND WOOL HATS 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, Cobb’s white property owners comprised 
two distinct political factions –those residing in urban areas and those in rural areas.  
Though their political and economic differences were forged in the nineteenth century, 
they had, at times, managed to form brief coalitions in attempts to lower their tax 
liabilities to local and state governments. The two most significant of these coalitions 
concerned the construction of the Western and Atlantic Railroad in the 1840s and the 
formation of the defunct anti-corporate Independent Movement in the 1870s and 1880s.  
With the rural and urban coalitions defeated by war, political-corporate mergers, and their 
own steadfast belief in white supremacy, the two groups of white property owners faced a 
new century independent of one another. Despite the fact that many of their interests 
during this time period overlapped, such as with education funding and infrastructure 
improvements, the lack of cooperation between the two groups of white property owners 
diminished their ability to affect a political change in their favor.       
From an economic perspective, these two groups can best be studied from their 
acceptance of separate, if not competing, ideologies.  Urban property owners, for their 
part, rearticulated nineteenth century Whiggism – a capitalist belief in public investment 
to spur economic growth and development – into a New South ethos that promised 
modernization through tax cuts and infrastructure improvements.  Rural white property 
owners, likewise, faced a changing local and national economy by building upon 
nineteenth century ideals of self-sufficiency and republican agrarianism.  Despite 




increasingly frustrated with their place in a changing economic system, where national 
cotton and municipal bond markets, for instance, threatened the livelihoods of Cobb’s 
rural and urban residents. 
1
  Geographers Alex Jeffrey and Joe Painter have theorized 
identity making in relation to these types of evolving political and economic systems 
thusly:  “Our pursuit of different strategies and our positions in relation to the strategies 
and claims to authority of others constitute us in a variety of ways as political subjects 
with particular political identities…partly products of our conscious intentions, but partly 
the outcome of the discursive and material practices to others.” 
2
  The incompatibility of 
these ideologies, and the breakdown in coalition building between the two groups of 
white property owners in the early twentieth century, led to failures in public policy-
making at the local level.    
A study that examines the anxiety and resentment of white property owners is a 
delicate one. 
3
  A study of how white property owners actually did experience oppressive 
external economic forces, yet maintained a fierce belief in white supremacy requires a 
critical intervention to avoid creating an apologia for systemic racism. 
4
  In Cobb, as in 
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most of the state, white land owners had made a conscious decision to favor a 
government built upon white supremacy and disenfranchisement.  As both property 
owners and voters, white taxpayers held a political and economic position well above 
Georgia’s African Americans and lower-income landless whites, yet continued to seethe 
resentment towards a variety of institutions including governments, banks, and 
corporations.  Sociologist Allan Johnson, writing of the anger of white males in a late 
twentieth century context, has referred to such episodes as the “paradoxical experience of 
being privileged without feeling privileged.” 
5
   
 Understanding how whiteness, as both an embodied form and a state of privilege, 
intersects with emergent economic ideologies in the early twentieth century is a fruitful 
endeavor. 
6
  Cobb’s white property owners accepted white supremacy as a normalized 
reality.  Property law and voting rights, for example, had been engineered with the help 
of rural and urban white land owners to purposively exclude African American 
accumulation of capital. 
7
  In this racialized environment, white property owners placed 
their belief in white supremacy but became increasingly agitated when the fruits of 
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racism failed to provide sustenance toward economic security and social stability. 
8
  
Instead of becoming reflective to the changing nature of economic systems which were 
growing much more integrated into national, regional, and local experiences, Cobb’s 
white property owner adopted an aggrieved persona of victimhood.  Realizing themselves 
to be outnumbered by landless whites, African Americans, industrial interests, and the 
planter class, the white property owner claimed a position of oppressed minority, what 
Judith Butler has termed the “willful act of self-reduction.” 
9
  Expecting racial privilege 
yet feeling aggrievement towards political and economic institutions, as well as towards 
African Americans, two distinct questions can be asked of Cobb’s white property owner 
in the early twentieth century: How did Cobb’s two factions of white property owners 
independently navigate changing local, regional, and national economies in the early 
twentieth century?  And, what were the contours of privilege within a white supremacist 
government?   
A Shrinking Electorate 
A hallmark of Georgia politics at the end of the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century was the writing of a series of bills and acts designed to both limit the movement 
and political influence of African Americans and to diminish challenges from 
discontented whites.  Arguably, the most important of these devices was the poll tax, a 
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rather banal mainstay of Georgia revenue collection prior to the Civil War that became a 
bludgeon during the late nineteenth century, used for decades to disenfranchise African 
Americans and poor whites, alike.  The poll tax was initially a part of Georgia’s 
Republican Reconstruction, where it was designed to highlight the new state 
government’s focus on bureaucratizing and modernizing the political system.  With the 
broad support of African American leaders, including Henry McNeal Turner, the annual 
tax was initially designed to fund public education for all Georgia children. 
10
   
To the dismay of Black leaders and other Reconstruction era politicians, white 
Democrats kept the poll tax as a part of the constitution, yet made no provision for how to 
enforce the law, ostensibly leaving the voting process open to corruption and intimidation 
by removing state-level bureaucratic oversight.  After passage of a new state constitution 
that laid the framework for Jim Crow, many Freedmen who had paid the annual poll 
excise saw county election chairmen refuse to print receipts of their payment.  In many 
instances, African Americans who did manage to keep their voting privileges were met at 
the polls by white men, who under the guise of being poll workers, noted which 
candidate was chosen – an occurrence that was legal under Georgia code due to the 
state’s refusal to adopt a secret ballot provision. 
11
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White Democrats also made the poll tax debt cumulative from year to year. 
12
  
African American leaders and allied white Republicans argued that poll taxes allowed 
states such as Georgia to circumvent the intent of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, which outlined citizenship and voting rights for all American-born persons.  
The state of Georgia, as well as other southern states that had adopted poll tax 
requirements countered that states were Constitutionally granted the power to levy taxes, 
and that the voting tax was merely a device to raise revenue, and had, after all, been 
supported by Freedmen during the Reconstruction period.  From 1877 to the time of 
World War Two, the states’ rights argument, with regards to taxation, was continually 
upheld by a politically conservative United States Supreme Court.   
The design of the new poll tax was to lower electoral participation; and it 
succeeded.  As noted in Donald L. Grant’s The Way it Was in the South: The Black 
Experience in Georgia: “the cumulative poll tax was the most effective bar to Negro 
suffrage ever invented.” 
13
  Not only were large numbers of African Americans 
disenfranchised, but so too were scores of poor whites. Georgia’s Reconstruction era laws 
had been as universally fair to poor whites as they had been to Freedmen, granting 
amnesty from many pre-Civil War tax debts, allowing women to own and will property 
without a male executor, and guaranteeing every man the right to vote freely.  But the 
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 One white southern official flatly said of the rewritten poll tax laws propagating across the South and of 
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cumulative poll tax, which was growing in popularity across the Deep South at the time, 
effectively disenfranchised large segments of white voters, and in Georgia and 
Mississippi more whites than African Americans. 
14
  The ability of the state’s lower strata 
of residents to challenge the new political current at the polls was significantly curtailed.  
No doubt fearful of the formation of possible coalitions between whites and Blacks, such 
as was heralded at various times by more left-leaning members of the Independent 
Movement, Farmers’ Alliance, and Populist Party, the late nineteenth century poll tax 
served as it was intended – as a device used to limit democratic participation, and 
especially political dissent.  Many historians such as Philip J. Wood place the 
disenfranchisement of poor whites in economic terms, noting that the “long-term impact” 
of the poll tax “was to eliminate the possibility of effective opposition to the domination 
of capital through the Democratic Party.” 
15
  In this sense, white property owners 
effectively dismantled their ability to form coalitions by supporting candidates who 
promised white supremacy and enacted devices of disenfranchisement.   
In light of the assault on voter participation the total number of voters, both white 
and African American, fell precipitously.  In 1876, for example, fifty-four percent of 
registered Georgians voted, including fifty-three percent of registered African Americans.  
By the 1904 general elections, however, only twenty-four percent of registered Georgians 
entered the polls, while the number of voting African Americans across the state stood at 
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just four percent. 
16
  Yet even in spite of declining African American presence at the 
polls, some Georgia politicians continued to argue for literacy tests and grandfather 
clauses to further purge Black voters from the rolls.  Such bills, however, were routinely 
rejected by the majority of the state legislature.  As historian Charles E. Wynes has stated 
on the question of such measures, most elites “believed the cumulative tax and white 
primary had solved the problem” of potential Black influence at the polls. 
17
  This 
sentiment was also studied by political scientist V.O. Key, Jr. in the 1940s, when he 
noted that the region had compiled “the most impressive systems of obstacles between 
the voter and the ballot box known to the democratic world.” 
18
 Another likely reason, 
however, as to why southern politicians refused to place further limits on voting was that 
many politicians were wary of instituting additional laws that might disaffect even more 
white constituents from the electoral process, and thus sow additional seeds of discord 
towards state government. 
Though hesitant to further disturb whites with disenfranchisement acts that tied 
taxes to citizenship, the State General Assembly did manage to create another roadblock 
to African American voting by instituting a whites-only primary at the turn of the 
century.  Although African Americans who had managed to overcome the burdens and 
harassment of meeting poll tax obligations could still vote in the general elections, they 
were denied the right to choose a Democratic candidate through the white primary 
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system.  With Georgia being a one-party state, the implementation of a racially 
discriminatory primary system further lessened direct political participation among 
qualifying African American voters.  Local governments, for example, often added 
important city and county decisions onto white primary elections.  In 1911, while 
Marietta was debating the possibility of restructuring the city’s mayoral and council 
offices and to rewrite the charter of a city-owned utility, city leaders decided to place the 
issue on the upcoming state-wide white primary ballot, so that “white people can settle 
[the] question.” 
19
  Considering, however, that voting laws also targeted many poorer 
whites, the “question” left to be settled would largely fall upon a shrinking faction of 
property-owning white citizens.    
TABLE 4:  Numbers of Voting Age Georgians Compared to Poll Tax Collected for Selected Years 20 
Year Number of Persons of Voting 
Age (White and African 
American), Being 21 Years 
or Older 
 
Year Amount of Poll Taxes 
Collected 
1910 620,616 † 1912 $977,000 
1920 1,421,606 1921 $808,000 
1930 1.498,567 1931 $577,898 
 
†This number reflects voting age persons prior to the 19th Amendment.  It does not, therefore, include women of at least 
twenty one years of age.   
 
With the state Democratic Party’s successful reduction of the voter rolls through 
poll taxes, the implementation of a white primary, and continued use of various forms of 
class and racial intimidation, the numbers of Georgians who could cast a ballot dropped 
again from 1910 to 1930.  Remarkably, the trend of diminished voter participation as a 
percentage of total population in Georgia continued in spite of ratification of the 
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Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, as women over twenty-one years were granted suffrage 
but also fell victim to the burden of cumulative individual voting tax debt.  Such was the 
disparity in voting that during the Great Depression, many women sociologists working 
in the South began to note that “[poll tax] laws…result in limiting women, more than 
men, in meeting voting qualifications.” 
21
  According to their findings, in households with 
enough disposable money to vote in an election, it was generally men who went to the 
polls.  In Georgia, as in states across the South that had poll tax laws, the ability of a 
woman – whether white or African American – to vote was largely constrained to those 
of more comfortable economic means.  Despite the entrance of women onto Georgia 
voter rolls after 1920, the amount of total poll tax collected between 1912 and 1931 
declined by nearly forty one percent and property owning white men continued to 
comprise the overwhelming majority of the state’s voters.  Their interests, which were 
not surprisingly becoming even more economically-centered in years of financial 
instability, continued to affect class and geographic differences in place since the 
nineteenth century.      
New Whigs in a New South  
The roots of anxiety felt on the part of white property owners in Cobb’s urban 
areas is perhaps best studied from the perspective of Georgia’s “persistent Whiggery” and 
within the context of the New South.  Although many historians have discussed “new 
Whigs” or “Neo Whiggery” in their studies of the twentieth century South, especially in 
regards to attempts to procure industrial and commercial development, it is important to 
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note that there are no examples of historical individuals personally claiming to self-
identify with the defunct nineteenth-century party. 
22
  What one does find in Georgia are 
urban politicians from the 1910s to the 1930s who constantly invoked the politics and 
policies of the state’s prominent antebellum Whigs, such as Toombs, Crawford, and 
Gilmer, but without mentioning the Whig Party specifically.  As tax policy battles 
continued between rural and urban real property-owning Georgians, a common refrain 
from politicians and voters in the state’s cities was that the state should return to funding 
infrastructure improvements and lowering tax obligations to residential, commercial and 
industrial concerns so as to promote economic development.   
The persistence of southern Whiggism played directly into the New South 
movement, a pro-business / pro-development strategy that dominated urban political 
thinking from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.  Born from the 
mind of Atlanta Constitution editor Henry Grady, the New South creed promised to spark 
an entrepreneurial spirit among native white southerners through a mixture of 
infrastructure improvements, educational programs, and tax cuts that would induce 
northern industries to relocate down South. 
23
  Grady’s message was especially popular 
with city leaders who, as pro-business advocates, imagined the New South movement 
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leading their communities into dual currents of modernization and industrialization, 
finally leaving behind the “old South” of “slavery and agriculture.” 
24
  As noted by James 
C. Cobb, the New South “promised immediate and sweeping economic change without 
the sacrifice of racial, political, and cultural autonomy or continuity” through a “powerful 
mixture of myths about the past, illusions of about the present, and fantasies about the 
future.” 
25
  Largely short on specific details on how to achieve development outside of 
providing a business-friendly climate built on public subsidy, the New South movement 
transpired with not unexpectedly mixed results.    
Local politicians, business leaders, and white property owners in Marietta, Cobb’s 
largest city and its seat of local government, were quick supporters of the New South 
movement, and they were certainly not alone in experiencing the pains of disappointment 
when it came to boosterism’s limits in the New South Era.  While cities such as Atlanta 
and Birmingham looked at rising levels of industry and investment as examples of the 
New South being an economic success, small cities across the South that embraced the 
ethos remained largely undeveloped.  This was especially true of cities on the periphery 
of larger municipalities, such as with Marietta to Atlanta.  With most industry gravitating 
towards Atlanta, Marietta was left mostly as supplier of labor to factories a few miles to 
the south and failed to see the increases in local revenue promised by the New South 
insistence on tax cuts and additional public spending.  As such, Marietta, much like other 
small to mid-size cities studied by southern historians, failed to realize a developing 
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industrial sector and held, instead, a local economy dominated by “retail sales, finance, 
insurance, and other services, much like it had decades prior.” 
26
   
 
FIGURE 7: MARIETTA DURING COTTON HARVEST, c. 1900.  
Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia, Cob-6. 
 
What the New South movement did achieve was the creation of a network of like-
minded pro-business persons and an ideological formation among white urban residents 
that business-friendly politics and low tax policies were the key to modernization.  Even 
with the death of its architect, Henry Grady, in 1889, the foundation he laid of merchants, 
bankers, lawyers, and civic groups working in cooperation left a lasting legacy.  At the 
turn of the century, for instance, Marietta business leaders and the mayor’s office worked 
with officials in the city of Atlanta to open a dedicated passenger rail service between the 
two cities.  Atlanta’s Chamber of Commerce, spurred to action by New South ideals, took 
up the passenger line issue and lobbied rail companies to aid in its construction.  By the 
early 1900s the Atlanta-Marietta interurban trolley line opened under the operation of 
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Georgia Power Company.  The working relationships established for the creation of the 
trolley line led Marietta to form its own local Chamber of Commerce with the stated 
purpose of “arousing public sentiment in favor of municipal improvements.” 
27
  During 
the 1910s and 1920s, Marietta’s chamber lobbied the city to issue bonds for street paving 
projects, while reducing local business taxes.  With the onset of the First World War, the 
chamber of commerce even persuaded the United States Army to open a ballistic training 
camp on the outskirts of the city. 
28
  And, in another instance of Marietta-Atlanta 
cooperation, the two Chamber of Commerces again aligned with city politicians to ensure 
that the southeast district’s Federal Reserve Bank would have its home in Atlanta instead 
of New Orleans or Nashville. 
29
   
     Despite the surface successes of Marietta’s chamber of commerce and the city’s 
pro-development advocates, there is an understudied component of civic boosterism: that 
many of its most ardent supporters at the local level were not especially adept at making 
business decisions.  This failing, combined with a general lack of banking regulation and 
a culture of graft that permeated local and state politics made for unsurprisingly bad 
results.   In 1916, for instance, a group of businessmen from Marietta and Cobb County 
lined up to support the erection of a new loan and trust bank building in Marietta.  The 
building furnished with “hot and cold water lavatories” and “electric lights” was a 
popular point of pride for both the business community and local newspapers which 
continually provided updates on its construction.  Organized under the name Sessions 
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Loan and Trust with the slogan “Sessions Stands for Safety,” the bank’s directors, which 
included members of the elite Marietta families and a former governor of Georgia, 
informed the Marietta Journal that business dealings had increased so much over the 
years that the completion of the new building was an absolute necessity.
30
   Within three 
years’ time, however, rumblings began brewing as to the bank’s solvency.  In less than 
four years from opening, the bank was put into receivership after an outside audit 
revealed a $200,000 shortage on their books; its vice president and head cashier were 
later arrested. 
31
  Subsequent stories appearing in local papers suggested fiscal 
incompetence rather than premeditated malfeasance in relation to the missing funds, as its 
banking managers had little to no formal training in financial lending or accounting 
practices.  The bank’s management were scions of elite local families funded by 
prominent state-level politicians.  As a loan and trust, whose charter defined its 
commitment to financing business and home ownership, the failed bank cost many 
residents substantial financial losses.   
Political corruption and cronyism also affected the creation of a Marietta public 
utility corporation chartered as the Board of Lights and Water (BLW).  Initially designed 
to raise the general health of the city by providing potable water and sewer service to all 
commercial and residential sections of the city, the organization of the BLW ran afoul of 
various powerful local leaders over funding, planning, and construction.  When Marietta 
issued bonds for the sewer infrastructure, for example, some leaders, not surprisingly 
given the city’s recent bond troubles, decried the long-term cost burden of providing city-
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wide sewer service.  Others, however, had a personal interest in the water treatment and 
sewer plan proposal, especially in matters of whose company would receive city 
contracts to provide materials and construction teams to the venture.  By 1917, BLW 
dissidents had managed to secure seats on the project’s governing board and refused to 
cooperate with the mayor’s office until the city met their demands.  Though the bonds 
were already let, opponents of the sewer plan fought over construction details.  Over the 
course of the next year, Marietta’s plan for the BLW service area was redrawn, with only 
the downtown business district and the wealthier neighborhoods being provided with 
sewer access. 
32
  Building material and construction companies with political connections 
received city contracts, triggering discontent among the majority of Marietta’s white 
property owners who saw the contract system as another example of political corruption.  
Although the entire city was expected to pay a share of the bond issuances, many 
property owners pointed out that only a small percentage would see the benefit.  For most 
of the 1920s, little infrastructure improvements were made to the BLW, and as late as 
1936, less than one fourth of the city’s total residents had a functional sewer connection. 
33
   
The best example of the failures of pro-business advocacy, however, is found in 
the early 1920s, when Marietta’s city government faced lawsuits from the National Bank 
of Boston and the Park National Bank of New York for unpaid bond notes totaling 
$90,000, events that led many to question whether the city was in the midst of a 
                                                 
32
 Mark H. Rose has also noted the perilous the state of bond sales in the 1910s and 1920s to finance public 
utilities. Mark H. Rose, Cities of Light and Heat: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in Urban America 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 55-57. Political fights over the operation and funding of the 
BLW found in Marietta Journal, 17 July 1914 & Cobb County Times, 15 March 1917.  
 
33
 L. M. Blair, “Memories of Marietta,” Interview by Florence F. Corley and Anne Blair Buchanan, 1962, 





bankruptcy crisis.  The origins of Marietta’s fiscal predicament began with two separate 
bond issuances from 1917 designed to fund several street paving projects in the 
downtown area.  The street paving bond issuance and the ensuing lawsuits highlighted 
both the naiveté of pro-booster policies and the effects of lax regulation in local, regional, 
and national bond markets.  
 
FIGURE 8: UPAVED STREETS IN MARIETTA COMMERCIAL DISTRICT, c. 1905.  
Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia, Cob-233. 
 
In 1917 the Georgia General Assembly approved an act allowing “persons, 
companies, and corporations subject to assessment” to petition their municipality for 
infrastructure improvements on the condition that they share in the cost of the project.  
Though championed as a progressive initiative for its granting of the right of petition to 
the general public, the plan heavily favored wealthy city neighborhoods and industry, 









FIGURE 9:  CITY MAP OF MARIETTA CITY LIMITS ILLUSTRATING STREETS AND LAND 
USE, c. 1938.  
Blair Papers, “Real Property Inventory for Marietta, 1938. Works Progress Administration.” Kennesaw 
State University Archives, Kennesaw, Georgia  
 
 
soon as becoming law, many newer businesses and industries in Marietta petitioned for 
street paving under the provisions of the act.  Some of Marietta’s older business owners, 
however, rejected the idea of having the city council authorize incoming funds or raise 
the local property tax rate to pay for sidewalk construction and street paving projects. 
34
  
Instead, they argued that the city should issue long term bonds for the projects, since the 
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“coming generations” would be “the ones who will enjoy [them] most.” 
35
  The city’s 
leadership, largely committed to the tenets of urban Progressivism and New South 
modernization approved the street paving measure and two bonds were released with 
reportedly little concern as to their issuance.  After all, the financial burden was to be a 
shared sacrifice between city and private interests.  Additionally, the optimism of 
boosterism assured city leaders that future tax revenue generated from property 
assessments and business licenses within a newly paved commercial district would pay 
Marietta’s share of the principal and interest of the bonds.  The first bond issued in 1917 
totaled $20,000 and the second, issued shortly thereafter, stood at $28,000.  The bonds 
were brokered by a well-connected South Georgia businessman, Frank Scarboro, who 
located favorable interest rates through the Merchants and Farmers Bank of Georgia with 
four year maturation at five percent interest. 
36
     
 
FIGURE 10: A WHITE NEIGHBOROOD IN MARIETTA WITH NEWLY PAVED 
STREETS, c. 1920.  
Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia, Cob-519 
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After a year of the bond issuances, the first payment came due.  As later explained 
by the city’s mayor, the contractor hired to perform the work did not complete the project 
on time.  Downtown businesses and industries, which viewed the paving project as still 
under construction, refused to pay their first-year share of the bond debt.  City 
government, whose “cash on hand” at the beginning of each fiscal year during the 1910s 
often amounted to less than twenty dollars was unable to meet the bond payment out of 
the city’s sinking or standing fund.  Compounding matters was the fact that many 
individuals and businesses were not even paying their other municipal obligations 
through real and personal property taxes, licensing, or professional fees.  In a city audit of 
1916 alone, clerks discovered over $10,000 in “accounts outstanding” from the city’s 
property owners and business operations. 
37
   
In 1919, with the paving project complete, but two years after the initial bonds 
were issued, Marietta made its first payment to the Merchants and Farmers bank in the 
total of $6,000.  With downtown businesses finally agreeing to pay their share of the 
costs and an ongoing campaign to collect unpaid tax obligations through the city, 
Marietta officials hoped to refinance the two bonds.  The National Bank of Boston, which 
held collateral in the Merchants and Farmers Bank, however, declined changes to the 
original note obligations and called for continuation of payment for the bond plus interest 
minus the $6,000 just paid.  Simultaneous to the city having its refinancing offer rejected, 
the broker who had initially handled the bond issue on behalf of the city was found to be 
engaged in “frenzied financing” by selling single municipal bond notes to multiple 
banking institutions.  Frank Scarboro, as the bond broker, had run a confidence scheme 
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on cities throughout the state by double and triple selling bond notes in an amount 
nearing $300,000. 
38
  Heavily indebted after making years of bad investments on the 
cotton market, Scarboro appeared to create the bond scheme to cover his losses. 
39
  
Shortly after news of criminal enterprise came to light, the broker fled the state and the 
Park National Bank of New York filed suit in federal court demanding $48,000 from the 
city of Marietta in principal bonds it had recently purchased from Scarboro.  Following 
suit, the National Bank of Boston filed for principal payment of the remaining $42,000. 
40
 
The Park National Bank of New York case against the city was eventually 
resolved with Marietta attorneys claiming “failure of consideration,” meaning that the 
financial institution’s grievance was with Scarboro and not the city in that the notes the 
bank acquired were for a project already completed and were therefore worthless.  The 
First National Bank of Boston, however, refused to drop its lawsuit against the city.  
Marietta officials, recognizing that having a municipal debt-related case in court 
proceedings would negatively affect the rates of interest it could expect for future bonds, 
persuaded the Boston bank to settle with the city in Cobb County Superior Court rather 
than having the case heard in federal court.  The “consensus verdict” was considerably 
favorable to the First National Bank of Boston who held considerable fiscal leverage 
against the city.  The new terms of the 1917 bonds called for “four thousand dollars in 
annual payments with six percent interest until liquidated.” 
41
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The bond fiasco became known as the “Scarboro Transaction” and it left an 
indelible stain on the optimism of civic boosterism and private-public partnerships, and 
reinforced the idea that unregulated bond markets, booster naiveté, and a system of law 
that favored creditors were road blocks to substantial development of smaller cities like 
Marietta. 
42
  The political leadership of the city, faithful in the spirit of boosterism, trusted 
someone to share in their vision of a renewed city, a broker it turned out, who in spite of 
a nefarious past in gambling and in making poor predictions on cotton futures, was not 
properly vetted by the mayor’s office.  At a national level, Marietta was not alone in 
feeling the pains of an unregulated bond market.  In Chicago, Sanders Shanks, reporter 
and future editor of the Bond Buyer – the “bible of the municipal bond business” - openly 
lamented in the late 1910s and early 1920s that the unregulated and corrupted markets in 
which securities were bought and sold would eventually lead cities to leave the bond 
market all together.  “[T]he municipal securities market is badly shattered,” Shanks wrote 
in the Bond Buyer, “…the city which can sell bonds or notes is today the exception, not 
the rule…It is no longer news when a default occurs.” 
43
 
The 1917 infrastructure improvement act had put cities like Marietta in untenable 
situations due to the necessity of issuing bonds to implement the large-scale projects.  In 
need of industry and business for jobs and revenue, Marietta could not ignore the appeals 
of commercial and industrial districts to have infrastructure improvements made, being 
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well aware that in the era of low tax New South policies, disgruntled industries could 
move to another city with a more favorable business climate.  Under the conditions of the 
act, private entities only had to share the cost of the project.  Securing money to begin 
expensive improvements such as paving, however, required upfront costs – necessitating 
municipal bond issuances. 
44
  The bonds Marietta issued included both the city’s portion 
of the project costs and the share to be paid by the businesses.  If businesses did not pay 
the city, for work performed – regardless of reason – it was the municipality and its 
taxpayers who ultimately carried responsibility for the debt issued under the city’s name.  
Perhaps aware that tax increases might be required to offset the effects of the next 
“Scarboro Transaction”-type fiasco, leaders of some local industries, labeled 
“conservative elements,” actively lobbied against any future bond initiatives for the 
remaining decade. 
45
                                                         
In the 1920s, as Marietta’s city government faced mounting debt obligations, city 
leaders with the help of their state representatives attempted to raise revenue without 
calling for a popular referendum.  Under the state constitution, a city – through a 
representative or senator – could request the General Assembly to approve a change to 
the existing city charter.  In 1922, faced with financial problems resulting from the 
Scarboro transaction, a proposal was entered in the legislature to replace property tax 
collection from forty cents per one hundred dollars to fifty cents per one hundred dollars.  
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Marietta’s mayor along with the city finance committee supported the change when 
questioned by reporters from the Cobb County Times, claiming that it was needed in 
order to pay down existing debt obligations more quickly. 
46
  The significance of the 
proposed raise to the millage was profound.  For decades, Marietta had lowered 
municipal tax rates while issuing long term bonds to build infrastructure all in an attempt 
to lure industry to the city.  With a budget crisis looming, Marietta had no choice but to 
raise taxes.  Following months of travelling through committees within the General 
Assembly, the millage referendum was approved by a majority vote of the legislature 
without Marietta having to rewrite its charter, saving the city at least another two years 
before it would be able to have an addendum completed.  
The difficulties cities such as Marietta faced in implementing laws and tax 
ordinances in a timely manner were due to the state’s failure to adopt a home rule 
provision for local governments. 
47
  For a city to issue bonds for a public infrastructure 
project or raise millage rates, the local representative had to file the proposal with the 
Committee of Cities and Counties where, if approved, the bond proposal would go before 
the General Assembly for an up or down vote.  Upon receiving the blessing of the 
legislature, the city could place the bond issue proposal, as submitted, onto a general 
local ballot.  The system was originally designed in the antebellum era to ensure that 
local governments were not incurring unsustainable amounts of debt.  Over time, 
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however, the Committee on Cities and Counties oversaw not just bond proposals, but also 
came to include matters of zoning, changes to local tax collection, and even the renaming 
of local roadways.  Georgia’s General Assembly also met biennially.  If the referendum 
had not been approved, Marietta would have had to wait until the next session to propose 
changes to the city charter.   
The burden of having to propose each and every modification to a city’s operation 
promoted not just inefficiency, but political lethargy.  As discord between rural and urban 
populations and between the multiple factions within the Democratic Party continued to 
metastasize though the early twentieth century, the possibility of using the Assembly’s 
control over municipal and county financial affairs to settle political differences or even 
personal conflicts became a plausible scenario.  As local representatives and senators 
engaged in bitter policy debates within the Assembly over issues relating to taxation, 
many local city and county leaders, though they had a direct connection in questions 
concerning revenue collection, often provided a public face in deference to all state office 
holders, whether their politics conflicted with their own, or not.  Although some city 
officials, especially within a city such as Atlanta, which was powerful enough to weather 
the vindictiveness of its political opponents in the Assembly, could, and did, voice their 
concerns, officials from smaller cities like Marietta could not risk running afoul of 
whichever faction or constituency would control the Assembly or governor’s office from 
year to year.  Thus, throughout the early twentieth century, as candidates with anti-urban 
sentiments came to the Cobb County courthouse on the Marietta square to deliver 




community could be expected to share the podium with someone who was probably the 
antithesis of their own political and economic interests. 
48
   
Periodically through the early and mid twentieth-century disaffected city leaders 
began encouraging their representatives and senators to push the General Assembly to 
allow for municipal home rule.  Based on systems enacted in other states in the early 
twentieth century, home rule allowed municipal governments the autonomy to handle 
their own financial affairs, zoning ordinances, and other city concerns, with limited 
interaction with state level government, so long as the city was not in conflict with 
existing state laws.  Although seemingly popular with many city governments, the home 
rule plan not surprisingly failed to gain traction within the larger body of the General 
Assembly or from what would become in the 1930s, a decidedly anti-urban executive 
branch.  The ability to keep local municipalities submissive to state control trumped 
expedient and efficient government.     
After three decades of local New South boosterism, which included publically 
funded infrastructure improvements for the benefit of industries, lowered tax assessment 
valuations, and the establishment of pro-business groups such as the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Rotary Club, the promised modernization of cities like Marietta had 
failed to materialize. In the end, currents of cronyism, manipulation of financial markets, 
and political divisiveness at the state level worked to undermine the development agendas 
of Marietta’s political establishment and its property owning constituents.  At the turn of 
the twentieth century, white property owners in the city embraced both the white 
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supremacy of a one party system and a belief in the modernizing ability of tax cuts and 
public investments.  By the end of the 1920s, only the racialized environment of a whites-
only political process was realized.  
The Wool Hat Boys   
While the New Whig moniker is a twentieth-century construct of southern 
historians, the self-identification of Georgia’s white farmers as the wool hat boys has use 
dating back to the antebellum era.
 49
   As a sartorial staple of small farmers, the 
ubiquitous wool felt hat was much more than just the primary choice of headwear; it was 
a statement of thrift, unpretentiousness, and self-sufficiency. 
50
  In the nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century, the wool hat became even more entrenched in the identity of 
white small farmers as political rivals began calling attention to their choice of headwear.  
During the height of the political factionalism of the early 1880s, for instance, the 
Marietta Journal, which strongly sided with the Democratic Party, reported on a farmers’ 
convention held outside of Augusta, Georgia, on the border with South Carolina.  In a 
description of the man nominated to lead the convention and its “plain farming folks,” the 
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paper remarked that he wore an “old wool hat” with a brim so wide that it “looked like a 
family umbrella.”  When the weather turned hot during the heat of the day, the white 
farmers kept their hats in place, but “shucked” their coats, exposing their “gallus” 
underneath.  “They wore the bone and sinew of the land,” the reporter observed. 
51
  In the 
following decades, the wool hat came to represent not just the ideals of thrift and self-
sufficiency, but Jeffersonian republicanism and a commitment to political grassroots 
organization.   
In the introduction to his biography of Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge, a 
self-proclaimed champion of the wool hat boys during the 1930s and 1940s, author 
William Anderson writes that the enduring conception of the felt-wearing white farmer of 
the early twentieth century is of a man with “cow manure on the boots, grass stains on the 
knees of the just-cleaned overalls, bad posture…white shirt sleeves rolled up, burned 
neck, bad teeth, dull eyed.”  Anderson, in an early example of social history in southern 
historiography, broke with such stereotypical portraits and wrote of the wool hat boys as 
social agents who combated the economic forces that befell them with political 
shrewdness and nuance. 
52
  The historical trajectory of the wool hat boys, of how their 
motivations and interests evolved in response to changing local and national economic 
forces is key to understanding the lived experiences of rural white Georgians.   
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FIGURE 11: LAND SURVEYORS MEETING WITH COBB FARMERS, c. 1890. NOTE 
THE WOOL HATS.  
Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia, Cob-30. 
 
The primary sources of wool hat anger towards state government was Georgia’s 
reliance on ad valorem taxes as the basis of state revenue.  The assessment-driven nature 
of ad valorem tax structure hit lower income and rural property owners especially hard 
during financially difficult times.  Farm families beset by fluctuating market prices and 
rising operating costs, and with agricultural acreage often mortgaged to the hilt, felt their 
lands were disproportionately taxed compared to wealthier city-dwellers who may only 
own an acre or less of improved property.  Georgia’s farm families also felt aggrieved in 
recognizing that in order to be self-sufficient by offering goods to market to meet tax and 




FIGURE 12:  VIEW OF OLD US 41 APPROXIMATELY 1 MILE NORTH OF MARIETTA CITY 
LIMITS (1934).  NOTE THE CLUSTER OF FARM HOUSES AND THE RURAL CHARACTER 
OF LANDSCAPE. 
RG 145. Cobb County, 1934. Aerial Collections, Cartographic Services. National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park 
 






maximize their productivity, all of which required paying personal property taxes in 
addition to real property taxes.  But machinery and vehicles had upfront purchase costs, 
as well as annual tag taxes and consumption-based fuel levies.  Likewise, many rural 
families resented having to pay a levy for newly implemented license permits for hunting 
and fishing, which, especially in difficult financial times, augmented a family’s diet.  
Throughout the late nineteenth century, as historian Joseph P. Reidy has argued, southern 
elites – whether large planters, corporations, or industries – “devised” through political 
means “both legal and political mechanisms to promote economic inequality.” 
53
  The 
manufactured aspect of financial burden was not lost on the wool hat boy. 
From the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century, portions of Georgia’s 
aggrieved white farmers engaged in various forms of social protest.  As large numbers of 
the state’s one-time self-sufficient land owning farmers began losing their properties 
during the economic downturn, many turned to acts of resistance against those they 
blamed for their troubles.  In the 1870s, for instance, with cotton gins across the state 
being burned to the ground under mysterious circumstances, one middle Georgia 
newspaper began likening the smoldering ruins that dotted Georgia’s countryside a 
“holocaust.”  
54
  As noted by historian Robert C. McMath in his study of white farmers in 
Texas, the reason behind such destructive acts rested in the changing nature of “property 
rights” at the turn of the century.  Since the earliest days of Native American Removal, 
Georgia’s white yeomanry had maneuvered to keep hold of their position in the state’s 
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economic hierarchy, but the changing market forces of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century made that more difficult.  To counter these developments, McMath 
contends, small farmers with Populist leanings engaged in “arson, fence cutting, and a 
host of community-based political protest movements” to challenge the changing 
economic landscape of credit capitalism and the political lobbying efforts of special 
interest groups who posed a direct threat to the livelihoods of white small farmers. 
55
   
Often unable to affect changes to economic systems controlled by national 
markets and local planters, white farmers turned to social transgressions against African 
Americans.  Across Cobb County in the early 1910s and into the 1920s, rural whites 
terrorized Black laborers and tenant farmers.  At a local marble company, signs reading 
“Hurry up n----- and leve this town if you don’t leve you will wish you hadder got out” 
became commonplace.
56
  In 1913, Cobb’s largest landowners all received notices to 
remove Black families from their farms.  In late spring of that year, the tenant house of an 
African American family residing on the Anderson farm southwest of Marietta was 
dynamited.  Miraculously, the family was sleeping in another room and escaped with 
only minor injuries. 
57
  As more white farmers lost their land in times of economic 
insecurity they sought to ensure that tenancy options remained for whites only.  Believing 
in the political and social compact of white supremacy, many new landless whites were 
incredulous that large-scale planters would retain African American families over 
                                                 
55
 Robert C. McMath, Jr, “Sandy Land and Hogs in the Timber: Agricultural Origins of the Farmers’ 
Alliance in Texas,” in Steven Hahn and Jonathan Prude, eds, The Countryside in the Age of Capitalist 
Transformation (University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 208.  
 
56
 Grant, The Way it Was in the South, 171.  
 
57
 Details of the dynamited house and a response from the governor of Georgia condemning the violence 





themselves. From 1910 to 1930, the total percentage of African Americans in Cobb 
dropped from 26% to 18%. 
58
  Part of a historical movement recognized as the Great 
Migration, scores of Black families left the South for the North.  While racial terrorism  
no doubt played a role in the relocation, the desires of African American families to seek 
better lives, have gainful employment, and to be social agents of their own accord should 
also be considered. 
59
      
TABLE 5: COBB COUNTY FARMS IN ACREAGE 1900-1930 
60
 

























1900 2684 4 71 294 988 683 455 124 55 9 1 
1910 3274 1 138 467 1292 798 435 97 41 5 0 
1920 3698 9 165 489 1663 947 330 56 33 6 0 
1930 3413 55 156 511 1466 840 311 51 20 2 1 
Mean 
Deviation 
------ 18.9 30.8 73.1 212.3 76.5 62.3 28.5 111.8 2 .5 
 
NOTE: A 40 ACRE FARM WAS HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM AMOUNT 
OF LAND NEEDED TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT.  FROM 1900 TO 1930, COBB COUNTY FARMS 
BETWEEN 20 AND 49 ACRES  ALSO SHOWED THE HIGHEST VARIANCE IN TERMS OF 
NUMBER OF FARMS IN OPERATION.  
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Across the Deep South, total farm tenancy rose from 39.7 % in 1880 to 55.1 % in 
1910. 
61
  Cobb, with climbing foreclosure rates among whites, saw similar levels in 
tenancy.  The growing tenant system, where a farmer rented a piece of land from a 
planter, continued a trend in tying the everyday lived experience of rural whites to 
economic systems outside their ability to change.  With most small farmers unable to 
acquire loans from local banking institutions, for example, the crop-lien system allowed 
future harvests to be put up as collateral, with planters and merchants being the primary 
grantors of liens.  Within state law, the interests of planters were privileged over those of 
merchants, meaning that if a farmer owed money to both a landowner and storeowner, the 
debt to the former trumped the obligation to the latter. 
62
  Merchants, in this sense, were 
financially dependent upon having farmers purchase their wares, yet had to offer credit to 
facilitate the transaction.  If the farmer fell into hard times, the merchant often came in at 
least second to incorporated banking institutions.   
In addition to property tax law and rising tenancy rates, another source of 
consternation among Georgia’s white small farmers was the cotton exchange market.  
Designed in the post-Civil War years to account for the loss of the South’s agricultural 
infrastructure, which was largely destroyed in the war, and to reduce ensuing post-war 
price speculation, cotton exchanges promised to provide price stability to a volatile 
commodity.  The exchanges were often created by large-scale cotton buyers to provide a 
futures price for an upcoming cotton harvest.  The futures exchange system worked by 
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providing an agreed-upon price between local cotton brokers and the larger-scale buyers, 
with the annual price being calculated by a board accountable only to the exchange.  At 
the local level, the futures exchange led to a “contract on call” system, where area cotton 
farmers agreed to sell their harvest to a local broker, who was often times the area 
mercantilist and operator of the cotton gin, at a to-be-determined price set by the 
exchange. 
63
  In theory, cotton exchanges were designed to provide a financial hedge for 
all parties involved in the cotton market – from manufacturer down to the farmer, by 
introducing the stabilizing effect of a price board.  By the late nineteenth century, the 
largest cotton exchanges were based in New York, New Orleans, and Liverpool, with the 
New York exchange easily dominating the United States cotton market.  Indeed, from 
1880 to 1900, the New York Cotton Exchange processed nearly three times the volume 
of cotton bales annually than did the New Orleans exchange. 
64
   
As the New York exchange came to control the price of cotton in much of the 
South, many southern agriculturalists began challenging whether the futures exchange 
really provided a hedge for the interests of the region’s small farmers.  From 1880 to 
1915, for example, the annual adjusted price for cotton rose and fell from year to year, 
despite the exchange’s promise to stabilize the price. 
65
  Georgia farmers complained that 
the futures system favored the buyer over the seller, with many pointing out that the 
exchange was headquartered in a region of wholesalers and manufacturers, not only far 
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removed from the site of production but where buyers had a financial stake in getting the 
lowest price for raw materials.  As one Georgia farmer wrote in a letter to a local 
newspaper, having a cotton exchange in New York made as much sense as having a 
“pineapple exchange in the Klondike.” 
66
  A more common argument against the 
exchange by Georgia’s wool hat farmers was that they felt intimidated into entering the 
contract system, being told by local brokers that the end of year price might be lower than 
the quoted price, only to have the opposite occur.  Farmers who did not contract with a 
broker were left to participate on the spot market, an open cash, direct market between 
seller and buyer.  Although the spot market could sometimes yield higher returns for 
cotton one year, it could be substantially lower than the exchange’s price the next, an 
occurrence which could well be disastrous to a farmer carrying excessive debt.  
Conversely, even if a farmer chose to avoid the exchange system by moving into the spot 
market, much of Georgia lacked the infrastructure for an individual to move a harvest 
from their field to an independent buyer. 
67
  Thus, many Georgia farmers remained in an 
economic system where a contract tied them to a price for cotton handed down from New 
York City to be paid by a broker who often happened to be the local mercantilist, who 
held a partial lien on the farmer’s debts.   
Resentment towards the economic state of agricultural life in the early 1900s led 
to a brief flirtation with the formation of unions and alliances across the South.  Built 
upon the principles established by the Farmers’ Alliance of the 1870s and 1880s, the new 
organizations also sought to form cooperative economic relationships with other 
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organizations in other counties.  In Cobb by 1907, the Farmers’ Union – as it was called 
locally – had a membership of over five hundred families and regularly held meetings in 
various locations throughout the county.  In one Marietta meeting that took on the air of a 
religious revival replete with hymns and pot luck dinners, R.F. Duckworth, an 
agricultural organizer, reminded his audience that while they toiled in the fields, someone 
else “fixes” the price.  Speaking to the dream of the old Farmers’ Alliance, Duckworth 
claimed that the white families assembled before him could “be the architects of their 
own fortunes if they would but stand together.” 
68
  A similar sentiment was found in 
farmers’ meetings in Fulton County, just south of Cobb, where speakers complained that 
the cotton farmer was at the mercy of too many external forces.  In a letter published 
afterwards in the Atlanta Constitution, one local leader in the fight for farmer’s rights 
complained that “Whatever the farmer has to sell he sells in an open market; whatever he 
has to buy he buys in a protected market…The farmer does not get a square deal.” 
“[M]anufacturers” he continued, “have outstripped farmers in the race for wealth, not 
because of any inherent and natural law guaranteeing them greater reward, but…because 
of governmental regulations guaranteeing him the monopoly of a market and the higher 
prices which logically follow.” 
69
  In his revisionist history of the New South, C. Vann 
Woodward noted that as “a producer and seller the farmer was subject to all the penalties 
of free trade, while as a consumer he was deprived of virtually all its benefits.”  In the 
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economic world of early twentieth-century Georgia, the combined forces of corporate and 
industrial interests and national monetary policies had the small farmer quickly becoming 
a “chronic debtor.” 
70
   
Discontent among white farmers in the early twentieth century tapped into 
decades of frustration over ad valorem taxes, market fluctuations, and land foreclosures, 
and ultimately accelerated the development of grassroots organization among the wool 
hat boys.  By far, the most influential voice of the white agrarian was Tom Watson, 
whose Jeffersonian newspaper reached farming households across Georgia and the Deep 
South.  Waging what they viewed as a “war on the Eastern Plutocracy,” Watson’s 
followers dedicated themselves to making a “white man’s government and for the people 
 
FIGURE 13: WEST COBB FARMER IN THE FIELD, c. 1910. 
 Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia, Cob-768. 
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to rule in place of the corporations.” 
71
  In addition to lambasting financial centers and 
corporate interests, The Jeffersonian continued to engender ill will towards tax policy.  
“All taxation is confiscation,” Watson wrote, “and when this dread power is employed 
for any other object than the necessary one of supporting the Government, such taxation 
is criminal.  The morality of it is that of the highway robber.” 
72
  By the 1910s, even 
though Indepedentism and Populism were no longer viable political alternatives in 
Georgia and the wool hat boys had reluctantly rejoined the Democratic ranks, they 
continued to harbor resentment at how the party was organized and to whom its spoils 
were delivered.  In this sense, the politically-aware white farming “redneck” chronicled 
by Albert D. Kirwan looked upon a changing capitalist system of the early twentieth 
century with expanding corporate influence over local and state politics, powerful 
banking interests, crop-lien systems, and protected markets and saw “a conspiracy against 
him, a conspiracy which was aided and abetted by the leaders of his party.” 
73
  Such 
feelings of mistrust towards government among white farmers would last for generations.    
By the early 1900s, even the pro-industrial Atlanta Constitution, which seldom 
criticized business and banking as a part of the New South creed, began to back the 
state’s rural farmers over the New York Cotton Exchange.  Following an investigation 
into annual price fluctuations, the newspaper charged the exchange with intentionally and 
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persistently undervaluing the price of cotton at one to two cents lower than “actual 
market value.” 
74
  The manipulation of market prices to better serve outside investors, 
such as northern manufacturing firms, the paper contended, reduced the exchange to a 
“gaming house,” where the “public is invited to play with a marked deck and with loaded 
dice.” 
75
  Critics of the exchange complained that the federal government was not 
regulating the futures market and the reform was needed to insure a fair system.  When 
politicians from Georgia and other Deep South states began debating whether the cotton 
exchange should fall under anti-gambling laws, the New York Cotton Exchange 
retaliated by briefly ceasing to provide price quotations, leaving farmers and brokers 
alike vulnerable to international price fluctuations. 
76
  Criticism of the cotton exchange 
system continued until 1914, when a particularly strong southern legislative coalition 
pushed through the United States Congress a bill to federally regulate the price setting 
features of the system.  Georgia Senator Hoke Smith who introduced the bill, claimed the 
cotton exchange had “robbed” southern farmers of $75,000,000 in the unregulated 
contract system. 
77
   
Although cotton prices rose substantially after the regulatory bill, the higher 
prices were more attributable to increased international demand during the First World 
War than to federal oversight.  Following several good years of increased harvests and 
high market values, the price on cotton suddenly dropped, causing many farmers who had 
gambled on planting nothing but cotton to take a disastrous financial hit.  In 1918, with 
                                                 
74
 Atlanta Constitution, 10 June 1907.  
 
75
 Atlanta Constitution, 9 September 1907.  
 
76
 Atlanta Constitution, 17 May 1908. 
  
77





price per bale at the lowest level in years, several hundred farmers marched upon the 
Cobb County Courthouse in Marietta and declared they had over one thousand signatures 
of area farmers who pledged not to sell any cotton until prices increased.  In an 
impassioned speech before the crowd, one man declared that his fellow farmers must be 
strong to counter the “insidious work of the cotton-fixing propagandists.” 
78
  The lowered 
price per pound of cotton combined with the arrival of the boll weevil only added to the 
anxiety of area farmers.  The price plunge in 1918 rebounded a year later, only to drop 
again in 1921.  One Cobb County resident recalled that his family was nearly ruined 
following the 1920-1921 cotton crash, when the price per pound dropped from a high of 
forty cents the year before to six cents the year after. 
79
       
      When the Great Depression hit, the plight of area farmers went from bad to worse.  
Not only did prices drop precipitously once more, but the entire cotton market itself 
became destabilized.  Following the October crash of the financial markets in 1929, 
national cotton buyers either backed out or were unable to purchase harvests at the agreed 
upon price.  Cotton brokers, which were mostly local merchants or gin operators, were 
left to search the spot market for potential buyers.  In Acworth, the largest city in north 
Cobb County, “cotton was lined up across Main Street…on both sides” with brokers 
unable to find someone to buy it at even “two cents a pound.”  After a fall rain settled 
into the area, the exposed cotton was ruined. 
80
  Across the county, many farmers, 
merchants, and brokers buckled under the economic pressure and lost land, store, and 
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capital, alike.  For those who weathered the onset of the Great Depression, the next few 
years would be spent trying to keep hold of both real and personal property.    
Shared but Unmet Desires 
Although politically factionalized in regard to tax policies, and in conflict with 
prevailing regional and national economic systems, Cobb’s white property owners 
actually shared a number of similar interests.  This was especially true when it came to 
local transportation routes and educational resources.  As much as white property owners 
in towns and country lambasted corruption, “fixed” markets, and predatory creditors, they 
also turned their wrath towards crumbling infrastructure and underfunded public schools.  
With corporations and industries successfully lowering their own tax obligations, the 
impetus to achieving educational and transportation growth fell to average Georgia 
taxpayers, who already believed themselves to be overtaxed.  
For farming families, road construction was imperative to achieving access to 
markets, both for selling and purchasing goods.  In the early 1900s, white rural farmers in 
Cobb routinely complained of the conditions of area roads to local newspapers.  In the 
“Georgia Crop Report” section of the Marietta Journal, for instance, one letter writer 
declared his intention to push for programs to improve transportation in the county.  “As 
one who was raised a farmer boy,” the letter began, “I am now unreservedly committed 
to all honest endeavors that will lead to better roads.” 
81
  Despite broad unity among 
Cobb farmers for new roads, little progress had been made by the end of the decade.  
Another letter writer from west Cobb, noting that he and his neighbors waste a great deal 
of time “pulling our teams through the mud,” demanded that county politicians “let better 
                                                 
81





roads be the issue with Cobb County…not talk, but business.” 
82
  At a trial in 1917 
involving a woman who had been injured in an accident on one of the county roads, 
where the woman sued the county for operating an unsafe roadway, the local papers 
reported that “despite the good weather for farmers, the court had had a fairly large 
attendance each day.” 
83
  
 Despite broad support of area farmers in the rural county, efforts to implement a 
broad road strategy in the county continued to flounder.  The Cobb County Times, the 
leading local newspaper of rural families, lamented in an editorial that farming taxpayers 
deserved the “best passable conditions…to get his cotton and farm products to market.” 
84
  
Owing to the geographic size of the county, the costs of transportation improvements 
required a huge fiscal commitment.  But given the demand for better roads from rural 
voters, the county’s commissioner of revenue set forth with a proposal to pave and 
provide proper drainage for both major and minor transportation routes.  As proposed, the 
plan would issue $700,000 in bonds to be matched dollar for dollar by the federal 
government.  The bond issue, as was common in the 1920s saw its payments back-
loaded, with smaller amounts paid in the first years of the issuance, while larger 
payments would be due in later years.  The theory behind such plans was that civic 
improvements would spur development and increased property values, which would 
offset the higher payments in years to come. 
85
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Like their rural counterparts, white property owners in the city also pressured 
local government to attend to infrastructure improvements.  In Marietta, following 
intense campaigning on the part of homeowners and the business community, the city’s 
mayor and council proposed a massive street paving project that included brick sidewalks 
along the downtown commercial district in an effort to bring the city into the 
“Progressive Age.” 
86
  Since the introduction of the automobile, city streets had become 
noticeably grim.  One Marietta resident recalled having his automobile tires receive “ten 
punctures” over the course of one day. 
87
  With the support of business owners and the 
voting public, the city road proposal passed with an overwhelming majority. 
88
  Funding 
for the project remained vague, however.  Despite the approval of the city’s taxpaying 
voters, road paving was a slow process.  Property owners were only willing to accept 
small adjustments to municipal millage rates, and often fought with other neighborhoods 
as to whose streets should be paved first.  By the end of the decade, less than one fourth 
of the city’s streets were paved.  Sections of the city that did have paved streets were 
mostly limited to the downtown business district and the wealthier neighborhoods. 
89
      
 At the same time the bond issue was being proposed, a group of large property 
owning planters in the county and local bankers unified to influence the reorganization of 
Cobb’s county government.  Their plan involved dissolving the existing five member 
county commission and replacing it with an eleven member commission that would be 
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appointed by the eleven largest banks in the county.  Additionally, the old “citizen’s 
committee” that rotated among white property owning farmers would see its veto 
privileges curtailed. 
90
  Not unexpectedly, the plan was met with sharp derision from 
county voters, the majority of whom were small landowning whites.  The banks and 
planters nonetheless successfully tied the commission reorganization plan to the road 
bond proposal, meaning that a vote for one was a vote for the other.  In an effort to 
diminish voter turnout for the proposals among county farmers, the planter / banker 
coalition scheduled the vote during the height of harvest season.  Despite these attempts 
to curb voter turnout, the dual ballot failed by an overwhelming majority.  As reported in 
the Cobb County Times, the opposition vote could have been even greater had it not been 
“cotton picking time.” 
91
   
Defeat of the ballot kept Cobb farmers in a position of influence in local 
government, but left the county without a road plan once again.  In the spring of 1922, 
Cobb’s white farmers embraced a rural progressive state-wide election proposal to issue a 
$75,000,000 bond to improve the state’s transportation infrastructure.  Set to be paid for 
through the creation of a state tag and gasoline tax, Cobb’s farmers, most of who relied 
upon wagons for transport, fully supported the bond plan.  “[M]ost of the cars owned are 
in the cities and towns,” wrote a rural supporter, but “not a dollar of the money is to be 
spent within the city and town limits.” 
92
  Though the bond plan would only pertain to 
state-controlled thoroughfares, urban voters surprisingly supported the proposal.  In 
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Marietta, two of the major north/south and east/west routes were state controlled.  
Likewise, following the Scarboro imbroglio, city voters were much more open to having 
state government disburse funding than have local government undertake another bond 
issuance. 
93
 Ultimately, however, the state bond would be defeated in the General 
Assembly when a group of rural legislators attempted to secure a reduction in ad valorem 
taxes for rural-owned property before they would support the state-wide road plan. 
94
   
 In addition to good roads, improved access to educational resources was also a 
shared desire of both rural and urban white property owners.  Prior to the 1910s, only 
Marietta had its own school system, consisting of primary and secondary schools for 
whites and primary school for African Americans.  By the 1920s, following resident 
demands for increased facilities, Marietta had become an independent school system, 
meaning that though it still took money from the state to pay teacher salaries and for 
general maintenance, it met all accreditation standards and could even charge tuition to 
families living outside of the city limits. 
95
  In the mid 1920s, the small north Cobb city of 
Acworth joined Marietta City Schools in offering primary and secondary education, but 
had not achieved independence as it still received an annual state grant that was tied to 
the district’s operation of a functional library and science laboratory, and in having 
college-degreed teachers on staff. 
96
  Both city systems operated on a nine month term 
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with the eleventh grade being the graduating class.  For Marietta’s working class 
families, the eighth grade was often the last year of education.  Beginning in the 1930s, 
middle and upper class city residents would begin demanding the creation of a twelfth 
year to serve as a preparatory grade for college-bound students. 
97
  Another point of 
contention for many city school families was that students had to purchase their own 
books each year.  Lack of available funds, especially during the Great Depression would 
dampen the school board’s ability to meet public pressure. 
 During the 1910s and 1920s, school choices in the county were often limited to 
non-accredited schools run by local county voting districts. 
98
  Offering an eighth grade 
education on a seven month school year to accommodate planting and harvests for 
farming families, the quality of the actual education was scattershot with teachers often 
travelling from one school or one county to another from year to year.  The one exception 
to the county’s dire educational resources was the Seventh District Agricultural and 
Mechanical School that opened 1908.  A fulfillment of the kind of federal, state, and local 
partnerships championed by educational proponents such as William Felton decades 
earlier, the A&M school was a fully accredited institution that served white students from 
northwest Georgia.  Built upon the principle that the school would “promote growth and 
increase wealth in rural communities,” the seventh district’s A&M remained an anomaly 
until the 1930s, when federal intervention and increased state spending actually helped 
create a viable county school system.  In the 1910s and 1920s, even though rural 
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residents often asked for more schools, the reason for the county’s lack of school choices 
was simply “scarcity of money.” 
99
         
In the early twentieth century, rural and urban white property owners were 
becoming less likely to affect political change to their economic realities.  Believing 
themselves to be victims of systems beyond their control, and growing increasingly 
frustrated with a lack of infrastructure and educational funding, whites in Cobb County 
grew ever more frustrated over local and state tax bills, a lack of education funding, and 
poorly maintained roads. In the decade leading up to the Great Depression, fights over 
distributing the tax burden would dominate local and state politics.  The tax burden, as it 
was formed through overly-optimistic pro-business ideologies, unregulated bond markets, 
and heavy-handed credit systems, is an integral part of understanding the everyday 
economic realities of Georgia and Cobb County in the early twentieth century as the 
transgressive qualities of tax politics became more apparent.  The failure to bridge 
historic rural and urban animosities in order to build a new political coalition between the 
two groups of white property owners provided opportunity to corporations, industries, 
and special interest groups to manipulate local and state tax codes to their own benefit.  
In an attempt to be politically independent of one another, the two groups of white 
property owners struggled in the changing economic climate of the 1910s and 1920s.     
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MANUFACTURING THE TAX BURDEN 
As much as predatory banking practices and unregulated markets at regional and 
national levels beset rural and urban white property owners in Cobb County with feelings 
of economic aggrievement, the manipulation of tax policy at the local and state level by 
big business led the two factions of land owners to embrace an era of political resentment 
towards one another that would reach its zenith by the beginning of the 1930s. This 
adversarial relationship between rural and urban white taxpayers over property 
assessment and revenue collection veiled their shared anxiety towards the unfettered 
power of corporations and large-scale landholders over the political process, and hindered 
the creation of a broad coalition of white property owners.  Despite their propensity to try 
to pass the tax burden onto each other, the grievances of the wool hat boys and new 
Whigs were criticisms of an increasingly integrated capitalist system in the first quarter 
of the twentieth century that transcended national, regional, or local limitations. 
1
   
In many case studies involving a privileged white class, the political and 
economic interests of said whites are presented as monolithic. 
2
  This is especially true in 
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works focused on the post World War Two era and the racialized expansion of suburbia.  
Scholarly investigations into the phenomenon of white flight, actions taken to defeat 
school desegregation and busing, and the rise of political conservatism have, no doubt, 
added to our understanding of the processes involved in the racialization of both politics 
and the built environment, but have also painted a somewhat incomplete picture.  Little 
attention has been paid to the differences and tensions between privileged classes of 
whites. 
3
  Cobb’s white property owners, for example, were privileged under a system of 
white supremacy that bestowed upon them voting rights and land ownership, but they 
remained starkly divided by historic rural / urban tensions that manifested into separate, if 
not competing, ideologies in the early twentieth century.  In this, white property owners 
constituted a defined privileged class based on political participation and land ownership, 
but should also be recognized as inhabiting two sub-classes:  rural white property owners 
and urban white property owners.  
4
   
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, rural and urban white property owners 
attempted to pass the bulk of the tax burden onto each other by way of various tax 
schemes, including equalization, income, or sales taxes.  With white property owners 
unable to form a political coalition that would align their shared interest of lowered 
property taxes, the door was open for corporations and special interest groups to 
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manipulate state and local tax codes for their own benefit.   How does a study of tax 
policy in the 1910s and 1920s expose inter-class conflict between rural and urban white 
property owners?  What do corporate and special interest interference into state and local 
tax codes mean to our understanding of the power and limits of whiteness over time?   
Manipulation of Public Policy     
Concurrent to the decline in overall voter participation was the marked increase in 
corporate manipulation of state politics.  After the Independent movement failed to take 
hold in state politics and with Populist leaders rejoining the Democratic Party, the 
machinery for challenging the influence of corporate and industrial interests through 
political organization had been significantly curtailed.  Unlike several states that enacted 
laws reducing or regulating the influence of corporations in state politics in the early 
twentieth century, Georgia’s elected government continued to let corporations and 
industries wield their power in the face of an increasingly smaller electorate. 
5
  Speaking 
to the influence corporate power sought to gain in many southern state governments at 
the beginning of the twentieth-century, David R. Goldfield has pointed out that “the 
barons of Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue were more intent than ever on 
maintaining their colonial possessions below the Potomac.” 
6
  Without a clear challenge 
to corporate and industrial hegemony, Georgia’s white property owners, which included 
small farmers, businessmen, and the urban middle class, embarked on a decades-long 
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struggle over how state government should be financed, who would bear the tax burden, 
and where state funds should be disbursed.   
For the first three decades of the twentieth century, Georgia’s tax code generated 
more resentment than revenue.  Despite the animosity felt between rural and urban 
taxpayers, they often shared a common bond in their desire to have better roads, more 
schools, and improved public services.  At the surface, the ability to fund such programs 
seemed thwarted by the preoccupations of white property owners to pass the tax burden 
onto someone else.  A deeper investigation, however, reveals that the antagonisms felt by 
one group of white taxpayers towards another were being manipulated, both indirectly 
and covertly, by influential capitalist forces. 
7
  This was especially true with large land 
holding corporations such as public utilities, railroads, and timber companies; industries 
such as textile operations and soft drink manufacturers and bottlers; and special interest 
lobbying groups organized by retail merchants, real estate, and later, automobile dealers.  
In late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Georgia, many of these concerns – with the 
major exceptions of public utilities and beverage industries – were directly tied to or were 
subsidiaries of northern-owned corporations.  It is also no surprise that Georgia’s 
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corporate and industrial powers had worked political devices in the late nineteenth 
century to curtail democratic participation by shrinking the electorate.               
In his studies of the Gilded Age, Alan Trachtenberg has contended that one of the 
major changes to American society during that period was the creation of a “modern form 
of corporate ownership” where a “small group of directors and managers” served at the 
head of a “larger…body of otherwise unrelated stockholders.” 
8
  The modern corporation 
emerging in the late nineteenth century irrevocably transformed the South’s economic 
systems.  The introduction of corporate capitalism into the daily lives of Cobb County 
residents, whether through agricultural markets, utilities, transportation industries, or 
bond markets, was an imposition into economic livelihoods more dramatic than the 
aftereffects of the Civil War itself.  In much of the South, for example, textile mill 
operations, emergent utility companies, railroad ventures, and beverage manufacturers 
could have stockholder interests in small towns, the rural countryside, in other states, in 
other parts of the country, or even internationally. 
9
  Although some historians such as 
Martin Sklar have argued for the democratizing effect of large scale corporate ownership, 
in Georgia, as in many parts of the still war-ravaged South, the increased influence of 
corporations through public stocks made it easier to manipulate the political process; 
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what was good for the corporation was good for the stockholder.
10
  Throughout the early 
twentieth century it was not uncommon for representatives of the biggest companies in 
the state to pay a personal visit to members of the General Assembly whenever tax issues 
were being discussed. 
11
  The close relationships forged between politicians and corporate 
concerns would lead many former governors and other high ranking elected officials to 
become lobbyists for various industry groups after their political terms expired.  Possibly 
no better example exists than the case of John M. Slaton, a Georgia governor and self-
proclaimed Progressive who spent the majority of his time after leaving political office 
working against plans to implement a state income tax and sales tax on behalf of the 
state’s manufacturer’s association. 
12
  It is no wonder that throughout Georgia’s 
Progressive era, corporate and industrial concerns often welcomed state plans for 
regulation, while working behind the scenes to ensure that their lobbyists could affect the 
regulatory process.               
Accounts of the relations between politics and industry echo Gabriel Kolko, who 
for much of his academic career has chronicled big businesses’ manipulation of reformist 
agendas during the Progressive Era and New Deal.  The basis of Kolko’s arguments is 
borrowed from Max Weber’s theorization of political capitalism and outlines how 
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American corporations inserted themselves into state and national political processes to 
ensure the continued advantage they held in the market. 
13
  “Political Capitalism,” Kolko 
writes, “is the utilization of political outlets to attain conditions of stability, predictability, 
and security – to attain rationalization – in the economy.” 
14
  The foundation of political 
capitalism as developed by Weber, and reinterpreted by Kolko, remains an important line 
of interrogation in the study of the practice of American capitalism, and is especially 
pertinent to the study of early twentieth-century Georgia.  In Kolko’s theory of political 
capitalism, the process of how the actions of corporate interests and accommodating 
governments have helped render changes in the market as natural forces is a significant 
part to understanding the intractableness of social and economic life in places like Cobb 
County.  Subsequent scholars such as John Love have continued to interrogate the 
foundation put forth by Weber and Kolko and have succinctly defined political capitalism 
as “private ownership of the means of production…secured by the coercive power of the 
state.” 
15
  George Lipsitz has also interrogated the effects of political capitalism, noting 
that corporate manipulation of public policy ultimately leads to tax receipts coming from 
those who can least afford them, and “promotes economic insecurity and social 
antagonisms.” 
16
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In Georgia, the introduction of corporate capitalism into the everyday lives of the 
state’s citizenry ushered in a new era of conflict between not just rural and urban 
interests, but with emergent capitalist interests, as well.  This conflict has largely been 
understudied by southern historians, who have, more often than not, grouped the state’s 
urban businessmen and industrialists with the interests of national corporations and 
industries.  As demonstrated in North Georgia, where so many small business owners 
joined the earlier Independent Movement, the interests of locally-centered commercial 
business operations were different than those of industrial or corporate ventures with 
boards of directors, stock offerings, and large numbers of employees.  As small business-
owners, local commercial and industry interests had neither the political clout nor the 
financial backing to affect favorable policy at the state level.  Another key difference, in 
terms of taxation, rested in the amount of land they owned.  A local merchant or a small-
scale textile owner would favor lowered assessments for improved properties, while a 
large land holding corporation or railroad, which often held title to vast amounts of the 
state’s open land, supported an ad valorem system favorable to rural or unimproved 
landowners.  The influence of small business owners in local and state politics would 
dramatically increase in the years leading up to the Great Depression, when Georgia’s 
small businesses organized their own special interest lobbies through car dealership 
associations, merchant’s groups, and pro-business civic clubs. 
17
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Since many of the state’s corporations and industries were also some of its biggest 
landholders, an interesting political alliance formed between big business and Georgia’s 
white property owning farmers.  With both groups concerned over the assessment process 
of real property, which had a direct effect on their financial liabilities, the two often 
overlapped in their support of state-wide candidates.  Theirs, however, was not a coalition 
in the traditional sense.  Outside of the position of favoring lowered ad valorem 
assessments, rural white property owners and big moneyed corporations had few 
common interests.  The best example of this is the political career of Eugene Talmadge, 
an upstart attorney from rural Telfair County along the southern edge of Georgia’s Black 
Belt.  Following his first foray into publically elected office in the 1920s, Talmadge, who 
early in his career did not have the backing of powerful local leaders, manufactured a 
political persona that appealed directly to the financial and social interests of white land-
owning farmers, but that was funded through corporate money. 
18
  As his career 
progressed through his time as governor, Talmadge would champion himself as a friend 
of the white farmer, while dismissing cities and urban residents as detrimental to 
Georgia’s agrarian roots.  With a dual focus on lower taxes for farming families and a 
defense of white supremacy, his elections to higher office allowed him to pass benefits 
onto his corporate benefactors, where they often received the same tax cuts as did 
farming families but on a much higher scale.       
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There was no bigger corporate benefactor to Talmadge’s political career than 
Georgia Power.  A public utility giant formed in the late 1910s, Georgia Power 
dominated the local and regional electricity markets and even extended its influence into 
neighboring states. 
19
  By the mid 1920s, aware of the enormous influence industries and 
retailers carried in the state, Georgia Power Company began a reorganization campaign 
that would make it the most powerful corporation in the state.  Pulling together its money 
reserves, Georgia Power, over a span of three years, aggressively sought mergers with 
nearly every existing electric utility in the state, including the Central Georgia Power 
Company, Macon Railway and Light Company, Central Georgia Transmission Company, 
the Georgia Public Service Corporation, the East Georgia Power Company, the Georgia 
and Alabama Power Company, and the Americus Light Company. 
20
  Once the mergers 
were approved by the shareholders of the companies to be absorbed and by the state’s 
overly compliant Public Services Commission, Georgia Power held near monopoly over 
electric utilities for the entire state by 1928, having ownership of hydroelectric dams, 
power stations, sub stations, and utility wire right-of-way.  Concurrent to its merger 
program, Georgia Power also began purchasing electric railway lines throughout the 
state.  Already holding ownership of trolley lines in Fulton, DeKalb, and Cobb counties 
(the cities of Atlanta, Decatur, and Marietta), Georgia Power purchased trolley rail lines 
throughout the state, including cities such as Rome and Athens, giving the utility 
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possession of rail bed and electric line right-of-way, as well as control over fare prices 
and route schedules. 
21
   
Following the consolidation campaign, Georgia Power was one of the state’s 
largest land holders, next to the timber industry and the railroad companies.  As the 
primary provider of electricity to the state, the company held enormous sway with the 
business and industry sectors that required its power, with state politicians, and of course, 
with local governments, whose cities were lit by Georgia Power and where the 
populations often depended on its trolley services to get to work or to city commercial 
districts.  When Georgia Power began issuing public stock to residents of the state, the 
company became even more involved in Georgians’ daily lives.  In 1927, for instance, 
the power company issued a special preferred stock only available to Georgia residents, 
and created a payment plan whereby purchasers paid “$10 cash at the time of purchase 
and $10 per share per month thereafter...” until the initial price was paid in full.  P.S. 
Arkwright, the company’s president, assured investors that the stock was not speculative 
but was “investment security” that allowed purchasers the “opportunity to promote the 
growth and welfare of the state” by investing in the utility. 
22
  In the Georgia General 
Assembly, the company asked that the stocks purchased by Georgia residents and the 
future dividends they earned be exempt from city, county, and state taxes. 
23
  The 
Assembly and governor’s office agreed.  With little to no competition, Georgia Power 
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boasted solid annual profits, and did not shy away from sharing its good fortunes with its 
stockholders. 
24
 These stockholders, many of whom were within the state’s political 
establishment, no doubt continued to look favorably upon Georgia Power so long as 
dividends remained high.  In an era of unregulated markets and financial insecurity, 
Georgia Power’s stock, created from monopolization and backed by government 
influence, was as stable a commodity as could be found in the state.    
Testament to the influence Georgia Power had in local and state politics is that 
they actually shied away from direct, overt lobbying efforts.  Although its president, P.S. 
Arkwright, was a prolific speechmaker to various business and corporate events where he 
espoused his belief in limited government and free market ideals, the company gave the 
appearance of not meddling in the direct affairs of state politics.  Behind the scenes, of 
course, was another issue.  In terms of Georgia Power’s private maneuvering, no one 
rivaled Fred Wilson, a company executive who while rarely seen in the capitol building, 
personally knew a significant number of the Georgia General Assembly.  Known as the 
power company’s “fixer,” Wilson often made personal “loans” to state legislators having 
money problems, and spent generously on “graduation gifts” to the children of local and 
state politicians.  In return, Wilson was often invited into the homes of politicians to 
privately comment on issues before the state legislature regarding taxes and regulation. 
25
       
In terms of its sheer size and resource, no other single industry or corporation in 
Georgia – save perhaps for Coca-Cola – could match Georgia Power in the first half of 
                                                 
24
 The preferred stock issued in 1927, for example, paid quarterly dividends of one dollar and fifty cents in 
less than one year of issue. Atlanta Constitution, 3 April 1928.  
 
25
 Background on Wilson and Arkwright found in Kytle and Mackay, Who Runs Georgia?, 43-45, 139-140, 
172.  In 1947, the Atlanta Constitution referred to Wilson as “the most persistent influence for corrupt 





the twentieth century.  The need to gain equality in bargaining clout with state and local 
government on par with the power utility necessitated the emergence of the special 
interests group.  Though many of these organizations predated the founding of Georgia 
Power, it was not until the 1910s and 1920s that they began entering the political arena.  
Unlike the utility behemoth, they did not shy away from direct lobbying and could often 
be seen in the state capitol building and county courthouses alike.  By the end of the 
1920s, many of the individual companies, corporations, and industries discovered that to 
achieve favorable policy-making decisions from politicians it was best to align forces 
with similar concerns.  By the onset of the Great Depression, the state was awash in 
special interests groups including the Associated Industries of Georgia, Cotton 
Manufacturers Association, and the Georgia Association Railroads, all of which tried to 
reduce their tax liabilities at the expense of taxpayers. 
26
       
As the economic depression wore on, special interest organizations spread beyond 
their traditional corporate and industrial beginnings.  In the early 1930s, for example, 
taxpayers’ leagues popped up across the state with local chapters intent on mobilizing 
voters to help elect politicians who would lower city and county millage rates. 
27
  In the 
1930s, the Georgia Farm Bureau Federation was formed just north of Cobb County with 
a charter to protect agriculture from high taxation and to encourage better market access.  
Within a decade the Farm Bureau boasted 150,000 members who it claimed supported its 
agricultural-friendly agenda before the state legislature.  Despite both group’s promises to 
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be lending a hand to average Georgia property owners in the fight against high taxes, they 
were far from the grassroots spirit they claimed.  The taxpayers’ leagues were the 
creation of real estate businesses, property-case lawyers, and local rentiers who sought to 
bring in urban homeowners to their cause of lowered real property taxes.  The Farm 
Bureau, similarly, was the creation of large land-holding farmers and bank executives, 
with large land-holders signing up their tenants and families to expand the ranks of the 
lobbying group at least on paper. 
28
  Although the bureau did press for legislation of some 
benefit to small struggling farmers, the main recipients of the bureau’s efforts were 
plantation owners and the lending institutions that provided financial backing to the 
state’s agricultural system.    
Machinations on the part of powerful moneyed interests to craft public policy to 
their own benefit left Georgia’s white property owners with little opportunity to alter 
distribution of the tax burden or to adequately fund the kinds of social services they 
demanded such as with schools and roadways.  As corporations and industries saw their 
influence strengthen in the years leading up to the Great Depression, the state’s white 
property owners – and on a smaller scale – in Cobb County, embraced a form of 
resentment politics that capitalized on the historic tensions between rural and urban 
factions.  The hostility between the two would bring state government into a constant 
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Passing the Hat 
 
In the fall of 1912, after returning from an extended business trip to Los Angeles, 
Marietta banker Moultrie Sessions penned a letter to the Atlanta Constitution praising the 
southern California county for its commitment to creating a pro-business climate for 
investors and entrepreneurs.
 29
   As the president of Marietta Loan and Trust, which 
specialized in residential and commercial real estate, as well as business loans, Sessions 
was one of North Georgia’s leading voices in promoting “progress and growth,” and had 
travelled to the west coast looking for investment opportunities. 
30
  What impressed 
Sessions enough to write a letter detailing the events of his trip was his encounter with 
California’s “tax equalization” system, whereby county assessors placed a fixed tax value 
on properties regardless of whether they were used for agriculture, business, or personal 
residence.  For the previous tax year, Sessions noted, collected property tax receipts for 
Los Angeles County alone under equalization were reported at “over $700,000,000.”  
Upon his return home to Marietta, Sessions discovered that the property tax receipts for 
all of Georgia, “the Empire State of the South,” over the same time period were “around 
$750,000,000,” a figure he deemed so low as to be “mortifying.” 
31
  These numbers were 
all the more telling considering that Los Angeles County’s total 1910 population was 
504,131, while Georgia’s total population in 1910 stood at 2,609,121. 
32
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Arguing that California’s equalized tax assessment system promoted economic 
security and tax fairness, Sessions noted “thousands of people with capital flocking in 
there because of the widespread advertising” coming from the state’s business 
community, civic organizations, and “various chambers of commerce.”  During his west 
coast trip, Sessions was witness to the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, a 
massive publically-funded infrastructure project that sought to bring much-needed water 
from Owens Valley into Southern California. 
33
  Though ostensibly designed to provide 
drinking water, the effects of the aqueduct project were often indirect and cumulative.  
Completion of the project was a boon to developers and industrialists looking to relocate 
to Southern California, but was a disaster to Eastern California’s agricultural concerns.  
As a banker interested in real estate and bond holdings, Sessions believed that large-scale 
public investments spurred private growth, and no doubt saw Los Angeles’s expanding 
streetcar line, business construction, and residential development as evidence to the 
merits of pro-growth spending.  Though tax equalization plans were growing in 
popularity across the country in the early twentieth century, they were especially popular 
in areas where emergent business and industrial interests were in conflict with an 
established agricultural sector.  This was true in New South strongholds such as the areas 
around Atlanta and Birmingham, and also in places like Los Angeles, where a rapidly 
growing business and industrial sector ran afoul of entrenched agriculturalists over issues 
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of land-use, water rights, and perhaps more importantly, the distribution of tax 
obligations.   
In his letter, Sessions asserted that properties in Georgia’s agricultural dominated 
counties were being under taxed in comparison to urban properties, a common complaint 
among the state’s city residents since the mid nineteenth-century.  As a banker overseeing 
mortgage loans, he noted that many times farmers in Cobb and adjoining counties would 
sell land parcels where the property’s total assessed value would be a fraction of the 
grantee’s purchase price.  In one example, Sessions recalled approving a loan for a local 
farmer to buy a property with a purchase price of $2800.  When Sessions examined the 
tax information he found that the property’s value was listed at a mere $500. 
34
  Such 
scenarios were supported by the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce’s study of state tax 
receipts submitted prior to 1912, which showed that farmers owning the same amount in 
acreage with similar improvements in housing and agricultural structures but in separate 
counties could pay as much as a one hundred percent difference in state property taxes 
from year to year. 
35
  Manipulation of tax collection on the part of county governments 
was commonplace not just in Georgia but throughout the Lower South.  In Mississippi, 
for example, historian Albert D. Kirwan has noted that whenever the “state levy went up, 
property assessments went down,” leading to an ever-expanding state deficit. 
36
  Without 
a uniform system of tax assessment, Sessions contended, agriculturally-dominated 
counties armed with their own separate assessors were free to act as “arbiter of its own 
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returns,” a process which he argued enticed property owners to support politicians who 
deferred their tax collecting responsibilities for the sake of being voted into office. 
37
  
Even within specific counties, a popularly elected tax collector could levy a state property 
tax of different amounts on similarly sized and improved parcels depending upon city or 
rural location, or even from one farm to another. 
38
  For Sessions, a strong proponent of 
New South boosterism and Neo-Whig policy-making, the manipulation of what he saw as 
an antiquated tax system led to a lack of investment-potential for Georgia.  As evidence 
to this, he recounted a meeting with an insurance company president from the northeast 
who stated he was unwilling to loan money in Georgia because “there was absolutely no 
way of arriving at any true idea of value of property from tax returns.” 
39
       
Evidence of tax discrepancies, whether anecdotal or empirical, continued to raise 
feelings of resentment among Georgia’s urban residents against their agricultural 
neighbors.  The issue of under-collecting tax receipts, after all, affected the disbursement 
of state funds for education and transportation projects. 
40
  With counties constitutionally 
required to send a portion of collected taxes onto the state, urban residents argued that 
when small rural counties under-collected county property taxes it placed an undue tax 
burden on Georgia’s more populated and industrial counties.  “The capitalist…,” 
Sessions warned, “is not apt to come in shoals into a state which passes the hat to support 
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its institutions, and which does not itself know the extent of its taxable resources, since it 
provides no adequate means of appraising them.” 
41
  According to arguments from city 
taxpayers, the under-collecting counties continued to take state money for education, yet 
balked at levying tax rates commensurate with those from the state’s urban centers.   
Among business leaders, urban politicians, and other assorted pro-growth boosters, as 
well as newspapers such as the Atlanta Constitution and the Marietta Journal, a common 
term that would come to be used to drum up public support for a Georgia equalization bill 
would be to refer to those opposed to tax reform as “tax dodgers,” “spongers,” or 
“parasites.” 
42
  In an editorial from the Atlanta Constitution, the paper opined that “tax 
dodgers too tight-wadded and too easy-conscienced [sic] to bear their just part of the 
public burden have been able to bring sufficient pressure upon invertebrate legislatures.” 
43
  In the language of tax resentment, terms such as “tax dodgers” and “parasites” were 
interchangeable with rural property owners, and were reflective of the historical divisions 
between urban and rural whites.  If all property owners in every section of every county 
paid a similar tax rate, pro-equalization supporters contended, the rates urban areas were 
assessing for their own properties could be lowered due to an overall increase in state-
wide revenue.     
Rural constituents and their representatives countered arguments for equalization 
by noting that most of the state’s small farmers lived precarious economic lives – beset 
with high rates of indebtedness, yearly climate conditions that could ruin a harvest, and 
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an agricultural market that could offer little to no profit margin dependent upon prices 
fixed in the exchanges of the northeast.  The small land-owning farmer, they argued, 
deserved to pay lower state property taxes compared to those in the cities and towns.  For 
many rural families, urbanization and industrialization were enemies of their own 
interests.  The city is where foreclosure notices often emanated and it was into the 
growing company towns of foreign industry that displaced farmers arrived looking for 
work after eviction, creating what Douglas Flamming has referred to as the steady 
“outmigration” of southern white labor from countryside to mill. 
44
  The fear of losing the 
identity of a self-sufficient farmer –as imbued in myth as it may have been – struck a 
discordant chord among Georgia’s rural families.  Much like their preceding generations, 
Georgia’s white land-owning farmers of the 1910s were very much aware of the 
economic realities they faced.  In light of this, many rural farmers questioned the growing 
wealth of Georgia’s urban middle and upper classes, who promoted investment in public 
utilities and bought stock in industry.  With the tax equalization argument – as it was 
constructed by pro-growth urban interests – focused mostly on questions of real estate 
value, the state’s small farmer could easily ask: and what of personal property?  In the 
pages of The Jeffersonian, Thomas Watson spoke for many of Georgia’s white farmers 
when he critiqued the state’s tax policy as being decidedly favorable to urban residents, 
writing that “the unavoidable taxes laid upon the people exceed the annual increase in 
wealth…thousands of people are annually reduced to poverty, while the privileged 
corporations have amassed such wealth that the world is amazed at the magnitude of 
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private fortunes for the few, and destitution and misery for the many.” 
45
  In the 
constellation of resentment constructed by Georgia farmers, corporations, textile mills, 
banks, and city dwellers shared common orbit, and often not without fair warrant.  For 
many of Georgia’s rural property owners, the anger of a Populist farmer years earlier 
continued to speak to their opinion of tax collection: “The moneylender often escapes 
from bearing his just proportion of the burdens of government.  The poor farmer is made 
to pay tax upon his rocky knolls and gaping gullies.  His every inch is taxed.  He cannot 
hide; he cannot escape it.  Though his wife and children cry for bread, the tax gatherer 
walks his rounds.” 
46
  
During the 1913 and 1914 legislative sessions, urban support for tax equalization 
began showing its strength in the Georgia General Assembly, where self-proclaimed 
Progressive governor John M. Slaton, an Atlanta attorney with strong ties to North 
Georgia’s business and industrial community picked up the cause.  Seeking to build a 
broad coalition by tying tax equalization, pro-growth boosterism, and Progressive politics 
together, Governor Slaton, accompanied by businessmen like Sessions, travelled to cities 
throughout the state telling local leaders that unequal collection of tax receipts was 
hindering their town’s ability to lure business and industry due to not having enough 
funds available to build proper roads, erect schools, or make other civic improvements.   
On education, equalizers sought to remind the public that under-collecting taxes affected 
the distribution of school funds.  Pointing to the fact that Georgia’s school teachers often 
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had to wait until December, when the last property tax payments were due, to receive 
payment for their work, city and county school systems across the state lined up behind 
the equalization plan, believing that its implementation would bring a steady monthly or 
even weekly salary. 
47
  To big business, pro-equalization supporters assured industries, 
utilities, and railroads that by making every property owner pay an equal amount, the 
state tax burden on their operations would decline.  In Atlanta, the Chamber of 
Commerce began holding banquets where politicians, business leaders, and various 
prominent citizens of neighboring cities such as Marietta were invited to attend dinner 
service and hear a presentation on the virtues of tax fairness.  A recurring theme of the 
speeches and banquets was, as Slaton would say in nearly every speech on equalization, 
to ensure that all of Georgia’s “citizens pay their just and equal amount of the state’s 
burden.” 
48
            
With so many of North Georgia’s counties split between rural and city interests, 
many state representatives and senators were accustomed to having to negotiate between 
the two.  In Cobb, for instance, it was not uncommon for an elected state politician to 
give a speech before a group of farmers one day and attend a businessmen’s luncheon 
event the next.  By 1914 support for tax equalization in the General Assembly was so 
high that a handful of politicians sharing rural and urban voters attempted to at least 
mitigate the final bill with something that would appeal to the concerns or interests of 
small farmers.  Their plan for compromise came in the inclusion of personal property and 
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intangibles, in addition to real property into the equalization matrix.  In theory, this would 
include stocks, bond holdings, assorted bank notes, precious metals, and other valuable 
belongings.  In an effort to placate the worries of small farmers, politicians with sizable 
rural constituents noted “that throughout the state invisible as well as visible property, 
mortgages, as well as land, is being forced to pay its just tribute.” 
49
 Representatives from 
Georgia’s rural-dominated Black Belt and southern regions were less amenable to 
compromise.  Using their power to keep the equalization bill in the Ways and Means 
Committee, rural legislators who did not need to balance agricultural and business 
interests began striking out key provisions of the tax proposal, especially those that 
oversaw the collection process of county assessors and the creation of a state equalization 
board and tax commissioner. 
50
  With pro-equalization forces complaining that the bill 
had been “mutilated,” they moved towards the compromise proposal from the rural/urban 
legislators of North Georgia.  A significant change made in the compromise was to allow 
individual counties to keep control of the assessment process and to only apply 
equalization to the state’s share of property tax.   
As the legislative battle continued in the summer of 1913, midyear state property 
tax returns showed that collected revenue from the counties was off nearly $500,000 
compared to that time a year earlier. 
51
  Compromise and the reality of a sharp decline in 
revenue for 1913 motivated the General Assembly to pass the bill where it was signed by 
Governor Slaton.  Though the final equalization bill continued to let counties control their 
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own assessment process, Georgia’s equalization law required that counties create a 
county board of equalization with members serving six year terms and to collect an 
annual rate determined by an equalization board but not to exceed five mills before a 
county could draw money from the state.  The receipts would then be sent to a governor-
appointed Tax Commissioner, who would make the decision whether a county had fairly 
collected the appropriate tax amount. 
52
  With equalization passing through the General 
Assembly, Governor Slaton named John C. Hart, a businessman and judge to be the first 
Tax Commissioner, and money was transferred to each county to fund the creation of 
county boards of equalization. 
53
   
In many of Georgia’s more sparsely populated counties, including those from the 
Black Belt, wiregrass, and mountains region, the final tax equalization bill was met with 
derision with a few counties even vowing not to participate in programs such as the state 
education system if it meant having to raise taxes on farming properties.  Though many 
counties blustered, however, only two failed to collect the minimum mill rate during the 
first year of equalization, Washington County in the Black Belt and Milton, a small 
Piedmont county carved out of Cobb’s northeastern boundary just prior to the Civil War.  
Washington County had even gone so far as to refuse to appoint assessors and an 
equalization board for 1914.  In the first year of tax equalization, other Black Belt 
counties reported tax collection increases between $200,000 and $300,000.  Baldwin, a 
particular county often singled out as a major under-collector before equalization, had 
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even reported an increase of $716,783 in collections from the previous tax year.  
Washington County, in contrast, turned over to the state a decline of $155,652 from the 
previous year.  Under terms of the equalization bill, Georgia’s tax commissioner refused 
Washington’s tax receipts and declared the county to be unrecognized for funding for 
education, roads, or any other project with monies disbursed by the General Assembly or 
a state departmental agency. 
54
  United States Congressman Hardwick, a native of 
Washington County with strong backing from rural middle Georgia and whose district 
stretched across the Black Belt, replied to the funding cut with “I am glad that the people 
of my county have refused to abide by it, and that they have refused to have their legs 
pulled.” 
55
  While both Hardwick and Slaton held themselves to be Progressives, each 
challenged the bona fides of the other.  Upon hearing the Congressman’s stand on state 
tax equalization, Slaton charged Hardwick with promoting tax-dodging, and for offering 
nothing more than a “minstrel performance” of Progressivism. 
56
  
In counties that shared similar numbers of urban and rural residents, hard feelings 
over equalization divided communities.  Within a few years of the equalization bill 
passing, Cobb’s farmers, who were supporters of publicly-funded education but not of the 
tax requirements set forth under equalization, began to vent their frustration to elected 
officials.  Cobb’s state senator, Herbert Clay, who often spoke of having to walk a 
balance between the interests of the business community with those of county farmers, 
told his rural constituents he sympathized with their concerns and would support 
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repealing equalization, so long as it was replaced with something that would be amenable 
to taxpayers in both the cities and the countryside.  As many of Cobb’s taxpaying farmers 
continued to struggle in a volatile cotton market, their pressure on politicians increased, 
and Clay became less diplomatic in his remarks on the ad valorem tax, remarking to local 
newspapers that equalization put an “unjust burden upon the farmers of our county and 
state.” 
57
  Laws such as equalization, Clay told the Atlanta Constitution, which tied 
popular programs like public education to revenue collection only served to further the 
historic resentment between the state’s rural and urban citizens. 
58
   
Georgia’s business community and urban counties showed little sign of 
acknowledging or sympathizing with the fears of land-owning farmers.  In one letter to 
the editor, Athens businessman and representative from Clarke County Frank Lipscomb, 
who along with Moultrie Sessions had been instrumental in organizing early support for 
equalization, praised Slaton for his “honesty and attention to duty” in supporting 
equalization, noting that the governor deserved to be “classed with Ben Hill, Bob 
Toombs, and Howell Cobb” – three of the state’s most influential Antebellum Whigs. 
59
  
John C. Hart, Georgia’s first Tax Commissioner and pro-business ally of Governor Slaton 
told a meeting of the National Tax Association that one of the ideas behind equalization 
was to make the taxpaying public see themselves as “stockholders…in the state,” while 
creating a “healthy and wholesome spirit” surrounding the “square deal” of tax 
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  For many of the state’s pro-growth advocates, tax equalization was a way 
to force rural farmers into participating in the modernization of Georgia, much like how 
business-minded antebellum Whigs saw state-funded railroad construction as a way to 
bring yeomen farmers into a market economy.      
At the end of the state’s 1914 fiscal year, the tax commissioner reported that 
Georgia’s counties generated nearly $86,000,000 in new property tax revenue.  From 
agricultural properties alone, the commissioner reported “an increase of more than 
$40,000,000 in the value of improved farm lands as compared with 1913.”  According to 
the commissioner, “nearly 1,000,000 acres” of new land found its way onto the tax digest 
thanks to equalization. 
61
  In light of the substantial increase, the commissioner and 
county equalization boards informed the General Assembly and Governor that next 
year’s state mill rate would be lowered one half mill to four and one half.  As noted by 
one state official: “One effect of this law was to reduce the valuation on much Georgia 
property and raise it on others.” 
62
  The promise made to businesses and industries, and to 
city residents that their property tax liabilities would decrease had been fulfilled.                    
Less than a year after Slaton’s victory with equalization, Leo Frank, a 
northeastern Jew who managed a pencil factory in Atlanta, was accused of murdering a 
thirteen year old white factory worker, Mary Phagan.  The daughter of a once prominent 
but since down-on-its luck farming family from Cobb County, Phagan had left the farm 
to seek employment in the city to augment the family income.  The sensationalist nature 
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of the murder resonated strongly along class lines, with Tom Watson, the one-time 
Populist leader, and anti-equalization activist, fanning the flames of anti-Semitism 
through his newspaper, The Jeffersonian.  Phagan’s murder underscored the economic 
and social fears of Cobb’s white small farmers.  After a six week trial, Frank was 
convicted, sentenced to death, and moved to the state penitentiary in Milledgeville.  
When both the Georgia and United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Frank’s 
lawyers and the American Jewish Committee turned to Governor Slaton to commute the 
death sentence.  Following a review of the trial, Slaton decided that the jury had been 
unduly influenced by public anger and even began to harbor doubts, as well, as to Frank’s 
guilt.  In the summer of 1915, Governor Slaton reduced Frank’s sentence to life in prison.  
When news of the commutation reached Cobb County, a disparate group consisting of 
farmers, mill workers, wealthy elites, and local businessmen drove to Milledgeville 
where they seized Frank, brought him back to Marietta, and promptly lynched him in a 
wooded area on the eastern outskirts of the city. 
63
   In Atlanta, a mob of whites, incensed 
by Slaton’s commutation of the sentence began a march on the Governor’s mansion until 
the state’s National Guard mobilized to keep violence at bay.  Within days of the mob 
uprising, Slaton and his family fled the state, and pro-growth Progressive policymakers 
associated with the governor suffered a strong public backlash and a setback to their tax 
restructuring agenda.   
 
 
                                                 
63
 Until fairly recently, the perpetrators of the Frank lynching were thought to have consisted of only mill 
workers and local farmers.  Extensive research and interviews conducted by journalist Steve Oney in the 
1990s, however, found that many of Marietta’s elite families and politicians also participated in the murder.  
Steve Oney, And the Dead Shall Rise: The Murder of Mary Phagan and the Lynching of Leo Frank (New 




A New Strategy for Rural Georgia 
Georgia’s passage of the equalization bill continued to heighten economic 
tensions between urban and rural Georgians, and highlighted the split between Georgia’s 
Progressive politics.  Although Georgia’s Progressive politics had indeed ushered in a 
number of reforms, such as child labor laws, increased educational spending, 
transportation improvements, and public hospital funding, the primary beneficiaries of 
the programs were the state’s urban residents.  This was not surprising given that most of 
the governors of the recognized Progressive period were either from urban areas or held 
strong ties to business and industry.  Anti-equalization forces, long weakened by a 
coalition of business, industry, educators, and city property owners, capitalized on the 
anti-Semitic anger white Georgians felt toward Slaton and his allies and set forth on a 
journey to reclaim power in state government.           
A major break in urban domination of Progressive politics came in 1917, when 
the effects of the Frank case and lynching challenged the hegemony of Georgia’s urban 
coalition.  Aiding rural Georgia’s revanchist quest to retake control of state government 
was Hugh Dorsey, a one-time ally of Georgia’s urban Progressive coalition who, through 
his position as prosecutor in the Leo Frank case, became a celebrity figure throughout the 
state due to the extensive press coverage relayed during the trial.  Dorsey took his 
newfound popularity, and with the help of Tom Watson, rode the Frank verdict to the 
governor’s office.  Owing much of his election to Watson and his loyal readers of The 
Jeffersonian newspaper, Dorsey repaid the debt by supporting legislation favorable to 
Georgia farmers, including increased educational spending in rural areas and supporting 




Often recognized as one of the hallmarks of rural Progressivism, the 1917 Neill 
Act sought to apply a county unit system onto state Democratic Party primary elections.  
In design, the system gave each county a set number of votes commensurate to their total 
population. 
64
  Accordingly, counties such as Fulton, which contained Atlanta, would be 
afforded the highest number of unit votes, while thinly populated counties would receive 
the fewest.  Counties like Cobb, which had strong numbers of urban and rural residents 
would fall into the middle of unit vote allocation.  The county unit system had been a part 
of Georgia’s Democratic Party’s bylaws since Reconstruction, but had never been 
enforced.  Though the bill’s sponsor and namesake assured his fellow legislators that the 
county unit plan was not meant to be divisive, it was clear that if the bill came to pass 
Georgia’s smaller populated rural counties would dominate primary elections.  Under a 
county unit system, a handful of small counties could effectively cancel out the vote of 
the city of Atlanta, the largest city in the state.  Five counties, for example, with a 
combined population one fifth the size of Atlanta’s Fulton County would have more 
electoral power under the county unit plan.  “Don’t be uneasy about this county unit 
system,” Neill assured his fellow legislators, “It merely distributes and balances the 
power between the large centers of population and more sparsely settled communities.” 
65
  
The county unit plan, combined with the state’s whites-only primary and poll tax 
requirements would, despite the assurances of Neill, give unprecedented strength to rural 
white property owners.   
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In opposition to the impending bill, a representative from Floyd, a county in the 
northwest part of the Bloody Seventh and which was home to several iron and textile 
industries, stated before the General Assembly that “A great many…are doing things to 
punish the large cities…That ought not to be…These cities are not your enemies.”  
Attempting to appeal to notions of alleged white unity in a one party state, opponents to 
the Neill Act’s county unit plan reminded legislators that Democratic Party voters in 
Fulton County and Atlanta were white, just like Democratic voters from the countryside.  
“Is any system fair that makes one Democrat disenfranchise another because he lives in 
another county?” 
66
  Discussion of the county unit plan continued to fuel urban and rural 
resentment.  When passage of the plan became clear a growing number of politicians 
from densely populated areas such as Atlanta, Rome, Columbus, and Savannah 
threatened that if the county unit plan did indeed become law then maybe tax revenue 
should be disbursed at a county level under its matrix, an idea that would undoubtedly 
keep the majority of funds in urban centers, and that fed into urban Georgia’s belief that 
it was financially subsidizing the rest of the state. 
67
       
Once enacted into law, the Neill Act had immediate repercussions on state-wide 
elections.  Not only did the county unit system help favor politicians who represented 
rural interests for election to the governor’s office, it indirectly affected the state’s 
appointment process, which was overseen by the executive branch.  This was especially 
true for the position of Tax Commissioner, the office created from passage of the 
equalization bill.  With rural interests in command of the commissioner’s office, urban 
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legislator’s plans to further amend the equalization system failed to materialize.  The 
most significant of these failures, from the perspective of urban interests, concerned the 
plan to force cities and counties to equalize local tax collection in addition to the state 
equalization.  Georgia’s first tax commissioner John C. Hart lamented near the end of his 
tenure that “Equality…can never be accomplished so long as local boards adopt varying 
percentages of valuation,” and argued that disparities in tax assessment and collection 
were examples of the “rankest discrimination.” 
68
 
In counties such as Cobb, however, where political influence was split between 
urban and rural constituents, general agreement was that the new unit system would 
marginalize the voices of those on the losing side of a political race.  The Cobb County 
Times in an editorial comment implied such an opinion by pointing to how the new 
system might affect future primary elections.  In the 1918 senate race, the paper pointed 
out, the Democratic primary was to feature three strong candidates.  Georgia’s incumbent 
Senator, Thomas Hardwick, had stood against President Wilson’s war mobilization plans, 
arguing that American involvement in the European war would stall his plans for a 
progressive agricultural agenda.  Hardwick’s position was popular with many rural 
farmers who favored his progressive plans, but was deeply opposed by city leaders and 
some county officials as threatening Cobb County’s chance to receive a possible 
ordinance facility from the United States Army.  The other two candidates, William 
Schley Howard and William J. Harris, were considered “loyal Democrats” to Wilson. 
69
  
Both the alternatives to Hardwick were popular in Cobb, especially in the eyes of the 
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business community, as Harris from Polk County was a familiar figure in Bloody Seventh 
politics, and Howard was well established in business circles within the city of Atlanta.  
What the Cobb County Times opined was that a split between Harris and Howard voters 
would leave Hardwick as the county winner with the majority of votes.  Under the county 
unit system, Hardwick, with the anticipated strong support of the countryside’s wool hat 
boys, would receive all of Cobb’s unit votes, while the votes accrued by Harris and 
Howard in Cobb would not transfer to the state-wide results.  Given the closely contested 
races historically emanating out of North Georgia, and especially within the Seventh 
District, the primary act’s unit tally, the paper argued, would provide a statistical 
aberration giving the appearance of county-wide solidarity to one candidate. 
70
  
While the county unit system disproportionately favored rural Georgia counties in 
state wide elections and affected the appointment process, it did little to alter legislative 
politics, where issues over tax policy continued to divide the state’s solons according to 
the economic interests of their constituents.  For legislators with large rural 
constituencies, repeal of equalization continued to be an important campaign issue, but 
the prospects of realizing that goal were dim, given the strength of urban interests in the 
General Assembly and the fact that equalization was increasing revenue to fund public 
education and the road projects throughout the state.  Although a county unit-elected 
governor with rural interests could appoint a sympathetic tax commissioner, it would take 
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an amendment to repeal the equalization law and the dismantling of the independent 
equalization board to not enforce collection. 
71
   
Despite the gains rural interests were making with their hold on the governor’s 
office and legislature, hostility towards ad valorem tax collection continued.  In 1920, the 
final year of Dorsey’s governorship, a resurgent band of urban legislators managed to 
propose a bill that would require every county to levy a local school tax to augment the 
state education system funded by equalization.  Placed on the year’s amendment ballot, 
which was calculated by popular vote and not by county unit, the majority of Georgia 
voters, with strong urban support, approved the measure.  The mill rate for Cobb County, 
which had remained steady at ten mills since 1917, had already risen to fourteen mills 
beginning in 1921.  Cobb’s unincorporated residents, who were overwhelmingly white 
farming families, in addition to paying the fourteen mill rate for Cobb, were required to 
pay an additional three and one half mill rate for the school levy based on their militia 
district.  Under the new mandatory levy, the county’s rural farming families witnessed a 
rise in real ad valorem collection from ten mills in 1920 to seventeen and one half mills 
in 1921. 
72
  During the 1920s, as Cobb and Marietta’s millage rose within a given year, 
the total amount of tax collected county-wide declined, an act that left high numbers of 
tax defaulters on public rolls.  The decline of revenue in the face of rising millage rates 
was not just an issue for Cobb County, but for all of Georgia, and in many cases, the 
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  While many assume that large scale tax delinquency was a 
phenomenon related to the onset of the Great Depression, in actuality, unpaid tax debts 
began to grow precipitously throughout the 1920s. 
74
  Between 1921 and 1922 alone, total 
revenue from real ad valorem taxes in Georgia recorded a one year loss of $24,590,233, 
in spite of equalization and the increased numbers of properties listed on the tax rolls. 
75
         
Table 6: Millage Rates for Marietta and Cobb County (Exclusive of School Levy) * 
 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Marietta 14 15 ¼ 13 ½ 15 ¼ 15 16 15 ½ 15 15 
Cobb 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 
    
*Data compiled from General Administration Records of the Comptroller General of the State of Georgia, Vol. 2-12026 Georgia State 
Archives, Morrow, Georgia. Record Group 034-01-005.   
 
Table 7:  Total Amount in Real and Personal ad Valorem Taxes Collected County Wide * 
 1921 1922 1925 1926 
Cobb $11,763,390 $10,692,930 $10,204,740 $10,175,020 
     
* Data compiled from Annual Reports of Tax Commissioner of the State of Georgia, 1921, 1922, 1925, and 1926. Georgia State 
Archives, Morrow, Georgia. Record Group 034-01-007.   
To successfully pose a challenge to the equalization system and mandatory school 
tax, rural Georgia would need to come up with another plan other than straight repeal.  
By the end of the 1920 legislative session, anti-equalization forces offered a new strategy 
designed to create another source of revenue that could replace the property tax system as 
the primary funding vehicle for education funding and transportation.  In a bill proposed 
by state representative Zach Arnold from Clay, a predominately rural county located 
approximately one hundred and seventy miles southwest of Atlanta on the border with 
Alabama, the legislature would create a new progressive state income tax, modeled after 
the federal tax plan.  In a speech discussing his proposal, Arnold argued that banks and 
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industries were as profitable as ever, while rural Georgians bore the weight of taxation. 
76
  
As proposed, the plan would collect rates of up to a maximum fifteen percent of what an 
individual, family, industry, business, or corporation paid in federal taxes.  Backed with 
the support of the state’s new tax commissioner, Henry Fullbright, the income tax 
amendment proposed to abolish the state’s collection of ad valorem real property taxes in 
lieu of the new levy on income.  According to Commissioner Fullbright, who carried 
rural sympathies, “real estate and personal tangible property should be relieved of 
taxation for state purposes and should be taxed for county and municipal purposes alone.” 
77
  Additionally, Fullbright told the Atlanta Constitution that Georgia should develop a 
better system for taxing intangibles such as stock and bond holdings. 
78
   
In spite of the equalization bill’s compromise years earlier to collect a tax on 
personal property and intangibles, it was apparent by the early 1920s that many Georgia 
residents were failing to comply.  The failure to report personal property and intangible 
holdings such as stocks and bond certificates was relatively easy compared to real 
property, which an assessor could view firsthand from a site visit.  Such evasion by the 
middle and upper classes was not endemic to just Georgia, however.  David T. Beito in 
his book Taxpayers in Revolt: Tax Resistance During the Great Depression notes that 
self-reporting of personal property and intangibles “made evasion much more tempting 
for the taxpayer.”  Wealthy residents were even more likely not to comply, believing that 
personal and intangible taxes were “burdensome and unjust.”  Such wealthy taxpayers 
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resented having to report the “personal property tax on the intangible piece of paper” and 
also the “real estate tax on the tangible it represented.” 
79
  Indeed, in the first three years 
of equalization, state revenue from bank shares declined from $41,834,587 in 1913 to 
$40,443,155 in 1915.  Revenue generated by intangible taxes on stocks, bonds, and 
mortgages declined even more so, from $3,324,580 in 1913 to $2,601,150 in 1915. 
80
  
The obscuration of personal property and intangibles from taxation remained a point of 
contention with rural land-owning residents.  Cobb’s Henry Clay, whose careful 
navigation of the urban /rural divide helped him attain the office of President of the 
Senate by the early 1920s, cautiously offered his hope that the “business interests of 
Georgia will meet the farmers half way and get behind a movement so invisible property 
could pay its just part of taxes.” 
81
                
Not unexpectedly, the proposed income tax bill’s biggest detractors came from 
the state’s urban areas and its small business, industrial, and banking interests.  A leading 
opponent to the plan was the Georgia Manufacturer’s Association, whose spokesman 
claimed that since businesses, industries, and corporations already paid federal taxes, a 
new state income tax would constitute double taxation. 
82
  State Senator John Jones from 
LaGrange, home to many of Georgia’s largest industrial mills, told a General Assembly 
committee charged with studying the plan that implementation of a state income tax 
would be a “disaster” for the business community, since most business operations, and 
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especially industries, have varying profits from year to year – from “fat years” to “lean 
years.”  “There is only one solid foundation for state revenues,” Jones argued, “…the ad 
valorem tax.” 
83
  By the end of the 1921 legislative session, forces on both rural and 
urban sides of the income tax proposal were entrenched in their positions and rallying 
supporters.  Facing yet another bitter fight over tax policy, politicians representing 
counties with combined rural and urban interests urged restraint and were successful in 
having the income tax proposal stay in committee until the next biannual legislative 
session.   
The postponement mobilized the state’s business and industrial interests to defeat 
the income tax amendment proposal during the next meeting of the General Assembly.  
Back from exile following the lynching of Leo Frank, former Governor and Progressive 
Democrat John M Slaton, who had recently opened a law practice in Atlanta representing 
many of the state’s leading industries and corporations, began speaking to civic groups, 
local chambers of commerce, and business organizations urging their support in defeating 
the income tax, which he said would “put all the burden of taxation on the cities.”  
Calling upon his audiences to preserve the principles of Georgia’s old Whig leaders – 
“Toombs, Jenkins, and Crawford” – Slaton warned that increasing the tax burden on 
business and industry would destroy jobs throughout the state.  “Would people favor such 
a move [implementation of the income tax],” Slaton asked, “if they knew that it would 
keep employment from the people?”  The primary focus of Slaton’s argument was to 
appeal to the sense of aggrievement the business community felt towards the rest of the 
state when it came to taxes, pointing out that Fulton County alone contributed over one 
fifth of the state’s total revenue, while, by his calculations, one hundred and seventeen 
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counties received more money in state aid than they sent to the state’s coffers.  For the 
1920 state fiscal year, Slaton told a group of Atlanta businessmen, Fulton County had 
sent $240,000 to the state in collections from a new automobile tax, which was enacted to 
augment the ad valorem equalization system, but received only $8,000 in highway 
construction funds.  “If you change the Constitution and enact this income tax,” Slaton 
warned, “[then] two-thirds of the counties will not pay anything and that two-thirds can 
control the legislature.”  No doubt alluding to the county unit system and the power it 
bestowed upon rural counties, Slaton admonished the crowd that having the governor and 
the assembly control a state income tax “will be teaching some people that they can have 
all the privileges of the state and have to give nothing to its support.” 
84
 
What became a popular refrain among anti-income tax advocates was the belief 
that the state would not end its tax equalization collection on ad valorem real property if 
the income tax amendment was ratified.  In spite of the assurances of Arnold and 
Fullbright that state government would stop collecting real property taxes, income tax 
detractors found a powerful tool in arguing that the plan was going to double the tax bills 
of industry and business with property and income open to levy.  At a meeting of the 
Marietta Rotary Club, for example, an anti-income tax speaker told the group: “Industries 
that give employment to people locate wherever they find the greatest inducement.  
Those who contemplate the building of a factory or the establishment of a dairy, or any 
other one of the many enterprises Georgia needs so much, would not invest their money 
in a state which takes a toll on their earnings, plus a property tax, while there are other 
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states around which do not put upon them the extra burden of income tax.” 
85
  In a similar 
vein, a prominent Georgia candy maker announced that if an income tax was enacted, 
they would close their doors and move their operation to another state. 
86
     
By the spring of 1922, newly elected Governor Hardwick, the former Populist 
turned Progressive who won the county unit vote in the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary on his platform of repealing the equalization requirement and to implement a 
state income tax, faced a harsh political reality in trying to fulfill his campaign promise.  
With the state’s business and industrial sectors in full revolt over the income tax plan, 
Hardwick proposed what he believed to be a compromise, but was rather a plan that 
emboldened anti-income tax advocates and alienated his political base.  Per his proposal, 
the state would collect an income tax not to exceed six percent of federal taxes paid, in 
contrast to the fifteen percent originally planned for by Arnold a year earlier, and would, 
only in times of budget shortfalls, collect ad valorem real property taxes for the state at 
two and one half mills.  Pro-business legislators such as Senator John Jones immediately 
attacked Hardwick’s proposal, noting that the plan would only encourage members of the 
assembly to spend revenue derived from the income tax without restraint before moving 
onto real property taxes.  “The best class of people who work and sacrifice to develop 
and save – owning small property and working for moderate incomes – would have a 
double burden to bear,” decried the Senator. “The new plan is worse than the original,” 
he continued. 
87
  Throughout the income tax debate, its opponents continually offered 
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themselves as protectors of the common taxpayer, but their true allegiance rested with 
businesses, industries, and corporations.  The Georgia Manufacturer’s Association and 
industrial lobbyist John M. Slaton belittled the new proposal, with the former advocating 
at its 1922 annual convention that state government should be working to reduce freight 
differentials and expand the port of Savannah to increase commerce instead of trying to 
run business from the state with new taxes. 
88
  The fight to oppose the income tax, much 
like the earlier equalization bill, managed to bring together a diverse coalition such as 
with the manufacturer’s association and the railroad companies, which despite their 
opposing views on issues such as freight differential, held common ground in their 
disdain for what they saw as double taxation.   
Slaton, Hardwick’s longtime adversary, also began calling the governor’s ethics 
into question.  At issue was a sugar manufacturer’s committee hearing chaired by 
Hardwick while he was still a United States Senator several years earlier.  According to 
anonymous sources from New York City newspapers, Hardwick, although he chaired a 
committee designed to investigate racketeering and collusion in the sugar industry, had 
secretly taken money from the “free sugar lobby,” which sought to lower tariffs on raw 
sugar and molasses.  Furthermore, an accusation was made that Hardwick had used the 
government printing office to produce free sugar propaganda. 
89
  Hardwick was not 
censured by the Senate, but an investigation into the case noted that his name did appear 
on pay receipts from several free sugar lobbying organizations.  The one-time Populist, 
who rose to political prominence largely on anti-industry rhetoric, saw his personal 
reputation suffer for a few years in the eyes of Georgia’s rural white voters.  By 
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reintroducing the free sugar scandal into the income tax debate, Slaton and his pro-
business allies were attempting to paint Hardwick as a tool of industry, even though they 
were paid lobbyists on behalf of the manufacturer’s association and various corporations.            
As Slaton, Jones, and other anti-income tax advocates were quick to reject the 
compromise proposal, Hardwick’s political base began to crumble.  In a coalition unseen 
since the heyday of the Populist Party, small farmers and labor joined together to assail 
the governor they had helped to elect.  Before a packed auditorium in Fulton County, 
disgruntled politicians, farmers, and labor leaders took turns berating Hardwick for being 
a “traitor to Georgia farmers” and for “double-crossing laboring people.”  The main 
arguments against the governor included his compromise proposal on the income tax and 
his failure to secure repeal of equalization.  At the rally, a state senator from rural Upson 
County told the crowd that his constituents carried the “banner” for Hardwick in the last 
election, but that he would probably not receive “two hundred” votes if he ran again.  No 
doubt alluding to the governor’s participation in the free sugar affair years earlier, the 
senator further implied that the governor was a hypocrite, declaring, “He is lined up with 
the gigantic corporations of Georgia against the common people,” adding that Hardwick 
“could not fool the wool hat boys” when it came to his income tax proposal.  After an 
evening of speeches, the assembled crowd agreed to oppose any income tax proposal that 
did not include the complete repeal of the equalization system. 
90
  In spite of what the 
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governor saw as a compromise to the income tax that might earn the support of rural and 
urban politicians, the bill once again failed to come out of committee. 
91
   
Manipulation of Public Policy, Part Two  
Mobilization against income tax proposals in the 1920s brought an alignment of 
corporate, industrial, and special interests to take a more direct role in affecting favorable 
conditions to state tax policy.  For the better part of two decades, big business and its 
allies preferred to exert a soft hand to the issue of public policy.  The sharp political 
disputes between rural and urban property owners and politicians, and the growing 
popularity of alternative tax structures that could impact the financial spoils of Georgia’s 
big business, however, necessitated a more direct route to protecting their interests. In the 
years leading up to the Great Depression, corporate-backed lobbyists would regularly 
engage the public and political establishment to argue against any kind of tax increase.  
In spite of the immense animosity generated from equalization, the tax plan’s 
ability to alleviate the state’s revenue problems was short lived.  In a matter of years, the 
increase in revenue brought in from property tax equalization had failed to keep pace 
with public demands for additional public spending. 
92
  Likewise, increased numbers in 
tax delinquency further curtailed the ability of state and local governments to achieve the 
steady streams of revenue needed to undertake civic improvements. 
93
  Because of 
Georgia’s continuing fiscal crisis, with teachers being unpaid and with pension 
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obligations not being met, the need for increased revenue continued to be the top priority 
in each legislative session in the second quarter of the twentieth century. 
94
  Since the 
early 1920s, the state income tax plan was the main focus of attention, but with nearly all 
sides turning against the proposal, other revenue-generating ideas began to emerge in the 
General Assembly.   
Two options that were increasingly gaining traction in other states during the 
1920s were the state sales tax and the expansion of the existing gross receipts tax.  
Similar in some respects in that they taxed transactions, they differed significantly in 
terms of who paid the levy.  Under a gross receipts tax, manufacturers, industries, and 
utilities paid a fixed tax on purchases made within the cycle of production.  A furniture 
making industry, such as at the Brumby Mills in Marietta for example, would pay a tax 
on the purchase of materials and tools required to make their product, including lumber, 
milling machinery, nails, glue, varnish, etc. 
95
  First introduced in the General Assembly 
at the turn of the century, the receipts tax had always faced stiff opposition from the 
state’s producers of material goods and public utility corporations.  In one earlier 
proposal to enact a receipts tax in 1907, leaders of Southern Bell Telephone, Atlanta Gas 
Light Company, as well as representatives from various power utilities and the state’s 
railroad corporations delivered their opposition to the tax plan in person before the 
Assembly’s Ways and Means Committee. 
96
  With New South business mantra ringing in 
the ears of many of urban Georgia’s political leaders, the united front of some of the 
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state’s largest and most powerful industries and corporations in opposition to the tax was 
an impressive showing.  Their efforts at intimidation, however, ultimately failed and soon 
after a one percent gross receipts tax was placed on public utilities, railroads, telephone 
and telegraph companies, as well as “equipment companies, manufacturers of patent 
medicines, carbonated drinks… and sewing machine corporations.”  “If any corporation 
was omitted,” one rural legislator boasted to the press, “[it] will be doubtless remedied.” 
97
   
Nearly as soon as the tax began to be levied, however, industries and corporations 
increased their lobbying efforts for its repeal or reduction.  Within two years, Atlanta’s 
soft drink manufacturers spearheaded by Coca-Cola successfully lobbied the General 
Assembly to reduce its gross receipts tax from one percent to “one-fourth of one 
percent.” 
98
  Utility companies and other industries followed suit and within a matter of 
years, small armies of lobbyists descended upon the state capital building seeking to limit 
the amounts owed under the system.  Lobbying at the state capital reached such heights 
that by the 1920s, lobbyists were required to wear special identification badges when 
inside official state buildings.          
The new gross receipts plan sought to return to the original intent of the tax, in 
effect rolling back the reductions earned over the years through lobbying efforts.  Unlike 
the older gross receipts tax, however, the sales tax proposal of the early 1920s would 
involve placing a levy on transactions at the point when a finished good was sold to a 
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  Not surprisingly, the sales tax struck fear into Georgia’s commercial 
business sector and its allies in the chamber of commerce, as well as in civic clubs such 
as Rotary and Kiwanis, which retained significant membership with local merchants.  A 
group of business leaders from Columbus, Rome, Dalton, and Augusta, all of whom 
shared a border with another state, complained to a committee of the General Assembly 
that a state sales tax would lead to customers crossing state lines to buy goods. 
100
  
Retailers in Atlanta, Marietta, and Macon, protested the idea of having to be responsible 
for collecting the levy in addition to paying real property taxes on their establishments, 
claiming it to be an example of double taxation. 
101
  Among Georgia’s small farmers, 
however, the sales tax plan was met with openness.  Still prideful of their perceived self-
sufficiency and individualism, many of the “wool hat boys” viewed the sales tax as 
something that would largely only effect the state’s urban residents, and when politicians 
began tying a sales tax to education spending, even more rural Georgians accepted the 
plan, believing that it might finally lead to the repeal of equalization.   
Joining retailers in opposing implementation of a sales tax were urban working 
class residents. 
102
  While labor and small farmers had historical ties dating back to the 
Independent and Populist movements of the late nineteenth century and more recently in 
the income tax debate, a sales tax would disproportionately affect the working classes, 
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both white and African American, who did not have means of household production and 
whose incomes were not just low but increasingly stagnant.  Promising to fight a sales 
tax, Georgia’s limited organized labor groups including the Georgia Federation of Labor 
and the Atlanta Federation of Trades held joint meetings to take their concerns before 
Atlanta’s mayor and the state tax commissioner. 
103
  A tax on canned foods, household 
items, clothing, and other goods used on a daily basis by working Georgians would place 
a large part of future education funding on the backs of those least able to afford the tax.  
The fact that working class Georgians had the lowest registration of voters in the state 
due to the poll tax also meant that the white and African American working class lacked 
political clout to directly affect tax policy.  In this sense, the sales tax was one of many 
proposed levies introduced in Georgia that had a regressive quality.  Like later user-based 
taxes and fees on gasoline, kerosene, and fishing licenses, such proposals hit lower 
income residents the hardest.  This was especially true with the state’s African American 
families, who had the lowest rates of property ownership and who often faced much more 
difficulty in obtaining credit from mercantile establishments than did poor white farmers 
or industrial laborers.  Even if the sales tax were to go towards education spending, it was 
unlikely given Georgia’s record of institutional racism that African American schools 
would receive funding commensurate to ones with white children.  The unification of tax 
policy with public spending programs, much like the plans from the Progressive Era, 
were of primary benefit to middle class whites.             
Faced with the possible creation of a new sales tax, however, commercial 
businesses began to rethink their opposition to the old income tax plan.  Merchant 
establishments from North Georgia counties including Cobb were among the first to 
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reproach the issue.  At a special meeting organized in Rome, approximately forty five 
miles northwest of Marietta, a rarely seen hall full of small business operators, mayors, 
county executives, as well as area farmers from across the Seventh District, listened to 
pro-income tax speakers lay out their idea of the tax plan.  The next day, the income tax’s 
supporters met in a private luncheon with members of area Rotary and Kiwanis clubs to 
address the concerns of the local business community. 
104
  Before a meeting of the 
Atlanta Association of Credit Men, a newly organized Georgia chapter of a group that 
promoted credit lending, collection, and financial management, and that sought to end 
economic sectionalism in favor of interstate commerce, Georgia Governor Clifford 
Walker championed the income tax plan as a necessity if the state was to meet its budget 
shortfalls. 
105
  Walker, from a rural community outside of Athens, but with strong ties to 
local merchants, after giving his speech, appeared to have won over the group who 
agreed that an income tax was at least better than a sales tax. 
106
        
With business groups at least showing willingness to discuss how an income tax 
might be implemented, Georgia industries and corporations mounted another stand 
against both the income tax and the possible expansion of the gross receipts tax, while 
shying away from the sales tax debate.  Reuben Arnold, an Atlanta attorney who started 
in politics as a campaign manager for Populist candidates in the early twentieth century 
only to become a lobbyist for industrial interests by the 1920s, led a speaking tour 
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denouncing the income tax.  Telling his audiences, which usually were comprised of 
civic groups including Rotary, Kiwanis, and local women’s clubs, that excessive taxes 
led to a “stifling of industry,” Arnold argued that the federal and state income taxes 
constituted a threat to the “basic prosperity of the country.”  While acknowledging that 
the state income tax plan was to help fund education spending in the state, Arnold told 
the Atlanta Women’s Club that “education is a fine thing but I don’t want to go hungry, 
naked, and shelter-less because I have spent all my money acquiring learning… [we] 
must get along with the best available, subject to our means and environment.” 
107
   
The increased attacks on the state income tax by corporate and industrial concerns 
echoed a national trend against the progressive federal income tax system.  As President 
Calvin Coolidge and fellow United States Congressional Republicans worked to lower 
federal income taxes, believing that low taxes were the best path to prosperity, their 
mantras were easily recognizable in the words of Reuben Arnold. 
108
  Former Progressive 
Governor turned lobbyist John M. Slaton even began praising the efforts of Coolidge in 
“reigning” in the income tax, asking readers in an opinion-editorial in the Atlanta 
Constitution if Georgians were willing to “knowingly put their necks within the noose” of 
an income tax system. 
109
  Public political fights over the tax issue grew so acrimonious 
by the 1920s that even the Atlanta Constitution, as pro-business and pro-urban a 
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newspaper as existed in the state, editorialized that Georgia’s tax policies were only 
serving to fuel resentment between different segments of voters.  Arguing that continuing 
conflict over equalization and the income tax were detrimental to Georgia’s 
modernization, the paper implored the legislature to stop “arraying class against 
class…city against country.” 
110
       
Despite their vigorous opposition to new tax devices Georgia’s businesses and its 
corporations and industries could not hold off rural Georgia legislators’ plan to 
implement a sales tax.  The break between commercial business establishments and 
industry also allowed the old state income tax plan to come back before the General 
Assembly, where it actually passed nearly a decade after being first proposed.  Georgia’s 
tax equalization system remained intact.  The sales tax was set to begin in 1929 and under 
the agreement worked out in the Georgia Senate, would expire at the end of 1931.  The 
income tax would apply to businesses, corporations, industries, and every individual 
and/or family unit within the state.  The state ad valorem real property tax would remain 
at five mills and all revenue collected from its assessment and all levies from the income 
tax were to be marked for education, with one half going to common schools and the 
other half to colleges. 
111
   
The Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, which was heavily represented by industry 
leaders, condemned the approval of the income tax, with its spokesman telling local 
newspapers that “hardships and deprivations will eventually come to all classes of 
workers and to every citizen of the state” due to the “burden” placed on manufacturers 
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  A group of mill owners in Rome immediately filed suit in Atlanta to 
challenge the “constitutionality” of the new tax laws. 
113
  Dire warnings and court cases, 
however, did little to change the impending income and sales tax laws.  The sales tax was 
approved for a two year term with a provision that it could extend beyond 1931 if the 
state budget was still in crisis, and the income tax as written was deemed constitutional 
by the Georgia Supreme Court.                       
Between 1929 and 1930, the General Assembly resolved the collection rates for 
the new state income tax.  For a single individual making over $1500 a year, and for a 
married couple with yearly household income of $3500, the state income rate was fifteen 
and one third percent of what the individual or couple paid in federal income tax that 
year.  With long-serving rural legislators in control of many of the General Assembly’s 
committees, the income rates were specially designed to exempt the majority of the 
state’s small farmers who, according to one study, averaged a yearly income of less than 
$500 per year. 
114
  For businesses, industries, and corporations, the income rate was 
variable and widely reflective of the influence each sector held in state politics.  Under 
the income tax structure, manufacturers were to pay rates of $35.00 for $100,000 and 
$485.00 for $1,000,000; wholesalers were to pay $70.00 for $100,000 and $970.00 for 
$1,000,000; retailers were to pay $140.00 for $100,000 and $1940.00 for $1,000,000; 
utilities and amusements were to pay $210.00 for $100,000 and $2910.00 for $1,000,000. 
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  Even at the highest rates, businesses, industries, and corporations were to never pay 
above one third of one percent in state income tax.  While there is no documentation that 
reveals why utilities such as Georgia Power received the highest rate of income tax under 
the new tax plan, the fact that manufacturers and retailers received the lowest rates 
indicates that lobbying may have been an important part.  The Georgia Manufacturer’s 
Association was particularly strong in its presence in and around the state capital 
building.  It is highly probable that Georgia Power learned the importance of lobbying, 
because after 1930, hardly any tax policy issue that came before the Assembly did not, in 
some way, favor the utility giant.   
Table 8: Maximum Income Tax Rate for Businesses, Manufacturers, and Corporations as Established in 1929 
 
 At $100,000 At $1,000,000 
Manufacturers .035% .049% 
Wholesalers .070% .097% 
Retailers .140% .194% 
Utilities and Amusements .210% .291% 
        
Receipts collected from the state income tax rose in each of the first two years the 
income tax was implemented, leading Georgia’s tax commissioner to proclaim that the 
new levy system demonstrated a “sane method of living” for the state. 
116
  Industries and 
corporations, however, continued to look for ways to diminish their share of the tax.  In 
the legislature, lobbyists continued to argue that tax rates upon the entire business sector 
were too high, and received in return, lowered rates, often with the support from the very 
legislators who championed the implementation of the income tax.  Public resentment of 
corporate manipulation of tax policy led the 1933 General Assembly to change the state 
income tax rate to a flat levy of five and one half percent of a corporation’s income, 
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inclusive of salaries and amounts paid to stock holders of over five percent.  By the next 
biennial legislature, the assembly, no doubt influenced by intense lobbying efforts, 
amended the 1933 act.  The amended state income tax for corporations was changed from 
“income” to “net income,” an amount derived after accounting for pensions, 
improvements, and general overhead, as well as a deduction “from such base of 
$10,000.”  In the end corporations doing business in Georgia would pay an annual 
income tax on their net income minus the $10,000 deduction, or a flat two percent of net 
income, whichever would “produce the highest tax.”  Additionally, every corporate entity 
in Georgia would have to pay a minimum income tax of ten dollars. 
117
  If the deductions 
made by the General Assembly were not enough, a suit filed on behalf of the state’s 
industries and corporations in the mid 1930s made its way to the Georgia Supreme Court, 
which ruled that businesses, industries, and corporations could also deduct the tax amount 
paid to the federal government from their state income tax filings.  Following the 
Supreme Court ruling, Georgia’s tax commissioner gave the conservative estimate that 
deducting the amount paid towards federal taxes would cost the state an additional 
$250,000 annually in lost tax receipts. 
118
   
As victorious as industry and corporations were in reducing their income tax 
liability, manufacturers and businesses were even more successful in fighting the sales 
tax law.  Although the Georgia Supreme Court had declared the sales tax to be legal, the 
influence the manufacturer’s association and local Chamber of Commerces held with 
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elected officials kept the General Assembly from collecting the levy over the course of 
the original two-year period.  Despite the power of business interests groups when it 
came to the sales tax debate, the issue would continuously be a contentious topic as 
Georgia struggled to meet its financial obligations.  It would be over two decades before 
Georgia would actually collect a sales tax, and even then, it came with several deductions 
favorable to business. 
119
              
Manipulation of the tax code was certainly not just in the purview of industries, 
utilities, and merchants.  Reflective of the financial rewards lobbying offered, nearly 
every enterprise with the monetary resource to influence the General Assembly engaged 
in securing some sort of tax deduction.  By the mid to late 1930s, farmer’s insurance 
companies, “banks and trust companies doing general banking business,” irrigation 
companies, companies who used their land holdings for “scientific” or “educational 
purposes,” and “farmers, fruit growers, or like organizations” who operated as “sales-
agents,” all became exempt from the state income tax.  Even lobbying groups themselves 
secured tax exemptions, including business leagues such as the Manufacturer’s 
Association and Taxpayers’ League, as well as local chamber of commerces and fraternal 
organizations like Rotary and Kiwanis. 
120
     
While industrial and corporate contributions to the state income tax declined, real 
and personal property tax rates remained steady.  After a decade of intense debates over 
the allocation of the tax burden, Georgia’s white property owners were once again left 
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paying the bulk of the state’s receipts.  Within a matter of years, public antipathy with the 
income tax system could be felt when the legislature proposed an amendment to the 
original income tax bill that would put a five percent maximum rate on the income levy.  
In theory, the proposed amendment would have lowered the taxable rates most Georgia 
individuals and families were paying – the difference being between the 15 ½ of federal 
rate and the proposed five percent maximum of individual income regardless of federal 
income payment.  In an unusual turn, both anti-income tax and pro-income tax supporters 
disparaged the amendment. 
121
  Pro-income tax supporters, most of whom were rural 
constituents, opposed the amendment and hoped to push for a new income tax instead.  
The original 1929 income tax bill had failed to remove equalization of the state’s ad 
valorem collection, and most rural Georgians understood that corporate and industrial 
interests were not contributing in kind to state coffers.  Anti-income tax supporters, 
which included private citizens and corporate and industrial concerns, not surprisingly, 
held unfavorable views of the income tax system in general and wanted it abolished 
rather than revised.  With little support among general voters, the amendment to revise 
the state income tax failed.  By the end of the 1930s, the income tax continued to bring in 
receipts but not at levels needed to adequately fund the state’s education system.  As the 
state entered the 1939 fiscal year, newspapers such the Atlanta Constitution and Marietta 
Journal reported that the state did not have the money to pay into teacher salaries, and 
that a popular plan to provide free textbooks to all school-age children was no longer 
under consideration due to the fiscal crisis.   
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No matter the intense fights that occurred between Georgia’s rural and urban 
voters over the tax burden, it was clear by the end of the 1920s that corporations and 
special interest groups had the upper hand in controlling state government.  Despite 
Georgia’s government being built upon a foundation of white supremacy as evidenced in 
Removal, slavery, and Jim Crow laws, the benefits of systemic racism bestowed upon 
average white Georgians, including property owners, was secondary to the political and 
economic agendas of corporations, industries, and special interest groups.  As the Great 
Depression unfolded, corporations would continue to manipulate the state tax code, and 
factional politics of rural and urban property owners would be tested.  By the second half 
of the New Deal and on the eve of World War Two, for instance, Marietta and Cobb 
County, in close association with Atlanta and Fulton County, would largely recede from 
engaging in the fight over control of state government, and would focus on the separatism 
of local government.  Before such a plan could ensue, however, a unified front of Georgia 
property taxpayers from rural and urban sections of the state, exasperated by higher 
assessments and a manipulated tax code, rebelled in a tax revolt that would have severe 





















With the discontent that white property owners held towards state and local tax 
codes and one another, and the constant manipulation of public policy on the part of 
corporations and special interest groups, the 1920s and 1930s became fertile ground for 
anti-government sentiment.  As local and state property taxes continued to climb for 
much of the 1920s, white property owners came to see themselves of victims of 
government oppression and malfeasance.  Corporations and special groups, despite their 
ability to manipulate tax policy to their benefit, also adopted the language of anti-
government rhetoric.  By the time of the New Deal, white property owners had so 
accepted their own economic victimhood that even as local property taxes declined 
during the early 1930s, they still complained of the oppressive burden of local millage 
rates. 
122
 Big business, for its part, viewed the New Deal and its entitlement programs as a 
threat to their economic security, and as such, unleashed a barrage of criticism against the 
very concept of central government. By the mid 1930s, state-level politicians, such as 
Eugene Talmadge, captured the zeitgeist of anti-government sentiment and built a 
political machine based on economic aggrievement and white supremacy, all while 
collecting large donations from some of the largest corporations in the state.   
An examination of the use of anti-government rhetoric is significant.  In assessing 
the startling influence of white homeowners in local and state politics during the third 
quarter of the twentieth-century, for instance, many scholars have turned a critical eye 
towards the use of anti-government rhetoric. Within such studies, white homeowners in 
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suburban enclaves, despite being largely subsidized through federal investment, honed a 
language built around concepts of self-sufficiency, property rights, and a pervasive belief 
in free market ideology.  From fights over school busing, housing policies, or lowering 
taxes, white property owners constructed a racialized logic that affected the built 
environment and established political conservatism as a significant factor of late 
twentieth century America. 
123
       
 The rise of anti-government rhetoric used to partially explain racial exclusivity 
and wealth accumulation in the later twentieth century is decidedly rooted in the first half 
of the century.  While the deployment of anti-government language by white property 
owners from the 1950s and 1960s is rightly seen as reactionary to the politics of 
desegregation and the economics of the Great Society, its use in the 1930s was less 
focused and represented a number of different interests.  White property owners in both 
rural and urban areas, for example, viewed local government with suspicion for 
controlling millage and assessment rates on property, while blaming state government for 
not funding schools and roads.  Likewise, big business and white professionals bristled 
over federal income taxes and plans to enact Social Security for all Americans. 
Politicians looking to establish their credentials among white property owners and to gain 
monetary support from corporate interests often parlayed general feelings of resentment 
towards government into the making of political machines.  When it came to tax policy, 
there was no shortage of anger along lines of social class, economic interest, or 
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geography.  There was, however, one common denominator to the use of anti-
government rhetoric: whiteness.  In his examination into the origins and effects of 
California’s 1978 state-wide tax revolt, Robert O. Self acknowledged that the white 
leaders of the state’s anti-tax movement “combined two political positions that did not 
necessarily converge: tax reform and anti-liberalism.” 
124
 In Cobb County (and the rest of 
Georgia), these two expressions would not seem so exclusive of the other.  In the 1930s, 
white property owners and white-owned businesses and corporations entered into brief 
coalitions and alliances in hopes of reducing their tax liabilities, while passing the burden 
onto others.  Political identities of liberal and conservative had yet to achieve their Civil 
Rights Era meanings. 
125
  Many scholars have also argued that the language of anti-
government rhetoric in the post-World War Two decades served as code to displace the 
overt vulgarity of racist speech and to deflect the realities of white supremacy. This is no 
doubt true, but the basis for learning the language - at least in Cobb County – is situated 
in fights to control tax policy and is based on multiple perspectives. Where did the 
different threads of anti-government rhetoric emanate?  Where did they converge? And, 
how would they affect political organization at the local and state level?   
The Taxpayers’ League 
With rural and urban property owning whites comprising the largest bloc of 
registered voters in the state by the 1910s and 1920s, their tit for tat struggle over 
distribution of the tax burden was not unexpected.  Changes in state and national 
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economies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that had led to the formation 
of special interest groups dedicated to securing fiscal privilege for agricultural, 
manufacturing, or banking concerns continued to grow in influence with state 
government.  Despite attempts to modernize Georgia’s tax system by reducing its 
dependence upon property taxes through a mix of sales, gross receipts, and income taxes, 
continued corporate manipulation of the tax code led state and local governments to 
remain committed to ad valorem constituting the bulk of revenue.  By the 1920s, with 
politicians refusing to raise taxes on businesses and corporations, a new interest group in 
the form of a Taxpayers’ League entered state politics.  Comprised mostly of rentiers and 
real estate lawyers who held title to multiple properties, and who historically had political 
ties with urban interests, the league of disgruntled taxpaying whites vowed to fight higher 
tax assessments on individual and corporate owned property. 
126
 Such an argument put 
them in an uneasy relationship with the interests of rural whites and threatened to break 
apart Georgia’s urban economic faction.  The realignment of Georgia’s political factions 
during the 1920s is a defining characteristic of tax policy debates prior to the federal 
interventionism of the New Deal.    
Georgia’s Taxpayers’ League consisted primarily of urban real estate 
professionals and tax attorneys.  Modeled after similar organizations started in several 
Midwestern states, the league sought to capitalize on popular anger towards the new 
federal income tax by channeling its focus on lowering the amount of real property taxes 
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paid to county and municipal governments. 
127
  Many times, League organizations 
referred to themselves as being “a bureau for governmental research,” attempting to 
downplay the group’s direct advocacy in affecting tax policy that benefited their own 
economic interests. 
128
  Largely an urban phenomenon, the league was successful in 
drawing into its ranks disgruntled city home-owners, realtors, rentiers, and attorneys who 
focused on property law.  Frank Weldon, an Atlanta attorney who was elected secretary 
for the Georgia Chapter, stated the group’s objective was to reign in what it saw as 
runaway local debt.  “The real tax burden,” Weldon wrote in a letter to the Atlanta 
Constitution, “is not the part paid to the state but it is the cost of county and municipal 
government.”  Noting that urban home-owners paid state, county, city, and school taxes 
through their real property assessments, Weldon stated that “people are protesting the 
heavy taxes but when they look for the cause, they find it at home.”  As outlined by 
Weldon, the league advocated local governments subsist on a “cash basis” in order to 
“practice the strictest economy.” 
129
       
Given the league’s opposition to new taxes that it believed would spur excessive 
government spending, the group was, not surprisingly, skeptical of Georgia’s state 
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income tax.  As articulated by Weldon, the league felt that a state-level income tax would 
unduly hinder Georgia’s businesses and limit industrial growth.  As for an income levy 
on individuals and families, the league claimed to be receptive of a “moderate” tax, as 
long as filers were provided an exemption for the amount of real property taxes paid, 
something that would arguably favor rentiers and banks who owned multiple real estate 
properties. 
130
  With regards to intangibles such as stocks and bonds, the league supported 
a small levy, but only if administered by the state with county and city governments 
excluded from collecting a share of the tax.  As a whole, the Georgia Taxpayers’ League 
in the 1920s was focused on avoiding what it saw as double or multiple taxations, 
whereby all levels of state and local governments raised revenue from the same source.  
This, of course, was a main complaint of rural and urban property owners, who sneered at 
having real and personal ad valorem taxes support local, county, state, and school 
funding.  It was no surprise then that many white property owners from the two factions 
would lend at least cursory support to the Taxpayers’ League.    
The anti-tax sentiments of the league also included the equalization system, which 
many of the group’s members had actually championed years earlier.  The splinter of the 
rentier interests of the Taxpayers’ League from other urban business and industrial 
interests would create yet another political faction in the debate over state tax policy.  As 
noted in a piece by Weldon appearing in the Cobb County Times, the league’s turn 
against equalization began when the group researched tax receipts and the amounts of 
disbursements given to counties in relation to how much each county sent to the state.  
According to Weldon’s study, urbanized counties – the backbone of the league’s 
membership – were not receiving allotments commensurate with local taxes paid.  In 
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Fulton County and Atlanta, the group claimed that taxpayers only received back forty 
seven cents for every dollar they sent to the state through tax equalization.  In Chatham 
County and Savannah, the return on tax equalization was fifty one cents.  Many rural 
counties, Weldon claimed, were receiving two dollars in state spending for every one 
dollar they sent to the tax commissioner, with one county in far North Georgia receiving 
over four dollars. 
131
   
Instead of equalization, the Taxpayers’ League proposed the creation of a 
classification system of taxation.  Under such a tax plan, different types of property 
would be taxed at different amounts in contrast to the across the board fixed rate 
structured through equalization.  Under the plan envisioned by the league, property with 
the ability to earn returns such as bonds, stocks, savings accounts, and rental property 
would be taxed at lower rates, while personal property such as machinery and furniture, 
along with unimproved real property would bear higher tax burdens.  According to the 
league, the reason why the former should receive lower tax rates was due to the financial 
risk associated with intangibles.  If investors feared losing their financial gains to 
taxation, the league argued, many would stop buying stocks and bonds and mortgages, 
the implied threat being that if investors and rentiers did not see reductions in their 
obligations, then the state economy as a whole would suffer. 
132
           
The position of the Taxpayers’ League on equalization is significant for it 
demonstrates how a study, backed by statistical evidence, was used in the early twentieth 
century to propagandize an economic issue.  The disparity in how tax funds were 
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allocated was not reflective of a design failure in equalization, but rather a problem of 
who controlled the disbursement process.  Since rural political interests had retaken 
control of state government in the late 1910s, the legislature had distributed a 
disproportionate amount of tax collections to agriculturally-dominated counties.  But for 
the league, which was focused on cutting tax obligations, the blame for the disparity was 
placed solely on equalization and an over-zealous government quick to spend its revenue.  
Interestingly, though rural counties were, indeed, receiving disproportionate amounts of 
funding in relation to what they were contributing, their calls for repealing equalization 
continued unabated.  Likewise, the results of the league’s study would even be used by 
equalization backers such as Slaton and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce as proof that 
cities paid disproportionately more in taxes than the state’s rural areas. 
133
  Although 
coming from decidedly different political angles, the Taxpayer’s League, pro-
equalization forces, and rural interests all relied upon an argument that aggrievement due 
to taxation was because of government as an institution and not from the failures of 
policy or political factionalization. Furthermore, the league’s attack on rural counties and 
especially the economic interests of small farmers, whom they often branded as tax 
dodgers, kept a renewed anti-tax equalization coalition from emerging.   
Despite the tensions between the league and small farmers, Weldon and other 
high ranking officials in the group did agree with Cobb County’s State Senator Herbert 
Clay – who himself generally aligned with rural interests – when he proposed an across 
the board millage limitation for county and municipal governments. 
134
  As explained by 
Clay, his plan would allow cities and counties to only tax real property up to a limit 
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imposed by the legislature.  The ongoing debates over tax policy created a significant 
break in political coalition making.  The Taxpayers’ League, though based in urban 
centers, was willing to break with pro-growth, business-friendly New Whig ideology 
over the issue of local taxes to fund schools, build roads, and other social services, but it 
was unwilling to lend support to anti-ad valorem rural politicians.  For the remainder of 
the 1920s, neither the Taxpayer’s League nor the millage limit proposal garnered much 
influence over the rest of the state, and with passage of the income tax, both receded into 
the background, only to be reawakened again with the Great Depression of the 1930s.        
“When Winter Comes…” 
Not surprisingly, anger from white residential property owners towards local and 
state government accelerated during the economic crisis of the 1930s.  To better 
understand the growth of anti-government rhetoric, an examination into the struggles 
municipalities faced at the onset of the Great Depression is warranted.  In an interview 
with former Marietta mayor Leon “Rip” Blair conducted in the early 1960s that centered 
on his career as a successful local attorney and his long political life, the discussion not 
unexpectedly dwelled on his extended mayoralty during the Great Depression and World 
War Two.  When asked what precipitated his embrace of securing large-scale bond 
issuances to match federal grants through the New Deal following a relatively 
conservative administration of Thomas Brumby, Blair returned the conversation to the 
earliest days of the Great Depression, years before he would become mayor in 1938.  
Recalling feelings of urgency and fear, Blair remembered seeing the city fill with 
itinerant families from the countryside, just as manufacturing centers, hurt by the national 




schools and charity-sponsored breadlines.  But what especially struck Blair, and what 
arguably may have triggered his seeking out every available federal interventionist 
program, was how the Great Depression had adversely affected what was supposed to be 
the most stable of classes: the white property owner. “[E]ven those who had been 
substantial businessmen,” Blair recalled, “reached the point of preaching the overthrow 
of the government.” 
135
 
The language of rebellion and revolution were not necessarily hyperbolic threats.  
Since the end of the Civil War, Georgia and indeed much of the American South had a 
long history of meeting economic upheaval with divided loyalties and fractious politics.  
Georgians across class lines rarely shied from re-making the social and economic 
ideologies that influenced their political lives.  Redeemers, Independents, Farmers 
Alliance, Populists, Progressives, and the effects of nearly six decades of tax policy 
manipulation at the hands of special interests and corporations had left deep scars, if not 
unresolved conflict, on the state’s political landscape.  Race and gender, intractable in 
their relationships within the spatial and temporal politics of social production were, even 
in fairly calm periods, significant sources of conflict.  In this sense, Blair’s concern with 
how the nation’s economic troubles might affect Marietta’s white voting families was 
something probably felt by preceding mayors in other economically tumultuous periods, 
as well.   
In terms of political influence, economic standing, and social well-being, the 
Great Depression had a profound effect on the everyday lives of Cobb County citizens.  
Public services, for example, burdened by spending cuts as revenue declined, while 
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witnessing marked increases in the numbers of people needing their help, struggled to 
fulfill their missions.  By the spring of 1931, cities and counties across the state began 
reporting dramatic rises in cases of tuberculosis, with Georgia’s lone state-funded 
sanitarium suffering the multiple effects of being underfunded, understaffed, and over 
capacity.  When word of a rapidly growing tuberculosis outbreak began to filter 
throughout the state, the sanitarium’s administration informed the governor’s office that it 
already had a nearly two hundred person waiting list. 
136
  A common scenario in southern 
cities even prior to the Great Depression, involved the practice of quarantining persons 
and families found with highly contagious communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, 
scarlet fever, polio, and rabies.  The lack of health care, coupled with sharp rises in 
diagnosed illnesses led many cities, including Marietta, to not just quarantine specific 
domiciles, but entire neighborhoods.   Within Marietta, the two areas of the city most 
likely to see a quarantine notice were the Hollandtown neighborhood, a sprawling 
patchwork of mostly dilapidated rental houses southeast of downtown that was home to 
both working class whites and African Americans, and the Baptist Town neighborhood, 
an exclusively African American neighborhood comprised of rental and owner-occupied 
dwellings that sat just north of the Black business district.  Quarantine notices had 
become so ubiquitous by the early 1930s – especially for rabies and scarlet fever – that 
the city police department openly declared that any “unpenned animal” would be shot on 
sight. 
137
  Marietta’s burgeoning health crisis led many to question why the city was not 
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investing in a new hospital facility and free clinic for the working poor and indigent.  One 
Marietta nurse, in a letter to the Marietta Journal, advocated for increased public health 
care access by pointing out that private charity had been unable to meet the needs of the 
city’s sick residents.  “There are two little Negroes down with typhoid fever just out of 
town who need hospital care,” she wrote.  “A woman very ill with pellagra who needs 
care cannot go to the hospital…In Africa, China, Japan, we help maintain hospitals so 




  What the nurse and so many other white professionals were tapping into was a 
growing sense of indignation at the declining economic and social conditions of the city 
and county.  A common phenomenon of economic downturns in the South included rises 
in urban populations, as dispossessed white and African American farming families 
headed into cities and towns looking for work.  As Cobb and its cities continued to see 
rises in unemployment and homelessness in the early years of the depression, Marietta’s 
First Methodist Church through the ministry of its Parish House Kitchen, provided over 
ten thousand meals to city and county residents over a time span of just three months. 
139
  
Even once prosperous local businesses struggled to stay open.  Joe Mack Wilson, whose 
family prior to the onset of the Great Depression had operated a successful jewelry 
business in Marietta’s downtown commercial district, recalled that one holiday season 
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following a bout of poor sales, Christmas day consisted of “an apple and orange,” along 
with a “used pocketknife that…had one blade broken out of it.” 
140
   
In the very early years of the Depression, Cobb’s property owning white farmers 
also faced an uncertain future.  With agricultural prices in flux and with banks and other 
creditors eager to recoup the losses felt from the national crisis by issuing liens and/or 
foreclosure, the old wool hat boys once more turned to radical populist rhetoric.  In his 
Marietta Journal column “Thinking Things Through,” W.R. Tapp, a local farmer and 
former Populist provided a grave prediction about the growing inequality and hardships 
faced by the economic victims of the Great Depression: 
“…[A] rebellion of farmers and laborers will upset our present system of government 
unless capital and government cooperate with those that toil.  Selfish interests must be 
made to give way to unselfish effort on the part of all to ward off political disaster.  When 
winter comes; when women and children are naked and starving nothing can forestall 
rebellion – workers will raid stores.  Can the financier and the wealthy feel secure in their 




Historian J. William Harris in his study of segregation in the Deep South has noted that 
while a true cross section of society found themselves out of work and on public relief, it 
was the white farmer and laborer who could readily call upon the language of political 
discontent.  As one recipient of New Deal-funded public aid stated “[I]f emergency aid 
had not been provided a revolution would have resulted.” 
142
   
Cobb and Marietta’s local governments could not expect economic relief to come 
from private industry.  Between 1920 and 1940 Cobb witnessed a continuing decline in 
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the number of manufacturing establishments operating in the county.  From a record high 
sixty six establishments at the beginning of 1920, the number reduced by over half, down 
to twenty seven by 1940.  Rising tensions between labor and management contributed to 
many Georgia workers participating in the Textile Strike of 1934, which saw nearly 
200,000 Georgia laborers – white and African American – walk off their jobs. 
143
  
Recognized in labor history as the “Uprising of ’34,” the nationally organized strike for 
better wages, improved working conditions, and negotiated union contracts gained 
notable traction in the Piedmont area of the state.  Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge, 
citing fears of a possible labor insurrection that could spread across the state, but more 
likely persuaded by powerful and moneyed industrial interests, ordered the state militia to 
crackdown on strikers from more militant textile mills.  In Coweta County, southwest of 
Atlanta, Georgia’s militia hastily erected barbed-wire fencing to enclose striking mill 
workers.  In the American upper Mid-West and Northeast, labor strikes were not 
uncommonly accompanied with reported acts of violence between workers and the 
police, private security forces, or militias sent to break them.  Yet when images of 
Georgia’s textile mill workers were released showing women, sometimes with their 
crying children in tow, being offloaded from trucks and into the new detention camps, 
many Georgians looked on in horror. 
144
  Not only did it provide visual evidence of direct 
state government intrusion into the affairs of labor and management, but in one batch of 
photographs, it undermined the carefully constructed myth of white southern 
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womanhood, by demonstrating that when racial and gender privilege intersected with 
economic security, the supremacy of industry interests were irrefutable.  Talmadge, who 
himself was a chief architect of racial privilege and gendered myth, had made a tactical 
blunder in trying to prove his toughness towards civil unrest but ultimately demonstrated 
his acquiescence to corporate power.      
Social and economic instability translated into regressive political policies at the 
local level, as municipal and county governments attempted to further purge the voter 
rolls to stave off growing discontent.  For many of Cobb’s citizens, voting in the 
twentieth century continued to be a precarious adventure.  At the city level, for example, 
municipalities could set their own requirements on voting privileges, one of the few 
locally autonomous rights granted by the General Assembly in lieu of home rule.  In 
Marietta, for instance, residents seeking to vote in local elections had to prove fulltime 
residence for six months and were expected to be current in all city, county, and state 
taxes.  In 1931, Marietta made voting even more difficult for residents.  In a new city 
charter approved by the General Assembly, the mayor and city council were allowed to 
appoint members to a new City of Marietta Board of Registrars, which would control 
voting registration and oversee local elections.  The powers granted to the board were 
immense.  Under the new charter, a registered voter could challenge - “subject to the 
inspection of any parties at interest” - the credentials of someone trying to, or already 
registered to vote.   Possible grounds for disqualification could include being named in 
“criminal records, insolvent tax lists…tax execution dockets, and tax executions.” 
145
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Given the economic upheaval generated from the Great Depression, many of the city’s 
white property owners found themselves in financial peril and thus subject to expulsion 
from the voter rolls. 
146
       
In light of growing discontent in the city and county, further attempts to limit 
democratic participation that could potentially upset local politics were not unexpected.  
Though elected officials and elites in urban and rural areas of Cobb desired a lowered 
overall voter turnout, they reached out to federal intervention programs from the New 
Deal to mitigate social discord, and often with mixed results.  When New Deal programs 
such as the National Recovery Administration (NRA), for example, began enacting wage 
and work codes for industrial operations, the owners and managers of many of Cobb’s 
remaining industries were suspicious of the government’s role in placing itself into the 
affairs of business.  In an oral history interview conducted in the 1970s, Guy Northcutt, a 
Marietta mill executive discussed how the New Deal changed both his political and 
economic outlook.  When the National Recovery Act’s wage standards were first 
implemented in 1933 and 1934, Northcutt, like so many of his contemporaries, worried 
that increased wages might destroy his operation.  “The whole textile industry in the 
South was paying pitifully low wages,” Northcutt recalled of the late 1920s and early 
1930s prior to the New Deal.  “We were working employees at almost peonage 
wages…We had skilled help earning as little as ten cents an hour,” he admitted.  “[When] 
FDR came in and slapped the thirty-cent minimum wage on all industry…Some of the 
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old codgers thought we were ruined and couldn’t survive.”  So many local industries had 
already closed down that the remaining mill owners and managers believed that the NRA 
would finally ruin the county’s entire industrial base.  To their surprise, however, the 
mills continued operating with little to no discernible ill effects.  Instead of losing money 
and shutting down, Northcutt, after studying his own mill’s books, discovered that 
productivity was actually rising in accordance with wage increases.  Likewise, since the 
remaining mills had all agreed to meet NRA price standards, no one mill was able to 
undercut the price offered by the others.  The decades old system of underbidding the 
market with low cost goods, which translated into low wages for workers, was forbidden 
by NRA regulations.  Even following the Supreme Court’s decision declaring the 
mandatory participation in NRA standards unconstitutional, Northcutt recollected that 
many of Marietta’s more progressive mill operations kept the wage scale in place. 
147
  
Many of the mills in the southern end of Cobb along the Chattahoochee River, however, 
did not.  One of the main differences between mills operating in Marietta as opposed to 
areas of the unincorporated county was that Cobb’s mills were owned and managed by 
corporations headquartered out of state, and which vehemently fought New Deal 
regulation of wages and prices. Marietta’s city mills were also smaller scale operations 
and more open to working with local government.      
As the effects of the Great Depression continued to manifest in the early 1930s, 
Marietta’s mayor, Thomas Brumby, began proposing to city council his desire to have the 
city partner with New Deal programs that required municipalities to put in matching 
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funds in order to construct buildings, roadways, and sewer projects.  A member of one of 
Marietta’s oldest and most influential families, Brumby was an economically 
conservative, pro-business politician.  Despite having run on a campaign of fiscal 
responsibility and promising to pay-down the city’s bond obligations, Brumby’s turn 
towards federal intervention should not be considered surprising.  Pro-growth politics 
were a mainstay of the city, and reflected the New-Whig mentality of Marietta’s elected 
officials.  In selling his plan to the council, local leaders, the chamber of commerce, and 
civic clubs, Brumby laid out a plan to offer matching funds for projects that would prove 
beneficial to the city’s businesses and industries, while offering their possibility to 
generate revenue to fund services demanded by local residents.     
Matching fund projects were key components of the New Deal and many small 
cities like Marietta chose to limit their financial obligations to what were termed self-
liquidating projects.  In design, a county or municipality would agree to fund a certain 
ratio of an agreed upon project, while the federal government would fund the remainder.  
In Marietta, such projects included public swimming pools that could charge admittance, 
school gymnasiums that could be rented to private organizations for meetings and 
banquets, and infrastructure improvements to the city’s water and power department, 
where an increase in spending could return dividends by expanding services.  One of 
Brumby’s major accomplishments was in convincing the city council and general public 
to support a $15,000 bond issuance to meet matching funds to update the city’s aging 
sewer system. 
148
  A narrowly won victory, the sewer enhancements paved the way for 
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Marietta’s Board of Light and Water to become a significant source of municipal revenue 
in the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s.    
Another part of Brumby’s fiscally conservative strategy to improve the city 
involved the Works Progress Administration (WPA).  While most WPA projects 
stipulated matching funds, local governments could often post materials in lieu of money 
to meet the obligation.  In an effort to keep North Georgia’s WPA headquarters in 
Marietta, the mayor and council agreed that the city would pay the rent on an entire 
building for the sole “use of WPA.” 
149
  In another example, Brumby and the Marietta 
school board found that the WPA would offer labor for the construction of a football 
stadium.  Unable to scrape up the money to match the project, the mayor and school 
board proposed to supply the building materials instead, if the WPA would supply the 
wages for local labor.  For nearly a year, school members and local laborers scoured the 
farms of Cobb County looking for discarded fieldstone that could be brought back to the 
building site.  In the end, the project was so successful that city leaders proposed a similar 
plan for the erection of wall around the National Cemetery, with Marietta supplying the 
materials and the WPA providing the wages. 
150
   
  At Kennesaw Mountain, the site of a Civil War battle, Marietta officials 
succeeded in getting the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to open a camp to turn the 
area into a public park that could entice visitors to the area.  In a partnership between 
local and federal authorities, property owners adjacent to the mountain sold their land so 
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that the camp could begin work.  Lasting until the beginning of World War Two, the 
racially segregated Kennesaw encampment brought in hundreds of young white men 
from across North Georgia for work and steady pay.  In the end, the city not only 
received a battlefield park that local politicians believed would bring tourist dollars into 
the area, but saw multitudes of white workers achieve skilled training in automotive 
repair, sheet metal working, and agricultural mechanics.  One of the greatest legacies of 
the CCC, not just in Marietta but across the country, was its success in reducing illiteracy 
rates.  In 1938, the Kennesaw Mountain camp identified sixty-five enrollees as 




At the county level, which was run by an elected three man committee, Cobb 
urged its farmers to accept crop acreage limitations imposed by the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration.  Highly controversial to small farmers who were used to 
planting the highest price crop of that season, the AAA was often met with resistance.  In 
some instances, it was not uncommon for AAA county agents to be met with a shotgun 
when they approached a local farm to check on its crop reduction.  But where the AAA 
had a shaky relationship with Cobb’s farmers, the Rural Electrification Administration 
(REA) was greeted enthusiastically.  With the formation of the Cobb County Rural 
Electric Membership Corporation, a co-op consisting of county government and power 
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customers, low-cost, federally subsidized electrical service spread across the countryside. 
152
        
With increased local involvement in the New Deal, corporations and large 
industries began pushing back against what they feared was a federal take-over of big 
business.  By the mid 1930s, Georgia Power, much like the big corporate-owned textile 
mills, turned against the New Deal at the national level and its supporters at the local 
level.  In a circular mailed out to mayors and local government officials throughout the 
state, a Georgia Power-written “Memorandum: In Re Taxation and Economic Progress,” 
became an oft quoted document and one noted for its non-too-subtle economic threats.   
For a company that had once preferred to deal in political matters through quiet one-on-
one meetings with legislators, and whose president often limited speeches to how 
Georgia Power worked for the common good of all the state’s people, the memorandum 
was a rare public showing of the company’s direct business interests.  In particular, it 
railed against proposals that promised free school books, raises to teacher salaries, health 
clinics across the state, and prison reform.  Citing what it deemed fiscal irresponsibility, 
the memorandum charged that future state and local budget deficits created by such 
initiatives would be passed on to industries, who would have to “make up or offset the 
losses” in revenue.  Georgia Power’s memorandum also illustrated the company’s disdain 
for the centralization of state and federal bureaucracies in regards to the Social Security 
Act of 1935.  Fearful that state government would turn to industries to “provide funds 
with which to match federal contributions for the wide range of social security purposes,” 
the power company decried any possible increase of their tax rate for the use of social 
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spending.  “Industry,” the memo continued, “cannot thrive unless it is permitted to earn a 
comfortable net income over and above wages, operating expenses, interest and taxes.”  
In a complaint against the governor’s office’s possible participation in an unemployment 
insurance fund as created in the federal Social Security Act, Georgia Power concluded its 
memorandum with a thinly veiled threat, stating “A healthy and prosperous state of 
industry is by far the best job insurance that has yet been underwritten or guaranteed.” 
153
  
Georgia Power’s president also wrote directly to state politicians such as Cobb County’s 
representative James V. Carmichael, arguing that any proposed tax increase on 
corporations would prolong the Great Depression. “For each one thousand dollars that 
could be saved in tax payments…,” Wright wrote in a letter to Carmichael, “[Georgia 
Power] could afford to spend ten thousand dollars for new construction.”  Wright 
concluded by suggesting that “new construction” meant more jobs for out of work 
Georgians, something that could only happen if government stopped stifling business 
growth with tax burdens.
 154
  In the latter half of the New Deal, Georgia Power would 
greatly benefit financially from increased electrification and new home construction that 
strengthened its position as the largest utility in the southeast.  It nonetheless remained 
antagonistic to the Roosevelt administration, and often supported anti-New Deal 
candidates running for state or federal offices.  There was no paradox in these facts, 
however.  As historian Alan Brinkley has pointed out, many large corporations across the 
country sought to “dismantle the ‘anti-business’ elements of the New Deal and restore the 
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kind of state to which they had become accustomed, one that at times assisted but seldom 
restricted private enterprise.” 
155
 Georgia Power, in this sense, had no problem with 
government’s intervention into the markets if it provided more customers to the 
corporation; it objected to social programs and tax increases designed to combat poverty, 
provide old age pensions, or improve general health conditions – things that might 
warrant a raise in the company’s federal tax obligations.       
Rebirth of the Taxpayers’ League 
 Quiet for several years following passage of the state income tax bill, Georgia’s 
Taxpayers’ League was reawakened by the onset of the Great Depression.  And, like 
Georgia Power and big business, they too feared an increase in taxes that would affect 
their financial interests. With many local governments contemplating new bond issuances 
to counter rising local budget deficits and to fund new improvements, the older league’s 
base of realtors, rentiers, middle class home owners, mortgage lenders, and developers, 
joined once more to fight against a threat of higher taxes.  Unlike the group’s previous 
incarnation in the 1920s, which had mastered the arts of speechmaking and of writing 
letters to large-circulation newspapers, but never seemed to have any real structure, the 
revived league embraced grassroots recruiting and chapter organization to insert itself 
into the political process.   
Helping to lead the new league was Hal Steed, an Atlanta-based realtor, rentier, 
amateur historian, and short story writer.  In a 1933 two-part piece published in the 
Saturday Evening Post titled “Adventures of a Tax Leaguer,” Steed recalled a general 
reluctance to involve himself in local politics at the beginning of the Depression, in spite 
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of what he complained was a “mounting tax bill.” 
156
  His position changed in 1931, 
however, when several of his tenants went bankrupt and Steed was left with empty rental 
units, a compounding tax obligation, and limited income.  At that point, according to 
Steed, he entered the fray and joined the Taxpayers’ League, which promoted economy 
in government, an end to political cronyism, and, of course, a sharp reduction in real 
property taxes paid to cities and counties.  In short time, he rose to the highest echelons 
of the league’s organization structure.  Referring to himself as a “civic uplifter,” he and 
his fellow cohorts divided the city of Atlanta into wards, where a league member would 
act as liaison to the local community.  By canvassing neighborhoods and business 
districts, the league dreamed of getting upwards of “10,000 members…who would 
register and vote.” With successes in their local membership campaign, league 
leadership, and Steed in particular, took to the road, travelling to major and mid-tier cities 
throughout the state, preaching the word that all property owners should unite and 
demand a reduction in their tax bills.  Before businessmen and civic groups such as the 
local chamber of commerce or Rotary, the league argued that government should manage 
their financial affairs like the “large corporations” and be more economical in their 
financial decisions. 
157
     
At its onset, the Taxpayer’s League denied being an advocate of partisan politics, 
insisting instead that it merely pointed its members towards politicians who embraced the 
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group’s mantras of “efficient government and lower taxes.”  In reality, however, the 
league was very much involved, at least, indirectly, in political elections.  During the 
early 1930s, for example, league members continuously confronted city councilmen, 
county supervisors, and possible mayoral candidates on their stand on tax reduction, 
reminding them of the group’s growing membership and the reach of its widely 
circulated newsletter.  In one instance, Hal Steed gained access to the city of Atlanta’s 
“balance sheet.”  After pouring over details of government employee wages, 
departmental expenditures, and revenue projections, the league, to its astonishment, 
found that city salaries “were not greatly out of line” and that most departments seemed 
essential to providing services. 
158
  What they did discover, however, was that Atlanta’s 
graft-prone council and mayoralty of the 1910s and 1920s had left the city with huge 
amounts of indebtedness.  Similar situations existed in many Georgia cities, including 
Marietta, where the city was still paying off the debt incurred from the infamous 
Scarboro transaction.  In the early years of the Great Depression and in dire need of 
money to make much needed infrastructural improvements, many cities with pre-existing 
high debt obligations routinely recalculated their old debt into new bonds with slightly 
higher interest rates, but that offered additional money for undertaking civic projects. 
159
  
This process led to municipalities paying more interest on old debt, while continually 
accruing new debt to meet the demands of changing city environments. 
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 Marietta Mayor Thomas Brumby and the city council repackaged the city’s debt obligation in 1931 and 
1932.  They used money from the new bond to build a new city hall and pave some streets near downtown. 





The lingering debt obligations from municipal mismanagement a decade or more 
earlier, combined with expanding new debt, fed into the league’s established opinion that 
government, itself, was inherently untrustworthy.  In 1933, when Atlanta’s mayor 
attempted to gain public support for a new $800,000 police headquarters building to be 
funded, in part, with bond issuances, the Taxpayers’ League chose to make stopping the 
new station a priority.  Although the league’s hierarchy readily admitted that better 
policing was in the public’s best interests, and that a new building was probably even 
needed, they argued that the city should focus on paying down its debt first, and not 
further increase the potential tax liability of city residents through general obligation 
bond issuances.  If the city, however, decided to continue with building the headquarters, 
the league told its members that Atlanta’s city government should cut funding to other 
projects such as road construction rather than taking on another long term bond issuance 
debt or raising local property taxes. 
160
  In response to the demands of the league, Atlanta 
officials curtailed the cost of the proposed headquarters to $500,000 and even agreed to 
consolidate its jail with Fulton County to save money in the long term. 
161
  The 
concessions failed to satisfy the Taxpayer’s League, which had mobilized its members to 
fill every public meeting held to discuss the police building, and vocalize their 
disapproval of the plan.  Proponents of the police building, which included much of the 
non real estate-aligned business community and labor organizations, likewise rallied in 
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support of the project.  When finally put to popular vote, the appropriation plan to build 
the headquarters lost by a “narrow margin.” 
162
  
  What especially troubled the city’s elected officials about the police headquarters 
vote was how the league managed to cause a realignment of interest group coalitions.  
Organized labor, for instance, which was often at odds with the mayor’s office and 
council, supported the proposed building because its construction would create jobs for 
its members.  Corporations and industry, which were normally allies of city government 
due to receiving favorable concessions, broke with convention and joined the league in 
decrying the cost of the building and the plan to finance it with bond money.  Years 
earlier, Atlanta’s real estate interests, the future base of the Taxpayers’ League, along 
with organized labor groups, had lambasted city government for not holding a Georgia 
Power subsidiary responsible for maintaining the right-of-way where its streetcars 
traversed public roadways.  In the post-Taxpayers’ League era, where everything 
appeared reducible to economic motive and self-interest, established coalitions no longer 
seemed safe. 
163
       
While many government officials viewed the Taxpayer’s League as a reactionary 
organization, the league was certainly not alone in expressing anger over the local tax 
burden. Though not directly affiliated with the league, outspoken, anti-tax voices did 
share common concerns over what they saw as out of control taxation.  Julia O’Keefe 
Nelson, a onetime suffragette and prohibitionist, as well as longtime school board 
member from Atlanta’s sixth ward became a vocal opponent to any property tax increase, 
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even if it went to education funding.  When the school system submitted its 1932 book 
purchase list to the board, Nelson dismissed the buying of kindergarten books such as 
The Little Chick That Would not Sleep and the collected stories of Mother Goose as 
“extravagancies.”  In her review of high school texts, she complained that Shakespearean 
plays, “the greatest dramas of the civilized world,” were available for forty two cents per 
selection, while contemporary plays of “no special value,” cost nearly one dollar and 
twelve cents.  At a school board meeting, Nelson provided figures, which by her 
calculations showed that the proposed book appropriations would cost thousands of 
dollars, only to be informed by a school representative that the purchases were not 
intended for each individual student, but for the library, where a student could check out 
a book such as Mother Goose and return it for the next student.  Unmoved, Nelson 
accused the school system of trying to pass textbook purchases over the “busy people” of 
the board, and assured administrators that she devoted a great deal of time to 
“investigating the school conditions.” 
164
  When news came that the city may raise its 
school funding millage rate, Nelson again took to the stump at school board meetings and 
in interviews with local papers.  “Watch your councilmen and school commissioners,” 
she told one audience, “defeat them if they try to get more money from you.”  Believing 
the school system to be corrupt and the city council to be inept, she placed blame for 
rising educational costs on the teachers’ groups and the parent-teacher association (PTA), 
who she claimed were “aggressive political organizations.”  No doubt drawing upon her 
past as a prohibitionist, Nelson constantly framed the debate as if organizing for a noble 
battle.  “Fight for our friends and against our enemies,” she told a school board meeting 
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audience.  If anyone in any city ward needed help in challenging an assessment increase, 
Nelson urged them to contact her in the “fight against increased taxes.” 
165
  In a final act 
of defiance, Nelson told a meeting of the city council that when it came to standing up to 
higher property taxes, “every one of us will go to jail before we will pay it.” 
166
    
As Hal Steed and the league urged its members to create a grassroots organization 
based on knowledge of municipal and county tax policy and civic attendance at public 
events, a growing segment of the anti-property tax crowd, such as with Nelson, was 
becoming more militant.  Based on Steed’s accounts, a splinter group of the league 
comprised mostly of city rentiers formed in late 1932 and began grumbling for a tax 
strike, a “protest…to show the politicians” that they would “go so far and no farther.”  
With the goal of starting a “rebellion of taxpayers,” the group believed it could 
“make…tax collectors take notice.”  Upon hearing of the plan, Steed and the league’s 
more moderate members attempted to head off the insurrection and “nip it in the bud.”  
Standing before the crowd, Steed begged the group to respect “law and order” and to 
recognize that “the remedy is not in striking but in orderly cure at the polls.” 
167
  Though 
Steed and the league often travelled in the discourse of anti-government rhetoric, they 
had little desire to abolish the entirety of local tax structure – they were just dedicated to 
amending the existing system for their own interest. 
           No matter the hysteria many anti-tax groups and individuals held towards what 
they saw as runaway taxation on real property, reality was another issue.  In many cities 
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and counties across Georgia, the rising millage rates of the 1920s began regressing within 
a year or two of the Great Depression, as appraisals and assessments, accordingly, 
declined.  In 1932, for example, the year which saw both the Taxpayers’ League reborn 
and Nelson’s school board fight begin, assessments in Fulton County and the City of 
Atlanta dropped.  Largely in response to the demands of property and business owners 
since the onset of the economic depression, Atlanta had lowered its combined real estate 
assessment by $45,000,000 from 1931 to 1932.  Since Fulton County tied its assessment 
to “seventy percent” of the city’s valuation, revenue from the unincorporated regions of 
the county, likewise, showed steep declines.  In Fulton County, assessment data from 
1932 showed a decrease of over $36,153,040 as compared to 1931.  In consideration of 
the projected assessment revenue, and after adding other levies including professional 
taxes and poll taxes, the county expected to add $2,753,368 to its treasury at the end of 
the year, down from 1931’s addition of $3,063,062, for a one year revenue loss of 
$309,694. 
168
  The projected numbers, however, were variable on the condition that 
property owners actually paid the amount of the reduced assessment.      
Cobb County and Marietta, like Atlanta and Fulton, also saw declines in 
assessment valuations during the early 1930s.  In 1931, for example, Cobb’s total 
valuation of real properties was $10,125,440.00.  By 1932, the new valuations had 
dropped to $9,356,494.00. 
169
  In Cobb County, the millage rate dropped from fifteen 
(exclusive of school levy) in 1930 to twelve and one half (exclusive of school levy) in 
1931.  Likewise, Marietta’s millage rate declined from sixteen in 1930 to fourteen and 
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one half in 1931 to twelve for 1932. 
170
  Despite lowering assessments and millage rates, 
the idea that property owners were being over-taxed nonetheless remained a powerful 
influence on how taxpayers viewed their relationship with local government.  With 
taxpayer anger at a heightened level after decades of tax code manipulation and 
fluctuating assessments, Georgia’s white property owning voters gravitated towards 
politicians who spoke to their own economic interests and more especially, for lower 
taxes.     
Talmadgism 
In channeling anti-government rhetoric into a formidable political coalition, no 
one in Georgia bested Eugene Talmadge. 
171
  The great grandson of a soldier under 
Andrew Jackson’s command during the Florida Seminole War, Talmadge was a graduate 
of the University of Georgia, a lawyer, and planter in Telfair County, a southeast Georgia 
county known for its pine trees and swampy condition.  Settling with his wife and 
children on a piece of land abutting a waterway known as Sugar Creek in the early 1920s, 
Talmadge began carefully crafting a political persona that would reverberate across the 
state for decades.   
A main characteristic of Talmadge’s political performance was to present himself 
as an outsider, a reformer willing to stand up to what he saw as a corrupt Atlanta political 
machine.  In reality, though Talmadge lacked financial backing and political support 
during his early years in politics, he would never shy away from using traditional 
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methods of cronyism and special interest money to attain his goals.  A hallmark of a 
typical Talmadge political campaign included antagonizing racial and economic 
resentments to the point of hysteria.  Like Tom Watson in the 1910s, Talmadge was a 
champion of white supremacy, arguing that the poor white farmers of the state were 
being besieged on multiple fronts; African Americans who sought to usurp the South’s 
traditional racial hierarchy; banks and business that wanted to take control of their land; 
and wealthy whites in the cities who wanted rural residents to support their lifestyles 
through their tax payments.   In this, Talmadge seemingly practiced what scholars such as 
Richard Hofstadter have referred to as America’s “paranoid style” of politics, which 
theorized that conservative politicians preyed upon social fears and economic anxieties of 
constituents in order to attain their support. 
172
  While fear and anxiety were undoubtedly 
a part of the everyday lives of the state’s white farmers, they were far from being dupes 
of demagogic politics.  Most historical writing on Talmadge’s popularity with rural white 
Georgia has focused primarily on the ideology of white supremacy, but an examination of 
the economic context of Talmadge’s political career reveals a rural electorate very much 
aware of the significance special interest money played in local and state elections.  In 
light of the damaging effects of the Great Depression and the ongoing tax fights between 
rural and urban Georgians, white farmers’ support for Talmadge was more likely rooted 
in pragmatism rather than any sort of pathology of paranoia. 
173
  Though it is difficult to 
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ignore the numbers by which Talmadge carried gubernatorial elections of the 1930s, it 
should be noted that a number of his executive proposals once in office were often 
rejected by state voters through amendment ballots.  More often than not, these proposals 
offered a modicum of benefit to rural residents by way of tax cuts, while offering huge 
windfalls to corporate powers who backed the Talmadge machine.  The fact that 
Talmadge’s amendment proposals often lost at the polls – even in rural counties 
considered to be his base – shows a politician perhaps less popular than previously 
thought, while illustrating an electorate just as keenly aware of economic self interest in 
the 1930s as they were in the 1910s and 1920s.  This largely unexplored segment of the 
Talmadge era indicates a politician who may have represented merely the best choice for 
rural whites, but whose popularity, aside from the pageantry of his election campaigns, 
was debatable.  A proper discussion of the effects of the Talmadge years must examine 
the connections between race, economics, and politics.   
In many studies of Georgia during the 1930s, it is not uncommon to read of Gene 
Talmadge’s clasp on state politics as the era of Talmadgism. 
174
  The interrelationship 
between economics and race had long been a powerful component in the everyday life of 
Georgia’s white farmers.  Talmadge certainly capitalized on white fears of financial ruin 
and the threat of losing racial privilege, but he did not create it.  The larger question then 
is why did Talmadgism strike such a powerful chord with the state’s poorer whites?  How 
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did concentrations of white farmers turn, in the historical narrative, from being nuanced, 
politically savvy Independents, Populists, Grangers, and free silver advocates, into 
supporters of a man who travelled in the baseness of racialized emotion?  The easy 
answer would be that hard times and racial animosity drove the old wool hat boys into 
voting against their own interests.  A far more probable answer is that white farmers 
chose to back the candidate with best chance of winning elections and at least 
accommodating their concerns, especially as they related to alleviating the perception of 
the tax burden.  While many historians focus on Talmadge and race in affecting the 
voting patterns of white farmers, an unexamined issue is in how rural Georgia retained 
political agency and actually continued to be informed arbiters of their own financial 
interests.  As at least one Talmadge biographer has noted, Talmadge made a calculated 
effort not to pander to his base by sporting a wool hat or overalls in his campaign stops.  
Instead, Talmadge courted white farmers to participate within his administrations – a 
shrewd maneuver that other politicians seeking the rural vote would not make. 
175
  Rural 
Georgia voters could seemingly accept a degree of corruption so long as economic 
concessions were made in their favor.  It was not until Talmadge’s hubris led him to seek 
special interest money without attending to the concerns of white farmers, that he 
suffered a state-wide defeat.           
In his first elected position in state government as agricultural commissioner in 
the 1920s, Talmadge honed his skills of engaging in ethically-challenged behaviors.  As 
commissioner, he moved collected agricultural revenue from a state deposit account over 
to a bank owned and operated by a family member, appointed friends and family to key 
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positions within the agricultural office, and often refused to answer basic queries of his 
department as submitted by the Georgia General Assembly. 
176
  During his tenure as 
agricultural commissioner, Talmadge made few allies in state government with his 
tendency to lash out at any person who dared criticize his running of the department.  
Many of his detractors came to refer to him as “the wild man from Sugar Creek,” a 
moniker that Talmadge himself embraced.  One of his first acts in his new office was to 
resurrect the state’s agricultural bulletin, within which Talmadge wrote an essay for each 
issue.  Through the bulletin, Talmadge assailed bankers, merchants, politicians, and big 
cities as being the architects trying to destroy Georgia’s white farming families. 
177
  At a 
time when much of rural Georgia did not have radios much less electrical service, the 
agricultural bulletin and its pro-Talmadge content provided the only serviceable news to 
the state’s rural citizens.  Talmadge’s agricultural bulletin quickly became a point of 
consternation with members of the General Assembly and potential political opponents 
who felt unfettered access to the state printing office gave the commissioner too much 
power.   
Few instances foreshadowed Talmadge’s strong-arm political style better than the 
hog affair.  In 1928, when hog futures failed to deliver an expected price, Talmadge, 
whose agricultural office was to serve as the middleman in delivering the state’s hog 
exports to a wholesale buyer, refused to hand over the livestock.  Instead, Talmadge, 
without notifying the governor’s office or the assembly, hired a rail fleet to ship 
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Georgia’s hog inventory directly to Chicago, where the spot market price was slightly 
higher.  Upon finding out about the sale, the governor and assembly demanded an audit 
of the affair, finding that after accounting for the rail costs, the price per hog was lower 
than it would have been if the commissioner had just passed them onto the futures market 
as planned.  Talmadge’s opponents believed the scandal would force him out of office 
and ruin his political career.  Undeterred by the audit and the accusations of graft, 
Talmadge took his case directly to receptive farmers where he told them that he only 
sought to protect them from the deceits of bankers and the futures market.  At the end of 
every speech, a recalcitrant Talmadge, in shirt sleeves and ubiquitous red suspenders, 
would raise a fist and exclaim, “Yeah…I stole, but I stole for you.”  Showing intense 
popularity with rural farmers, Talmadge also gained support from Roy Harris, a powerful 
state legislator from Augusta who headed what was known as the “Cracker Party,” a 
powerful faction within the state Democratic Party that had less to do with political 
ideology than with courting corporate money, winning elections, and exerting its 
influence onto state affairs.  In Talmadge, Harris undoubtedly saw a great political gift in 
being able to admit to theft but still retain high levels of support from his political base.  
In the assembly, Harris personally oversaw that possible impeachment proceedings were 
squashed.  “Gene was a good boy,” said Harris, “He hadn’t meant any harm.”  The hog 
affair emboldened Talmadge’s crafted persona as an outsider and a “wild man” in 
political life.  “I’ll never admit I’m wrong, even if I am, and I’ll never apologize,” 
Talmadge would remark as being the foundation to his political success. 
178
       
                                                 
178
 All quotes from William Anderson, The Wild Man from Sugar Creek: The Political Life of Eugene 





In 1932, Talmadge, backed with Harris money, was a frontrunner for the 
Democratic white primary for the governor’s office.  With financial backing, his 
campaign stops took on the air of county fairs, featuring barbeques, impromptu wrestling 
matches, and pie baking contests.  At many of Talmadge’s stops in North Georgia, he 
was accompanied by popular recording artist Fiddlin’ John Carson and his daughter Rosa 
Lee, who went by the stage name Moonshine Kate. 
179
  Natives of Cobb County, 
Carson’s family were onetime farmers who, like so many others, had moved to the city 
looking for steady pay.  At one campaign rally on Marietta’s square before the 
gubernatorial white primary, Talmadge told a large crowd that he was committed to 
“reducing the high and exorbitant taxes from the backs of our already overtaxed people.” 
“[T]he high cost of government and the waste of the taxpayers’ money in carrying useless 
bureaus and boards,” Talmadge claimed, “must be abolished,” referring, at least 
indirectly, to the state’s equalization board and highway department. 
180
  Also in his Cobb 
County speech, Talmadge pledged to end the freight-rate differential, cut the automobile 
ad valorem tax to a flat three dollar fee, and lower taxes on businesses who contributed to 
the good of local communities such as doctors and druggists.   His speech emphasized 
platforms amenable to farming and urban interests, a nod to the integrated business and 
agricultural counties found throughout North Georgia’s Seventh District.  Underlying the 
speeches, however, were the early strains of Talmadge’s anti-government message – one 
that blamed bureaucracies, tax collection, and politicians for the ills affecting white 
Georgians during the Great Depression.    
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Talmadge rode his popularity to the white primary victory, and given Georgia’s 
one-party politics, won the general election.  Although white farmers were his base 
constituents, the onset of the Great Depression combined with his populist-tinted anger 
towards banks broadened Talmadge’s popularity with working class whites in the cities, 
as well. 
181
  During the campaign and for part of his first term, Talmadge told supporters 
that he stood with Franklin Roosevelt and his plans for a New Deal for the American 
people, reflecting more Roosevelt’s popularity with all of Georgia than his own 
acceptance of the New Deal agenda.  By the start of the 1934 campaign season, however, 
Talmadge had turned against Roosevelt.  “Damned foolishness,” he would come to say of 
New Deal programs. 
182
  One source of his political pivot was the implementation of the 
federal Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which was unpopular with many Georgia 
farmers, who bristled at having to plow under established cotton fields to receive AAA 
financial benefits.  In Cobb County, it was not uncommon for farmers to pledge to the 
AAA, but still plant cotton in far corners of their property, and to scare off county agents 
with threats of violence. 
183
  Talmadge latched onto such stories and claimed that 
Roosevelt and his New Deal administrators understood neither agriculture nor the ways 
of the South.    
The traditional assumption is that ideology played a crucial role in Talmadge’s 
turn against the New Deal, with many historians noting the governor’s staunchly anti-
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communist views and his defense of what he saw as traditional southern “conservatism.”  
A largely unexplored reason, however, has less to do with ideology as much as it does 
with traditional Georgia politics.  Under New Deal organization, federal money for use in 
local projects went to an appointed agency administrator, who was responsible for 
disbursing the funds.   This organizational approach allowed large amounts of federal 
money to enter the state, while effectively bypassing both the governor’s office and the 
General Assembly.  For Talmadge, who like so many of his political forbearers, 
depended upon the ability to parcel favors amongst political allies, the loss of control 
over New Deal money jeopardized political power.  In 1933, when still vocally 
supportive of Roosevelt, Talmadge had even created the Georgia Relief Administration 
(GRA) to provide assistance to the state’s unfortunate citizens.  While it appeared on the 
surface like a federal New Deal agency, it was run by a Talmadge flack and its funds, 
derived from collected state revenue, were distributed to counties loyal to the governor 
and his allies with little to no oversight.  When the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) created the Georgia Emergency Relief Administration (GERA), 
Talmadge’s GRA became redundant.  Appointed by FERA director Harry Hopkins to 
head GERA was Gay Bolling Shepperson, a Virginia native with a long history of 
conducting social work and well respected in her field as a superb administrator.  When 
Talmadge attempted to use the governorship to influence who would control county 
offices within GERA, Shepperson answered by appointing professional social workers 
with bureaucratic experience – “predominately women” – to the positions. 
184
  After 
learning that Shepperson and GERA intended to pay African American men the national 
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FERA pay rate for a day’s work, Talmadge charged that Georgia’s crops would rot in the 
fields because farmers could not compete with such a pay scale.  In a letter to President 
Roosevelt, Talmadge wrote: “I wouldn’t plow nobody’s mule for fifty cents a day when I 
could get a $1.30 for pretending to work on a ditch.”  In a reply signed by Harry Hopkins, 
the FERA director chastised the governor.  “I take it you approve of paying farm labor 
forty to fifty cents a day.  Somehow I cannot get it into my head that wages on such a 
scale make possible a reasonable American standard of living.” 
185
   By 1934, Talmadge 
had begun referring to the President as the “Roosevelt problem,” the New Deal as 
“socialistic,” and its supporters as part of the “gimme crowd.” 
186
  Despite Talmadge’s 
turn against Roosevelt, the President continued to have the support of most rural 
Georgians.  Even though the AAA requirements upset some farmers, other programs such 
as rural electrification, flood mitigation measures, road construction money to local 
governments, and farm resettlement were extremely popular with rural Georgia.  In the 
mid 1930s, Talmadge’s hometown newspaper The Telfair Enterprise conducted an 
informal survey of farmers as to who they thought would be a better President of the 
United States, Talmadge or Roosevelt.  All but one said Roosevelt.  When asked who 
they wanted as governor of Georgia, they unanimously said Talmadge. 
187
  Talmadge 
biographer William Anderson has referred to the pro-Talmadge and pro-New Deal 
tendencies of Georgia’s voters as akin to a kind of “schizophrenic liberal-conservatism.” 
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  Although easy to reduce the issue to a political binary, what the farmers were really 
supportive of was the benefit of New Deal intervention, but also Talmadge’s protection 
of their financial interests and his stalwart defense of white supremacy.  For a group 
historically frustrated by economic changes, the stance on being pro-Talmadge, the anti-
New Dealer, and pro-Roosevelt, champion of the New Deal, was actually quite logical.   
For the remainder of his governorship, Talmadge honed a rhetoric that centered 
on the alleged evils of government intrusion.  When he stayed on local and state issues, 
the governor was at his best in mobilizing rural support for his plans.  Favorite sources of 
his derision were the boards, departments, and agencies created in the 1910s through 
urban Progressivism.  His attacks on equalization and the tax commissioner’s office were 
not surprisingly frequent targets.  Politically unable to repeal equalization, much like his 
predecessors, Talmadge instead focused on reducing other forms of taxes that were 
despised by rural white Georgians.  One popular activity during his travels across the 
state as governor was to order sheriffs to stop levying fines to persons caught without a 
valid hunting or fishing license.  Standing before the assembled crowds that greeted the 
governor wherever he went in rural counties, Talmadge would tell his audience that in 
tough economic times, the government should not expect its citizens to pay a fee in order 
to feed their families.  The poor white farmers of Georgia, Talmadge was keen on telling 
audiences, had but three friends: “God Almighty, Sears Roebuck, and Gene Talmadge.” 
189
       
                                                 
188
 William Anderson, The Wild Man from Sugar Creek: The Political Life of Eugene Talmadge (Louisiana 
State University Press, 1975), 195. 
 
189
 William Anderson, The Wild Man from Sugar Creek: The Political Life of Eugene Talmadge (Louisiana 





In another instance, enraged that the General Assembly refused to adopt his 
campaign promise to implement a flat three dollar tag for automobiles, Talmadge 
declared martial law.  When the state’s highway department would not cooperate in 
creating a three dollar tag without an assembly bill, Talmadge had the state militia 
remove the department’s personnel from their offices.  After ordering a local welder to 
cut open the department’s safe, Talmadge took the money and parceled it out to the 
counties as he saw fit. 
190
  The three dollar tag was to benefit the poor working farmers of 
the state, Talmadge argued, and he had promised to implement it.  While most of the 
urban parts of the state and newspaper editorials in Atlanta and Marietta condemned the 
highway department seizure, the three dollar tag plan remained immensely popular with 
small farmers who felt burdened by the expenses associated with taking goods to market.  
As a popular song heard in Georgia from the early 1930s proclaimed, “You can’t put a 
thirty dollar tag on a three dollar car.” 
191
  Much like the previous hog affair, rural voters 
accepted corruption of the political system to receive favor.  Once the highway 
department fiasco was resolved, Talmadge’s supporters in the assembly helped push his 
tag plan through committees and into law.        
With a year left in his second term and constitutionally prohibited from seeking a 
third consecutive nomination as governor, Talmadge set his sights on national politics.  
Noting that it “ain’t like running for sheriff,” Talmadge began courting big money donors 
from parties united in opposition to the New Deal.  His initial plan was to challenge 
Roosevelt for the presidency.  Talmadge’s most vocal financial backers included John 
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Henry Kirby, an oilman from Texas; Gerald L.K. Smith, a popular evangelical preacher 
that the New York Times would later refer to as a “semi-fascist nut;” the membership of 
the Share Our Wealth Club, which had ostensibly been leaderless since the assassination 
of Huey P. Long; and finally Thomas Dixon, author and editor for the Klansman.  
Despite attracting what has been referred to as a “strange coalition,” consisting of anti-
New Deal conservatives, left wing populists, the Ku Klux Klan, and traditional pro-
business southern Democrats, Talmadge’s vocal backers alone were not a serious threat 
to the presidency.  Behind the scenes, however, secret money from powerful individuals 
and corporations flowed into Talmadge’s campaign chest.  The DuPont and Raskob 
families were large contributors, as was Alfred Sloan from General Motors and members 
of many influential Georgia companies such as Coca Cola, Georgia Power, and West 
Point Manufacturing. 
192
  “He is perhaps lacking in the elegancies, politeness, and very 
sensitive refinements, but he is strong, determined, and courageous…I am a great admirer 
of his and I am for him,” the president of Georgia Power wrote of Talmadge’s possible 
presidential candidacy. 
193
  From the northeast, Talmadge even garnered the quiet support 
of allies of Al Smith, a political opponent of Roosevelt and former New York governor 
who held strong ties to the old Tammany Hall political machine.   
Armed with new money, Talmadge mobilized his supporters into a “Grass Roots 
Convention,” where the Georgia governor and other allied politicians would make 
speeches and test the waters as to a presidential run.  The convention was set to be 
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broadcast nationally for radio from its site in Macon, Georgia, and newspapers from 
across the country planned to cover the event.  Unfortunately for Talmadge, he left the 
organization of the convention to his political cronies.  According to a Talmadge 
biographer, the convention was an “enormous embarrassment,” replete with Confederate 
battle flags, Christian imagery, anti-communist propaganda, and anti-Semitism. 
194
  
Instead of reaching out to other regions of the country and presenting Talmadge as a 
serious contender, the convention seemed narrowly focused from the world view of rural 
white Georgians and to the vindictive feelings of Talmadge, himself.  Every attendee, for 
instance, was greeted with a free copy of Georgia Woman’s World magazine, which 
featured a picture of Eleanor Roosevelt surrounded by a group of African American men 
in nondescript military uniforms on the cover. 
195
  In his keynote address, Talmadge 
compared himself to Andrew Jackson as a defender of white southerners.  Unlike 
Roosevelt, Talmadge told the crowd, “when Andrew Jackson got to be President he 
didn’t put in Republicans, Socialists, Communists, and Negroes to tell him how to run 
these good old United States.” 
196
  In addition to travelling in ahistoricism, the convention 
notably failed to produce a platform or any pledged candidates, as Talmadge, perhaps 
aware that the convention was a failure, even balked at the end at announcing a run for 
President.  In general, the convention lacked coherence, outside of what one reporter 
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jokingly remembered as its being able to unite the crowd in opposition to “Negroes, the 
New Deal and…Karl Marx.” 
197
  One long-serving Georgia politician, when asked of the 
grass roots meeting dismissively replied, “it was just a plain old fashioned crab grass 
convention.” 
198
   
 It is important to note that the rise of anti-government rhetoric in the 1920s and 
1930s came from different points.  Rural and urban property owners vented anger 
towards what they viewed as unresponsive local and state governments. Politicians such 
as Eugene Talmadge, while courting corporate money and sponsorship, did the bidding of 
big business by attacking the New Deal as socialism. Taxpayers’ Leagues, meanwhile, 
stoked resentment towards wasteful government spending, while ultimately trying to 
protect their own financial interests as rentiers and real estate agents. In subsequent years, 
following intensive federal intervention during the New Deal and into World War Two, 
the disparate points of anti-government rhetoric would only continue as white property 
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ANATOMY OF A TAX REVOLT 
In many academic studies, angry white property owners and their support of tax 
reduction plans are presented within a context of the 1960s and 1970s, where they serve 
mostly as a backdrop to reactionary racial politics, grassroots organization, and the 
decline of what many scholars refer to as the “New Deal coalition.” 
1
 Georgia’s tax revolt 
of 1937 adds another dimension to narratives of tax reduction, white landowners, and 
political organization by illustrating that the roots of tax reduction plans extend deeper 
than studies focused on post-war suburbanization, racial integration, or the formation of 
modern conservative ideologies. 
2
  It is also a misconception to assume that Georgia’s 
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property owners began to foment a tax revolt solely in reaction to New Deal policy 
making.  While the mid 1930s would witness a rise in anti-government rhetoric and 
culminate in a major property tax revolt, discontent among property owners towards local 
and state government had a long historical trajectory.  The beginnings of Georgia’s 
property tax revolt in the 1930s clearly had its roots in events of the 1910s and 1920s, 
when local governments began incurring more debt through bond issuances to pay for 
various infrastructure improvements.  Through a combination of bad planning and 
corruption, many municipalities turned to increased tax assessments to pay outstanding 
obligations.  While local naiveté and graft were certainly factors in contributing to rising 
city and county debt obligations, so too were the effects of under-regulated financial 
markets in creating financial risks for municipal borrowers.  Making the politics of the 
revolt all the more interesting was that property owners and real estate interests were 
historically the ones most likely to demand sidewalks, schools, and better transportation 
routes – the very kinds of improvements cities and counties issued bonds and raised 
millage rates to fund.  Historian Meg Jacobs has referred to such instances as examples of 
“pocketbook politics,” the ability to expect social and political services without 
necessarily having to be responsible for the cost. 
3
  Importantly, practitioners of 
pocketbook politics did not see themselves as entitled to increased benefits, or as 
privileged, but instead formed a self-identity based on perceived economic victimhood, 
where other groups received too many resources, while they, themselves, received too 
few.  The belief in not receiving a fair share of spending in line with what they felt they 
contributed combined with the realization that powerful economic interests were 
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manipulating the political system are important components to understanding Georgia’s 
tax revolt of the 1930s. 
As demonstrated, Georgia’s property owners as a recognizable class constituted a 
disparate group, representing not just rural and urban components, but a variety of 
subgroups, including white collar professionals, urban rentiers, small farmers, African 
American home owners, as well as the state’s corporate and small business owners.  Yet 
even though property owners constituted a broad section of Georgia’s population, 
political devices had limited participation at the polls.  Each group of property owners 
had its own agenda, built primarily around the idea that they should be receiving more 
but paying less.  The politics of aggrievement born from decades of tax policy battles and 
the manipulation of tax codes by industrial and corporate entities, while being abetted by 
political cronyism, led to a politically explosive situation that saw old coalitions 
dissolved and more fluid ones emerge in their place.  Gavin Wright’s assertion that 
economic backlash is nearly always expressed in response to something that has already 
happened – that is, that it remains in the psyche – is especially pertinent to the taxpayer 
revolt of the 1930s. 
4
  The grievances of Cobb County homeowners in the 1920s, for 
example, when millage rates and assessments increased due to government debt 
obligations, equalization, and school funding laws, continued into the 1930s, at a time 
when millage rates and assessments actually decreased.   
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The wide-spread revolt against property taxes also threatened the goals and 
objectives of local governments who needed steady revenue to meet matching fund 
requirements to participate in New Deal programs.  Unregulated markets, real estate 
bubbles, volatile agricultural prices, corporate corruption of the political process, and an 
endemically inept state government in the 1920s had already brought hardships to areas 
like Cobb County and Marietta prior to the Great Depression.  New Deal money allowed 
cities and counties to mitigate the compounding effects caused by economic upheaval.  
Not surprisingly, the primary recipients of New Deal programs ushered in at the local 
level were white.  The exposition of racial bias within the New Deal has a long historical 
tradition.  Many of those targeted for aid were not just white, but were also white 
property owners. 
5
  Federally-engineered building programs of the New Deal offered, 
arguably for the first time, the opportunity for Cobb County to achieve the kinds of 
internal improvements that civic boosters and taxpayers had dreamed of since the 
emergence of the New South’s pro-growth mantra.  Marietta and Cobb’s involvement in 
New Deal programs stayed relatively conservative for much of the early to mid 1930s, 
and mostly depended upon securing self-liquidating projects that required minimal 
upfront costs.  On the heels of a property tax revolt, however, local government’s 
involvement in federal projects would become grander, as local officials expanded upon 
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the foundations of earlier New Deal participation, and began courting larger revenue 
generating projects that could offset the loss in local tax receipts.   
Concurrent to the courting of federal money by local governments in the early 
years of the New Deal, however, a backlash arose against government spending at the 
local level.  The efforts of Taxpayers’ Leagues, Talmadgism, corporate influence, and the 
lingering anxieties of white property owners towards higher property taxes created a 
hostile environment to fiscal liberalism. The tax revolts of the 1930s were not a rejection 
of physical improvements made during the New Deal, per se, but were a continuation of 
economic resentments birthed decades earlier.  As such, the anti-tax movements brought 
together a complex set of economic actors that included real estate holders and rentiers 
who had large financial stakes in seeing lowered property taxes, anti-bureaucratic and 
small government advocates, and voting blocs of urban and rural property owners who 
believed themselves to be paying too much in ad valorem taxes as compared to the other.  
The one major common denominator was that they all constituted Georgia’s voting 
electorate.  Because so many different actors and interests were represented in the tax 
revolt, the road to affecting a substantial reduction in property tax obligations was 
arduous, and ultimately complicated by continued special interest manipulation and 
shifting political coalitions.  To best understand the growth of anti-tax measures in the 
1930s, two questions need to be asked: How did tax limitation bills affect political 
organization in rural and urban parts of Cobb County and the state? And, how and why 
were the interests of the state’s historically factional white property owners eventually 





The 15 Mill Limitation Plan  
Near the end of his second term as governor, Talmadge became a champion for 
what was known as the fifteen mill limitation plan, a popular tax theory spreading across 
the Midwestern states beginning in the early 1930s. 
6
  As proposed, the limitation plan 
advocated that local and state governments, along with school districts be limited to a 
maximum real property tax levy of five dollars for every one thousand dollars of assessed 
value.  Sam Welsch, one of two state assembly representatives for Cobb County endorsed 
the plan’s goal of capping millage rates, insisting that tax relief must be a priority of state 
government.  Popular among the county’s rural voters and with real estate interests whom 
he often represented in his legal practice, Welsch told the Marietta Journal that 
something had to be done to lower the tax burden of both city and county residents, 
pointing out that at his own residence in Marietta, he was paying a total millage rate, 
inclusive of tangible and intangible taxes and the school levy, of twenty nine dollars per 
every one thousand dollars in assessed value. 
7
   
  Talmadge urged the limitation plan’s immediate passage through the General 
Assembly, comparing the proposal to his three dollar tag bill in its ability to offer tax 
relief. 
8
  The Governor’s claim that local governments were spending too much money 
and needed to be curtailed by state government was a not-too-subtle attempt to limit 
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municipal and county involvement in the New Deal by decreasing revenue needed to 
match federal funds.  The plan also proposed that the state collect a new fixed levy on all 
taxable “intangibles” such as stocks, bonds, and dividends held by residents of Georgia, a 
still largely under-collected source of revenue with a history dating back to the fights 
over equalization and the state income tax.  In the early part of 1936, the fifteen mill 
limitation proposal was submitted into assembly committee with the backing of 
politicians who were particularly strong in rural and economically-depressed areas.  The 
tax limitation proposal argued to be of primary benefit to families facing economic 
hardships during the depression by making wealthier persons with stock holdings and 
bond certificates pay more in annual taxes, a popular tax plan supported by rural Georgia 
dating back to equalization.  Additionally, the limitation plan’s supporters pointed out 
that ratification of the measure would protect Georgia homeowners from rising property 
taxes through the implementation of the cap.  Because the plan involved rewriting the 
state’s tax code, the limitation proposal – after approval by the legislature – would need 
to be ratified by Georgia voters as a constitutional amendment.  Speaker of the Georgia 
House of Representatives E.D. Rivers, a Talmadge partisan, promised to guide the plan 
through the assembly and onto a statewide ballot. 
9
       
  Nearly instantaneous to the announcement of the limitation plan, two special 
interest groups emerged touting the plan.  One was the Georgia Taxpayers’ Relief 
Association, a group whose charter supported “elimination of all unnecessary taxes of 
every kind; relief for the taxpayers of excessive, confiscatory and arbitrary taxation; 
prevention of harsh, unfair and un-American methods in assessing and collecting taxes, 
                                                 
9
 Background on the limitation proposal and its early days in legislative committee found in Marietta 





and to require all tax assessors and collectors to treat all taxpayers as honest and patriotic 
citizens unless conclusively proven otherwise, and always to treat the public with 
uniform courtesy, patience and consideration.” 
10
  The other interests group saw the old 
Georgia Taxpayers’ League reorganize and reincorporate itself as the Georgia Real Estate 
Taxpayers’ League.  A major difference between the Taxpayer’s League of five years 
earlier and the new one seemed to be that unlike the former’s reliance upon grass roots 
mobilization and its canvassing of local neighborhoods for voting allies, the new league 
chose to depend upon lobbyists and industry insiders who would take the league’s 
concerns directly to members of the assembly and to the business community.  The 
reorganization also changed the hierarchy of the group, as older leaders like Hal Steed 
who had been instrumental in fighting for lower assessment rates years earlier were 
noticeably missing from the new organization.  His noticeable absence indicates that the 
more extreme voices recounted in “Adventures of a Tax Leaguer” had replaced the 
moderate positions of those held by Steed. 
11
  With its new structure, the Georgia Real 
Estate Taxpayers’ League fully supported the fifteen mill limitation plan, and by the time 
Speaker Rivers moved it into committee, began an intensive advertising campaign to win 
over public support. 
12
   
Two of the league’s emergent leading voices were Frank Carter, a prominent 
Georgia real estate attorney with close ties to Atlanta’s business community and Alvin 
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 Atlanta realtor Alvin Cates was president of the Georgia Real Estate Taxpayers’ League’s Atlanta 
chapter, which also included membership in surrounding areas including Cobb.  Atlanta Constitution, 30 





Cates, the president of one of the state’s largest real estate firms who had previous 
dealings with the state assembly on matters of economic policy.  Carter took his 
arguments directly to local Chamber of Commerces, Kiwanis and Rotary Club meetings, 
and various business associations.  With business and industry being historically in favor 
of ad valorem taxation as being the basis of state and local revenue, Carter faced an uphill 
fight in trying to get them to support a reduction in property tax collection.  In the past, 
proposed reductions in ad valorem taxes were generally planned to be offset by increases 
on things associated with business and industry.  The bitter fights over income tax, sales 
tax, and gross receipts tax in the 1910s and 1920s had accentuated the divide between 
landowning interests and the state’s business community.  At a talk before a jointly 
attended Atlanta and Marietta Kiwanis Club meeting, Carter attempted to deflect the old 
tax burden issue by claiming that the limitation proposal was about more than tax relief, it 
was about forcing governmental “reform” by reigning in excess spending.  If voters 
approved limitation, Carter assured the crowd, the “ad valorem taxpayer” would still pay 
“more than his fair share in the cost of government.” 
13
  Both Carter and Cates argued 
that supporting property tax limitation was actually in the best interests of business and 
industry.  In most of his speeches covered by local newspapers, Carter emphasized that 
Georgia’s high real estate valuations were keeping businesses from moving into the state. 
14
  Cates, likewise, told assembly members that if Georgia did not “modernize its tax 
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laws,” then many industries would flee the state looking for better financial opportunities. 
15
        
Despite their arguments that Georgia’s tax laws were driving away business, or 
keeping industry from moving into the state, a review of census data refutes the 
argument.  While true that the total number of manufacturing establishments in Georgia 
dropped from 4803 to 4179 between 1920 and 1930, it is also significant to note that 
overall value added by manufacturing rose from $252,747 in 1920 to $294,649.  If 
adjusted for inflation, the $294,649 value of 1930 would have the same purchasing power 
as $352,873 in 1920 dollars.  In constant 1920 dollars, Georgia’s value added by 
manufacturing rose forty percent in spite of the decrease in the number of establishments. 
16
 The figures are illustrative of increased efficiency in the production of higher valued 
finished products, not necessarily the abandonment of Georgia as a location for 
production.  Fewer Georgia workers may have been employed in manufacturing during 
the 1930s, but the state’s industries were increasing production with more value.  Cates 
and Carter’s assertion that real estate accounted for well “over fifty percent” of Georgia’s 
revenue collections, however, was true. 
17
  Statistical reports for Georgia in 1935 indicate 
that seventy three percent of the state’s total revenue collection came from combined 
“country real estate” and “city real estate.” 
18
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Unlike previous tax proposals since the 1910s, the fifteen mill limitation plan 
incorporated a sophisticated propaganda campaign to stir public opinion, no doubt owing 
to the intensive lobbying efforts of the Georgia Real Estate Taxpayers’ League and the 
shadow corporate money funding the limitation proposal.  Paid radio spots heard on 
Atlanta and Cobb County stations, which included half hour addresses on the merits of 
limitation and interviews with local supporters of the proposal, combined with full page 
advertisements, largely replaced mass meetings and public debates.  Print advertisements 
placed in the Cobb County Times and Marietta Journal focused on the proposal’s 
promise to provide tax relief, with one imploring voters not to squander the “opportunity” 
of finally being able to lower their property taxes.  Often attached at the bottom of the 
advertisements was a cut out, where readers could pledge to support the limitation plan 
by sending one dollar to the Georgia Real Estate Tax League.  One of the more reprinted 
pro-limitation advertisements titled “Reduce Your Taxes” illustrates how the Georgia 
Taxpayers’ League codified differing anti-government rhetoric into a focused political 
strategy.  By threading together criticisms of government leveled in the past by business 
concerns, conservative voices, independents, Populists, and Progressives – both rural and 
urban – the league’s advertisements presented a decontextualized view of government 
that was insatiable in its desire for money, inefficient in its operation, that served as a 
breeding ground for corruption, was anti-business and pro-labor union, and that was 
ultimately too powerful.  The league’s advertisements created a synthesis of historical 
resentments, while ignoring the storied antagonisms of rural and urban Georgia, and 




mattered less than what should be an electorate united in opposition to the very idea of 
government.         
“For the 15 Mill Amendment” 
 
“Farmer – I have to pay taxes whether I make a crop or not.  It’s not right for land to 
carry all the load…It’s no wonder there are more tenant farmers than farm owners.” 
 
“Business Man – We need more common sense and fewer dollars and cents in this matter 
of government…No business could survive if it had the waste in overhead and 
administration that we have in government.”  
 
“Homeowner’s Wife – It looks like every year we have to borrow money to pay the taxes 
on our home.  Yet I know people who have stocks and bonds worth several times as 
much as our house and they pay no taxes at all on the property.  It’s not right to 
discriminate against the homeowners.  I’m for limitation.”  
 
 
“Against the 15 Mill Amendment” 
 
“The Politically Dominated Educator – It seems that – er – since I am, after all, paid out 
of the tax money that I should – er – be on the side of the fellows who desire unlimited 
taking power.” 
 
“The High Salaried Labor Leader – I’ve told my labor boys how to vote on this tax 
limitation amendment because I want to see all the teachers and other government 
employees strongly organized.  When we get them all together they’ll make it so we labor 
leaders can draw down more real dough and can dominate capital, the government, the 
farmers, and everybody.”  
 
“The ‘Political Pull’ Business Man – Shucks, if they limit the taxes on real estate, my 
friends that spend the money will have to work harder digging up the taxes on stocks and 




While anti-government rhetoric as used by the Georgia Real Estate Taxpayers’ 
League and Talmadge demanded that limits be placed on governmental power, proposals 
such as the 15 mill limitation plan would have actually made state government much 
more centralized.  By allowing the state assembly to set the annual ad valorem amount 
(up to five mill each per the proposal), a significant fiscal instrument of local government 
would be abolished.  Without home rule doctrine for municipalities and counties, local 
governments were already limited in being able to carry out changes to things such as 
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zoning, liquor laws, and terms and duties of elected officials.  Implementation of the 
limitation plan would have local governments become even more dependent upon the 
governor’s office and the General Assembly in financial matters, as well.  Without the 
means to raise its own revenue from year to year, local governments such as in Cobb and 
Marietta would, indeed, find it difficult to maintain their financial relationships with New 
Deal programs.  Even though Marietta tended to focus the majority of its attention on 
self-liquidating projects by the mid 1930s, it did rely on small bond issuances and 
increased revenue projections to match funds for larger infrastructure projects such as 
sewer upgrades and a planned expansion of the Board of Lights and Water. 
20
  Without 
steady sources of revenue, cities wishing to issue bonds would likely have to pay higher 
interest rates to satisfy bond purchasers.  If limitation succeeded at the polls, Marietta’s 
long-term improvement plans would almost certainly end.     
Just as the limitation proposal brought together corporate land-owning interests, 
urban rentiers, state-wide real estate organizations, and the Talmadge political machine, 
opponents of the plan also constituted a diverse collection of political voices including 
labor unions, chambers of commerce, city and county politicians, and New Deal 
advocates.  In response to the advertisements of the limitation supporters, opponents to 
tax limitation coordinated their opposition to focus on four primary arguments:  that the 
millage cap would reduce education spending; that it would decrease the amount of 
funding for newly formed public services, that cities would incur higher bond debt to 
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offset revenue losses; and that the plan would eventually lead to the creation of state sales 
tax.  J.H. Saxon, the president of the Georgia Educational Association announced that 
approval of the limitation plan by state voters “will mean retarding the progress of our 
schools twenty-five years…it will mean that long years of work and struggle on the part 
of the people to improve educational opportunities for their children will be wiped out in 
a day.” 
21
  According to the board of mayors of the newly created Georgia’s Municipal 
Association, the state would lose approximately fourteen million dollars if the 
amendment passed.
22
  The dramatic loss in revenue predicted by limitation plan 
opponents would jeopardize, the association contended, the ability of municipal and 
county governments to continue working with the New Deal bureaucracy. 
23
  In an 
Atlanta speech, Saxon further argued that cities and counties that had begun participating 
in New Deal programs by organizing various local agencies, such as health departments 
and road construction departments in order to receive matching funds and/or grants from 
the federal government, would find their ability to continue in the expanding local-federal 
relationship problematic given the cut in revenue.  Roy E. Calloway, representing the 
Georgia Municipal Association, which had previously figured the state’s projected 
revenue losses, discredited the limitation plan as being a “soft appearing sweet mixed 
elixir with the deadly effect of cyanide.”  “Limiting the levy,” Calloway continued, 
“would reduce the revenue of the local governments to approximately fifty percent of the 
present revenue throughout the state.” 
24
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In an effort to demonstrate the possible effects of limitation succeeding to win the 
popular vote, Atlanta’s city property assessors analyzed previous yearly tax receipts and 
applied them to the proposed limits set forth under the amendment.  According to their 
findings, if limitation had been in place in 1934, the city’s total revenue from ad valorem 
taxation would have been $1,615,071 instead of the $5,221,633 actually collected.  Such 
dramatic declines in revenue would not only damage local government’s ability to 
participate with the New Deal, but would impact the ability to repay outstanding bond 
obligations.  Fulton County’s assessors noted similar projections in lost revenue, and 
noted that Fulton’s seven mill school tax would be required to drop to five mill if the 
amendment passed, a loss of nearly one third of the school system’s annual funding. 
25
  In 
Cobb County, residents and politicians pointed out that the newly organized Blackwell’s 
School District would no longer be able to tax local residents for school funding since the 
county already levied a county-wide five mill tax. 
26
  For local communities such as 
Blackwell’s that had long sought its own schools, and that had to convince Cobb County 
government, its state representatives and senator, as well as gain approval from the 
Georgia General Assembly to levy a separate school tax, the effects of mill limitation 
would mean the end to local access to educational resources.            
Other anti-limitation groups focused on the potential indirect effects of the 
proposal, namely in the form of a sales tax.  While issues of bonded debt obligations and 
public service funding were often targeted towards local politicians, chamber of 
commerces, and the general public, warnings of an impending sales tax resulting from the 
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amendment’s possible passing were aimed at the general public and local merchants.  The 
most vocal group engaged in tying the fifteen mill limitation amendment to a sales tax 
continued to be members of the state’s business community who feared that a retail tax 
would hinder commerce.  Former governor John M. Slaton, who had lobbied against the 
income tax during the 1920s on behalf of business and industry, once more helped lead 
the fight against the sales tax discussion. 
27
  In language remarkably similar to that used 
to fight the income tax a decade earlier, the Atlanta Retail Merchants aligned with Slaton 
and other industry lobbyists to cloak their own self interest in a noble crusade to protect 
the working families of the state.  The limitation amendment, according to the press 
releases of the merchant’s association, was nothing more than “tax relief for the rich and 
an extra burden for the poor.” 
28
  In a luncheon speech before an Atlanta audience of 
business owners, the head of the retail merchant’s group noted that if the fifteen mill 
amendment passed and a sales tax was implemented to cover the revenue shortfall, the 
“burden” of generating tax revenue would fall onto the “little fellow to pay.” 
29
  In 
protecting the interests of state retailers, the merchant’s association began publically 
blaming the amendment on the National Real Estate Boards, their “meddling” in 
Georgia’s tax structures, and the corruption of state government. 
30
  The insinuation was 
that the Georgia’s Real Estate Taxpayers’ League was merely a cover organization 
serving national corporate interests.              
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One of the rising voices in the fifteen mill limitation debate belonged to James V. 
Carmichael, a newly elected state representative from Cobb County.  A young 
accomplished attorney in practice with Marietta’s soon-to-be mayor, Leon “Rip” Blair, 
Carmichael was gaining a reputation as being an independent who avoided swearing 
allegiance to any of Georgia’s standing political factions.  In his campaign for state 
representative, Carmichael urged a substantial overhaul of the state’s existing tax system.  
Mill limitation supporters likely believed that Carmichael and his tax reform message 
would be a natural ally to their cause.  With Sam Welsch, Cobb’s other state 
representative, standing behind both limitation and Talmadge, Carmichael surprised 
many by offering passionate and often eloquent defenses for a robust local government 
and its ability to control its own revenue structure.  In one highly discussed speech before 
Marietta’s Rotary Club, Carmichael condemned the fifteen mill limitation as being 
fiscally and even morally irresponsible.  “It takes money,” Carmichael reminded the 
crowd, “to operate schools, courts, health departments, road building and repairing units, 
police patrols, and fire departments.”  Should the limitation plan pass by popular vote and 
if Marietta and Cobb County should want to continue offering these services, Carmichael 
continued, municipalities needed to be prepared to carry “increased bonded debt” with 
higher rates to offset the loss of revenue. 
31
    
With the new backing of Cobb County’s business community to oppose the 
limitation bill, Carmichael began speaking before larger audiences in Atlanta and Rome, 
and throughout North Georgia.  Before a PTA group with members from Atlanta and 
Marietta in the audience, Carmichael warned that the mill limitation plan would make it 
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difficult to collect taxes on “corporate franchises, lands or other properties owned by 
railroads, electric power companies, cotton mills, foreign corporations, and other non-
residents.”  Pointing out that “non-residents” owned approximately “forty percent of the 
land in this state,” Carmichael claimed that if the mill limitation plan passed it would 
amount to a loss in tax revenue of “$1,841,832” in just the first year of implementation.  
“This amount of money will be handed to non-residents with no possible method of 
replacing the same except from the pockets of the residents of the state.”  In discussing 
the limitation proposal’s plan to tax intangibles at five mill, where real property would be 
taxed up to combined fifteen mill, Carmichael argued it to be unfair, noting that “the vast 
majority of intangibles are owned by the extremely wealthy…and they are the ones who 
stand to gain.” 
32
  Carmichael’s investigation into the limitation proposal shed light on 
what many critics had assumed but did not have evidence to claim: that large land owners 
and especially utility corporations such as Georgia Power would be the primary recipients 
of lowered taxes if the bill became law.   
During the early to mid 1930s, the fifteen mill limitation plan had been approved 
by voters in several Mid Western and Western states.  From Michigan to Colorado, 
economists, government bureaucrats, and members of the business community seemed to 
have reached the same conclusions as Carmichael - that the limitation plan was most 
valuable to utility companies and large corporations who in spite of owning a vast 
amount of acreage within a particular state, were headquartered in another state.   An 
economist from the University of Colorado noted that utility companies saved nearly four 
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million dollars in the first year Colorado passed the fifteen mill limitation plan. 
33
 A large 
finance banking concern in Michigan that dealt in locating bond purchasers for 
municipalities likewise noted that after passage of the fifteen mill limitation, local 
governments were having difficulty meeting match fund requirements to participate in 
federal New Deal programs. 
34
  Also in Michigan, a forestry expert noted that following 
passage of the limitation amendment, large land holders saw great reductions in the tax 
bills, incommensurate to those of the average property owners limitation was purported 
to benefit. 
35
  In this respect, millage limitation schemes throughout the country were 
little more than a redistribution of wealth from homeowners and farmers (along with their 
city and county governments) to corporations and industries.      
In the end, anti-government rhetoric used by pro-limitation supporters who sought 
to tie high taxes with municipal fiscal incompetence lost to anti-limitation opponents who 
used anti-government rhetoric to tie millage limitation to crony capitalism.  Despite the 
intense campaign of mill limitation supporters to sway public opinion, the plan lost in the 
popular vote by a landslide, with 31,969 voting for the amendment and 113,775 against. 
36
  According to the final tally, limitation carried only nine of Georgia’s one hundred and 
fifty nine counties.  With the exception of Bibb County, which was a strong center for 
middle Georgia agricultural real estate, the other eight counties comprised some of the 
lowest populated areas of the state.  Even Telfair, Talmadge’s home county, only voted 
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for limitation by one hundred and eight votes out of one thousand and twenty four votes 
cast.  In Fulton County, where the rentier-backed Georgia Real Estate Taxpayers’ League 
was strongest, limitation lost the popular vote by a two to one margin.  In Cobb, 
limitation also failed by a similar percentage. 
37
  What was likely conceived of in early 
1936 as a formidable political partnership between the Talmadge machine, urban and 
agricultural real estate interests, and corporate money had failed spectacularly.  In the 
end, Georgia’s voters – even those who historically championed property tax relief – 
likely realized that limitation was little more than continued corporate and special interest 
manipulation of the tax code.          
A New Deal with a Homestead Exemption 
In 1936, with Talmadge constitutionally unable to run again for governor, speaker 
of the house and Talmadge ally, Eurith D Rivers won the white Democratic Primary in a 
statistical landslide, winning three hundred and seventy two county unit votes out of four 
hundred and ten available.  Seeking to distance himself from Talmadge, whose credibility 
had waned since the failure of the fifteen mill limitation plan, Rivers campaigned as a 
pro-Roosevelt candidate who would implement a “little New Deal” for the state of 
Georgia.  The state’s newspapers, quick to compare the new governor with his 
predecessor Talmadge, noted that where the former governor was known for his red 
galluses, rolled up shirt sleeves, and bombast, Rivers was “polished and urbane” with a 
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penchant for formal attire as illustrated in his choice of wearing black bow ties with a 
dark coat.
 38
   
While Talmadge and Rivers differed in sartorial choice and personality, they both 
counted upon rural Georgia as the starting point for political power.  Drawing upon his 
strong support with Georgia’s countryside, Rivers embraced a progressive rural agenda 
that included additional education funding, transportation improvements, expanded rural 
electrification, and maternal healthcare.  But the new governor had also polled well in 
urban areas, having won the support of politicians such as James V. Carmichael, and as 
such, his little New Deal promised more cooperation between state government and 
municipalities. 
39
  With a coalition of support that reached from countryside to city, 
Rivers ended the bureaucratic fights between state government and New Deal 
administrators and welcomed Gay Boling Shepperson to advocate for reform measures 
she thought would be beneficial to both cities and rural areas.  By 1938, Georgia was 
opening vaccination clinics across the state. 
40
  When the Federal Housing Act of 1937 
allowed local governments to create public housing agencies in order to “adequately 
house low income families,” Rivers created the Georgia Housing Authority and Rural 
Housing Authority to ensure that the state received as much federal money as needed to 
eradicate poor housing from the cities and countryside and to construct new housing units 
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in their place. 
41
  With state government now firmly in partnership with the New Deal, 
cities like Marietta, following Atlanta’s lead, formed their own housing authorities to 
investigate slum clearance.  Rivers also embraced Roosevelt’s plan for a Social Security 
Administration and promised to have Georgia participate in providing old age and 
disability pensions, a plan that alienated support from corporate interests such as Georgia 
Power. 
42
          
Even though Rivers retained strong support for his initiatives, the issue of how to 
pay for his programs would be a problem throughout his governorship.  The fiscal 
problems associated with implementing the little New Deal were not surprising, given 
that assembly members, special interests, and taxpayers had a history of being unwilling 
to work out the funding for projects for which they would all benefit.  The economic 
uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the little New Deal would finally demand 
attention when Rivers announced his plan to offer every homeowner in the state a 
homestead exemption.        
   As initially conceived by Rivers, the homestead plan would allow for an 
exemption of up to $5000 for qualifying homeowners from city, county, state, and school 
district taxes.  Additionally, a $500 exemption would be granted for personal property.  
Unlike the fifteen mill proposal, which offered tax relief to all properties regardless of 
function and use, the homestead exemption, as originally proposed by Rivers, was to be 
limited to “owner-occupied residences” including city and rural domiciles.  The plan 
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would also include owner-occupied farms of up to fifty acres – the accepted standard size 
plot needed for self-sufficiency – and an acreage amount that would include the vast 
majority of the wool hat boys.  No doubt cognizant that the voting public saw Talmadge’s 
fifteen mill plan as a windfall for corporations, real estate interests, and other foreign-
headquartered concerns, Rivers was adamant that Georgia’s white property owning 
voters remain the primary beneficiaries of his homestead proposal.  Not surprisingly, the 
owner-occupied stipulation proved very popular with white property owners across the 
state. 
43
  An editorial cartoon from the Marietta Journal captured both the Homestead 
Exemption’s popularity with local voters and the anti-government sentiment whites had 
towards state and local taxes.  Standing the steps of their house, where a sign read “To be 
Sold for Taxes,” an elderly white man embraced his wife, stating “If only we had the 
Home Exemption law…we wouldn’t have lost everything we have worked and saved for 
all our lives.” 
44
      
The homestead plan struck fear, however, into politicians from more urbanized 
counties.  Within weeks of Rivers announcing his plan, representatives from DeKalb and 
Floyd counties condemned the proposal, claiming that the $5000 across the board 
exemption would “cripple” local governments.   Roy Harris and his Cracker Party, who 
stood as allies to Rivers’s homestead plan, countered the arguments of opposing 
legislators by responding that the exemption was not so much about cutting taxes, as it 
was about creating a way to “save taxpayers” between three to four million dollars a year.    
Since the nineteenth century, Georgia taxpayers, especially in the rural / urban divide, 
engaged in ways to have government pass taxation onto someone else, “passing the hat,” 
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as Moultrie Sessions called it in the 1910s. 
45
  Harris’s argument presumed that taxation 
itself was unnatural and invasive; that the “small home owner” deserved to live without 
government intrusion into their economic affairs. 
46
    
Gene Talmadge, though out of state government and heading into his senatorial 
campaign, also took time to denounce the homestead exemption plan.  Two years earlier, 
when the former governor was trying to gain support for the fifteen mill limitation plan, a 
similar proposal to the homestead exemption was briefly discussed by the General 
Assembly.  Talmadge lashed out at the exemption proposal by arguing that African 
Americans would become exempt from state taxes due to either not owning land or 
owning land of lower value.  African Americans, he told the assembly, were already 
receiving too much of state spending, especially in education funding.  This latter 
assertion brought a strong rebuke from the editorial staff of the Atlanta Daily World, an 
African American newspaper that circulated across North and Middle Georgia.  “The 
Negro and all fair statisticians are forced to take issue with the governor,” the paper 
stated. “[W]hile he may not own much property, [He] pays tax on every piece of property 
he rents.”  “The tax,” the paper continued, “if not paid direct on property is finally shifted 
on his shoulders and today the Negro pays into the state treasury, through property tax, 
automobile license fees, gasoline tax, and what not, many more times more than he 
receives in the measly opportunities offered him in the name and excuse of educational 
privileges.” 
47
  The amount of funding African American schools received was dismally 
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low compared to white schools, and no medical or law schools were open to enrollment 
in the state. 
48
  Hoping to pass a tax limitation plan amenable to corporations, which 
would return favor by supporting his candidacy for higher office, Talmadge covered his 
acquiescence to big business by deploying a racial language of an undeserving African 
American minority. 
49
  Even though Talmadge cloaked his opposition in his usual race-
baiting language, he was no doubt smart enough to realize that the exemption would, 
indeed, affect local governments and their ability to raise revenue, much more so than his 
fifteen mill limitation proposal.  With his eyes set on returning to the governor’s office 
after Rivers’s term, Talmadge most likely realized that if homestead were implemented 
local governments would be turning to state government for help with school funding and 
road paving.  But with state government also hindered by the exemption, the capacity to 
draw revenue to hand to local governments would be curtailed.  To meet the loss in 
revenue Talmadge realized that the state would need to introduce new forms of taxes.  In 
light of the fights over equalization and income taxes, Talmadge had little interest in 
entering what would assuredly be an epic political battle that might cost him allies and 
fundraising money.    
     Despite the opposition to his plan from urban counties and Talmadge, Rivers 
continued to gain the support of the majority of the state’s property owners.  Riding a 
wave of popularity, the governor began solidifying his commitment to the exemption for 
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furniture and household goods of up to three hundred dollars per individual.  The 
personal property clause of the homestead exemption is an excellent example of 
intersecting political and economic interests.  Georgia’s furniture manufacturers and 
retailers, of course, supported the exemption for obvious financial reasons and used their 
lobbying clout in Atlanta to argue for the personal tax reduction, believing that the 
exemption would entice homeowners to buy new furniture. 
50
 But the exemption was also 
supported by Georgia’s New Deal reformers and bureaucrats, including state WPA 
director Gay Boling Shepperson, who noted that federal relief programs had brought in 
over $11,500,000 of “commodities” into the state – a figure that included food and 
clothing, as well as household goods and furniture for Georgia’s neediest families.  For 
relief advocates such as Shepperson, the personal property exemption would protect 
Georgia families from being burdened by the goods sent to make life easier. 
51
 
With a rare unity of cross-class support making homestead a popular bill, 
politicians opposed to the exemption, but whose electorate were in favor of its passage, 
ceded that the bill would most likely be on the ballot and would achieve ratification.  As 
such, the bill’s opponents sought to distill the bill by at least lowering the exemption.  
Though Rivers and Harris originally sought a $5000 homestead exemption with a $500 
personal property exemption, Rivers unexpectedly divorced himself from the debate over 
reducing the amount of the exemptions.  This left Harris and the Cracker Party to fight 
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for the $5000 figure, arguing in several floor debates that after Florida had implemented a 
$5000 it saw an extensive surge in real estate investment. 
52
  Rivers, in a rare appearance 
before the assembly during the debate process, stated that the exact amount of the 
exemption was up to the legislature to decide, telling the legislators that “if we exempt up 
to $2,500, we will fill the state with $2,500 homes; if we exempt up to $5,000, we will 
fill our state with $5,000 homes.” 
53
   
In the end, a considerable amount of the assembly, probably coming to terms that 
the exemption would hurt local governments in their district, but also aware that voting 
against a popular bill could endanger their chances at reelection, agreed to support a 
homestead exemption of up to $2000 for owner-occupied urban and rural domiciles, and 
farms up to fifty acres with a $300 exemption for personal property that could include 
furniture, domestic animals, and tools. 
54
  Urban legislators also won a concession that 
city municipalities and city school districts would be immune from the homestead 
exemption. 
55
  As written, the homestead exemption would apply to “state, county, and 
county school district taxes.” 
56
  In Cobb, that meant that newly formed school districts 
such as Blackwells, would no longer be able to levy a tax to fund its system.  County 
governments also received a small reprieve from exemption, in that homestead would not 
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include the “interest on or retirement of bonded indebtedness,” meaning that a mortgage 
was still susceptible to tax levy but only at the county level. 
57
        
When it finally came before Georgia voters, the vast majority of whom were 
white property owners, the homestead exemption amendment passed by a three to one 
majority, almost the same ratio by which the fifteen mill limitation plan had failed. 
58
  
Despite being easily ratified by Georgia voters, the issue of how to finance the little New 
Deal in the wake of a massive reduction in revenue was left unresolved.  As arguments 
continued to mount concerning projected budget shortfalls for state and local 
governments, Rivers called the assembly into a special fall session.  The governor, 
without a clear strategy, left the mechanics of generating new revenue much as he had 
left the exemption amount up to the assembly.  James Carmichael, who had initially 
supported Rivers when he ran in the primary but had since soured on the governor due to 
his support for Social Security and increased spending, complained to a reporter that 
Rivers’s plan to have the assembly fix the problem was just another attempt by the 
governor to “sidestep the issue.” 
59
  Carmichael argued that the combined effects of 
homestead exemption, increased school and transportation funding, and the state’s 
participation in the federal social security system would lead to financial disaster.  Once 
the special session began, other Atlanta area representatives, Carmichael included, urged 
a complete overhaul of the tax code, but were blocked by rural members and the Cracker 
Party.  When rural representatives countered that the state should take over the 
construction and maintenance of Georgia roads, in addition to the revenue counties 
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collected from an existing county-administered one cent gasoline tax, politicians from the 
urbanized and densely populated counties rejected it outright and proposed instead that 
counties be able to place an additional one cent gasoline tax on residents to offset the “tax 
loss…they will suffer from homestead exemption,” a proposal that would, in effect, 
double the gas tax.   As urban assembly members claimed that a double gas tax would put 
their larger populated counties in a better position to match federal funds, rural legislators 
pointed out that small counties would never be able to raise a one hundred percent tax 
increase and expect to remain in office.   
As the assembly broke into historical divisions of urban and rural interests with 
regard to tax policy, Rivers finally entered the revenue debate by supporting a sales tax to 
cover the budget shortcomings of the exemption amendment.  Upon hearing of Rivers’s 
plan to create a state sales tax, Georgia’s business community and its interest groups in 
the chamber of commerce and merchants association once more mobilized as they had in 
the 1920s to halt the proposal.  The Atlanta Constitution, writing on Rivers’s proposal, 
editorialized that with a sales tax debate, the assembly was heading for a historic 
“political scrap.” 
60
  Cobb County’s James Carmichael, a close ally of business and 
merchants groups began a campaign of “no more taxes,” arguing before various civic 
groups and business organizations that the assembly and Rivers, were committed to 
“revision and redistribution” and would grab at anything to make up for the lost revenue 
created by their exemptions.  In a speech later given to an automobile dealers association, 
Carmichael furthered his opinion on the sales tax issue, stating that “Regardless on 
whether it is called by that name or by some name intended to disguise it, such as gross 
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receipts tax or luxury tax, I have been and am now opposed to these taxes.” “If the people 
aren’t willing to vote to pay for the program [sales tax]…then the legislature ought not 
cram it down their throats.” 
61
  An anonymous Marietta business owner when asked by a 
reporter from the Cobb County Times how he though the state would make up for the 
shortcomings in revenue stated he expected levies to “revert to the man least able to bear 
the burden,” most likely in his mind, the small business owner. 
62
  In Cobb County 
government, the Board of Control, the body charged with disbursing county funds to 
match New Deal projects, offered a sobering assessment to the Marietta Daily Journal, 
noting that by its calculations, the county would need to raise the millage to continue to 
operate, but that even with higher rates, the county’s participation in malaria control and 
welfare programs would probably end the next fiscal year. 
63
      
With acrimony spreading in the capitol building, with the state’s businesses lining 
up against him, and with editorial sections of local newspapers becoming more critical of 
the exemptions, Rivers closed the special session a week before Christmas Eve 1937, and 
signed the exemptions into law, even though the state lacked viable devices for offsetting 
the loss in revenue.  In his closing speech before the assembly, Rivers proclaimed the 
exemptions to be a “real Christmas present” to Georgia homeowners.  Echoing Harris’s 
assertion that exemptions were about saving money and that taxes were signs of an 
intrusive government, Rivers told the assembly that Georgians could expect to keep 
“$7,000,000 in taxes” at home next year.  In a nod to New Deal reformers such as 
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Shepperson, Rivers announced that “with these exemptions as a basis we expect to 
cooperate with the Federal Housing Administration to put on a real home building 
program.” 
64
            
While many of Georgia’s municipal and county governments in its developed 
regions were solidly aligned against the Homestead Exemption Act, the building 
programs ushered in by the Federal Housing Administration and United States Housing 
Authority would inextricably alter the built landscape of places like Cobb County and 
Marietta.  The boom in new housing construction fostered through federal housing 
initiatives and the guarantee of a property tax exemption would actually allow local 
governments with the means to collect revenue on utility services such as water, sewer, 
and electricity to at least recoup a portion of that lost from homestead.   
The origins of Georgia’s Homestead Exemption had followed a trajectory firmly 
rooted in public policy debates in play since the turn of the century.  Manipulation of 
state and local tax codes on the part of corporations, industries, and influential special 
interest groups had heightened tensions between rural and urban white property owners 
and begat a decades-long battle over which group should bear the weight of the tax 
burden.  The rise of anti-government rhetoric from the 1920s and into the early 1930s 
illustrated the transformative process from aggrieved property owner to grassroots 
organization.   
The maturation of the white property owner’s economic struggles into a political 
ideology defined by low taxes, fiscal conservatism, and the preservation of their own 
self-interests changed the political landscape of Cobb County and Georgia.  When, for 
example, Cobb’s white property owners were confronted with a corporate-designed mill 
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limitation plan to reduce taxes on all properties in the state, they correctly saw it as a 
wealth redistribution scheme that would disproportionately favor large-scale land owners 
such as Georgia Power and the railroad companies.  The grassroots-driven Homestead 
Exemption, however, catered to the newly evolving ideology of white property owners.  
When the historically fractious rural and urban landowners united in overwhelming 
support to pass the exemption ballot amendment to reduce taxes on owner-occupied 
properties, they effectively altered the dynamics of local and state government.  Long 
pitted against one another by corporate influence and political corruption, homestead 
marked a new coalition between rural and urban property owners.  This relationship, and 
the burden it placed on local and state government to find new sources of revenue, would 
lay the foundation for future metropolitan growth.  The 1937 homestead exemption 
marked the rise of Cobb’s white property owners as a united and politically reenergized 
group.    























BROADENING THE TAX BASE 
 
A common narrative in studies of how the New Deal affected local governments 
tends to focus on coalitions of liberal reformers and pro-business citizens working with 
federal agencies to re-shape local cities and counties.  A study of the relationship between 
Cobb County and Marietta in light of the 1937 Homestead Exemption Amendment helps 
to complicate this story by challenging the notions of reform-minded liberalism or civic 
boosterism as motivating factors in promoting significant changes to the built 
environment.  The new coalition of rural and urban white property owners evidenced in 
the grassroots campaign for homestead had altered the dynamics of local and state 
government by significantly curtailing revenue collection for the sake of lower property 
taxes.  The primary trigger, therefore, to Cobb and Marietta’s embrace of federal housing 
programs, job training, and expansion of municipal utilities with New Deal money was 
much more pragmatic – the need to raise additional revenue. 
1
  While true that Marietta, 
and in some respects Cobb, had historically demonstrated a commitment to pro-growth 
policies at the local level, many of the plans they enacted prior to the involvement with 
the New Deal were not as successful as envisioned.  When New Deal money initially 
became available, Marietta and Cobb tended to stay on the fiscally conservative side of 
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matching expenditures by limiting participation to self-liquidating projects.  But with the 
constraints imposed on local governments by ratification and implementation of the 
Homestead Exemption, both Marietta and Cobb’s political leaders found themselves 
needing alternative sources of revenue, a problem that could be potentially mitigated by 
issuing greater bond measures in order to participate in more financially complex New 
Deal programs.  The precursory factor, therefore, in why local governments were willing 
to risk future solvency to put up more matching funds was not merely a continuation of 
ideologies of growth and development, but was found in the need for revenue that would 
help meet the demands the new white coalition of voting property owners had for 
increased services.           
Within the historiography of twentieth-century Georgia, the effect the homestead 
exemption had on local governments has yet to be explored. 
2
  Yet in relation to the role 
New Deal housing, infrastructure, and job-training programs played in Georgia, 
understanding the economic impact of the exemption on local governments is crucial to 
appreciating the disparity in development from one area of the state to another.  In 
Marietta, for example, in spite of the fact that cities were exempted from granting the 
homestead for local and school taxes, city leaders were cognizant that state funds would 
be greatly diminished and that public demands for services would need to be met even 
more so by municipal government.  Marietta’s Board of Light and Water, once 
considered a public boondoggle of the 1910s and 1920s, had been greatly enhanced with 
New Deal money and matching funds from the city.  When Marietta entered into the 
post-homestead exemption era after 1937, it had a well organized system of sewers, 
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waste disposal plants, and electrical connections.  What it was missing was large scale 
residential construction.  With BLW being a city utility, the profits generated from 
supplying new residences with water, sewer, and electricity could go directly into 
Marietta’s coffers. 
3
  In the unincorporated county, the situation was much direr.  With 
counties mandated to give a homestead exemption for county and school levies, the fiscal 
impact was devastating.  Additionally, Cobb lacked a revenue generator on par with 
Marietta’s BLW.  While Cobb had an electrical co-op through subsidies from the REA, it 
was not designed to supply surplus revenue.  Likewise, Cobb lacked a county water and 
sewer system due to its being cost prohibitive.  With both Marietta and Cobb in search of 
extra revenue, the two often fractious entities began to work together to solve each of 
their funding problems.  What would emerge by the onset of World War Two was a 
governmental coalition that looked beyond the historic tax hostilities of its urban and 
rural real property owners and instead sought out new ways to promote fiscal 
independence from state government, while meeting the educational and infrastructure 
demands of its constituents.    
Another significant aspect of understanding the effect of homestead to Cobb and 
Marietta is how it accelerated a racialized built environment based upon the need to 
provide revenue for local government.  Plans for increased housing, the recruitment of 
industry, and the provision of services from Marietta’s BLW or Cobb’s electrical 
cooperative had profound implications for codifying a local concept of whiteness in the 
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mid twentieth-century.  With local governments searching for ways to expand their tax 
bases, they often turned to New Deal programs that abetted the white supremacist 
environments of cities and counties. In Cobb and Marietta, for example, both 
governments embraced a supply-side oriented approach to housing construction. 
4
  To 
offset losses in revenue due to homestead, local leaders looked to the Federal Housing 
Administration and United States Housing Authority to increase not just the number of 
available property taxpayers, but the numbers of homeowners that would be paying for 
municipal utilities such as sewer, water, and electricity. In Marietta, the demolition of 
existing neighborhoods to make way for new public housing units allowed city leaders 
the opportunity to re-segregate the historical urban environment by way of planning 
policy and federal intervention through subsidized housing funds.  The effects of the 
Federal Housing Administration, in both unincorporated Cobb County and Marietta, 
likewise, favored white homeowners through a federal guarantee of mortgage loans 
granted by local banks, which engaged in racially discriminatory lending practices. 
5
   
The study of how cities and larger metropolitan regions embraced federal 
intervention as a mechanism for home ownership and wealth accumulation through 
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processes of racial segregation is only recently receiving the attention it deserves.  At the 
forefront of such work is Robert O. Self, who has documented the growth of political, 
social, and economic inequality in Oakland and Alameda County in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  At the center of Self’s study is California’s Proposition 13, a tax 
reduction scheme passed in the late 1970s that has strong resemblance to Georgia’s tax 
revolt of the late 1930s.  Writing on the effects of Proposition 13 and how it favored 
white homeowners in the Oakland suburbs Self notes that “The political resolution that it 
imposed…deepened a more profound crisis in the political economy of California’s 
metropolitan areas: a spatial political economy in which vast differences in the levels of 
development within a single metropolitan region were not merely tolerated, but 
encouraged and subsidized.” 
6
  Such was also true of Cobb and Marietta in the late 1930s 
and early 1940.  How, then, did white supremacy (in its political, economic, and social 
dimensions) and local tax policy intersect in Cobb County to increase the numbers and 
political influence of white property owners during the New Deal years?                   
The Fiscal and Political Toll of Homestead   
In a nationally-published 1940 study on how state homestead exemption laws 
were affecting school financing nationwide, a researcher from the University of Arizona 
discovered that in 1939, the first full year of Georgia’s exemption, local governments 
across the state saw an astonishing combined reduction in revenue of “up to 64 percent of 
property tax yield” from the previous year. 
7
  In Cobb, the full impact of the homestead 
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exemption can be seen in Georgia’s 1940 Department of Revenue report. 
8
  Within the 
county, 3,461 homeowners filed for the homestead exemption, which led to a one year 
total loss of $565,785 in revenue.  Additionally, 4,761 persons filed for the personal 
property exemption of furniture and household goods.  The per capita average of Cobb’s 
personal property exemption was $118.83 per filing.  State-wide in 1940, 214,263 
homeowners claimed the exemption for a total one year “tax value exempted” amount of 
$40,182,631. 
9
   
With the homestead exemption set at up to $2000 of the assessed value of real 
property, Rivers’s 1937 assertion that whatever the exemption was set at would fill the 
state with properties at that amount proved prophetic.  In 1930, the median value of a 
Cobb County property was recorded by the United States Census at $2995.  By 1940, the 
federal census listed the median value of a Cobb County real property at $1788.  The 
average value of real property in Cobb for 1940 came in at $2308. 
10
  Between 1935 and 
1940, 1462 new domiciles had been built in the county, and given the drop in median and 
average values it can be assumed that most of those constructed were at or near the 
homestead exemption amount. 
11
  In Cobb, as across Georgia, value assessments stayed 
fairly close to the exemption’s cut off.  The adverse economic effects of the exemptions 
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were felt almost immediately in local governments, reflective of how many homeowners 
chose to pay property taxes in monthly installments. 
   Yet by 1940, even with more housing being constructed with help of the FHA, 
property tax delinquency, even in spite of the 1936 homestead exemption, continued to 
climb in Cobb and in Marietta.  As of August 1939, the city treasury announced that 
unpaid taxes stood at $21,674 of which nearly $9,000 was a carry-over from the 1938 
fiscal year.  According to the treasurer’s remarks detailed in the Marietta Daily Journal, a 
substantial number of city residents were still making back payments on tax bills from 
1931.  Despite rosy announcements as to the city’s financial standing, Marietta’s 
outstanding bond debt was nearing $250,000, and by August of 1939, the city’s sinking 
fund had a cash on hand balance of $6,964, less than three percent of the total obligation. 
12
  Since the early 1930s, Marietta was the twenty second largest incorporated 
municipality in the state of Georgia in terms of total population, and ranked fifteenth in 
highest per capita debt.  A few cities with lower debt obligations than Marietta even had 
twice the total population. 
13
  By 1938, forty-one percent of all of Marietta’s tax collected 
revenue went directly to paying down the city’s previous bond debt obligations.  City 
officials, when confronted with the high debt to revenue ratio, relied upon traditional 
booster optimism, claiming that Marietta was “very financially sound.” 
14
     
Similar economic realities were facing county government.  Much like other 
North Georgia counties, Cobb’s fiscal problems began decades earlier.  After the 
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ballooning debt of the early 1920s, the downturn in financial markets after the crash of 
1929 further destabilized the county’s economic future.  From 1922 to 1931, Cobb’s 
gross debt less its sinking fund rose from $439,000 to $835,000, an increase of 90.2 
percent.  Cobb’s per capita share of county debt rose accordingly, from $14.18 in 1922 to 
$23.00 in 1931, an increase partially mitigated by the 16.3 percent increase in total 
population between 1920 and 1930. 
15
  These figures would grow more disproportional in 
the years after the homestead exemption, as county residents faced higher per capita share 
of debt, but had a local government unable to raise revenue.  As poor as many of Cobb’s 
financial decisions were prior to the New Deal, much of it was done in response to the 
demands of white property owners for more services such as with school construction 
and road building.  With a homestead exemption, the ability to pay down the debt was 
severely diminished.  What Cobb County needed, as did Marietta, was a larger body of 
taxpayers on to whom per capita debt could be dispersed.     
Even with tax delinquency and bond debt, Marietta was able to keep its millage 
rate steady for the first years of the homestead exemption.  Cobb County, however, 
“hiked” its tax rate from twelve and one half to fourteen and one half in 1938.  One 
county official, citing the need to “defray expenses for the increased public welfare 
program which the county is participating in during the present fiscal year,” claimed that 
raising the millage rate was a necessity.  Other county sources, noting that the county had 
obligations to meet old age pension funding stated that the county just needed more 
revenue.  All county officials interviewed by local papers, however, placed the 
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overarching need to raise the millage rate on the effects of the homestead exemption. 
16
  
By the spring of 1939, with the rise in the millage rate failing to bring in additional 
revenue, Cobb’s Commissioner of Roads and Revenue informed the WPA that it would 
no longer be able to participate in any ongoing or planned transportation projects.  “I 
deeply regret,” the commissioner wrote, “that it is necessary for us to withdraw from your 
projects the machinery, equipment, fuel, and repairs which we have been furnishing to 
date…[T]he strained financial condition of the county makes it impossible for us to 
continue to furnish things on these projects.” 
17
     
The significant changes in revenue receipts in the county led to a growing 
discontent between county officials and state government.  While city leaders had a long 
history of finding themselves at odds with the state’s General Assembly and governor’s 
office, which were often populated by rural interests, the emergent disaffection between 
Georgia’s rural county officials and state government was unprecedented.  In an 
interview with the Cobb County Times newspaper, Judge N.A. Morris voiced his 
frustration with the homestead exemption and complained that most of the state’s 
legislators came from small poorer counties and were unable to comprehend the needs of 
cities and counties such as Marietta and Cobb.  “A large percentage of the members of 
the General Assembly,” Judge Morris stated, pay “practically no taxes of any kind.” 
18
  
By late spring of 1938, the Board of Managers of the Georgia County Commissioners 
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Association met for its annual meeting in Macon.  In what was noted for its “heated 
attacks” on the governor and General Assembly for enacting the homestead exemption 
without allowing for other sources of local revenue, consensus among attendees was that 
“something must be done.”  “It becomes our bounden duty to stop this fast growing trend 
towards centralization of all government functions at the state capital,” said one member 
of the organization’s committee on legislative activities. 
19
  For decades county leaders 
and their constituents had called upon state government to lower tax liabilities.  The 
realization of lower taxes with little relief funding, however, was driving many county 
governments to rethink their positions on a strong state government, and opening the way 
for a new city and county cooperation.       
The Quest for Local Revenue 
When Rivers left the governor’s office in 1941, Georgia’s standing budget deficit 
stood at a disquieting $14,500,000, a figure largely due to the effects of the homestead 
exemption on state revenue.  Compounding matters was an additional outstanding 
obligation of $38,500,000 in quickly maturing state bond debt that had helped fund 
Rivers’s Little New Deal. 
20
  As early as 1940, Georgia’s General Assembly, in a 
desperate attempt to raise revenue without having to re-engage with politically divisive 
plans such as the sales tax issue or state income tax law, began passing excise and 
ownership taxes on nearly every material good imaginable.  As recorded in the 
assembly’s yearly records, annual taxes were to be levied on bicycles, billiards tables, 
typewriters, engineering equipment, playing cards, fire arms, soft drinks, and books, 
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among others.  While the personal property exemption covered furniture, kitchen 
equipment, and material relating to household production, the amended list of items open 
to levy were meant to counter the loss in revenue.  But when material possession taxes 
failed to generate much in returns, the assembly turned to placing a ten percent luxury tax 
on “bowling alleys,” “golf courses,” “bathing beaches,” “dance halls,” and “operas.”  In 
an effort to gain support from local governments, the assembly promised that fifty 
percent of all revenue collected through the new levies would go to “individual 
counties…on a basis of the ration of their separate tax losses as a result of the homestead 
and personalty exemption.” 
21
  Under the “ration” metric, however, it was clear that small 
rural counties would receive the disproportionate share of the new revenue, even though 
most of the collection would occur in larger counties.  Not surprisingly, representatives 
from the larger counties did not rally to the “ration” tax plan.  The revenue plan not only 
largely fell to more populated and developed counties to collect, it also targeted many 
businesses and operations that politicians in those counties relied upon for political 
support, and upon which many city residents depended economically.  In this regard, the 
old tensions between rural and urban counties continued in the wake of decreased 
revenue, despite the mass agreement between white property owners to initiate a 
homestead exemption.   
The debate over how to raise revenue continued to fall along traditional divisions 
of urban and rural politics, and served to strengthen the power of special interests and 
corporations in the state.  In another controversial levy, for example, in keeping with 
rural legislators’ plan to offset homestead tax losses by increasing the obligations of 
businesses and industries came the idea of a chain store tax.  As designed, the tax 
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imposed a tiered levy on businesses operating more than one store in the state.  After the 
tax’s approval in 1937, a second store operation would pay a tax of ten dollars annually, 
with each additional store having a levy of five additional dollars.  For the fortieth store, 
the tax rose to two hundred dollars annually with each additional store after forty paying 
its own two hundred dollar levy.  Mail order stores were also targeted.  A store with a 
catalogue service in the state would pay two thousand dollars annually.  In light of the 
dependence many rural families had on catalogues stores, however, the Assembly 
exempted those dealing in agricultural goods and household production. 
22
   
By the time the General Assembly moved to discuss raising taxes on other 
business operations, some of the state’s industries mobilized to mount a propaganda 
campaign against higher taxes on businesses and corporations.  In North Georgia 
newspapers, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, for example, which leased operation 
of the old Western and Atlantic line, reacted to a proposal to raise the amount it paid to 
the state with a series of advertisements.  Recalling the language industries and 
corporations used to stall implementation of the income tax a decade earlier, the railroad 
embraced anti-government rhetoric and positioned itself as the victim of out of control 
government spending.  “Public Enemy No.1…Excessive Taxes,” read one such 
advertisement.  “The public debt, national, state and local, is believed to be approaching 
sixty billion dollars.  If equally apportioned, each family’s share would be almost TWO 
THOUSAND DOLLARS.  This constitutes a FIRST MORTAGE on what each family 
owns or earns.”  That the railroad’s figuring of per capita share of the national debt 
happened to match the amount of the homestead exemption was most certainly not an 
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accident; it was meant to instill a belief that government was going to waste the tax 
savings brought about through homestead.  The advertisement went on to claim that 
industries operating within the state were suffering under “excessive taxes,” before 
ending with a thinly veiled threat if the General Assembly were to approve the raise in 
lease terms.  “This heavy tax equals about one-sixth of the wages paid employees for the 
year; thus every seventh employee could be said to be displaced by the tax man.” 
23
  
Throughout the 1930s industries across the country would claimed that higher business 
taxes would force companies to conduct massive layoffs of employees.  In one nation-
wide campaign, the United States’ Chamber of Commerce posted billboards along major 
highways reading “Less Taxes = More Jobs.” 
24
  With Georgia’s persistent quest for 
revenue, local industries also tied taxes to employment in an effort to scare a public that 
needed work during the Great Depression, while threatening booster politicians who still 
looked at private industry as the key to future development. 
25
  With industries and 
corporations once more wielding their influence with elected officials and waging a 
disinformation campaign among the state’s taxpayers, the General Assembly backed off 
pursuing substantial tax increases on the state’s capitalist enterprises.  
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For many cities, including Marietta, a proposed liquor tax was seen by local 
politicians as way to generate new revenue following the homestead exemption without 
jeopardizing the relationship between local governments and corporations and industry.  
Following the repeal of federal prohibition, the state had allowed municipalities to sell 
beer and wine, so long as it was approved by resident voters.  Liquor sales, however, had 
remained a taboo issue for the governor and assembly.  Even with the end of prohibition, 
much of rural Georgia had resisted the sale of liquor in the state on moral and 
conservatively religious grounds.  Despite intense lobbying on the part of liquor makers 
and wholesalers, the General Assembly had been unable to gain the votes needed to allow 
counties to have referendums on the sale of liquor within their borders.   
When the devastating fiscal effects of the homestead exemption were realized by 
late 1937, many local politicians who had either been resistant or ambivalent about liquor 
sales came to embrace the “wet” movement as a way to impose a local tax to counter the 
losses from the homestead exemption.  From 1937 to 1938, Marietta’s mayor and council 
lobbied to get voters to support Cobb as a “wet” county.  For many of Cobb’s local 
politicians, the liquor tax was an example of a centralized state government not allowing 
local governments to decide their own fates.  Obtaining the support of Cobb’s cities, as 
well as its unincorporated residents, would be a difficult challenge.   
After a contentious vote that saw the assembly fail to allow counties to decide 
liquor sales on their own, Cobb County representative James Carmichael, a newly 
converted member to the pro-liquor lobby chastised his fellow legislators for not allowing 
“wet” counties to sell liquor in addition to beer and wine.  Cobb’s other representative, 




highlighting a riff between the county’s elected officials.  “If we could enforce 
prohibition,” Carmichael told the General Assembly in a prepared speech, “I would be 
the last man to vote to allow liquor sold.  But we have seen what a farce has developed 
from our so-called ‘bone-dry’ law:  you can’t get a conviction for liquor violation unless 
the defendant pleads guilty.  The juries won’t convict a man for possessing liquor 
because most of the jurors themselves have liquor in their homes.  Why not eliminate a 
ridiculous situation and at the same time provide additional revenue for education from 
the tax on liquor now being sold openly without any tax or regulation?”  Alluding to his 
vehement opposition to the general sales tax, Carmichael reminded his audience that 
“There are members of this house who would vote to put a tax on meat and bread and 
clothing, but they hold up their hands in holy horror when you suggest taxing liquor.”  
“Right now,” Carmichael concluded, “there are two things exempt from taxes in Georgia 
– homes and whiskey.” 
26
   
By March of 1938, with more local governments falling behind the pro-liquor sale 
movement, Georgia’s General Assembly approved a law allowing counties to decide 
whether they wanted to sell liquor in addition to being either wet or dry.  In an April 
ballot, Cobb voters approved the county becoming wet and allowing for liquor sales with 
the small south county city of Smyrna becoming the first municipality to allow sale of 
“controlled whiskey.” 
27
  City officials in Marietta, in keeping with Mayor Blair’s 
promise to use liquor sales to increase revenue, imposed a $500.00 fee on any merchant 
with plans to offer liquor in their establishment.  Additionally, the city placed several 
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regulatory requirements on merchants that had to be met, including the establishment’s 
being within one block of the downtown square, that the building must face a street and 
not an alley, that it must close by 10:00 pm, and that the interior of the establishment 
must feature a window so that activity could be seen from street. 
28
  
In a matter of years, liquor wholesalers had grown into one of the more powerful 
lobbying groups at the state capitol.  In Marietta, wholesalers bristled against Blair’s 
regulation of liquor merchants and began pushing for less regulation of liquor 
establishments in the hopes of increasing trade in the city limits.  The split between the 
one-time allies grew so acrimonious that by 1941, liquor wholesalers financially backed 
three candidates for Marietta’s city council.  When the liquor-backed candidates defeated 
three mayor-supported candidates, an angry Blair threatened to pull the liquor license of 
every alcohol-selling establishment in the city if the “liquor menace” continued meddling 
in city affairs.  “I thought when prohibition was repealed that the bootlegger would 
become a thing of the past,” he told a local newspaper. 
29
  From the late 1930s onward, 
liquor wholesalers would constitute yet another special interest group with the political 
influence and financial clout to affect local and state government.    
Cobb’s county government also began making structural changes to its 
organization in light of the debate over liquor sales and the growing power of the liquor 
lobby.  Reflective of the traditionally conservative values shared among the county’s 
residents, Cobb’s government moved to limit the ability of alcohol sellers or industries 
from moving into the county by proposing a series of governance changes to the General 
Assembly.  The first major change involved expanding the powers of the County 
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Commissioner for Roads and Revenue.  At the behest of the commissioner, a newly 
created office of county surveyor was to draw plat maps showing current and proposed 
zoning districts.  Based upon the information from the zoning maps, the commissioner’s 
office had the power to “restrict or regulate” the height and size of buildings, the function 
and use of buildings planned for construction, and the “architectural design” of buildings.  
Additionally, the commissioner had the power to “prohibit the use of certain property for 
certain businesses, trades, professions, or industries.”  Under the changes approved by the 
General Assembly’s Committee on Counties and County Matters, any alteration to the 
zoning districts would require the approval of seventy five percent of the residents 
affected by the proposed change.  Given that any change to Cobb’s zoning would also 
require the approval of the assembly, due to Georgia’s lack of a home rule doctrine, the 
commissioner’s ability to “restrict or regulate” what occurred within the districts was a 
markedly new power, and one that would have implications in the years to come as Cobb 
and Marietta continued to work together to find extra sources of revenue. 
30
     
Another instrument for providing additional revenue being championed by 
politicians in Marietta and Atlanta concerned the classification of property, a tax plan 
once favored by the Taxpayers’ League in the early 1920s.  Since the passage of 
equalization, property taxes were theoretically to be levied at the same amount regardless 
of whether they were real, personal, tangible, or intangible.  The ease with which 
taxpayers could avoid paying rates on intangibles, such as stock certificates or bond 
notes, however, had made parity in collection almost impossible to achieve.  The move 
towards classification favored a tax system that would create a tiered structure from 
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which local and state government could impose a levy.  In keeping with the interests of 
many urban politicians, real property would retain the highest rate of taxation, while 
taxes on intangibles would be significantly lower.  Proponents of classification argued 
that most of Georgia’s stock and bond holders either failed to report their assets or kept 
the certificates in other states.  Under a classification system, they contended, previously 
undisclosed property would be brought into the open to be subject to taxation – albeit at a 
lower rate.  In an effort to draw support, classification advocates pointed to Virginia, 
where a similar tax scale had been implemented and had contributed annual state 
revenues of nearly five million dollars.  Georgia’s rural constituency, despite their calls to 
place more of the tax burden onto urban and wealthier citizens had, since the 1920s, 
routinely thwarted the implementation of classification by defeating the measure in the 
General Assembly.  The reason for their opposition was that they believed classification 
to be unfair, that wealthy Georgians should pay the same assessment rate of taxes on 
stock and bond certificates that they would pay on real estate and other forms of personal 
property. 
31
   
After failing multiple times in the first half of the 1930s to leave Assembly 
committee, urban politicians finally managed to get the classification plan on a state-wide 
public ballot in the summer of 1937, where it passed largely on the support of city voters, 
who held the vast majority of intangible property.  Although classification’s biggest 
supporters, such as James Carmichael, claimed that the new amendment would bring in 
much needed revenue to the state, its implementation had an ulterior motive that 
undoubtedly benefitted the state’s wealthiest citizens.  With so many Georgians not 
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claiming title to intangibles, it meant that they could not be traded or sold without having 
to be reported for federal taxes, a condition that might trigger the watchful eye of state or 
federal revenue officials.  In effect, the new classification amendment allowed Georgia 
investors access to liquidity.  Though they were to pay a tax on their intangible holdings 
and future transactions it would be lower than the rate that caused investors to refuse 
acknowledging ownership in the first place.  After 1937, wealthy Georgians could 
liquidate or move assets, while paying a smaller amount in taxes.  That fall, a group of 
assembly representatives including James Carmichael travelled to Richmond to study 
how Virginia structured its classification system, and by the next year, Georgia began 
receiving revenue from classification. 
32
    
James V. Carmichael  
 
From the mid 1930s and into the 1940s there was no more influential voice in 
Cobb County politics than James Vinson Carmichael. Though he only served a short 
period of time as an elected official, first as a state representative for Cobb County, and 
later as the county attorney, he left an indelible imprint on local politics in his quest for 
fiscal conservatism, low taxes, and industrial development.  His stance on major issues of 
the 1930s and early 1940s went beyond mere political discourse, however, as he helped 
provide intellectual clout to a still nascent, but growing, coalition of white property 
owners.  When Carmichael, for instance, spoke of encouraging development, bringing in 
high paying jobs, or expanding education, he was directly speaking to white desires for 
economic stability and increased wealth.  In this, Carmichael collapsed the South’s 
                                                 
32





language of white supremacy into a more nuanced and coded language of self-
sufficiency, local governance, and good government.   
 The son of a mercantilist and gin operator, Carmichael grew up immersed in 
aspects of commercial business, working in the family store and tending to customers.  
During his formative years in the 1920s, he had firsthand knowledge of the troubles the 
county’s farmers endured – especially the looming threat of losing their farms due to a 
low yield harvest or a bottomed-out cotton market.  One day as a teenager, while racing 
to get to school on time, Carmichael was hit by an automobile travelling on the highway.  
Following months of bed rest, he learned that his spine had failed to heal properly and 
that he would need to rely on a cane for the rest of his life.  With limited mobility and 
sporadic but often debilitating back pain, he focused more on academic study, finishing 
coursework at Marietta High School and eventually graduating from Emory’s law school. 
33
          
Noted for his excellent debate skills, Carmichael excelled as an attorney and 
opened an office in downtown Marietta in the early 1930s, eventually going into 
partnership with Marietta mayor Leon “Rip” Blair.  Within a few years of practice, he 
also rose to prominence in the state’s Kiwanis Club, gave speeches on business matters to 
local Masonic groups, and was elected by his peers to be secretary of the Blue Ridge 
Circuit’s Bar Association. 
34
  When a district seat opened up in the state legislature, 
Carmichael took the opportunity to begin a political career in addition to his law practice.  
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During the campaign season, he travelled throughout the confines of the Bloody Seventh 
talking politics with local registered voters.  As remembered by a life-long friend who 
accompanied Carmichael in the campaign, the two men would drive into small towns and 
country outposts to speak with prospective supporters.  In such meetings, Carmichael 
undoubtedly relied upon his experiences as a young man working in the family store in 
rural Cobb County, speaking with merchants, bankers, and farmers, alike.  “They were all 
older men,” his friend recalled, adding that those he spoke to, despite the age difference, 
were impressed with his knowledge of their specific economic concerns and interests.  
“[They]…asked him questions, what he thought about [things].” 
35
        
Carmichael’s ability to travel in the language of white property owners in urban 
and rural areas put him in similar political terrain as William Felton nearly half a century 
earlier.  Much like Felton, Carmichael was an unapologetic capitalist, yet was willing to 
decry the corruption and cronyism of Georgia’s government and the special favors it 
bestowed upon moneyed interests.  Also similar to his Independent predecessor, 
Carmichael promoted increases in educational spending, transportation improvements, 
and fair lending practices that he believed would encourage economic growth in the 
region.  He was also staunchly opposed to increasing the state budget deficit, which he 
saw as destabilizing Georgia’s economic vitality.  An early supporter of Rivers’s 
administration based on the governor’s call to increase school funding and teacher 
salaries, Carmichael turned against the Little New Deal upon realizing that Rivers was 
willing to dramatically increase the deficit without restructuring the state’s tax system.  In 
a speech before an automobile dealers association, Carmichael called Rivers’s fiscal 
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policies “un-democratic” and “un-American,” in that they allowed a sitting executive to 
run budget deficits without having an instrument to generate revenue in the future. 
36
  A 
recurring theme with Carmichael was his fervent belief that government and policy-
making should be based on method and analysis, as recounted in a speech titled 
“Economy as Science” that he gave to business and civic groups throughout 1939. 
37
   
As Carmichael entered into his second term as legislator, and despite his 
opposition to the Rivers’s administration, he found himself appointed to a special 
committee charged with making recommendations to overhaul the state’s tax system.  
Within a year, Carmichael began formulating his plan to overhaul the state’s tax system 
in a series of speeches before business groups and civic clubs.  In an address before the 
Atlanta Rotary Club, he outlined a plan to end the state’s tax allocation system.  Dating to 
the nineteenth century, allocation systems dedicated the revenue derived from a specific 
tax into a specific fund.  For much of the twentieth century, allocation taxes were 
engineered by the General Assembly to provide funding for popular programs such as 
state hospitals or education.  Unlike the state’s general fund, which was primarily 
supported by ad valorem taxes on real property, allocated revenue went to wherever it 
was earmarked.  Political debates at the end of prohibition, for example, often centered 
on using liquor tax revenue collected at the local level to pay for school textbooks 
statewide.  In his first term as a legislator, Carmichael had opposed allocating liquor taxes 
to school funding on the grounds that any revenue collected should stay in the county in 
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which it was collected, a position in keeping with Cobb and Marietta’s plan to gain 
political and economic autonomy from state government.  Before the Rotary Club, 
Carmichael used the example of the gasoline tax to argue against allocation, describing 
both the tax and its disbursement into funding as “unfair.”  Since the 1910s and the 
creation of the Georgia Highway Department, the tax on gasoline had gone to the 
construction of roads and bridges by way of the state aid system.  As Carmichael noted, 
only 10,000 miles of roadway were included in the highway department’s system, even 
though the state had more than 100,000 miles of roads.  Even though everyone had to pay 
the gasoline tax, he told the crowd, not everyone benefited from the allocation to the state 
aid system. 
38
  While Carmichael did not directly point to middle and south Georgia – the 
base for Talmadge’s and Rivers’ support – he reminded Atlanta’s Rotary members that 
many rural counties whose residents utilize public schools and public hospitals 
contributed very little to the state’s general fund, especially since the passage of the 
homestead exemption.  The disbursement of road funds had long troubled Cobb 
politicians.  An example of the inequity of revenue disbursement could be found in the 
allocation of highway funds to the counties.  In the second quarter of 1935, Cobb 
received $4,870.75 from Georgia’s gas and kerosene tax.  Laurens County, in the state’s 
Black Belt, received $9,369.00.  Laurens had over 120 miles of paved roads compared to 
Cobb’s 70 miles.  Many Cobb officials privately scoffed at why Laurens, with a smaller 
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overall population and where half that figure was comprised of African American 
sharecroppers deserved more state money than they did. 
39
 
Unlike previous Cobb County legislators who kept complaints such as those with 
Laurens County out of public opinion, Carmichael did not shy away from implying that 
the highway department’s state aid system was run for political spoils, whereby counties 
received infrastructure improvements based on political expediency rather than need.   “A 
large percentage of them pay no tax other than the gasoline tax,” Carmichael stated.  By 
allowing the highway department to have dedicated state funding that would be 
augmented by federal dollars, Georgia’s transportation agency, he contended was too 
powerful, a problem he continued that even Talmadge realized during his term as 
governor.   Making his case for ending allocation, he asked the crowd:  “Should not the 
taxes they pay contribute to the benefits they receive from the general fund?”  After 
outlining his plan to destroy the allocation system, Carmichael proposed to enter a 
resolution for the creation of an independent “pre-audit” commission that would analyze 
the budget requests of state agencies for “defalcations and malfeasance.” 
40
               
A few months after his Rotary speech, Carmichael hit the radio airwaves on 
Atlanta’s WSB, whose signal covered most of North Georgia, to give an evening talk on 
repealing the state’s newly established stabilization law.  Pushed for by Governor Rivers 
on the grounds that it would help deal with the state’s fiscal crisis, the stabilization law 
allowed Georgia’s executive to take ten percent from every state agency, except from the 
highway department, which had the political clout and muscle to lobby against its 
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inclusion in the bill.  “The stabilization law is not good business, it is not economically 
sound,” Carmichael told his radio audience.  Arguing that the law did not stabilize 
Georgia’s finances by plugging agency shortfalls, but instead allowed Rivers to bolster 
programs that were popular with voters, Carmichael contended that the law based 
funding on political “desirability” instead of need.  The crux of this charge was to remind 
North Georgia listeners that the region was failing to receive spending levels 
commensurate with those of the southern half of the state.  Carmichael ended his address 
by proposing a plan to end the state’s budget deficit.  First, was to end allocation and 
stabilization and the corrupting influence he argued they held over state finances.  If that 
failed to bring Georgia out of debt, the state could issue long-term bonds, as long as the 
state could secure favorable interest rates.  Finally, Carmichael’s last best option was to 
levy a special but non-descriptive “emergency” tax that would expire when the deficit 
was absolved. 
41
     
As Carmichael perfected his arguments against what he viewed as corruption and 
bad business practices, he increasingly began inserting social subjects into his speeches.  
In an address before a meeting of Kiwanis International in 1940, Carmichael largely 
ignored the state of Georgia’s political and economic affairs to speak before a broader 
audience.  “The most vital need of the United States today,” he told the audience, was to 
create “a more intelligent, aggressive and serviceable citizenship.”  Pointing to problems 
between labor and management and general economic instability, Carmichael argued that 
a “hungry person is receptive to any plan or scheme which promises him food.”  “A free 
people who are profitably employed and are happy with their lot in life,” he continued, 
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“have no time to listen to any revolutionary plans or to the ravings of a disciple of any 
‘ism’ other than Americanism.” 
42
   
From his anger directed at South Georgia’s political cronyism to his attempts to 
accomplish a science of good government and fiscal prioritization, Carmichael’s 
speeches increasingly spoke to concepts of citizenship – of forging a new electorate 
based on political principle, economic growth, and comprised of white taxpayers. Though 
Carmichael often argued for additional spending on African American schools or hospital 
care, he was unwavering in his belief in the South’s “traditional values” of white 
supremacy. 
43
  His vision, therefore, of a politically-informed, well-educated electorate 
was one based on white privilege and very much in line with the old Independent Party of 
Felton six decades earlier.  For Carmichael, economic growth, tax relief, and political 
stability were directly tied to operations of whiteness.        
By 1940 the recommendations of the special tax committee spearheaded by 
Carmichael not surprisingly failed to register with most members of the General 
Assembly who for the most part supported the patronage system that allocation and 
stabilization allowed.  At the end of his second term as legislator, Carmichael chose not 
to run again, citing a potential conflict of interest between a new client of his law practice 
who had financial dealings with the state and his own position in the General Assembly.  
His message of tax reform, however, only intensified.  Heading into what would be a 
gubernatorial campaign year, Carmichael agreed to deliver a speech before the annual 
convention of the Georgia Real Estate Association, the backbone of the Taxpayers’ 
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League.  What could definitely be considered a hostile audience given his opposition as a 
legislator to the association’s previously backed 15 mill limitation, Carmichael chose to 
focus mostly on the Homestead Exemption and his theme of broadening the overall tax 
base.  Alluding to the Boston Tea Party and how “American citizens appear to have an 
inborn hate for taxes of all kinds…regardless of how infinitesimal those taxes may be,” 
Carmichael began his speech by pointing to what he saw as the root of the state’s fiscal 
problem:  “The only taxes the average American favors are the taxes the other fellow has 
to pay.”  Instead of changing the tax system to meet the needs of a changing economy, he 
argued, “we spend so much of our time being against taxes that we fail to correct our 
existing tax laws,” which, he implied, led to feelings of historical resentment between 
rural and urban white property owners.  In support of his argument, Carmichael pointed 
to the state income tax bill that was supposed to increase and decrease in proportion to 
that fiscal year’s ad valorem real property tax.  “It was only a matter of…years until this 
provision was stricken from the law, and now we have the net income tax and levy of the 
constitutional limit of 5 mills ad valorem tax.”  Carmichael also pointed to the 
Homestead Exemption, noting that “while the small homeowner was exempted, the 
burden was redistributed to the remaining owners of real estate not subject to exemption,” 
such as rentiers, industry, and small business owners. 
44
  
After assailing the Homestead Act and the resentment politics of “redistribution 
of the tax burden,” Carmichael entered the crux of his speech, a plan to “streamline” 
Georgia’s real estate tax code, declaring “our ad valorem system of taxation is 
antiquated.”  The basis of his plan was to create a “more equitable distribution of the 
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burden,” which owed a striking resemblance to the single tax arguments of nineteenth-
century reformer Henry George. 
45
  He proposed that all real property would be taxed at a 
“nominal” rate.  From there, land would be classified based on the level of income 
produced on site.  A homeowner, for instance, who did not enter into household 
production, would only pay the “nominal” levied tax for real property.  Land used for 
income would be taxed based on how productive the land was for the owner.  
Carmichael’s proposal was to remove property assessment from deciding the ad valorem 
tax.  “The market value is an intangible thing…Income is tangible and it is certain,” he 
told the crowd.  “The fixing of market values…in Georgia,” he continued, “is a glorious 
system of guessing, playing favorites, and penalizing enemies and non-residents.” 
46
   
Under Carmichael’s “streamlining” of real property taxation, small farmers would 
pay a classified tax commensurate with the value of their harvest.  Georgia’s large 
plantation owners would theoretically bear a higher classification based on the market 
value of their yield.  For Carmichael, this would help diminish the ill feelings between 
Georgia’s wool hat boys and the state’s largest farmers.  But the majority of Carmichael’s 
argument for modernizing the real property tax system was devoted to what he 
considered the positive effects it would have on business.  As he pointed out in his 
speech, businesses in Georgia were often at the mercy of county assessors.  “[L]and 
values are governed not by what the land can produce but rather by its strategic location.”  
Businesses, according to Carmichael’s position, often faced losing “income producing 
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ability because the population shifts to another section of town,” in a search for newer 
housing or lower tax rates.  “If we are to preserve our present system of private 
ownership of property, we must see that the system is not prohibited by confiscatory 
taxes.”  In a speech before the Georgia Mercantile Association in South Georgia, 
Carmichael told the crowd he supported “economy in government and no more taxes” 
until the General Assembly reformed its tax system.  The Cobb County representative, 
claiming that forces of “redistribution and revision” were too quick to support additional 
levies in taxes warned that business and industry would bear the brunt of new tax 
schemes.  New taxes, Carmichael asserted, “would make profit in business impossible, 
and would likely result in a general exodus of capital…from Georgia.” 
47
 
Because of his tax rhetoric, Carmichael often had to address the common 
conception many had of him – including Cobb County’s newspapers – that he was 
opposed to any and all new forms of revenue.  Noting that he had, indeed, argued against 
the state income tax and the sales tax, Carmichael clarified that his opposition was based 
on the General Assembly’s unwillingness to modernize its tax codes.  New sources of 
revenue, he stated would be “much less objectionable if they gave substantial relief to 
existing tax payers while tapping new sources of revenue heretofore untouched.” 
48
   
One such area for tax relief was regional consolidation, a popular plan among 
Georgia’s urban politicians from the 1920s.  In one report written by Thomas Reed of the 
National Municipal League, a lobby group dedicated to promoting the growth and 
development of America’s cities, the author outlined a plan to consolidate city and county 
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services in an effort to promote metropolitan cooperation. 
49
  Interestingly, the 
consolidation plan followed the recommendation of Harley L Lutz, a famed Princeton 
economist hired by Georgia Governor Hardman in 1930 as part of a team to study the 
state’s bureaucratic organization and tax system.  When Lutz unveiled his proposals, he 
managed to alienate most of Georgia’s more powerful factions.  He upset rural 
lawmakers by arguing that assessing intangible property in line with real property would 
be “impossible to apply” and would only lead to increased “evasion.”  When he proposed 
that Georgia’s timber industry be given tax breaks on real property in the years after a 
harvest to ensure that there was a financial stake in letting new growth trees mature and 
for the industry to remain viable, other agricultural concerns complained that it gave the 
timber industry special treatment. 
50
  But Lutz really drew the wrath of the General 
Assembly when he advocated county consolidation.  Noting that Georgia was only the 
twenty-third largest state in square miles, yet had a total number of counties second only 
to Texas, Lutz contended that if the state had less counties it would run more effectively.  
“Through consolidation,” he wrote, “the maze of needless units will be disorganized and 
after that receive more efficient control at far less cost.” 
51
  Such a plan, however, would 
undermine the state’s county unit system and would diminish the influence small county 
machines had in gaining influence in state wide elections.  Emory political science 
professor Cullen Gosnell, who supported the recommendations of Lutz, reported to the 
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National Municipal League that by his calculations, Georgia could save $6,900,000 
annually by consolidating the state’s counties.  “The people of these counties…fear that 
county consolidation will wipe out the advantages they hold over urban counties in 
nominating state legislative officials.” 
52
  For pro-business politicians such as Carmichael 
and organizations such as the municipal league, consolidation would translate into a more 
efficient government, one better suited to modernization, and more reflective of his 
mantra of economy as science.  In Carmichael’s vision, a united metropolitan region 
replete with white property owners would align Marietta and Cobb County with Atlanta 
and Fulton County, and would bring a potential economic renaissance to North Georgia.  
Over the next few years, when both white homeowners and high paying jobs would come 
in droves to the area, the language of low taxes, local control, and good government 
crafted by Carmichael would help articulate a new political awareness for residents of 
Cobb County and its municipal cities.            
More White Property Owners = More Revenue 
 
Throughout the 1930s, state and local governments across the country engaged in 
various “tax broadening” schemes designed to increase revenue, expand the numbers of 
taxpayers, or in some cases, reinforce economic ideologies.  In the upper Mid-west, a 
Progressive faction led by Robert La Follette, Jr, argued that the national graduated 
income tax needed to be expanded to include more individuals of each income bracket.  
La Follette’s theory was that additional taxpayers – even at the lower end of the tax 
bracket – would translate into more revenue, while also increasing the number of citizens 
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involved in public policy.
 53
  The revenue generated from the expanded tax brackets 
would allow for more spending on health services, schools, and farm programs, while 
keeping the federal budget in balance. 
54
  Although La Follette’s plan failed to curry favor 
with his fellow Progressives, his theory proved lasting among many tax reformers, 
especially at the state and local level. 
55
  In its design, after all, expanding the general tax 
base would mean lowering the per capita tax liability of residents due to an increase in 
the amount of taxpayers, a similar argument that had informed pro-state equalization tax 
forces two decades earlier.  As New Deal programs became more entrenched into the 
economic fabric of American life in the second half of the 1930s, “tax broadening” was 
adopted nationally by the political right, who argued that not enough lower income 
individuals and families were contributing to the tax base.  More often than not, these 
plans involved making lower income people pay through tobacco, liquor, gasoline, and in 
user-based fees like those proposed in Georgia.  At least at the local and state level, 
according to Mark Leff, “Conservatives…hoped to reap political benefits from a 
broadened tax base.”  On the national scene, members of the anti-Roosevelt coalition 
hoped that broadening the tax base would breed additional tax discontent, believing that 
“the new taxpayers, once conscious of the government burden, would join the effort to 
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clamp down on New Deal expenditures.” 
56
  In terms of expanding the tax base, where La 
Follette saw a renewed citizenship, others saw an opportunity to further inflame tax 
resistance at local, state, and national levels and to further extend anti-government 
rhetoric into public policy discourse.   
Cobb County, along with its largest city, Marietta, would become advocates of the 
tax broadening movement by the late 1930s, when the full fiscal effects of homestead 
emerged.  Despite Rivers’s promise to help city and county governments meet the lack of 
education and transportation funding, most elected officials realized that they could not 
depend upon state government to follow through on funding measures.  Throughout the 
1930s, after all, Georgia’s General Assembly would, as one historian has noted, 
“magnanimously” appropriate funds for popular state education initiatives only to report 
the money “amazingly misplaced” when the time for disbursement arrived. 
57
  The 
continuing struggle to fund education and road improvement projects only added to 
Carmichael’s argument that local governments needed to consolidate their interests, 
broaden their tax base, and ultimately gain economic if not political autonomy from state 
government.  While Marietta remained in better financial shape than did Cobb County by 
being able to levy real property and school taxes without having to comply with the 
homestead exemption, its infrastructure plans faced an uncertain future.  With state 
government seeing significant reductions in revenue, funding for roads and schools – 
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even with the new excise taxes – would most likely be curtailed as local governments 
would receive a smaller share of a diminishing state revenue stream.   
 
TABLE 9: THE NEW DEAL IN COBB COUNTY AND MARIETTA 
New Deal Agency or Program Effect on Cobb and/or Marietta 
 
 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) Assisted Local Farmers in Crop Diversification in 
an Attempt to Stabilize Regional and National 
Agricultural Prices and Supply 
 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) Construction of Kennesaw Mountain National 
Battlefield Park and Provided Vocational Training 
to Male Participants Within the White-Only Camp 
 
National Youth Administration (NYA) Provided Vocational Training and Work Programs 
for Local White Teenagers and Young Adults 
 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Low Interest Mortgage Loans Requiring Minimal 
Down Payment and Guaranteed by Federal 
Government 
 
Rural Electric Authority (REA) Provided Infrastructure for Domestic Electrical 
Current to Local Rural Families 
 
Public Works Administration (PWA) Replacement of Bridges Along the Chattahoochee 
River Connecting Cobb County to Fulton County 
and Construction of Four Lane Highway Between 
Marietta and Atlanta 
 
United States Public Housing Administration 
(USHA) 
Provided 90% of Total Construction and 
Associative Costs Pertaining to the Erection of 
Subsidized Public Housing for Low Income families 
  
Works Progress Administration (WPA) Provided matching Federal Grants for the 
Beautification of Marietta National Cemetery, 
Construction of Athletic Facilities at Marietta High 
School, City and County Road Paving Projects, and 
Sewer and Water Pumping Stations 
 
As the full impact of exemption was being felt at the local level, Marietta’s 
mayor, Leon “Rip” Blair began a bold initiative to expand the city’s housing base 
through private and public partnerships that included local and federal government, 
banks, builders, and merchants. 
58
 The plan to add additional housing units for the city 
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had its roots with former mayor Thomas Brumby, who had guided Marietta into applying 
for self-liquidating projects through the WPA, road enhancement projects of the PWA, 
and the expansion and improvement of the municipal Board of Light and Water.  In one 
of his last acts as mayor before dying in office, Brumby had successfully appealed to the 
city council to allow Marietta to create a local housing authority to help eradicate many 
of the city’s lower income areas and to construct new federally subsidized housing as 
stipulated in the United States Housing Act of 1937. 
59
  When Blair assumed the 
mayoralty in a special election shortly after the creation of the Marietta Housing 
Authority he continued Brumby’s pledge to clear Marietta of its downtrodden 
neighborhoods and applied to the WPA for help in conducting a city-wide housing study 
that would rate domiciles according to structural quality, land value, and racial 
segregation. 
60
     
As Marietta’s city leaders and newly formed housing authority awaited the 
housing report from the WPA, the mayor’s office focused his attention on expanding the 
numbers of single family houses in the city.  Since the city was exempt from having to 
abide by the exemption of school taxes under the homestead law, Blair theorized that the 
double efforts of increasing the city limits through annexation and rezoning large tracts 
for development, additional housing units would not only add direct real property tax 
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revenue to offset the loss of state funds, but would provide a steady revenue stream to the 
municipal Board of Light and Water. 
61
 The additional money paid to the BLW could 
then be used to pay teacher salaries and build hospitals, as well as providing for matching 
federal funds for New Deal projects. 
62
          
While the BLW had been in operation since the 1910s, it was not until the end of 
the 1920s that that the city-owned utility and its board reconciled differences with city 
government.  Largely, this was due to the decline in power of some of the city’s more 
politically and fiscally “conservative elements” who stood against plans to extend sewer 
and water to the entire city because of cost projections. 
63
  By the end of 1929, BLW’s 
operating infrastructure had an assessed valued at $330,000 but was barely generating 
income to remain solvent. 
64
  Revenues for BLW in 1930 stood at $126,424, but after 
accounting for liabilities, brought just over $9500 to the city.  After spending $500 to 
install toilets for the one African American school and $2200 for a heating system for the 
white-only elementary school, BLW had contributed a credit surplus even lower than the 
previous year. 
65
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Turnaround of the publically-owned utility began in the early 1930s with the 
election of Thomas Brumby as Marietta mayor and Leon “Rip” Blair as city attorney.  In 
the years leading up to passage of the homestead exemption amendment, both men 
worked to enhance the operation of the city’s largest but underperforming asset through 
participation in WPA programs.  In his capacity as city attorney, Blair rewrote the BLW 
charter to state the utility’s driving purpose to connect the entire city to sewer, water, and 
electricity.  A key component of the enhancement strategy was Blair’s plan to allow 
BLW to become an incorporated entity that would then be able to issue its own bonds.  
Blair and Mayor Brumby, still aware of the voting public’s wariness of bond issuances, 
planned to have BLW issue “baby bonds,” low denomination notes that under Georgia’s 
recently passed Baby Bond Act, did not need the approval of the General Assembly 
before issuance.  Blair’s reworking of the charter also proposed that BLW be able to 
obtain condemnation rights to areas not just within the city, but “outside of the city 
limits,” when it proved beneficial to the workings of the utility. 
66
  Without municipal 
home rule, the state’s General Assembly was required to review and vote on the revised 
BLW charter.  At the end of 1931, the assembly was persuaded by Cobb’s legislators and 
senators to approve Blair’s plans for the BLW, and granted the utility power as a “body 
corporate” with the right to issue bonds and to enter into legal contracts. Blair and his 
plan for the BLW also won over the often conservative Marietta Journal, which began 
publishing stories favorable to water and sewer expansion. 
67
 Perhaps most significant to 
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the city’s financial operation, the new revisions approved by the state assembly allowed 
revenue derived from BLW to be used to “retire…any outstanding bonds issued by the 
city of Marietta” and allowed the city’s Board of Education to receive part of its funding 
through BLW’s collected receipts. 
68
  This, in effect, set the BLW to become a revenue 
engine for local government. 
69
    
As Marietta’s Board of Lights and Water Works continued to expand their 
coverage in the city, residents began to demand even more services.  Even though the 
BLW often tried to persuade residents against supporting projects that would require 
money expenditures on the part of the board and thus cut into the amount set aside for 
repaying past bonds or providing school funding, those who wanted additional services 
found an ally in none other than the Georgia Power Company.  In the summer of 1936, 
for example, city residents requested that BLW erect lights at a city park so that local 
teams could play evening softball and baseball games.  At several meetings, the board, 
wary of the possible construction and operating costs, skirted the issue and tabled even a 
discussion for studying the matter.  When the board met again in July, pro-light residents 
produced a report written by “experts” from the “power company” that detailed the cost 
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outlays if the project was implemented, an amount that was lower than many board 
members had felt it would cost when they originally dismissed the plan.  Georgia Power 
Company, in this respect, was meddling in local affairs to ensure that municipal utilities 
were going to continue to consume greater amounts of electricity. 
70
  Though city leaders 
were certainly cognizant of the power company’s interference in local affairs, there is no 
evidence that anyone ever voiced a public criticism of the corporation.  Under Blair’s 
plan to increase revenue through housing construction and expansion of BLW service, 
Georgia Power with its near monopolistic hold on electrical current, would once again 
become an entity too powerful to question.    
In order to gather the required money to match federal funds for the expansion of 
the BLW, Blair needed to persuade both the city council and the city’s white property 
owners to support the issuance of several large municipal bonds.  For a city that still 
owed a great deal in past maturing bond debt, the quest to sell city residents on the merits 
of bond issuances was difficult. 
71
  To gain public support, Blair argued that only through 
participation in the New Deal would property owners in the city see the kinds of services 
that they had been demanding for decades.  Among his first actions as mayor, Blair 
offered the WPA free use of a building in Marietta to coordinate its North Georgia 
activities, invited the National Youth Administration to manage its operations out of a 
city-owned property, and allowed the PWA to use city land as staging areas for work 
being performed in the Atlanta area. 
72
  In these efforts, Blair sought to integrate the New 
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Deal into the everyday lives of white residents.  Despite the physical appearance of New 
Deal agencies in Marietta, the first public ballot measures for bond issuances to provide 
for matching funds were difficult.  Two short term bonds of $15,000 and $26,000 tied to 
expanding the BLW and for school construction, for example, barely achieved council 
and public approval. 
73
  One day after securing the two bonds, Blair informed the council 
of a new bond proposal, a $100,000 twenty year maturing issuance that would provide 
matching funds for a new high school, public swimming pools, city-wide street paving, 
playgrounds, streetlamps, and a community recreation center.  Following an intense 
summertime campaign on the part of Blair, the chamber of commerce, and local 
businesses to encourage its approval, the largest bond issuance in city history was 
accepted by a majority of voters in all five wards. 
74
          
There to aid Mayor Blair in his quest to expand the numbers of homeowners and 
gain public support for the bond measures was his friend and law partner, James 
Carmichael.  Since leaving the General Assembly, Carmichael had used his popularity 
among wide swaths of the county’s white property owners to become Cobb’s county 
attorney.  In this position, Carmichael protected the legal interests of county government, 
advised on New Deal projects, and worked with the state legislature to approve zoning 
requests sought after by the county commissioner. 
75
 As did Blair, Carmichael embraced 
the plan to add single family homes to the area and worked to encourage the residential 
development of parts of the unincorporated county.  While much of the county would 
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74
 Marietta City Council Minutes, 15 September 1938, Office of the City Clerk, Marietta, Georgia.  
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need to rely on septic and electrical power from the county cooperative, Carmichael and 
Cobb’s commissioner agreed to allow areas close to the city of Marietta to draw from 
BLW without being formally annexed into the city. 
76
  The agreement was no small 
accomplishment as county residents had historically fought against being brought into the 
city due to Marietta’s higher tax bills. The act to let areas on the municipal border receive 
BLW service was beneficial to both the city and county residents; the former received 
additional revenue that did not need to be spent on the county customer, while the latter 
received a service without the added tax liability of being a city property.  Through the 
New Deal, federal agencies granted electrical current derived from dam projects to 
private corporations such as Georgia Power, who sold current to municipalities for profit, 
which the BLW sold to consumers who lived in houses financed with private bank loans 
yet backed by federal loan guarantees, while the revenue went to local governments for 
school and health care spending.       
The subsidization of residential growth by the federal government had profound 
implications for local patterns of racial segregation and local economic development.  
With mortgage loans being guaranteed through the Federal Housing Administration, local 
governments – not just in the South but across the country – relied upon racially 
exclusive maps generated by New Deal agencies that favored investment in areas with 
high concentrations of whites at the expense of African Americans. 
77
 Because the New 
Deal often veiled its direct participation in the housing programs by parceling mortgaging 
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 Details on the annexation plan found in Marietta Journal, 11 August 1939.  
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 One of the best detailed analyses made concerning race and land-use maps is found in Freund, Colored 
Property, 111-118.   Geographer Judith Tyner pioneered a method of viewing maps as “Persuasive 
Cartography.”  Such maps illustrate ideology as much as place, creating an idealized environment that 
could represent fictions of racial or class exclusion. Judith Tyner, “Persuasive Cartography,” Journal of 





to private banks and construction to private builders, the expansive growth of 
homeownership seen during the late 1930s and into the 1950s and 1960s had the 
appearance of being a natural phenomenon, where the racial exclusivity of America’s 
cities and suburbs was taken as evidence of a free market instead of a direct effect of 
racist policy making. 
78
   
At the local level, city and county officials took their cues from a variety of 
federal guidelines when dealing with single family home construction.  Through 
correspondence with municipalities with pamphlets titled Community Campaign: How 
Your City can get the greatest benefit from the National Housing Act, A Suggested plan 
for organizing under the Better Housing Program and in newspaper advertisements and 
magazine inserts, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) laid a blueprint for 
residential development. 
79
  In addition to his duties as county attorney, Carmichael also 
became the director of Cobb’s Better Housing Program, a local-federal cooperative that 
provided guidance on how to encourage homeownership and mortgage applications.  In 
one FHA produced pamphlet local housing programs such as in Cobb were encouraged to 
enlist the support of “leaders of civic, commercial, financial, industrial, labor, home-
owner, farm, social and other organization, such as: Chamber of Commerce, Real Estate 
Board, Women’s Clubs, American Legion, Business Associations, Government officials, 
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 The study of how free market ideologies became code for racial segregation has a long historiographic 
tradition. An early example of such scholarship is R.H. Johnston, who argued that fixation on property 
values was an offshoot of an American racial experience (Johnston did not identify it as white supremacy, 
however) rooted in the arrival of “advanced capitalism.”  R.J. Johnston, “Local Government, Suburban 
Segregation and Litigation in US Metropolitan Areas,” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 
(August 1981), 211-229.     
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newspapers, religious organizations, school board.” 
80
  The literature of the Better 
Housing Program highlighted the integrated nature of much of the New Deal.  It also 
serves to illustrate how housing privilege worked in practice.  By and large, each group 
listed as a potential ally in the pamphlet catered to, or was controlled by whites.  The idea 
that whites would receive the greatest benefit or attention from such large coalitions of 
business groups, politicians, and fraternal organizations was unquestioned.  Likewise, 
when the FHA encouraged people to take a loan to renovate or modernize their existing 
home, the audience was clearly present homeowners, an already privileged class. 
81
   
The early effects of the plan to broaden the local tax were promising. In 1938, the 
first full year after the homestead exemption was implemented, the BLW recorded a net 
profit of $60,000, ten percent of which was dedicated to school funding. 
82
  Into the first 
six months of 1939, Marietta had used as much water and electricity as it had for the 
entire year of 1933, and the BLW had generated $84,291.63 in revenue. 
83
  City building 
permits grew by forty four percent between January and June of 1939 compared to the 
same six months of 1938. 
84
  For all the criticism of detractors such as Talmadge that the 
New Deal was redistributing the country’s wealth to the lower strata of America, in truth, 
New Deal policy was strengthening white homeowners, business and industry, and 
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 Community Campaign: How Your City can get the greatest benefit from the National Housing Act, A 
Suggested plan for organizing under the Better Housing Program (Federal Housing Administration, 
Washington D.C., 1934), 10.  
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 Marietta’s First National Bank, for example, often ran local advertisements encouraging homeowners to 
finance an improvement  loan to “modernize” their home.  See Marietta Journal, 22 April 1937.  
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 Marietta Journal, 27 July 1939.  
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 Out of the revenue generated, however, the city was responsible for paying Georgia Power for electrical 
current and the federal government for potable water. Marietta Journal, 27 July 1939.  
  
84





perhaps most importantly, the persistent Whiggish economic ideologies of the South’s 
urban political elite.   
Two full years into the homestead exemption with state revenue continuing to 
decline, Blair began working with officials from the FHA, as well as local banks, 
contractors, and building supply companies to launch a local “homeownership 
campaign.”  With the local tax broadening plan proving successful, Blair encouraged 
civic clubs and boosters to further support the development of residential – albeit 
segregated – housing within the city. 
85
  From March into the early summer, the city 
scheduled evening meetings where residents could come by and talk with elected officials 
and FHA representatives about buying a new home. 
86
  Over time, the meetings proved so 
successful that officials from nearby cities traveled to Marietta to study how the city was 
implementing its homebuilding campaign. Increased participation with New Deal 
programs also led to partnerships between civic clubs and local government agencies.  In 
1937, for instance, Marietta’s Board of Education, Board of Lights and Water Works, and 
the local Rotary Club combined forces to apply for WPA funds to construct a 
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 Historian Elizabeth Tandy Shermer in her study of Phoenix, Arizona has likened the cooperation between 
“urban and small town professionals, storeowners, and bankers” as “Sunbelt boosterism.” While Blair and 
other Cobb boosters were certainly supportive of pro-growth policy-making, their prime motivation was to 
raise revenue. Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “Sunbelt Boosterism: Industrial Recruitment, Economic 
Development, and Growth Politics in the Developing Sunbelt,” in Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuk, 
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  Residential housing construction proved a powerful salve to the historical 
antagonisms between urban and rural white property owners.  Separate newspaper 
advertisements targeted towards urban and rural families appealed to each one’s 
ideological understandings of the economic world. For city residents, the advertisements 
promoted a new house as a sign of “thrift,” “security,” and “investment.” In 
advertisement’s generated for rural families, local FHA affiliated builders and banks 
touted a new home as a means to achieve “wealth and happiness,” the exact phrasing 
Georgia Populists used at the turn of the century to describe their ideal guiding principles 
for state government. 
88
  The W.P. Stephens Company, a Cobb County builder 
headquartered in Marietta, also began urging veterans of World War I to come by their 
offices and see how they could take advantage of the new federal home loans.  As noted 
in a series of advertisements from the company:  “A man of forty who is without a home 
is like an army without a country or a ship without a port to put into in the wake of a 
storm…the home is an immovable anchor in the seas of turmoil and unrest.” 
89
  By 1940, 
the connection between low property taxes, race, and financial security and happiness 
was serving to allay historical divisions between Cobb’s white residents, creating a 
powerful voting bloc of aligned interests.    
The political influence white property owners were gaining in Marietta is best 
illustrated by the increased numbers of zoning requests the city made before the General 
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 Advertisements from W.P. Stephens Company in Marietta Journal, 2 March 1939 & 30 October 1939.  
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Assembly during the first three years after the homestead exemption. In some cases, such 
as in the Oakmont subdivision located less than a half mile west of the downtown 
commercial district, Marietta was designating areas of the city for residential zoning, and 
laying sewer and electrical connections before a single home was constructed. 
90
  In one 
city subdivision located immediately west of the downtown commercial district, the new 
neighborhood had sidewalks and paved streets before lots were even sold. 
91
  Local 
banks, builders, city officials, and land speculators were all working in cooperation to 
encourage residential development.  Throughout the zoning and construction build-up, 
not one area of the city was marked for new African American residential housing. 
92
         
With single family house construction well underway throughout Cobb due to the 
collaborative efforts of county and city governments, civic clubs, Georgia Power and the 
local business community, officials in Marietta turned their attention back to eradicating 
what were deemed “slum” areas of the city and replacing them with federally subsidized 
public housing.  At the center of Mayor Blair’s eradication plan was the city’s 
Hollandtown neighborhood, a “ramshackle” collection of houses located one block 
southeast of the downtown commercial district.  Comprised of single family and duplex 
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 Oakmont subdivision consisted of thirty-four lots with “water, lights, gas, and sewerage.” In 
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 After World War Two, a returning veteran, Claud Hicks, complained that while waiting for his street to 
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FIGURE 14:  PLAT MAP FOR OAKMONT SUBDIVISION. 







FIGURE 15:  CONTEMPORARY STREET VIEW OF SINGLE FAMILY HOUSES BUILT IN 
OAKMONT SUBDIVISION IN WEST MARIETTA IN LATE 1930s AND JUST PRIOR TO 
WORLD WAR TWO.  OAKMONT SUBDIVISION WAS DESIGNED TO HAVE MORTGAGES 
APPROVED BY MARIETTA’S FIRST NATIONAL BANK UNDER GUIDELINES OF THE 
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA). THE SUBDIVISION INCLUDED THIRTY-
FOUR INDIVIDUAL LOTS.  
Google StreetView. Marietta, McCord Street. Assessed 15 June 2015. 
https://www.google.com/maps/views/streetview?gl=us .  
 
 
units, the neighborhood housed the city’s poorest residents, both white and African 
American.  Hollandtown was predominately rental housing with only a small handful of 
units being owner occupied.  In consideration of the generally poor condition of the 
houses and Hollandtown’s reputation as being ground zero for many of the city’s 
outbreaks for scarlet fever, rabies, or polio, city leaders eyed the downtown location as a 
prime candidate for demolition. 
93
  In their early proposals to the United States Housing 
Authority, Blair and the city council outlined their plan to demolish the neighborhood and 
to erect in its place white-only public housing units.  According to their proposal, a group 
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of African American-only units would be built in the northeast quadrant of the city 
nearby the historically Black Baptist Town neighborhood. 
94
    
In many studies involving the construction of public housing in the American 
South, scholars have correctly identified the relationship between a paternalistic 
progressivism that sought to improve living conditions and white supremacy that sought 
to recreate urban environments for the benefits of white residents. 
95
 An examination of 
Marietta’s efforts to eradicate Hollandtown and build public housing locates another 
reason: the need for steady revenue.  Much like city and county efforts to encourage 
single family home construction through the FHA, plans for public housing were also tied 
to the tax broadening movement. 
96
   
One of the main issues the mayor’s office had with the neighborhood was that it 
was failing to generate revenue to the city, while requiring a substantial amount of 
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 Though Marietta’s African American leaders often worked with elected white officials, Marietta’s 
political leadership historically viewed Black property as their property – something to be moved or 
destroyed whenever it served the interests of the city. Tiya Miles, in her work on Afro-Cherokee kinship 
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Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth Century United States 





funding for fire protection and health quarantines. 
97
 In making his case for demolition to 
the city council and local community leaders, Blair presented a study his office had 
conducted regarding a sample of houses in the Hollandtown neighborhood.  Based on a 
survey of eighteen units rated in condition as “bad,” “fair,” or “good,” the mayor’s survey 
found that none of the houses sampled had an indoor bathroom and that only five had 
access to indoor water.  But most egregious to the mayor was the discrepancy between 
what the houses contributed in annual property taxes compared to what rentiers were 
deriving in annual rent.  House number one in the survey, for example, was a four room 
unit rented by an African American family that lacked both an indoor bathroom and 
access to potable water.  Rated by the study as “fair” in condition, the house generated 
$5.75 in annual property taxes to the city, but $130.00 a year to the landlord.  Similarly, a 
three room house rented by a white family with no indoor toilet but with indoor water, 
and rated as “poor” in condition, generated annual property taxes of $4.60, while bringing 
$91.00 in annual rent for its landlord. 
98
  The Cobb County Times, whose editorial staff 
strongly supported Blair’s plan to demolish Hollandtown, chastised the city’s rentiers as 
living off the “profits of human souls.” 
99
 Shortly after releasing the Hollandtown housing 
survey, Blair and the council announced that all rental units in the city of Marietta must 
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 Despite the generally poor structural condition of African American rental housing in the cities, the units, 
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 Data Compiled from Marietta Councilman John W. Lewis from city tax records. Originally published in 
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have an indoor bathroom, toilet, and electrical connection. 
100
  Though the proclamation 
was heralded as an example of the Blair administration’s campaign to improve the living 
conditions of low income families, it also ensured that every domicile in the city would 
utilize the services of the BLW.    
In the eyes of many property owners, the city had overstepped its bounds by 
mandating adequate sanitary and electrical provisions.  In early 1940, a group of 
disgruntled owners met in open assembly to protest the city’s actions.  Virginia Crosby, a 
landlord herself and speaking on behalf of other property owners, told the Marietta Daily 
Journal that if the city did not retreat from its position, then their group would evict its 
African American renters and allow the city to provide housing for the indigent. 
Furthermore, Crosby attested that the city should recognize the “kindness we have shown 
the Negro tenant for several years now.” 
101
 Although the new housing codes were to 
affect poor whites as well as African Americans, Crosby and her group of irate property 
owners chose to turn their position into one drawn largely along racial lines.  Perhaps by 
alluding to the fears of wealthy whites that impoverished and homeless African American 
families would be roaming the city streets in search of food and shelter, the group chose 
to intimidate the city into believing that they were not slum lords but the protectors of 
racial cohesiveness. 
102
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 Eugene Talmadge was not unexpectedly also opposed to public housing plans and slum clearance 
projects, having once remarked “Slums don’t hurt anybody, in fact, slums are good for people, makes ‘em 
stronger.”  William Anderson, The Wild Man From Sugar Creek:  The Political Career of Eugene 
Talmadge (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1975), 210.  Douglas L. Smith, The New Deal 






FIGURE 16:  AERIAL VIEW OF HOLLANDTOWN NEIGHBORHOOD IN MARIETTA (1938). 
THE DOWNTOWN SQUARE AND COMMERCIAL DISTRICT IS NORTHWEST OF 
HOLLANDTOWN. 
RG 145. Cobb County, 1938. Aerial Collections, Cartographic Services. National Archives and Records 












































4 4 Negro Outside No No Fair $2.50 $500.00 $5.75 $130.00 
4 8 Negro Inside No Yes Fair 2.50 500.00 5.75 130.00 
3 4 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.50 300.00 3.45 78.00 
3 3 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.50 300.00 3.45 78.00 
3 3 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.50 300.00 3.45 78.00 
2 3 Negro Outside No No Good 2.50 300.00 3.45 130.00 
3 6 White Outside No Yes Bad 1.75 400.00 4.60 91.00 
3 3 White Porch No No Bad 1.35 500.00 5.75 72.00 
5 2 White Inside No Yes Fair 1.85 700.00 8.05 96.20 
3 4 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.75 250.00 2.88 91.00 
4 6 Negro Outside No No Fair 2.25 250.00 2.88 117.00 
3 2 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.75 250.00 2.88 91.00 
3 4 Negro Inside No Yes Fair 1.75 250.00 2.88 91.00 
3 5 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.75 250.00 2.88 91.00 
3 2 Negro Outside No No Fair 1.50 325.00 3.74 78.00 
3 3 Negro Outside No No Good * 150.00 1.77 * 
2 2 Negro Outside No No Bad 1.00 150.00 1.77 52.00 
3 ½ 7 White Outside No Yes Good 1.60 300.00 3.45 83.20 
 
* Residence owner-occupied 
 
Data Compiled from Marietta Councilman John W. Lewis from city tax records. Originally published in Cobb County Times, date unknown).  Kennesaw State University Rare 





Alongside the rentier revolt, another obstacle the city faced in trying to build 
public housing was its small size. Most resources of the USHA in the Southeast were 
going to larger cities such as Atlanta, Savannah, New Orleans, or Memphis. Even when 
first attempting to form the Marietta Housing Authority, Blair complained on numerous 
occasions that he had not been able to actually read the Wagner-Steagall Act due to 
“scarcity of copies.” 
103
  Unable to work with the Home Ownership Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) to perform a city-wide housing survey as was necessary to receive funds for 
slum demolition, Blair and the city turned to the WPA to complete its public housing 
application packet. 
104
  Much like the maps created by the HOLC, Marietta’s self-funded 
WPA city-wide housing survey would not only serve as a template for future growth, but 
would veil the practices of racial segregation through a campaign of sanitary 
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 Marietta Housing Authority Records, Meeting Minutes, 1938-1963. Kennesaw State University Rare 
Books Collection. 12-014 (8 July 1938).  
 
104 
The WPA also worked with Georgia’s State Planning Board to conduct the survey.  The board was part 
of Rivers’s Little New Deal meant to foster working relations between state government and federal 
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substandard.” Cobb County Times, 26 October 1939; Marietta Housing Authority Records, Meeting 
Minutes, 1938-1963. Kennesaw State University Archives. 12-014 (12 July 1938). 
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 At the national level, many housing experts in the 1930s were critical of how New Deal programs were 
being implemented. Architect Albert Mayer writing in The Nation criticized the Roosevelt administration 
for not listening to housing experts and for creating an inefficient system where the agendas of the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation, Federal Housing Administration, and slum clearance programs of the PWA 
were often at odds with one another.  By 1935, as Mayer points out, the HOLC was bailing out mortgages 
in areas the PWA was scheduling for slum clearance and the FHA was denying loans that would later be 
approved by Federal Home Loan Bank.  “Not the President, not Hopkins, not Ickes,” Mayer stated, “ever 
met any first-rate men intimately or talked with them long enough to get any comprehension of the 
problem.”  After presenting arguments that the country needed to have an efficient, coordinated plan to 
solve the housing problem, Mayer lamented that “the new element in the situation which may force the 
government away from its preoccupation with private speculation is the impending housing shortage,” 
brought on by the continuing effects of the economic crisis. Albert Mayer, “Can We Have a Housing 






FIGURE 17: AFRICAN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN MARIETTA PRIOR TO 1938.  
HOLLANDTOWN WAS REPLACED WITH WHITE-ONLY PUBLIC HOUSING IN 1941-1942.  
JONESVILLE WAS DEMOLISHED TO MAKE ROOM FOR BELL AIRCRAFT IN 1942-1943.. 
THE LAWRENCE STREET SECTION WAS TURNED INTO GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND 
PARKING LOTS BETWEEN 1945 AND 1960.  IN THE LATE 1950s, LOUISVILLE WAS 
DEMOLISHED THROUGH AN URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT AND REPLACED WITH 
PUBLIC HOUSING. FROM 1938 TO THE LATE 1960s, BAPTIST TOWN WAS LEFT LARGELY 
UNSCATHED. 
Blair Papers, “Real Property Inventory for Marietta, 1938. Works Progress Administration.” Kennesaw 














Blair’s last hurdle to complete the public housing plan was to have voters approve 
one more large-scale bond issuance to meet the matching funds as stipulated by the 
USHA. Under the terms negotiated between the Marietta Housing Authority and USHA, 
the cost of the project would be $690,000, of which the federal government would fund at 
ninety percent. At an interest rate of 2.35% per annum, the total cost amounted to 
$844,000. As further stipulated by USHA, any bond used to fund the project would have 
to be disbursed by a “bank or trust company in the Borough of Manhattan” and that 
purchases must also be made by banking institutions at the city’s discretion. By the end 
of 1939, the bond issue was approved by city voters by a close margin, and the residents 
of Hollandtown were readied for eviction. 
106
    
Approval of the public housing bond measure among the city’s white property 
owners was controversial.  White voters, wary of anything that might result in increased 
taxes and for which they were not the direct beneficiaries, were largely skeptical of the 
public housing plan. To allay the fears of white voters, Blair and the MHA devised a 
racial strategy that sought to dehumanize Hollandtown’s African American residents and 
call upon whites to practice Christian duty to save the low income families from their 
living conditions. 
107
  In a tour of the Hollandtown neighborhood prior to the bond vote, 
for example, a local reporter asked his newspaper readers if they ever noticed “those little 
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  Marietta Housing Authority Records, Meeting Minutes, 1938-1963. Kennesaw State University Rare 
Books Collection. 12-014 (Folder #1). 
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 In Ellen Ross’s “Slum Journeys: Ladies and London Poverty 1860-1940,” the evolving practice of upper 
class women and men becoming interested in touring the domiciles of poor working class Londonites, 
resulted in numerous exposes, newspapers articles, and books all meant to shed light on the city’s 
downtrodden.  “Pathos became science,” Ross contends, “and part, a well-thought-out fundraising 
programme.” Ellen Ross, “Slum Journeys: Ladies and London Poverty 1860-1940,  in Alan Mayne and 
Tim Murray, eds, The Archaeology of Urban Landscapes: Explorations in Slumland  (Cambridge 






pickannies on a Sunday morning,” and how “their mothers, who work for white folks in 
your home or some other, manage to keep the little imps looking so blackly angelic even 
one day out of seven.” 
108
  On other occasions leading up to the vote, Blair and his public 
housing allies argued that without slum demolition, the city would need to pass 
“racketeering codes” against “shooting craps” and illegal card games, and inferred that 
local white children were being endangered by the “low character” of Hollandtown’s 
Black residents who might start selling  “marijuana weed to school children.” 
109
  In large 
part, Marietta based the racial language of its demolition campaign on Atlanta’s effort to 
build public housing several years earlier. In a promotional film, arguing for the need of 
slum clearance in Atlanta, a narrator intoned of low income African American 
neighborhoods: “It’s a jungle world breeding jungle life, where many children learn to 
steal, to fight civil authority, to forage like little jungle animals and often take what they 
want wherever and whenever they can find it.” 
110
 Historian Karen Ferguson has noted in 
Atlanta that its pre-public housing neighborhoods were, indeed, centers for disease but 
that factual disease quickly became metaphorical disease when reform intersected with 
race. 
111
 The rise of visual images of low income African American neighborhoods in the 
1920s and 1930s is likened by Psyche Williams-Forson as the making of an “ideology of 
fear,” whereby white Americans socialized themselves to see Black daily life through a 
________________________ 
108 Marietta Journal, 6 February 1940.  See also Cobb County Times, 3 October 1940  and “Clay Homes 
Far-Cry From Hollandtown’s Disease Ridden Shacks,” Cobb County Times, 16 October 1941. 
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  The planned dislocation of a significant portion of the city’s African 
American population to the northeastern peripheries of the municipal limits was certainly 
not just a reform measure, but a strategic decision to begin the creation of a white-only 
cityscape. 
113
        
In the fall of 1941, one year after demolition, Marietta opened Clay Homes for 
white families on the site of the old Hollandtown neighborhood and Fort Hill Homes for 
African American families on the outskirts of the historic Baptist Town neighborhood. 
114
 
At near full capacity at the grand opening, the public housing venture proved successful 
in “adequately re-housing low income families.” The completion of the units also proved 
to be a success in the quest to find new revenue.  Per the terms of operation with USHA, 
the Marietta Housing Authority was responsible for 20% of a total 3% of “development 
costs” for building upkeep, administration, and apartment appliances. Through several 
cooperative agreements between MHA and local businesses, the authority was able to 
lower its overhead cost. By the end of 1942, MHA supplied the city with $1545.00 in 
funds derived from the federally subsidized housing units, which included  
________________________ 
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 In a study of African American housing patterns in the Mississippi Delta, geographer Charles S. Aiken 
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officials created isolated geographic pockets where African Americans were to be re-housed through 
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reimbursements to the city of Marietta for utilizing electricity and water from the BLW. 
In 1939, the year prior to redevelopment, the Hollandtown neighborhood produced only 
$359.95 in property taxes for the city.  According to the Cobb County Times, the housing 
authority was considered “the best customer” of the Board of Light and Water. 
115
  
The housing campaigns instituted during the late 1930s following passage of the 
homestead exemption accomplished three primary things. First, the integration of local 
businesses with federal housing programs insured that the numbers of white single family 
homes in the area would rise. Second, the creation of segregated public housing allowed 
the city to racially divide its municipal limits in ways it had never been before. Third, the 
city-wide ordinance requiring water, sewer, and electricity for domestic residences 
opened a revenue stream to local government. It also opened the way for local backdoor 
taxes, a charge every resident was required to pay into the BLW to ostensibly fund city 
schools, pave streets, and pay down pre-existing debt obligations.  For African 
Americans in Marietta this had profound implications. With Jim Crow laws affecting 
housing availability, educational resources, and other basic public services, the backdoor 
tax of requiring payment to the BLW meant that Black families were supporting white 
only institutions through their own monthly utility bills.  The move to such regressive-
based taxes was only beginning in the late 1930s and early 1940s.    
By the end of 1941, the political leadership of Cobb County and Marietta had 
managed to provide a substantial infrastructure for the construction of single family 
homes. This construction process was largely due to federal intervention policies of the  
_______________________ 
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New Deal, which gave local access to matching funds, monetary grants, and housing 
programs.  The racial dynamic of tax broadening efforts was also quite clear before the 
onset of World War Two: local governments and white property owners, which had been 
the architects of Jim Crow’s racial segregation, openly embraced federal programs that 
allowed, and often encouraged, the exclusion of non-white residents as homeowners. 
Housing policies engineered at the federal level, and put into practice at the local level, 
built an environment of inequality.  Yet despite the direct effect of government policies 
and local support for systemic racism, white property owners in Cobb and Marietta 
viewed the expansion of single family homes as a natural outgrowth of good government 
and low taxes.  With the rural and urban divide having been bridged by the homestead 
exemption, and Carmichael’s language of low taxes as a unifying ideology, Cobb and 
Marietta would need to continue their development campaign to bring high paying jobs 

























THE HOLY GRAIL 
 
As many economists have noted regarding the implementation of supply-side 
oriented fiscal policy through tax reduction strategies, the long run consequences of 
reducing tax liabilities is that it cannot generate new taxpayers at a rate to offset the loss 
of revenue; the supply-side model, as such, cannot pay for itself. 
1
 This was no less true 
for Cobb County and Marietta at the onset of World War Two.  Despite remarkable 
success in promoting new home construction, whereby local banks and builders in 
concert with local government encouraged white residents to partake in federal 
government housing programs, the dramatic rise in home construction between 1938 and 
1941 failed to broaden the tax base in such a way needed to counter the effects of the 
homestead exemption.  Even Marietta’s Board of Light and Water, despite its serving a 
growing number of customers, was not generating the revenue needed to fund education 
needs, match federal funding projects, or pay down the city’s outstanding debt 
obligations. 
2
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 Local officials in Cobb and Marietta, however, gave no indication that their plan 
to broaden the tax base through home construction was not working.  When the two local 
governments faced the need to raise even more revenue to cover current and future costs, 
they did not turn to the politically contentious issue of raising millage rates on real 
property, but instead chose to continue with an approach centered on expanding the 
number of taxpayers.  With the federal government preparing for a marked military build-
up in the early months of 1941 officials from both Cobb County and Marietta determined 
to have a defense operation locate to the area. 
3
 The courtship of a federal defense project 
was centered on jobs and on the belief that new employment would spur another round of 
home construction and further facilitate the expansion of municipal utilities.  Even 
though the two local governments had chosen the path to low taxes with their tax 
broadening efforts, the desire to bring in a large federally subsidized workforce into the 
area was an example of Keynesian economics where government intervention increased 
demand for goods and services, including housing and retail.  When the efforts of Cobb 
and Marietta proved successful in getting a defense plant to open in the area, local 
officials and white property owners and voters saw the increased economic prosperity as 
proof that low tax rates were the key to growth and development rather than 
acknowledging the full impact of federal intervention.  
  Both during and after World War Two, the belief that low taxes accounted for 
economic prosperity would have profound political and social implications.  For much of 
the twentieth century, white property owners in Cobb’s urban and rural areas were at 
odds concerning distribution of the state and local tax burden.  The emergence of a large 
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defense factory offering high paying salaries mitigated old historical divisions among 
white voters.  From the 1910s through the 1930s, voices of discontent towards policy 
making and anti-government rhetoric, in general, were disparate and unfocused; 
corporations railed against regulation and taxes; urban and rural property owners 
complained of bearing too much of the tax burden; special interest groups such as the real 
estate-dominated Taxpayers’ League sought to lower liabilities on their investments.  The 
one major denominator among them all was tax policy.  With federal funds creating a 
field upon which white property owners, businesses, and corporate interests prospered 
financially, a new tax-dominated fiscal conservatism emerged. 
4
    
Viewing the intersection of tax policy and race within broader contexts of 
economic development and political power offers insight into not just the making of 
white privilege, but its historical reformulation over the course of the twentieth century.  
Since Georgia’s founding, and through to the twentieth century, the state’s white property 
owners were a privileged class, being granted through the institutional powers of the state 
access to legal recourse, land rights, and ultimately capital.  While their interests were 
often thwarted by corporate influence, political cronyism, and factors relating to the 
national economy, white property owners remained nonetheless in a hierarchical position 
ahead of Georgia’s African American population and non-property owning whites.  The 
courtship of a federal defense plant and the dramatic rise in population figures and per 
capita income within Cobb County during the 1940s to 1950s changed the metric of 
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 Within the course of less than a decade the number of whites in Cobb 
County would more than double, with similar rates in homeownership.  The demographic 
growth of white property owners made them much more politically significant and less 
likely to have their interests manipulated.    
While white privilege making has certainly been a mainstay of Georgia history, 
the economic transformations brought about by federal intervention solidified a belief in 
low taxes as being the trigger for growth and prosperity.  These changes served to reify 
whiteness into a new fiscal conservatism, one where white property owners saw 
themselves as not being privileged through federal investment and local Jim Crow laws, 
but as successful participants in economic markets and engineers of their own good 
fortune. 
6
  Among cultural theorists and scholars of racial privilege, Albert Memmi’s 
work has played a significant role in shaping discourses on race in American life.  The 
core of Memmi’s theory of how racism works in society is the “deployment” of 
difference “to denigrate the other,” thereby achieving “legitimization and consolidation 
of power and privilege.” 
7
 Memmi’s placement of power and privilege is central to 
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understanding the impact of economic development in Cobb County. 
8
  How did federal 
intervention aid in the creation of a local language for economic prosperity that reified 
good planning and local governance, but that veiled increased racial segregation and 
inequality?   
Assembly Plant #6: The Holy Grail  
 
As Elizabeth Tandy Shermer has pointed out, local coalitions in the New Deal 
period relied upon shared economic and political interests that saw “urban and small 
town professionals, storeowners, and bankers” align together to promote pro-growth 
policies. 
9
  Historian James Cobb has made a similar judgment concerning pro-growth 
policies in the mid twentieth-century South, noting that “Although the marriage of 
boosterism and reform clearly had its limitations, it produced a modified philosophy of 
industrial development, one that remained socially conservative but nonetheless 
recognized the importance of an expanded role in promoting economic growth.” 
10
  Cobb 
County’s participation in New Deal projects and defense-related industries was not, 
however, precipitated by natural progressions of boosterism, but was necessitated by the 
self-inflicted wounds of oppositional local politics and a dysfunctional state government.  
In order to expand collected revenue, city and county officials continued the partnership 
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forged shortly after passage of the homestead exemption. 
11
 The formation of Marietta 
and Cobb’s political coalition was undoubtedly influenced by the pro-growth alliance 
formed between Atlanta’s mayor, the city’s business community, and the Fulton County 
commission in the late 1930s, the same time as Blair was settling into the mayor’s office.  
The model upon which Atlanta’s Mayor Hartsfield based the alliance was from a report 
sponsored by city and county governments, along with the Atlanta Chamber of 
Commerce that stressed metropolitan organization of Georgia’s geographic areas. 
12
  The 
dual forces of increasing the numbers of white property owners and reorganizing the 
structure of local government would lead to a racialized political environment where the 
interests of homeowners, business, and politicians would converge.    
During the late1930s, Cobb County’s government continued to reorganize its 
structure.  Following the lead of Fulton, Cobb County’s representatives asked the General 
Assembly to approve the creation of a new county-wide elected official titled 
Commissioner of Roads and Revenue.  In a position to plan county roads and 
infrastructure, as well as collect local revenue, the new commissioner was expected to 
work closely with the county’s cities and neighboring county governments.  Much like 
other elections in Cobb, the race to fill the commissioner’s seat was hotly contested 
between the county’s rural voters and constituents of its cities.  In the 1936 election, for 
example, incumbent Horace Hamby, a popular farmer from east Cobb, was defeated by 
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Charles Head in a county-wide election giving the latter 2107 votes to the former’s 2033. 
13
  The final tally was decided by the Marietta ballot boxes, where Charles M. Head was 
favored.  An elderly west Cobb farmer, noted for his support of progressive farming 
practices and his close ties with area banks and the Chamber of Commerce, Head was 
seen by city politicians and leaders as the most likely to pursue a business-friendly 
agenda. 
14
  During the next few years, Head worked closely with city officials to help 
make infrastructure improvements in the southern parts of the county between Marietta 
and Atlanta and oversaw the completion of a waterworks project that provided sewer 
connections to parcels just south of Marietta in unincorporated Cobb County. 
15
 When 
Head died in office, a special election brought George McMillan in as the new 
commissioner with his promise to “carry forward…the projects now under construction 
and [to] cooperate with PWA [and] other governmental agencies wherever possible to 
obtain beneficial results for the county.” 
16
 With both county and city property owners in 
                                                 
13
 Marietta Journal, 16 January 1936.  
 
14
 Head’s ties with banks and the Chamber of Commerce were discussed in the 1920s, when he offered to 








 From the outside, McMillan seemed like a dark horse candidate.  Raised in Acworth in northern Cobb 
County, his family ran a successful mercantile operation, with a general store and feed mill, while serving 
as cotton brokers for area farmers at time of harvest.  On the eve of the Great Depression, McMillan took 
over the operation.  When the country’s financial market collapsed, cotton prices fell accordingly.  As they 
had done for decades, area farmers brought their cotton to downtown Acworth, expecting the McMillan 
family to find the best price for their harvests.  By November of 1929, the price for cotton had dropped to 
two cents a pound and McMillan could not locate a purchaser.  Along Acworth’s commercial main street, 
cotton bales were “lined up…on both sides” without “anyone to buy it,” and after getting drenched by a 
prolonged rainstorm, much of north Cobb’s cotton harvest was ruined.  Though McMillan held liens 
against the farmers for goods, seed, and fertilizer they had purchased from his store on credit, he did not 
call in the notes.  The following spring, McMillan extended store credit again without calling in past debts. 
By the early 1930s, McMillan’s own creditors foreclosed on the family store and feed mill.  Shortly after, 
they seized his house and contents.  Still owing a considerable sum of money, McMillan took a job as a 




favor of increased infrastructure plans, they threw their support behind a single candidate 
who spoke to each group’s interests.   
Another central component to the Cobb County and Marietta coalition was James 
Carmichael who, in his position as county attorney, had become a vocal supporter of 
growth policies as a way to raise revenue without increasing millage rates on real 
property or the classification rates on intangible property. 
17
 Carmichael, together with 
Blair and McMillan, worked together to limit the opening of “road houses,” increase 
education funding, and to expand rural electrification to farmers through city and county 
partnerships. 
18
 Speaking not just to government cooperation, but also to the historical 
divisions between rural and urban residents, Blair proclaimed that the renewed city and 
county partnership would continue to “bring the people of Marietta and Cobb County 
together.” 
19
   
At the state level, Cobb’s renewed city / county coalition benefited from the 
election of Ellis Arnall as Georgia governor. A respected local attorney from west 
Georgia who was popular with both rural and urban factions in his home county of 
Coweta, Arnall eventually entered into politics and became Georgia’s Secretary of State 
in the early 1940s. Prior to the 1942 gubernatorial primary, incumbent Eugene Talmadge, 
who had taken the governorship after ED Rivers, had made a political blunder in trying to 
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take over Georgia’s system of universities and colleges – a move that wound up costing 
nearly every white school in the state to lose its academic accreditation. 
20
 Seizing on the 
opportunity to dislodge Talmadge from the governor’s office, Arnall, backed by a 
coalition of reformers, successfully ran for and won the 1942 gubernatorial election. 
21
 
During his time in office, Arnall restored accreditation to Georgia’s public colleges, 
reformed the state prison system, established a guaranteed pension fund for school 
teachers, and succeeded in writing a new state constitution that expanded rights for 
women, lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, and allowed for limited 
home rule for local governments.  Arnall was especially popular in counties such as Cobb 
and Fulton for two primary reasons:  he did not raise state taxes, and he pushed the 
legislature to allow local governments to enter federal programs without obstruction.  
22
      
While the pathway to bridging the interests of white property owners was 
underway, the city / county coalition would need to bring in more homeowners and utility 
customers to Cobb County and the city of Marietta to continue seeing increases in 
revenue collection.  The courtship of a federal defense-related project was a key 
component of accomplishing that goal. As early as 1940, Marietta Mayor “Rip” Blair, 
Carmichael, McMillan, and members of the local chamber of commerce were laying the 
foundation for what they envisioned to be a commercial airfield located southeast of the 
city.  Using matching fund money from the New Deal, Marietta began construction work 
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on a pair of runways. 
23
  When local officials learned that the federal government was 
preparing for a defense build-up, Blair headed to Washington, DC to lobby for Marietta 
as a possible candidate for military spending.  At the War Department, Blair discovered 
that the Army officer in charge of the Civilian Aeronautics Administration was Lucius 
Clay, a Cobb County native and the son of the man for whom the new white-only Clay 
Homes was named. 
24
 Working behind the scenes, Clay persuaded the United States 
Navy to use Marietta’s new airfield as a training facility.   
As the Navy began preparations to use the city airfield, the onset of World War 
Two changed local fortunes.  Confident that Cobb and Marietta could have something 
more substantial than a training facility, Blair, Carmichael, and McMillan again travelled 
to the War Department and found that Clay had been promoted to General and made 
director of materiel procurement.  In his new position, Clay was responsible for meeting 
the defense needs of the Army and Air Force.  As a favor to his “hometown,” Clay 
contacted Bell Aircraft, which had been chosen to build bombers for the Air Force, and 
recommended Marietta as a site location. 
25
   
Following an intense campaign that persuaded Bell to push for a Marietta site, the 
War Department and United States Army Corps of Engineers investigated the Cobb 
County location.  Despite finding the existing airstrips to be too short and incapable of 
handling the weight of bomber planes and other problems including an inadequate water 
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supply, an underpowered electrical grid, and no telephone service, the construction of the 
assembly plant’s construction was approved with Clay’s backing. 
26
  In terms of the role 
federal intervention played in creating the American Sunbelt, the choice of location for 
defense plants has never received proper attention.  In the case of Cobb and Marietta, 
primary evidence indicates that favoritism and dumb luck were critical factors. Given the 
extraordinary significance the emerging Sunbelt phenomenon played in transferring 
wealth away from the nation’s traditional industrial cities and into new metropolitan 
areas, the question of how many other defense-related facilities were built on personal 
favoritism needs further exploration. 
27
 
 Army surveyors and officials within the War Department were not the only ones 
surprised by the Marietta location.  Civic leaders from Atlanta and Fulton, who were also 
trying to court federal investment in a defense industry, were just as shocked at why a 
relatively small county with a lack of skilled workers would receive a plant estimated to 
employ tens of thousands. 
28
 Ralph McGill, the editor of the Atlanta Constitution 
marveled at Cobb and Marietta’s fortunes.  After attending a formal ceremony where 
Blair announced that Bell was coming to Cobb, McGill likened Blair, Carmichael, and 
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 There were eight aircraft assembly plants built during World War Two.  The cities included Marietta, 
Omaha, Tulsa, Kansas City, Ft Worth, Oklahoma City, Cleveland, and Chicago.  In terms of population 
size, existing workforce, and infrastructure, Marietta was certainly the odd location compared to the other 
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McMillan as “Marietta’s Sir Galahads,” in reference to the Arthurian knight who pledged 
to find the Holy Grail. 
29
  Since the New South boosterism of late nineteenth century, 
local civic leaders across Georgia had attempted to lure industry to their locales, mostly 
to have their plans fall far short of planned expectations.  The arrival of Bell, its plans to 
employ tens of thousands of workers, and a $40,000,000 investment by the federal 
government were unprecedented. 
30
    
 
FIGURE 18: SITE OF FUTURE BELL BOMBER PLANT, c. 1942  
Photograph Collections, Marietta Museum of History, Marietta, Georgia, D3.17.5. 
 
With Bell set to employ a workforce four times the size of Marietta’s total 
population, a nation-wide call was extended for skilled workers. 
31
  The history of the 
Bell plant in Marietta has mostly been written from the perspective of its white 
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employees and works to limit a more critical understanding of how white supremacy 
affected both economic growth and the lived experience. Skilled positions at the plant 
were overwhelmingly held by whites in numbers disproportionate to the racial 
demographics of the area, and major newspapers such as the Marietta Journal, Cobb 
County Times, and Atlanta Constitution, despite daily features on life inside Bell, rarely, 
if ever, discussed African American experiences at the plant. Reconstruction of a Black 
experience inside Bell is limited to accounts recorded in the African American owned 
and operated Atlanta Daily World and in oral history interviews conducted decades after 
World War Two.  
 In the early months of the announcement of Bell’s arrival, Atlanta’s Urban 
League held out hope that African Americans would receive employment opportunities 
on par with whites. After numerous failed attempts to ask Bell Aircraft management if 
skilled Black workers would be hired, the Urban League moved forward with plans to 
have night school machinery and fabrication classes taught at African American 
vocational schools throughout the Atlanta area. “The…difficulty in securing jobs for 
Negroes at the plant,” the League reported in a press release, “is intensified by the failure 
of the school systems…to set up training programs for Negro workers.” 
32
 As the League 
worked to organize training classes, Bell’s management answered the question of African 
American employment with a response that it was “aware of the traditions sacred to the 
South and it intended to abide by them.” The Atlanta Daily World, the paper of record for 
African Americans throughout Atlanta and Marietta, scoffed at the remark. “The most 
sacred of traditions in the South,” the paper editorialized, is that “Negroes are the workers 
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of the South.” 
33
 When Bell Aircraft began accepting “file cards” to apply for work at the 
under-construction Marietta plant, over ten thousand African Americans waited in line to 
fill out an application. 
34
  By the fall of 1942, Bell Aircraft announced it would coordinate 
with the Atlanta Public Schools, the newly formed Atlanta Negro Defense Training 
Council, and the United States Employment Service to train African American applicants 
for skilled assembly positions. 
35
 As noted in the Atlanta Daily World, though the training 
courses did produce African American graduates who went on to work at Bell, the 
courses had great success in preparing students to take skilled jobs in other parts of the 
country including Los Angeles, San Diego, New York, Washington DC, and Cincinnati. 
36
  
 Bell’s coordination with African American training programs in the Atlanta area 
was illusory. The Marietta assembly plant never hired African Americans commensurate 
to their population numbers in the area.  Although President Roosevelt had issued an 
executive order for the hiring of minorities at federally-funded defense plants, operations 
in the South never complied. 
37
 Training programs such as those sponsored by Bell 
provided a veneer of racial acceptance in employment.  Under the guidelines of the 
training program, students would receive skilled certification that could then be used to 
apply for open positions at Bell. White workers, however, did not need certification to 
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apply for jobs, and were trained onsite. As recounted by a former Bell manager who 
arrived at the Marietta plant from Buffalo, New York, many white workers “didn’t know 
what a drill or drill motor or rivet gun was.”  When it came to issuing paychecks, he 
recalled that many workers were unable to read and write and signed for pay using an 
“X.” 
38
  Where African Americans took night school classes in order to just apply for 
skilled jobs, white workers were hired first, and then trained for the position. 
39
     
Along with Bell Aircraft, the other primary party responsible for racial exclusion 
and segregation at the plant was James Carmichael. Shortly after Bell began operation, 
Carmichael left his duties as county attorney and assumed the position of general 
manager for the assembly plant.  In this role, he was responsible for day-to-day activities 
and personnel.  On multiple occasions during Bell’s operations, African Americans 
would file grievances with the Fair Employment Practices Committee claiming 
discrimination in hiring practices. Sarah Madison, for example, filed a complaint after 
completing an eight week training course organized through the Atlanta Urban League, 
where she learned metal fabrication and basic engineering methods.  When she applied to 
work in a skilled job at Bell the only job she was offered involved “sweeping floors.” 
40
  
Complaints such as those filed by Madison were often explained by Carmichael and Bell 
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management as being non-racial, countering that they just chose the best qualified 
applicant. 
41
   
In many respects, the arrival of Bell could be termed a great white migration that 
brought in workers from the countryside and into the city. 
42
  For white workers, the 
increase in pay brought astonishment. In many of Marietta’s and Atlanta’s factories, 
white workers in skilled machinery or seamstress positions could earn between twenty 
and twenty five cents an hour – or, about ten dollars a week.  In oral history interviews of 
former white workers, many recalled making upwards of fifty dollars for a forty hour 
work week, and more if overtime hours were accrued. 
43
  Not only were white workers 
receiving unprecedentedly higher wages, but employee families had access to federal-
funded child care and medical services. 
44
  When local white-only schools could not find 
enough teachers to handle overflowing classrooms due to the influx of new workers and 
their families into Cobb County, the federal government stepped in to relocate educators 
to the area and pay their salaries. 
45
  To provide for entertainment and consumer products, 
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Bell Aircraft constructed segregated movie theaters and local banks built new shopping 
centers.    
 
 
FIGURE 19: TWO PAYCHECK STUBS FOR SAME MARIETTA RESIDENT  
As a seamstress in 1939, the worker earned a gross of $7.68 for 30.1 hours of work. In 1943, 
the same worker grossed $54.70 for 40 hours plus 9 hours of overtime. 
Paychecks in the possession of the author. 
 
Evelyn Nakano Glenn has theorized the formation of the “worker citizen” in her 
studies of American labor history, writing that “Citizenship has been a principal 
institutional formation within which race and gender relations, meanings, and identities 
have been constituted in the United States.” 
46
 In this, Bell’s employment record and the 
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benefits granted to privileged white workers is a case study in the bias of citizenship. 
Through the large-scale exclusion of African American men and women from the 
economic benefits of defense work, whiteness and citizenship became more integrated. 
Through their labor, white workers became privileged actors within a changing economic 
landscape. The long-term racialization of tax policy, housing programs, and labor in the 
1930s and 1940s connects directly with Patricia Hill Collins’s work on the “structural 
domains of power.” In her theorization of how the process of racialization works to 
promote “subordination over time,” Collins points to how social, political, and economic 
institutions are historically integrated into one another. 
47
 What appear to be seemingly 
disparate institutions and policies on the surface are actually working in concert to 
disempower one group, while privileging another. 
48
 The efforts of Carmichael and Bell 
management to veil racial discrimination in terms of hiring the best qualified applicant is 
also an example of the developing white ideology of color-blindness. 
49
           
In addition to the economic and social transformations brought about by Bell, the 
physical changes to Marietta and Cobb were just as dramatic.  Edmund Hughes left Cobb  
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FIGURE 20:  AERIAL VIEW OF MARIETTA AND PORTIONS OF COBB COUNTY BEFORE 
CONSTRUCTION AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY PLANT # 6, BELL BOMBER (1938).  
RG 145. Cobb County, 1938. Aerial Collections, Cartographic Services. National Archives and Records 











FIGURE 21:  AERIAL VIEW OF MARIETTA AND NORTHERN LIMITS OF SMYRNA AFTER 
CONSTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY PLANT # 6 (1950).  NOTE THAT THE PLANT’S 
PRIMARY BUILDINGS ARE ROUGHLY THE SAME SIZE OF MARIETTA’S ENTIRE 
DOWNTOWN AREA.  
RG 145. Cobb County, 1950. Aerial Collections, Cartographic Services. National Archives and Records 
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County in 1941 after being called to active duty with the Army.  An aspiring journalist 
before the war, Hughes was appointed to General MacArthur’s public relations staff in 
the South Pacific where he helped edit news releases for print and radio services.  In 
September of 1944, after nearly two and half years away from home, Major Hughes 
returned to Marietta on leave.  “I was unprepared for the new Marietta I found,” Hughes 
recounted in an opinion-editorial piece for the Cobb County Times.  In the commercial 
sections of the city where many businesses operated well into the night to accommodate 
second and third shift workers at Bell, Hughes could not even find a place to park in what 
he remembered as a “once comparatively placid” part of town.  In keeping with his rank 
and position in public relations, Hughes was invited on a tour of the bomber plant.  On 
the short drive from downtown Marietta to the gates of Bell, Hughes marveled at “how 
new houses by the scores had sprung up like mushrooms on the once-wooded hill sides.”  
“The plant itself, viewed from a distance, lent a false impression as to its size at first 
glance,” he recalled.  “[T]his impression,” Hughes continued, “gave way to one of almost 
complete bewilderment as I began to comprehend the true magnitude of the place.” 
50
  
Hughes’s account was far from hyperbole.  When he had left Marietta in 1941, the city’s 
population stood at approximately 8,000 persons. By the beginning of 1945, the 
population number topped 27,000 and Marietta had become the sixth largest city in 
Georgia. 
51
  The sentiment Hughes recounted in his op-ed piece for his hometown before 
the end of the war accelerated after it, as returning soldiers exited Marietta’s bus terminal 
and looked upon a city that seemed at once both familiar and foreign.     
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Prior to 1941, Marietta and Cobb officials had two objectives: expand the number 
of homeowners in the area and bring in new customers to municipally owned utilities 
such as the BLW.  Rationing of building materials during the war precluded much single 
family home construction, but on the latter goal of adding utility customers, the arrival of 
Bell was a boon to local revenue.  As a defense plant, Bell was deemed vital to the war 
effort and the federal government spent millions of dollars on providing housing to the 
county’s growing population.  With federal agencies underwriting construction costs, 
Marietta never had to issue local bonds to provide matching funds. 
52
  By war’s end, 
thousands of new housing units were built in the city of Marietta alone – each requiring 
utility services provided by the local board of light and water. In May of 1942, an FHA-
approved series of duplexes totaling one hundred units began construction on the south 
side of Marietta. 
53
 In June of 1942, the War Production Board (WPB) and FHA began 
construction on one hundred and twenty five apartment-style units. 
54
  By 1943, the 
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), which had previously passed on working with 
Marietta four years earlier, authorized conversion of over three hundred properties into 
defense housing at a cost of nearly $750,000. 
55
 The Federal Public Housing Authority, in 
an effort to alleviate housing demand, approved construction of an additional five 
hundred units to be built within walking distance of the Bell plant. 
56
 At the end of 1943, 
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the federal government had either built or approved for construction a total of 2,700 
housing units at a cost of $9,000,000. 
57
 In addition to housing units subsidized by the 
federal government, private individuals also financed the construction of defense 
housing.  Given that private housing plans required permits from the FHA and WPB, 
individuals looking to construct such housing needed to have local and federal 
connections. Two of Marietta’s largest privately-built housing projects were Victory  
 
FIGURE 22:  MACHINE FLOOR OF AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY PLANT #6 IN 
MARIETTA, GA, c. 1944.  
Photograph Collections, Marietta Museum of History, Marietta, Georgia, D1.17.11. 
 
Homes and Pine Forest Apartments, both of which were financed by Fred Wilson, the 
“fixer” for Georgia Power. At Pine Forest, Blair and Carmichael were listed in the deed’s 
public announcement information as secondary partners. 
58
 With nearly three thousand 
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new housing units in the city and each one paying utilities to the municipal BLW, and 
with local taxpayers not responsible for additional bond payments, the physical and 
economic transformation of Marietta during the war years was achieved with practically 
no dissent from the city’s white property owners.     
Bell continued its production of B-29 bombers until shortly after the formal 
surrender of Japan in 1945. 
59
  In a mass fire sale of tools and machinery, the War 
Department sold equipment for mere “pennies on the dollar.”  Former white workers, 
emboldened with new found wealth accumulated during the war embraced an 
entrepreneurial spirit by purchasing Bell’s three year old equipment and opening 
mechanic shops, electrical repair companies, and sheet metal businesses.  Other skilled 
white workers went to work with Georgia Power, while others went to work at Atlanta’s 
new commercial airport, taking their federally subsidized skills to private industry. 
60
  
Despite the closure of Bell, however, Marietta’s and Cobb’s population remained 
remarkably stable in the years after the war.  In the years that followed, the county’s 
newly skilled white workforce and returning veterans would once again begin demanding 
the return of single family home construction, new educational facilities, and 
transportation funding.  
 “A White Man’s Party” 
 
Even though the former bomber plant would reopen in 1951 as Lockheed, the first 
years after 1945 were tenuous for Cobb County, Marietta, and white property owners.  
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One of the more significant developments in the period between the end of World War 
Two and the start of the Cold War concerned the major reorganization of the state’s 
political dynamics.  The startling rise in political participation in the late 1940s and early 
1950s directly owed itself to two significant events: the repeal of the poll tax and the end 
of the white primary.  Efforts to end the poll tax and white primary, two devices from the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, meant to disenfranchise African Americans 
and poor whites, came from different ends of the political spectrum.  The end of the poll 
tax was born from rural conservative politicians such as Eugene Talmadge who wished to 
curry favor with low-income whites.  The end of the white primary owed itself to the 
coordinated efforts of African Americans and urban white pro-growth boosters, the 
former wanting to overturn the state’s ban on having Black voters participate in 
Democratic primary elections, while the latter sought to establish a coalition between 
African Americans and pro-growth policy making.  While each of these concurrent 
measures came from different groups with differing agendas, the impact the two would 
collectively have on Georgia’s political landscape was immense.  Although resolutely 
true that African Americans and poor whites were always key players – even if 
disenfranchised – in the negotiated processes of local and state politics, the numbers of 
new voters added following the end of the white primary and poll tax system unsettled 
established systems of governance.   
The first test of Georgia’s new political environment came in the first 
gubernatorial election after World War Two that pitted a new metropolitan-oriented 
coalition against Georgia’s traditional political factions.  With Arnall constitutionally 




primary began to turn into a race between E.D. Rivers and Eugene Talmadge.  Upon 
hearing of the upcoming primary, Carmichael wrote to a friend, exclaiming “it seems to 
be Talmadge and Rivers – God, what a situation.” 
61
 In the early months of 1946, 
Carmichael decided to use his connections to try and stir the state against another 
Talmadge or Rivers candidacy. In a speech before an energized crowd at Emory 
University, Carmichael told his audience that the South stood at the “threshold” of a 
“new era” that could be ushered in if “our people will only seize the business, cultural 
and social opportunities knocking at their door.” 
62
  Shortly after, a group of businessmen 
and civic leaders from the Atlanta area, concerned about the possible return of either 
Talmadge or Rivers to the state’s highest office, arrived at Carmichael’s Marietta home 
and persuaded him to enter the primary race.
63
  
The accepted narrative of the 1946 governor’s primary race and its after effects 
tends to center on Eugene Talmadge’s vociferous race baiting and the ensuing debacle of 
the three governors controversy.  What has been lacking in studies of the 1946 primary is 
a critical examination of the language used by Carmichael on matters of race, organized 
labor, and municipal home rule.  Beyond a simple decoding of words and terms, a look at 
Carmichael’s campaign platform and strategies reveals an early articulation of what 
would arguably become within the next decade, a white suburban ideology, one that was 
reliant upon the mechanisms of federal housing policy, transportation funding, and 
defense spending, yet veiled its beliefs in equal opportunities for all, personal 
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responsibility, and low taxes.  The significance of Carmichael’s political rhetoric is 
twofold.  First, it elucidated the desires of many white metropolitan Georgians prior to 
the rapid suburban growth that would begin in the early 1950s and continue for the next 
fifty years.  The atmosphere in which the 1946 primary campaign occurred was largely 
one of uncertainty.  Defense operations in the state such as at Bell Aircraft in Marietta 
had either ceased operation or were winding down production, thousands of veterans 
were returning home, and racial tension was at its highest since before the Great 
Depression.  Carmichael’s campaign vision of homeownership, high wage technical jobs 
in a business-friendly environment, and a nonexistent race question, foreshadowed the 
iterations of suburban politicians from the 1960s and 1970s.  Second, his campaign 
highlighted a difference between self-identified conservatives in rural areas and those that 
had reaped physical and economic benefits from New Deal or defense-related spending 
such as in Carmichael’s own Cobb County. 
64
  Though Carmichael eventually lost the 
primary election, he played a decisive role in shaping Georgia’s future political discourse.   
Early into his campaign, Carmichael drafted a platform that spoke to an emerging 
metropolitan Atlanta region that had seen remarkable economic development during the 
war and pronounced accumulation of wealth by its white residents.  In keeping with his 
Cobb County base and his beliefs on fiscal spending, the platform was centered on tax 
policy issues.  “The very foundation of good government is economy,” Carmichael 
argued in campaign speeches.  “A tax dollar should be spent only where necessary, and 
then only when full value is obtained…We must never again permit the shameful 
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spectacle of a debt-ridden state.”  Carmichael promised to fund teacher salaries and build 
“all-weather roads” across the state, noting that in his administration “money will go on 
roads; not into the pockets of conniving politicians and those whom they support and feed 
from taxpayer dollars.”  On issues relating to business, he promised to promote low taxes 
to spur capital investment, expanding upon a supply-side oriented view of state and local 
economics forged during the housing unit campaign of the late 1930s.  “No investor is 
going to put their money into a business which might be taxed out of existence,” he 
argued.  In making his case for being pro-business, Carmichael pointed to the success 
Bell Aircraft had achieved during the war.  What he did not acknowledge, however, was 
the role federal interventionist policies had played in allowing white workers to 
accumulate wealth and in transforming the physical environment of the city and county.  
The most controversial component of Carmichael’s platform, however, spoke directly to 
the state’s white property owners.  On state tax policy, Carmichael pledged than any 
proposed tax increase would be put on a state-wide ballot amendment, where it would 
need a popular vote to pass.  In an appeal to the financial interests of those who had 
engineered the homestead exemption, Carmichael claimed that his administration would 
“jealously guard the state’s good name and taxpayer’s money.” 
65
   
Unlike Carmichael’s tax-centered platform, Talmadge and Rivers developed 
platforms that sought to shore up the votes of rural Georgia, which would likely decide 
the primary due to the county unit system.  Typical of both their platforms were promises 
to pave rural roads, build rural hospitals, grant white veterans free business and drivers’ 
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licenses, and increased old-age pensions for white Georgians. 
66
  The inclusion of direct 
appeals to white voters stood in contrast to Carmichael’s platform.  Where Talmadge 
especially sought to gain support of white voters by vowing to reintroduce the white 
primary and disenfranchise newly registered African Americans and openly courting the 
Ku Klux Klan to support his candidacy, Carmichael’s platform was decidedly non-racial 
by design. 
67
 With two primary candidates with widely known Klan affiliations, 
Carmichael was in a good strategic location to secure significant numbers of African 
American voters despite his poor track record at Bell when it came to fulfilling the rights 
of Black applicants and workers.  Indeed, after reviewing the three primary candidates 
the Atlanta Daily World reluctantly endorsed Carmichael despite his being mostly silent 
“on many of the vital issues respecting the welfare of Negroes.” 
68
     
Even though Carmichael had attempted to downplay race as a campaign issue, his 
garnering the support of the state’s newly franchised African American voters pushed the 
primary candidate to formulate a color-blind message built on pro-growth policies and 
low taxes. It was not so much that white Georgians in larger populated counties disagreed 
with Talmadge’s views on race as much as they disliked his vulgar presentations of white 
supremacy.  Their vision of a modern Georgia was one based on the appearance of social 
respectability and the reality of economic legislation that promoted business growth.  
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Instead of alienating potential African American and pro-business white voters, 
Carmichael’s speeches began highlighting his commitment to “helping the Negro 
advance his economic status in life,” while also promising to never “permit the mixing of 
the races in our schools” and to uphold the tenets of “southern traditions.” 
69
  Most times 
when Carmichael did directly address race it was to denounce the Klan as backwards and 
anti-modern. The Klan, Carmichael told audiences, were little more than “racketeering 
parasites” and “asphalt-drooling profiteers waving fiery crosses.” 
70
 In the context of 
Georgia political history, the use of “parasite” as epithet had an economic dimension, 
especially when it came to tax policy.  Since the 1910s, urban politicians with Neo-
Whiggish pro-development ideas had used “parasite” to describe someone who received 
more back in funding than they put in as revenue.  Carmichael’s use of “parasite” was not 
just a mere insult, but was meant to tie overt racial demagoguery to issues of low 
character and citizenship. 
71
 
While Carmichael went to great lengths to construct a color-blind veneer of 
honest government and fairness in economic equality, Rivers and Talmadge embraced 
racial rhetoric.  In many campaign speeches, Rivers began pronouncing Carmichael as 
“Car-Mickel” in an appeal to the state’s anti-Semitic voters.  The Talmadge campaign, in 
a similar vein of race-baiting, hired a Carmichael look-alike to drive around rural parts of 
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the state in a convertible filled with young African American men and women. 
72
  
Talmadge not only relied upon racial language, but increasingly tied emerging Civil 
Rights issues to anti-Communism. 
73
  In several speeches, for example, he pointed out 
that Carmichael’s support of Arnall had helped end the white primary, a circumstance he 
claimed that put Georgia on the “Moscow-Harlem axis.” 
74
         
 
FIGURE 23: CARMICHAEL CAMPAIGN IN 1946 (LOCATION UNKNOWN).  
Photograph Collections, Marietta Museum of History, Marietta, Georgia, D.18.6.1. 
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In July of 1946, Eugene Talmadge once again won the democratic primary for 
Georgia governor. 
75
 According to primary returns, Carmichael won the plurality of the 
votes cast, but lost the county unit votes.  In the end, Talmadge won 242 county unit 
votes to Carmichael’s 146 and Rivers’s twenty-two. 
76
  Unbeknownst to nearly everyone, 
the higher echelons of the Talmadge machine knew that Eugene Talmadge was nearing 
death from cirrhosis of the liver, and had Talmadge supporters in small South Georgia 
counties conduct a write-in campaign for his son, Herman Talmadge.  Under the old state 
constitution of 1877, the death of a primary winner before a general election would have 
been settled by the state’s General Assembly, where the Talmadge machine still held 
powerful sway over members.  When Eugene Talmadge died before the general election, 
the Talmadge machine declared Herman to be the Democratic nominee for governor.  
The new state constitution passed by Ellis Arnall, however, had created the office of 
Lieutenant Governor and anti-Talmadge forces claimed M.E. Thompson, the winner of 
the Lieutenant Governor’s primary to be the new governor.  With the General Assembly 
giving the governorship to Herman Talmadge, Arnall refused to give up his office and the 
younger Talmadge ordered the state guard to forcibly remove Arnall and his staff.  
Eventually the state supreme court decided that M.E. Thompson was the rightful 
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governor until a special election could be held in 1948.  Herman Talmadge won the 
special election in a landslide. 
77
    
  The frustration many Georgians felt after the 1946 gubernatorial election became 
the focus of a study conducted by Calvin Kytle and James A. Mackay in 1947.  When 
they first began conducting interviews for what would become the manuscript for Who 
Runs Georgia?, the state’s post-war political crisis, the “three governors controversy,” 
was still in the process of being settled by the Georgia Supreme Court.  Georgia politics 
was certainly no stranger to its share of colorful episodes, but the 1946 election which 
included voter fraud, a governor-elect dying before taking the oath of office and a sitting 
governor refusing to step down, had managed to throw the state into political turmoil 
with many pundits even questioning whether factional violence would erupt across the 
state.  In urban areas, local Chambers of Commerce, mayoral offices, and other members 
of pro-growth coalitions, many of whom had worked since the 1930s to foster an image 
of a modern urbanizing Georgia, winced in disgust as the national press mocked the 
state’s ineptitude in resolving the affair.  What many Georgians, pundits, politicians, and 
laypersons alike wondered was:  how had the old Talmadge machine managed to strong 
arm its way back to the top of state politics?  This, especially following five years of 
progressive leadership from Ellis Arnall, after having a landscape transformed by New 
Deal era projects, after witnessing a startling rise in wages and skilled jobs brought about 
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by federal defense spending, the adoption of a new Georgia Constitution, the end of a 
whites-only primary, and the end of World War Two. 
78
  
   These questions were especially pertinent to representatives of the Atlanta 
Urban League, the Anti-Defamation League, the Negro Georgia Association of Citizen 
Democratic Clubs, the Southern Regional Council, and the Georgia Workers’ Education 
Service who all feared the state might lose the progressive forward momentum the groups 
and their political allies had worked so hard to develop during Arnall’s tenure.  In an 
effort to understand what was transpiring, these organizations, with money from a 
Rosenwald grant, hired Kytle and Mackay, both of whom had studied political science 
and sociology at Emory University and who both happened to be World War Two 
veterans, to travel the state asking politicians and laypersons the seemingly simple 
question of who controlled Georgia’s local and state government.  The interviews 
recorded by the authors were surprisingly candid and offered a rare glimpse into the 
internal workings of state and local politics. 
79
  Topics included in the interviews ranged 
from the rising cost of running a successful election to racial demagoguery to how 
cronyism and corruption ran rampant through all levels of government.  
80
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 Portable tape recording machinery was, of course, unavailable in 1947, so Kytle and Mackay depended 
upon note-taking followed by writing the text of the interview afterwards on a portable type writer.   
 
80
 After a meeting with Georgia’s Secretary of State Ben Fortson, who at the time of the interview was in 
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The goal of the “Who Runs Georgia” project was to see Georgia, as the authors 
put it, from its “grass roots;” to expose the often veiled mechanics of the state’s political 
operation.  Teetering back and forth between melancholia and exasperation, the 
interviews and comments of the authors highlighted what they saw as a system imbued 
with “political hacks and corporate wealth.” 
81
  Kytle and Mackay, looking back at the 
interviews in their prologue, noted a recurrent theme of near fatalism that ran throughout 
the sixty-four interviews they conducted, writing that “each had a different experience to 
describe, but they all seemed to be of the same mind.”  “Almost without 
exception…during the interview,” the authors continued, “there would come the note of 
despair, followed by a long pause and the gesture of resignation – a shake of the head, a 
long sigh, a shrug, an upturned palm. 82  One striking aspect of the interviews was the 
realization that no one seemed especially happy about Georgia’s political system as it 
existed immediately after World War Two, not even members of the resurgent Talmadge 
faction.  Liberal-leaning newspaper editors and progressive special interest lobbyists 
lamented the power politically corrupt local bosses wielded in their respective counties; 
candidates running for election in the state’s urban areas were concerned about having to 
take corporate donations in order to purchase advertising during election years; pro-
Talmadge politicians worried over how the death of Eugene Talmadge would affect their 
ability to retain the support of rural families – the backbone of Talmadge-style 
conservatism; in North Georgia, a public school teacher complained that Georgia Power 
Company lent overwhelming political support to office-seekers who would allow the 
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corporation to keep their property valuations low – something which directly affected 
educational funding at the local level; and Roy V. Harris, the “kingmaker” of Georgia 
politics, openly fretted over the end of the whites-only primary and the impact African 
American voters might have on the political scene, proclaiming that if every able Black 
Georgian registered to vote – and did – “we might as well go fishing.” 
83
   
The documented interviews were indeed illuminating, but the interpretation of the 
events surrounding the 1946 election and its immediate aftermath demonstrates the 
authors’ failure to recognize a contemporaneously shifting political and social landscape.  
This is especially strange in light of the collective worry the interviewees felt about the 
unstableness of their own self-interests.  While it is true the 1946 election for governor 
saw a marked return in racial demagoguery, a continuation of corporate influence in the 
electoral process, and highlighted the unfairness of a county unit system that privileged 
rural Georgia over its urban population, evidence of a substantial political transformation 
should have been readily apparent.  As Georgia entered the post World War Two era, a 
number of profoundly significant political events were emerging, as evidenced in the 
worries of the Talmadge faction and Roy Harris.  The state’s new Constitution pushed for 
by Governor Ellis Arnall, though not as progressive as many had hoped, contained many 
articles that would affect the state’s political future, notably the lowering of the voting 
age from twenty one to eighteen and the inclusion of conditional language that would, 
nearly two decades later, lead to a municipal home rule amendment, which would give 
municipalities more autonomy in making financial and zoning decisions at local levels.  
Likewise, when the populist-inspired repeal of the poll tax, a movement which was 
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designed to curry favor with poor whites and returning service veterans, intersected with 
the United States Supreme Court decision outlawing whites-only primaries, an 
unprecedented number of whites and African Americans registered to vote, doubling in 
one year the size of the state’s voter rolls.  By the end of 1947 and into the election cycle 
of 1948, most Georgia politicians at both local and state levels realized that newly 
enfranchised African American voters were a bloc to reckon with, and that returning 
veterans along with whites who had prospered in defense-related jobs during the war 
would no longer acquiesce to the desires of city and county political bosses, but would 
shape public policy and discourse through the ballot box by way of grassroots 
organization.     
What has been lacking within recent studies of grassroots organization in the 
American South is an underlying theory as to how self interests are formed from a 
historical perspective. 
84
  Matthew Lassiter, for instance, in his studies of grassroots 
organization, and building upon the work of Mike Davis, presents a case that white 
property owners in the post-war years relied upon an “exclusionary brand of homeowner 
populism grounded in class privileges and racial barriers imbedded in the built 
environment.” 
85
  Since the homestead exemption revolt of 1937, white property owners 
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had seen their political influence blossom.  Their insistence on low taxes was a major 
reason behind the arrival of Bell Aircraft as local politicians from the city and county had 
to work together to meet their growing demands.  Both before and after the war, James 
Carmichael articulated a low tax ideology built upon the veneer of Cobb County’s 
prosperity being both color-blind and self-realized without the help of exclusionary racial 
housing policies or federal intervention.  With the end of the poll tax and white primary, 
the state’s voter rolls doubled within one year and Georgia faced a complicated set of 
political alliances and coalitions. After the 1946 gubernatorial campaign that had seen a 
major political divide emerge among the supporters of white supremacy, the prophetic 
remarks of Roy Harris on the need to continue to bridge the conflict between rural and 
urban whites to stave off the affect of African American voters offered insight to future 
events. “[W]e’re going to have a white man’s party in Georgia.” 
86
 
In less than three years from 1942 to 1945, Cobb County and Marietta underwent 
a dramatic transformation with the arrival of Bell Bomber.  Since the New South era of 
the turn of the twentieth century, local boosters had dreamed of luring a substantial 
industry with high paying jobs into their cities or counties, only to meet with 
disappointment.  The effects of federal intervention, and the pure luck of having the 
Army officer charged with locating sites for aircraft production being a native of 
Marietta, changed Cobb’s fortunes. Since the passage of the statewide Homestead 
Exemption Act of 1937 that lowered state and local property taxes, Cobb and Marietta’s 
elected officials had scrambled to find new sources of revenue. With the New Deal’s 
matching grants for infrastructure improvement, and generous housing programs, which 
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were crafted to benefit white homebuyers, Cobb and Marietta laid a foundation for 
potential growth, but lacked a resource that would encourage residents to move to the 
area.  Aircraft Assembly Plant # 6 was the missing key, and the local white population 
doubled in size, while businesses prospered meeting the demands of such a large 
workforce.  
Even though Bell closed shortly after World War Two in 1945, the effects of the 
plant’s presence dominated local politics, with white residents and returning veterans 
embracing the new Cobb County and the wealth it had accumulated.  Building upon the 
speeches of James Carmichael, Cobb’s white property owners and new residents accepted 
their newfound prosperity as the result of good government paired with low taxes.  
Through this new metropolitan ideology that had successfully salved the historic tensions 
between whites in the county and city, the perceived impact of federal intervention was 
minimized.  For white residents and local officials, the growth of Cobb County and 
Marietta appeared to be the natural result of a grassroots push for lower property taxes 
and the dedication of local politicians.  With a belief that they earned their good fortune 
rather than being the beneficiary of federal intervention, Cobb County sought to keep 
their prosperity within the purview of local control.  As the rest of white Georgia worried 
over the prospect of newly enfranchised African Americans voting as a bloc to threaten 
the political spoils of white supremacy, Cobb County moved further along in a bid to 
claim metropolitan sovereignty, while amassing a super-majority white population. By 
the early 1950s, Cobb would see another massive investment of federal spending in the 




homeownership throughout the county, and would grant Cobb the political power to 
















































THE METROPOLITAN COUNTY 
 
 Even with the closure of its “Holy Grail” of industrial development, the physical, 
political, and economic transformation of Cobb and Marietta continued into the late 
1940s and early 1950s.  The wealth accumulated during the operation of the Bell bomber 
plant coincided with a new super-majority white population that fostered rising housing 
rates and local entrepreneurship. The primary vehicle for the economic and political 
growth witnessed throughout Cobb County was federal interventionist policy.  Due 
largely to the lethargy involved in federal appropriations of project funding, major 
infrastructure programs planned for during World War Two to benefit Bell’s growing 
workforce continued to see implementation. 
1
   
 The systemic racial privileging imbued within federal intervention in the post-war 
years was especially significant.  As a socially formed phenomenon, whiteness, in the 
context of Cobb County at mid-twentieth century, was made more concrete by policy-
making at the federal level.  The continued federal investment in the area with Cobb and 
Marietta being only minimally responsible for small matching funds – and in some cases 
not at all, allowed increased wealth and development to appear as a natural outgrowth of 
a new metropolitan ideology rooted in a belief in low taxes and fiscal conservatism.  
When Lockheed re-opened the Marietta assembly plant in 1951, Cobb and Marietta had 
the physical infrastructure in place to provide single-family houses to another great 
expansion in their white population.  Perhaps more importantly, they had a political 
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infrastructure that dated to the grassroots push for the homestead exemption in 1937 and 
that had matured during the operation of Bell Aircraft.  With Cobb’s white population 
seeing themselves not so much as privileged, but as the architects of growth and low 
taxes, white voters in the county and cities sought to keep control of their prosperity by 
embracing the decentralization of state government to local government.  










as Percent of 
Population 
 
1870 13,814 10,593 76.7% 3217 23.3% 
1880 20,748 14,734 71.0% 6012 29.0% 
1890 22,286 15,335 68.8% 6774 30.4% 
1900 24,664 17,252 69.9% 7328 29.7% 
1910 28,397 20,971 73.9% 7418 26.1% 
1920 30,437 23,782 78.1% 6645 21.8% 
1930 35,408 28,865 81.5% 6540 18.5% 
1940 38,272 31,990 83.6% 6280 16.4% 
1950 61,830 55,606 89.9% 6214 10.1% 
1960 114,174 106,096 92.9% 8032 7.0% 
 
The fight to keep political power rooted at the local level had a profound effect on 
tax policy. In the years after World War Two, and following the reopening of the defense 
plant in preparation for the Cold War, a new wave of white homeowners arrived in Cobb 
County, many from states such as California, New York, and Michigan. 
3
 These new 
arrivals, along with Cobb’s pre-existing white property owners, would form the backbone 
of a white metropolitan coalition.  Beginning in the early 1950s, this coalition would 
come to wield immense power in the state legislature as it helped pressure a series of new 
tax laws, including a sales tax, user-based taxes, and a lowering of the state capital gains 
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tax.  The regressive nature of these new laws sought to shift the state’s tax burden away 
from ad valorem real property and onto consumption and user-based fees.  For whites in 
Cobb and the immediate surrounding areas in Atlanta, and who worked in high paying 
post war jobs, new taxes on food and clothing were preferable to increasing taxes on real 
property.  The homes constructed after the early 1950s, after all, tended to be larger and 
would bring in higher assessment rates.  The pervasive belief from the nineteenth century 
onward that land and property were the basis of wealth also continued to inform white 
relationships with tax policy.  For many white property owners the attempt to transfer 
taxes away from houses and land to consumption was merely indicative of postwar 
consumer prosperity.  For Georgians without ownership of real property, including 
working class or lower income African Americans and whites, the benefits of postwar 
consumerism were marginal, and the burdens of shouldering an increasing share of the 
state tax burden were crushing.  How did the confluence of federal intervention and 
Cobb’s new metropolitan ideology contribute to the local government movement and the 
push for a regressive-based tax system?     
The Public-Private Partnership of Federal Intervention 
 
Due to the complicated bureaucracy surrounding large-scale infrastructure 
improvements, federal projects that had begun or that had been planned during the war 
years were carried to completion even though the Bell plant stopped production in 1945. 
These projects, which included the construction of a hydroelectric dam, a recreational 
beach, and the replacement of highway bridges, laid a foundation that would help Cobb 
County to accrue even more white homeowners over the next several decades.  In the 




relation to surrounding cities and counties such as with Atlanta and Fulton.  The vast 
infrastructure improvements made in Cobb during and after the war set the stage for the 
county to become a bedroom community for white collar workers employed in jobs in 
Atlanta.
4
 Also in the post-war years prior to the reopening of the aircraft assembly plant, 
Cobb remained eligible for low-interest loans from the federal government and received 
favorable interest rates from bond rating agencies due to the massive federal investments 
made in the area since 1942. 
5
 This latter point was especially important to local 
governments, as it allowed them to engage in pro-development planning without fear of 
being gouged by high interest rates and alienating taxpaying voters as had occurred in the 
1920s and early 1930s.  Federal intervention into the local economy allowed Cobb 
County’s elected officials to utilize low interest loans and bond measures to create an 
environment that catered to the low tax desires of white property owners.  When 
Lockheed moved into the former Bell plant in 1951, Cobb’s white property owners would 
see the culmination of two decades worth of tax revolts and political activism. 
6
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As summer of 1946 approached, scores of earth moving machines moved upon an 
area known as Allatoona Pass on the border of Cobb and Bartow counties.  For the 
previous five years, the United States Army Corps of Engineers had been flirting with the 
idea of erecting a series of dams along the Coosa and Alabama rivers in a geographic area 
extending from the city of Rome in northwest Georgia to Mobile in southwest Alabama.  
The idea of constructing a series of dams was not a new one, but dating to the 1890s, 
when a group of industrialists, planters, and civic leaders from Georgia and Alabama 
formed the Coosa-Alabama River Improvement Association with the vision of creating a 
navigable waterway that would connect the mills of northwest Georgia to the cotton belt 
of Alabama and on to the port of Mobile. 
7
   
The Corps’ initial plan was to dam the waterways of the rivers and their main 
tributaries to induce flood control measures, while providing an infrastructure that could 
be used in the production of hydroelectric power.    Throughout much of the New Deal, 
dam construction often fell to the Public Works Administration, but with the PWA in 
decline as the United States shifted to war preparation prior to Pearl Harbor, the War 
Department’s Corps of Engineers assumed the role of lead agency in the construction of 
dams, hydroelectric plants, flood control systems, and other projects considered to affect 
or create a navigable waterway.  When the Corps first proposed the possibility of 
damming the Etowah River near Allatoona, two and a half miles north of Cobb County’s 
northern most city, Acworth, local officials immediately became intrigued by the plan 
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and, as with nearly every other federal program being implemented in the area, looked to 
how the dam project could help bring industrial development.  
8
  
As the country entered its tenth month of war, the War Department’s early interest 
waned for the dams, as materiel, machinery, and personnel were moved overseas.  Even 
with the completion of the Bell Plant and the subsequent population boom of Marietta 
and the county, the War Department continued to hedge on building the flood control 
project while the war was still being fought in spite of the association’s best efforts to 
proclaim that the hydroelectric capabilities of the proposed Allatoona dam were vital to 
the war effort. 
9
  The Corps of Engineers, however, having already invested money to 
study the project, and understanding the demographic growth north of Atlanta, assured 
interested parties that the dam would be their “number one post-war priority.” 
10
  News of 
the Corps’ prioritization list was welcomed enthusiastically by the association, as well as 
Marietta and Acworth officials, and the Cobb County Commissioner’s office.  The 
Marietta Journal, as it had grown accustomed since the 1930s, praised local politicians 
and celebrated the potential benefits of the project, noting that a dam with hydroelectric 
capabilities could produce upwards of 166,000,000 kilowatt hours per year and that the 
reservoir behind the dam would give Cobb over twenty miles of shoreline which might 
spur tourism and a “motor-boat industry.” 
11
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Construction of the Coosa-Alabama Rivers project was well underway by 
November of 1946, and the concrete dam at Allatoona Pass began its upward rise, soon to 
hold back nearly 22,000 surface acres of water.  According to federal estimates, the total 
cost of the Coosa-Alabama project was $331,325,000 with the cost of the Allatoona dam 
and reservoir alone expected to exceed just over $16,000,000. 
12
  As the dam neared 
completion, Acworth’s mayor, members of the local Lion’s Club, and several prominent 
citizens from Marietta and the county gathered at the Acworth Men’s Club and 
announced that because of the project thirty industries had moved into the city.  Joe 
Wingo, the secretary for Cobb’s Chamber of Commerce, told the assembled crowd that 
on nationally produced chamber progress maps, Cobb was entirely in a “blue 
area…indicating that the county has great potentialities.”  Before the meeting adjourned, 
the Men’s Club’s chairman in thanking everyone for coming stated, “we Acworth people 
are tooting our own horn in remembering the old adage:  he who doesn’t toot his horn, 
won’t get same tooted.” 
13
    
In 1948 with Allatoona’s hydroelectric facility in operation, Georgia Power 
Company entered into an agreement to purchase the electricity.  When Congress 
approved the Rural Electrification Administration to grant a loan to Cobb’s REA 
Membership Corporation for the placement of transmission lines that would carry 
electrical current into Cobb, Fulton, Paulding, Bartow, and Cherokee counties, the REA 
had to purchase the electricity from Georgia Power. 
14
  While agencies and 
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administrations of the federal government built the dam and hydroelectric facility and 
provided the infrastructure to carry the generated current, it was Georgia Power who 
controlled the access and price given to local governments.              
 The public / private partnership between the Corps of Engineers, local 
governments, business associations, and Georgia Power is a key component to 
understanding post-war suburban growth.  It is especially noteworthy given Georgia 
Power Company’s historic antipathy towards federal intervention.  Historian Andrew 
Needham has examined the complex relationships between private corporations and 
federal intervention, often highlighting the distrust business held towards robust 
centralized government planning.  “Such patterns of attack on federal authority by those 
who benefited from them most remain one of the central paradoxes of modern political 
history,” Needham has written. 
15
 Georgia Power’s P.S. Arkwright and Fred Wilson were 
among the most vocal detractors of New Deal programs in the southeast, yet made 
considerable profits on the projects it completed. Wilson had even benefited from private 
investments made on building war-time housing. 
16
  As Mark Leff has noted, however, 
many businesses were not against federal intervention in practice, but were distrustful of 
a possibly strengthened regulatory environment. 
17
 The Corps’ construction of the dam 
and granting price-making authority to Georgia Power gave a veneer of a free market at 
work.  In truth, however, Georgia Power did not have to make an infrastructure 
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investment, but was able to reap the rewards.  Local governments also received a better 
electrical grid from which to expand development.  
A Coalition Tested 
While local governments had no fiscal role in constructing dam projects, they 
were responsible for providing transportation infrastructure. 
18
  Although Cobb County 
had experienced unprecedented growth since 1941 due to New Deal policies and defense 
spending, its road system – with the exception of ones that directly connected Marietta to 
Atlanta – remained in pitiful condition.  When the county was unable to raise revenue to 
match funds with the WPA in the late 1930s due to the Homestead Exemption Act, the 
county’s goal of building a modern county-wide transportation system fell by the 
wayside.  Through a series of bond issues passed by Blair, the city of Marietta had paved 
most streets in white neighborhoods and commercial districts, and the War Department 
improved access roads leading to the Bell Plant, but the outlying dirt roads of the county, 
beyond the Dixie Highway, were becoming more impassable with each year as 
maintenance work could not keep pace with the county’s population growth.   
After an especially wet winter and spring in 1946, a growing voice of discontent 
arose from residents of the county.  In rural areas outside the city of Smyrna, south of 
Marietta, parents complained about the amount of time their children spent waiting on 
county school buses.  “When the rains fall…some children remain at their roadside stops 
for hours and finally return to their homes because the bus has been unable to get through 
the mud to pick them up,” a local columnist reported after interviewing county parents.  
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“The road facing the Smyrna school,” the columnist continued, “becomes a rut of red 
clay six inches deep when it rains.” 
19
 In late March of 1946, county commissioner 
McMillan attended a meeting of Cobb’s Farm Bureau to address the road situation.  
Standing before more than one hundred farmers and their families, one of the largest 
groups ever assembled for a bureau meeting, people voiced their unhappiness with the 
condition of the roads.  In his prepared remarks, McMillan outlined his plan for a bond 
issue with a maturation period of thirty years.  “Our investigation has determined,” he 
told the crowd, “that money today can be obtained at rates of less than two percent, which 
is the lowest figure that any group should expect to borrow money.” Driving home the 
benefit of a long-term floating bond issuance, McMillan concluded his remarks with 
“Build them, enjoy them today, and pay for them tomorrow.” 
20
 Shortly after the Farm 
Bureau meeting, McMillan, with the approval of a Cobb County Grand Jury, announced a 
bond referendum for June 19, 1946.   
While most could probably agree on the deplorable state of the roads and the need 
to address their condition, opposition to the proposed bond issue gained momentum as 
the referendum date approached.  The voices of discontent that arose highlighted the fact 
that Cobb’s coalition of white property owners were still not completely above their 
historical misgivings towards one another.  Residents of the southern portion of the 
county, which had fewer roads, groused about the possibility of paying higher taxes so 
that other parts of the county could enjoy better access to the county’s cities.  Likewise, a 
number of farmers in north Cobb County complained that they were being left out of the 
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decision making process. 
21
  Some residents of Marietta also voiced their disapproval of 
the possible bond issue.  As the county’s largest and most industrialized city, the trials of 
rural farm families trying to send their children to county schools or to bring their goods 
to market failed to register with many Mariettans who already enjoyed paved streets and 
were connected to Atlanta via a four-lane highway and trolley system.  With the closure 
of the Bell Plant and the suspension of its 30,000 person workforce, many in Marietta 
worried more about bringing in additional industry than they did about paving county 
roads.  As a county-wide referendum that would affect the property taxes of city and 
county resident alike, any possible ambivalence Mariettans had to county residents would 
need to be overcome.  Fearful of a loss of support for the bond issue, McMillan swept the 
county and cities in an effort to explain to a population who, demanded new roads, but 
were growing hesitant about paying for them through additional taxation, that a bond 
issue was the only solution.  Speaking at a nighttime meeting in east Cobb, the county 
commissioner explained to the crowd that the Homestead Exemption Act, which 
continued to have near universal support of property owners in Georgia, made paying for 
the project out of county coffers impossible.  Even though the county’s population had 
grown substantially since 1940, and had a 1945 tax digest valuation of roughly 
24,000,000 dollars, when the homestead exemption was subtracted, the county was left 
with only 11,000,000 dollars.  Georgia law, which capped the amount a municipality 
could levy in bonds to seven percent of the final tax valuation, meant that choices had to 
made about which roads could be paved given the amount of money the bond could 
generate.  The cost of paving just one mile of roadway, he told the assembly, was nearly 
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22,000 dollars.  By his calculations, only one hundred and four miles of road could be 
paved with the amount generated by the bond issue. 
22
     
The alliance between McMillan and Marietta’s mayor Rip Blair proved just as 
strong after the war as it was before.  Quick to continue the pro-growth initiatives the 
men had pioneered in the early 1940s, Blair came out in full support of McMillan’s 
paving plan.  In the weeks leading up to the referendum vote, one hundred Marietta 
merchants and business leaders joined the Cobb Farm Bureau, the Cobb County 
Agricultural Program Planning Committee, and the Chamber of Commerce in heralding 
the bond issue. 
23
  Support for the referendum was needed, McMillan told a newspaper 
writer, so that “the doctor, the veterinarian, the preacher, the REA repairman, or the 
mailman” could travel without hindrance on roads of Cobb County. 
24
  When the 
Marietta Daily Journal, which still ran the banner head “A Progressive Paper for a 
Progressive City,” began publishing stories that tied the bond referendum with civic 
responsibility, it appeared the old New Deal coalition, dormant for much of the war 
years, had come back to life.  “It is our duty to show our friends on the farms of Cobb 
County that we are interested in their comfort and welfare,” read a full page 
advertisement in the paper signed by every major employer in Marietta. 
25
  In an 
interview piece, reminiscent of the paper’s crusade to drum up support for public housing 
years earlier, several business leaders were asked their opinion of the forthcoming bond 
vote.  Not surprisingly, all the people whose remarks were published fully endorsed 
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McMillan’s proposal.  Unlike McMillan, who appealed to county resident’s needs and 
desires for efficient transportation and quality of life, Marietta’s businessmen placed the 
need for new roads in terms of commercial growth and even possible residential 
development.  Al Dodd of the city’s Diamond Jewelry Company was quoted, “…if all 
roads leading to Marietta are paved, there is no reason why we should not draw trade to 
Marietta.”  Lee Garner, the owner of a local appliance store, echoed Dodd’s sentiment by 
adding that paved roads “would mean a great increase in trade for Marietta and other 
Cobb County merchants.”  H.O. Schilling, the owner of a local hardware store also 
complimented his peers’ feelings that good roads would increase business, but also 
looked to the future.  “Better roads,” he said, “will increase the value of real estate as 
much as the cost of the project.”  The bond referendum passed on June 19, 1946, with the 
Marietta paper proclaiming the vote passed by a margin of three to one.  Every district in 
the county and all the cities voted for the measure, and Cobb made plans to issue a thirty 
year bond with an annual interest rate of one and three quarters percent payable in six 
month coupons.  When the final costs were calculated, every property owner would pay 
an additional four dollars for each one thousand dollars in tax valuation. 
26
         
During the immediate post-war years, Cobb County and Marietta’s continued bid 
to pave county roads and encourage the construction of hydroelectric dams was neither 
exceptional nor surprising.  The city and county had nearly perfected the art of municipal 
growth politics.  To have elected officials, interest groups such as the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Farm Bureau, local businesses and state and regional corporations, 
and a propaganda arm in the local newspaper united in the goal of growth certainly made 
passing bonds and ordinances easier, but again, within the context of the mid century 
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Deep South, it was not atypical.  One thing, however, differentiated Marietta and Cobb 
County from other subscribers of a business friendly, pro-growth agenda: the massive, 
yet idle, Aircraft assembly plant on the southern end of the city.   
The Arrival of Lockheed 
Nearly three months into the start of the Korean War rumors began circulating 
throughout the county that the Bell plant would resume operations.  As reported in local 
papers, the Lockheed and Fairchild corporations were in discussions with the Air Force, 
which along with the Pentagon controlled tenancy of the plant, concerning the possibility 
of manufacturing aircraft at the vacant Marietta site. 
27
 Although Bell Aircraft had wanted 
to reopen the location, the Air Force and Pentagon chose to grant Lockheed first choice 
among all the assembly plants constructed around the country in which to begin 
assembling bombers. After negotiations with Air Force procurement officers and 
following an intense booster campaign by local Cobb and Marietta officials, Lockheed 
chose to take over the former Bell plant in January of 1951 and announced that James 
Carmichael would once again take over daily operations. 
28
 
Even though Lockheed would have a smaller total workforce than Bell did at its 
peak, the Lockheed operation actively sought out Bell’s former white male workers for 
skilled positions.
29
  Many of the former managers had moved back to their original home 
states and moved back to Marietta when Lockheed began putting together its workforce. 
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  Also unlike the old Bell operation, women were largely absent from the assembly 
floor and were instead relegated to support and secretarial duties.  Like Bell, however, the 
new Lockheed operation continued the practice of racial discrimination. In a mass 
meeting of over 5000 workers, Carmichael assured the crowd that he would hire only 
“qualified” African Americans and that they would work in separate assembly lines from 
white workers. 
31
  Initially tasked by the Air Force to refurbish B-29 bombers built during 
the war, Lockheed’s Marietta plant turned to producing a new bomber after the Korean 
War.  By the start of the Vietnam War the Marietta plant had begun production of the C-




 The opening of Lockheed in Marietta signaled a greater integration between local 
governments, the federal government, big business, and the growing military industrial 
complex.  As Bruce Schulman has noted in his study of the impact of federal intervention 
in the American South, Lockheed was the “largest single industrial organization in the 
southeast” and “paid several hundred million dollars a year in wages and salaries.”  
Likewise, it was a major consumer of local goods and services.  It sought out graduates 
from state universities and relied upon local venders to supply everything from soda 
machines to office equipment. 
33
  Lisa McGirr, in her examination of Orange County, 
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 “Sherman Martin,” Interviewed by Thomas Scott, 11 August 2000 & 25 October 2000, Cobb County 
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 Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the 




California, has noted that “defense money drove national economic growth” in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and that the southern Sunbelt stretching from Georgia to California was not 
only the catalyst of that growth, but its “biggest beneficiary.” 
34
  Since its inception in the 
mid-nineteenth century, Cobb County had looked to government intervention at state and 
federal levels to increase its economic development through its support of Removal 
policies, national trade tariffs, and state banks.  Similarly, it had always sought to find 
devices to raise revenue while keeping tax liabilities to a minimum as illustrated by the 
Antebellum Western and Atlantic Railroad and the New Deal era campaign to expand the 
local tax base.  The arrival of Lockheed in many respects was a fulfillment of both of 
those desires.  
Beginning in the 1990s, several social scientists began referring to locations such 
as Cobb County as the “gunbelt” for their predilection in taking in defense-related 
money.  In terms of “size and singularity…the gunbelt…ranks among the most powerful 
of changes in American settlement patterns in the postwar period,” argued one study. 
35
  
No longer hampered by wartime and immediate postwar rationing of building materials, 
Cobb initiated another large-scale housing campaign focused on single family units and 
zoned for white-only. Thanks in large part to the road paving bond of the late 1940s new 
housing units were not limited to the geography immediately near the assembly plant.  
Throughout Cobb County in 1951, the small farms that once formed the backbone of the 
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county’s rural white constituency transformed into subdivisions. In a typical 
advertisement from local papers, realtors boasted of offering three bedroom homes with  
 
FIGURE 24: CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF SINGLE FAMILY HOUSE IN MARIETTA’S 
WHITLOCK HEIGHTS.  THE EARLIEST HOUSES IN THE SUBDIVISION WERE BUILT IN 
THE LATE 1940S. TYPICAL FEATURES OF THE SUBDIVISION INCLUDED LARGE LOTS 
AND A SUBSTANTIAL STREET SETBACK FOR THE HOUSE.   
Google Street View. http://www.goole.com/maps. Assessed 20 June 2015.  
 
“porch and carport” and “large lots facing asphalt paved streets” for only $8450 for 
approved Veteran Administration loans. 
36
 In the city of Marietta, realtors selling homes 
in the Whitlock Heights subdivision advertised “brick ranch type homes” with three 
bedrooms and two baths. “These are lovely homes.” 
37
  In the late 1930s Blair had set 
aside Whitlock Heights for paving and sewers even though it lacked actual homes.  With 
the arrival of Lockheed, the subdivision finally came alive and offered some of the 
costliest real estate in Cobb County.  Many of Lockheed’s incoming managers having  
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FIGURE 25: AERIAL VIEW OF WHITLOCK HEGIHTS SUBDIVISION, c. 1960. PLANS FOR 
THE UPSCALE WHITE-ONLY SUBDIVISION BEGAN IN THE LATE 1930S.  THE FIRST 
HOUSES WERE NOT BUILT UNTIL 1947.  THE SUBDIVISION CONTINUED TO EXPAND 
INTO THE LATE 1960s.  MANY OF LOCKHEED’S MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS LIVED 
IN WHITLOCK HEIGHTS. THE ATLANTA ROAD ENTRANCE TO THE AIRCRAFT 
ASSEMBLY PLANT IS IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MAP.   
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) Maps, Cobb County, 1960. Georgia Aerial 
Photograph Collection, Digital Library of Georgia (Galileo), University of Georgia Science Library. 




















 moved from other states chose Whitlock Heights to build a new home. 
38
  For Cobb 
County, subsidized by federal intervention, the growth of large-scale middle-class to 
affluent subdivisions all but mitigated the effects of the homestead exemption on local 
revenue.  In Georgia counties untouched by federal intervention, however, local 
governments still struggled to pay teachers, pave roads, and attract business.  
Local Control through Regressive Tax Policies 
The ascendency of privileged white property owners in Cobb County and the 
surrounding metropolitan area of Atlanta led to a sharp rise in regressive taxes. 
39
 The 
foundation for this turn had its roots in the 1930s when Cobb tried to expand its tax base 
by introducing user fees and special taxes on liquor and luxury items.  In the late 1930s, 
the growth of white property owners brought about the homestead exemption and New 
Deal-backed housing campaigns led to a movement spearheaded in the Atlanta region to 
exempt state income taxes from the amount paid in federal taxes. 
40
  As whites 
accumulated more wealth and property, the desire to preserve it grew more intense.  
During the war years, urban state legislators grew frustrated with federal rationing and 
surcharges on goods such as liquor and gasoline. With the state trying to pass more of the 
tax burden onto consumers, county commissioners decried a loss of revenue due to the 
imposition of federal control.  Georgia’s Commissioner of Revenue, specifically naming 
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gasoline rationing even “predicted nationwide agitation for states’ rights will follow the 
current trend of centralization of government services.” 
41
   
 After the war and with the arrival of Lockheed and a new round of growth and 
prosperity, the metropolitan white property owner began to push for even more of the tax 
burden to be passed onto devices other than real and personal property. By the end of 
1950, Georgia’s legislature finally adopted a state-wide sales tax that was supported 
mostly by metropolitan residents and businesses. Set at three percent and even applied to 
food purchases, state auditors predicted the tax would bring in $90,000,000 annually. 
42
  
In Cobb, local politicians lobbied that the new revenue should reduce state income and 
real property taxes, while being used to fund public schools.  The following year when 
Cobb’s legislators learned that the state school budget was only increased by ten percent 
while the “public welfare” budget increased by nearly 23 percent, they mobilized to stop 
the redistribution of sales tax money to Georgia’s poorer counties.  With metropolitan 
legislators holding powerful positions on the General Assembly – having broken down 
the old rural / urban divide – they asked for immediate changes.  Speaking to the interests 
of his Cobb County constituents, one politician scolded the state assembly that 
“Education is the primary interest of the taxpayers” and not state welfare programs. 
43
  
While poorer counties argued for a need to continue progressive tax structures, the new 
metropolitan coalition in the legislature successfully cut the state capital gains tax in half. 
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 Cobb’s white property owners expected lower taxes and the preservation of acquired 
wealth.   
White property owners were not alone in seeking tax reductions.  The state’s 
corporations, which had been the chief antagonists of white property owners since the 
late nineteenth century, relied upon their traditional influence to gain several reductions.  
In the post war years, Georgia’s corporations lobbied the legislature to restructure their 
tax code to a flat-tax system of six percent.  By the late twentieth century, the combined 
contributions of Georgia’s wealthiest corporations, including Georgia Power, accounted 
for roughly three percent of the state’s total collected revenue. 
45
    
 The dual effects of preserving the accumulation of wealth and embracing tax 
regressivity greatly hindered the economic mobility of African Americans and working 
class whites in Cobb County, and all populations of the state not subsidized through 
federal intervention.  A pair of sociologists who have studied the connections between tax 
regression and race found that “the costs of state government are more likely to fall on 
low income groups when many members of this class are Black.” 
46
 As the state became 
even more regressive in the late 1950s and early 1960s, struggling southern union leaders 
began arguing that the “real meaning of states’ rights” meant “more regressive taxes and 
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restricted free labor.” 
47
 In the late 1950s, poorer counties adjacent to Cobb began paying 
for excess potable water treated from a low interest bond-built treatment plant outside of 
Marietta.  The water came from the dam built by the Corps of Engineers. 
48
 As poorer, 
rural counties struggled to fund schools and build roads in the 1950s, Cobb seemed an 
economic miracle, having achieved growth and prosperity with the promise of low 
property taxes. It was also more racially homogenous than any other county in the region, 
as Cobb’s African American population – though growing decade to decade – was 
dwarfed by the influx of whites. Where African Americans had once comprised nearly 
20% of the total population in 1930, the number dropped to roughly 5% by 1965. 
49
  
Within fifteen years of Lockheed opening operations in Marietta, Cobb’s growing 
affluence and political influence continued to affect the machinery of state government.  
In the mid 1960s, Cobb’s dominant white property owners would push for the institution 
of a local home rule doctrine, a component of the 1945 Georgia Constitution that rural 
Georgia had always managed to block being implemented through its control of the state 
supreme court. 
50
 The 1960s would also see the beginning of the decline of state 
collection of real property taxes.  By the end of the twentieth century, Georgia’s state 
government collected only one quarter mill, an amount so small that it constituted 
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roughly one percent of the state’s total collected revenue. 
51
 Prior to implementation of 
the sales tax, real property had historically comprised the vast majority of collected 
revenue.  After the decades long fight over tax equalization between rural and urban areas 
of the state, metropolitan counties such as Cobb, which had ample local revenue and 
federal investment, no longer needed state government to equalize and disburse funds.     
 
  Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the mantra of low 
taxes and economic prosperity would continue to resonate with Cobb’s white property 
owners.  Residents in affluent subdivisions, whose children attended some of the best 
funded and highest rated public schools in the southeast, came to believe that their 
prosperity rested on having made good financial decisions at the local government level, 
and in their activism of seeking reduced taxes.  The long term accumulation of wealth 
experienced by Cobb and its white property owners was thus a process of naturalization.  
A scholar of American tax policy once observed that “the cumulative impact of the tax 
code is relatively invisible to the casual observer.” 
52
  This aptly describes Cobb County 
after World War Two. As a county largely subsidized by federal investment its residents 
rarely had to confront the realities of hard budget choices. Having relocated political 
power away from the old rural and urban dichotomy and towards a new metropolitan 
landscape, Cobb County was not representative of a vulgar white privilege, but was an 
example of suburban hegemony, where power resided at the intersection of race and 
geography.    
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It was not until the mid 1990s, when Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the 
United States House of Representatives, that many Americans were first introduced to 
Marietta and Cobb County.  In early interviews with the press, the soon-to-be-speaker 
credited the county’s conservative citizenry for energizing him into action against what 
he viewed as an out of control federal government.  With political pundits pushing forth 
the story that Gingrich, an arch-conservative Republican, was preparing to do battle with 
a Democratic Presidential administration over taxes, budget funding, and various social 
issues, media outlets rushed to the suburbs northwest of Atlanta, looking for background 
information on the new speaker’s home district.   
The New York Times, in an article titled the “Good Life,” interviewed several 
transplanted families from the Northeast and Midwest.  A native New Yorker, speaking 
on the virtues of living in Cobb County, responded, “I like that the people are more down 
to earth, more polite, that you don’t have to walk around screaming and yelling and being 
rude – you know the whole New York thing.”  The father of a little leaguer, who had 
moved his family from a “stagnant Detroit” to Cobb in the 1970s, recalled that a friend 
encouraged his initial move down South, telling him that “if you don’t like it, I’ll pay 
your way back.”  The former Detroiters stayed, and as the man reported to the 
interviewer, “You can travel the whole world and not find a better place to live than this.”  
Still another New Yorker remembered that when his father came to visit in the late 1970s 
he advised him to put down permanent roots in the area.  The elder told his son that he 
was living in the “next New York.”  “What he meant was the old New York,” the son 




died and gone to heaven.” 
53
  The New York Times was not alone in reporting the 
generally happy feelings Cobb residents felt about their suburban lives, as the 
Washington Post and Wall Street Journal were busily producing similar-themed pieces.  
Television news programs such as CBS This Morning headed to Marietta, the county seat 
of Cobb, to interview local officials about the rise of Gingrich and to discuss the impact 
the area’s prosperous citizens had on formulating his political beliefs, with the show’s 
Paula Zahn reporting to viewers that the county was the “heart of the Republican surge in 
the South.” 
54
  The connection between southern suburbia and Republican voters became 
more entrenched in 1996, when journalist Peter Applebome’s Dixie Rising: How the 
South is Shaping American Values, Politics and Culture was published, a book which 
argued that white suburban Republicans in places like Cobb County were dictating the 
nation’s political discourse. 
55
    
Concurrent to stories pushing a narrative of either hometown pride or Republican 
dominance in local and regional affairs, others began digging into the county’s finances, 
particularly in the allotment of federal dollars awarded per capita.  Interest in the subject 
was largely spurred by Gingrich’s assessment of New York City as a “culture of waste,” 
noting that as speaker he was “not going to bailout the habits that made New York so 
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  In response, left-leaning filmmaker and provocateur 
Michael Moore took a film crew to Marietta where he crashed the local Fourth of July 
parade.  With megaphone in hand, Moore told the parade-goers that Cobb was getting 
between three and four billion dollars in federal money each year and that they should 
return it as a statement of their commitment to conservative ideals. 
57
  The Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, whose editorial page often commented on how Atlanta’s northern 
white majority suburban counties received disproportionate amounts of federal dollars in 
relation to other parts of the state, pointed out that Cobb was awarded over fifty million 
dollars in Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sewer construction grants during the 
1970s.  These grants, the paper argued, helped lay the infrastructure for the county’s 
phenomenal suburban growth from that decade onward with its population expanding 
from just under 200,000 in 1970 to nearly 450,000 by 1990 (and over 600,000 by the year 
2000). 
58
  Further, the Washington Post revealed that for every $1.00 Cobb sent to the 
federal government it received $1.80 in return, while New York City residents got back 
only 0.82 for every dollar that left in federal taxes. 
59
  Common Cause Magazine 
discovered that the only two counties in the country that received more federal dollars 
than Cobb County had in the first part of the 1990s were Arlington, Virginia – the home 
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 Moore’s TV Nation segment is viewable online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJWemnpvrSM 
[accessed online 22 August 2012].  According to the NYT, Cobb received 3.4 billion USD in 1992; NYT 1 
August 1994.   
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of the Pentagon and Brevard, Florida – the home of the Kennedy Space Center. 
60
  In the 
fall of 1995 the Buffalo News continued to expose Cobb’s predilection for taking federal 
money by noting that Cobb benefitted from federal contracts due to the presence of 
Lockheed Aircraft in Marietta.  When Gingrich’s staff was asked for comment, they 
flatly stated that Cobb was producing aircraft vital for national defense with its share of 
tax dollars, but that New York only took money for welfare and other “social programs.” 
“If New York had the military facilities – and related jobs – that Cobb County has,” the 
Buffalo News editorialized, “its welfare rolls would be smaller, too.” 
61
  What was not 
reported in the Buffalo paper was that Marietta and Buffalo actually shared a common 
bond.  During World War Two, Marietta’s Lockheed plant was operated by Bell Aircraft, 
which was then headquartered in Buffalo and who had sent the first wave of northern 
transplants down to Cobb County to build B-29 bombers.              
Neither of these media portrayals – whether as a “suburban Eden” for northern 
families or as a home for financially conservative hypocrites – adequately reflects the 
complex factors that contributed in making Cobb County a powerful force in 
metropolitan, state, and national politics by the 1990s. 
62
  What was missing from the 
glowing comments of the county’s transplants, for instance, was a discussion of the 
relationship between atrophying post-industrial areas in the Northeast and Midwest and 
the sprawling suburbs of Atlanta’s northside.  A popular narrative of the 1990s concerned 
the division of the country’s Rust Belt and Sun Belt, an academically constructed 
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demarcation between a declining North and a rising South, yet the stories that surrounded 
Gingrich and Cobb County in the mid 1990s rarely asked what factors contributed to the 
transfer of white and blue collar workers from one region to another in the second half of 
the twentieth century.   
When a New Yorker compared suburban Cobb County in the 1970s to an 
idealized New York from the 1940s, what was being racially implied?  May there have 
been, in light of Cobb being over ninety-five percent white by the late 1960s, a racialized 
nostalgia for New York City burroughs before white flight, budget crises, and high crime 
rates?  To discuss the apparent resplendency of Cobb’s suburbs without addressing the 
question of race enables the county and its white majority to reside in a state of 
decontextualization.  From the politics of Native Removal to Jim Crow laws, race has 
been a central component of the local history.  This was especially true with regard to tax 
policy.  The decades long push to reduce state and local property taxes on the part of 
Cobb’s white property owners should be correctly read as the making of white privilege.  
As such, the suburbs visited by the New York Times in the 1990s were built on a 
foundation of local white supremacy and federal interventionist policies that abetted 
segregation and inequality.  The failure of national newspapers to interrogate the 
intersection of race, taxes, and federal policy-making legitimated the racial logic of 
America’s white majority suburbs, a logic that argues that economic prosperity is a 
creation of low taxes, fiscal conservatism and not the result of systemic white privilege.          
Likewise, with regards to charges of conservative Republican hypocrisy, no 
scholar from American urban, community, or regional studies would be surprised to learn 




no social scientist worth their own salt would uncritically accept irony as a conclusion. 
63
 
Cobb’s position as a component of the national defense industry, as a home to politically 
active suburban actors, and as the base of operation for the Speaker of the House in the 
mid 1990s, allowed the county to exert political influence on an integrated scale that 
reached across local, state, regional, and even national levels.  As much as suburban 
racial logic serves to veil the significance of white privilege in policy making, the 
political power that grew in Cobb County from the opening of Bell Aircraft in the 1940s 
to the arrival of Lockheed in the 1950s provides a screen for immense effects of federal 
intervention.  When Gingrich commented that Cobb County was vital to national defense 
and deserved federal investment, he shifted the question away from why Cobb has a 
defense-production industry.  Avoiding the history of Cobb’s tax rebellion, the fact that 
its selection as a defense industry site was largely the product of luck, and the racial 
inequality of its suburban development serves a narrative that the county made good 
fiscal decisions and was merely a supporting actor to America’s military.   
Over eight chapters, this dissertation has attempted to complicate the history of 
Cobb County to account for the dramatic rise in both the numbers and power of white 
property owners.  Their trajectory from the nineteenth century to the mid twentieth 
century was certainly not preordained, but instead reflected the effects of a constellation 
of events.  The grassroots movement to form a political coalition to push for a homestead 
exemption, for example, was a direct effect that demonstrated the resurgent strength of 
white property owners and their capacity to implement economic changes in their favor.  
                                                 
63
 Matthew Lassiter has referred to such efforts as a “telescoping strategy,” one that seeks to tie “almost 
anything that happened after about 1938” to the election of Ronald Reagan as president. Matthew D. 






Federal programs that supported racial exclusivity in terms of housing policies and 
infrastructure improvements, though not written specifically for Cobb, were used by local 
politicians to create an enclave of white privilege.  As Cobb’s prosperity grew, its elected 
officials and white residents embraced a metropolitan language rooted in low taxes and 
good government.  The politics of tax reduction, coalition-making, federal investment, 
and white supremacy were all key components to Cobb’s rise – as they were for countless 
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